Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 113-614, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 273 (2015).

Renunciation is an act whereby a person, named in a will as executor, declines to take on personally the burden of that office. The act is, therefore, predicated on an existing office. It presupposes the existence of the will. If no will has been made, there is no executorship to renounce. Nor until it is shown that there is a will, can it appear that there is a renunciable executorship. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 82 Ga. App. 831, 62 S.E.2d 579 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-614).

Interested persons only have right to file caveat.

- Georgia Supreme Court has found that only those who have some interest in the will or estate which will be affected or concluded by probate have a right to file a caveat. Georgia cases have recognized those interested persons with standing to caveat a will to include heirs, a purchaser from an heir, a judgment creditor of an heir, an administrator appointed for the testator before the discovery of the will, and persons claiming under an earlier will. Ray v. Stevens, 295 Ga. 895, 764 S.E.2d 809 (2014).

Must be an interested person.

- Trial court erred by denying two children's motion to dismiss the petition to probate filed by the decedent's brother because the brother lacked standing to offer the will to probate under O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2 since the brother was not an interested person as the brother was not a judgment creditor of an heir of the decedent, a purchaser from an heir, a person claiming under an earlier will, or an administrator appointed for the decedent before discovery of the will. Ray v. Stevens, 295 Ga. 895, 764 S.E.2d 809 (2014).

General creditor not an interested person.

- Being a general creditor of an estate would not give a person standing to offer a will for probate; thus, a general creditor is not an interested person for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2. Ray v. Stevens, 295 Ga. 895, 764 S.E.2d 809 (2014).

Separation of a legally married couple does not deprive the widow of her right to a year's support out of the husband's estate. Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga. App. 642, 188 S.E.2d 800 (1972) (decided under former Civil Code 1933, § 113-1002); Hunnicutt v. Hunnicutt, 180 Ga. App. 798, 350 S.E.2d 770 (1986); Brown v. Estate of Brown, 246 Ga. App. 332, 539 S.E.2d 824 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2).

Terminable nature of widow's right to year's support.

- Widow is entitled to no year's support unless she applies for it prior to her death and prior to her remarriage, and thus, it is apparent on its face that her right is a terminable one. United States v. Edmondson, 331 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 53-5-2).

Impact of death of widow.

- When a widow dies pending proceedings to have a year's support set aside to her out of her husband's estate, a return of the appraisers setting aside a year's support is void. May v. Braddock, 92 Ga. App. 302, 88 S.E.2d 539 (1955).

Right to a year's support can be waived if application is not made while the spouse is alive and widowed. However, there is no basis to conclude that the year's support, if applied for, lapses if the award is not finalized before the death of the claimant. Wigley v. Hambrick, 193 Ga. App. 903, 389 S.E.2d 763 (1989), cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 911, 389 S.E.2d 763 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2).

Cited in Fletcher v. Gillespie, 201 Ga. 377, 40 S.E.2d 45 (1946); Heath v. Jones, 168 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1948); Oakley v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 607, 221 S.E.2d 31 (1975); In re Estate of Ehlers, 289 Ga. App. 14, 656 S.E.2d 169 (2007).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills, § 776.

C.J.S.

- 95 C.J.S., Wills, § 468.

ALR.

- Necessity of allegations that contestant of will is an interested party, 117 A.L.R. 1455.

Statutes dealing with existing intestate administration, upon discovery of will, 65 A.L.R.2d 1201.