O.C.G.A. § 6-3-22 (2019)
Methods of acquisition of property for airports and landing fields
Private property needed by a county, municipality, or other political subdivision for an airport or landing field or for the expansion of an airport or landing field may be acquired by grant, purchase, lease, or other means, if such county, municipality, or other political subdivision is able to agree with the owners of the property on the terms of such acquisition, and otherwise by condemnation in the manner provided by the law under which the county, municipality, or other political subdivision is authorized to acquire real property for public purposes; provided, however, that the power of condemnation may be exercised extraterritorially only with the consent of the governing authority of the county, municipality, or other political subdivision wherein the property is located, as expressed either in a resolution adopted by such governing authority, granting its consent to such condemnation, or by failure of such governing authority to adopt a resolution denying its consent to such condemnation within 60 days from the receipt of a resolution from the proposed condemnor requesting approval of such condemnation, or with the consent of the General Assembly, as expressed in a resolution enacted by the General Assembly, after denial of consent to such condemnation by the governing authority of the county, municipality, or other political subdivision wherein the property is located; provided, however, that for any proposed airport or airport expansion by a city into a county where such city is located, or by a county into a city located in such county, the decision of the governing body of the jurisdiction into which such proposed airport or airport expansion is to be located shall be final as to whether or not such power of condemnation may be exercised extraterritorially.
History
(Ga. L. 1933, p. 102, § 3; Code 1933, § 11-203; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1434, § 1.)
Annotations
Law reviews. - For note discussing the relation of airport zoning to the constitutional provision requiring just compensation for a taking of property, see 10
Ga. L. Rev. 218 (1975). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 149 (1992).
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS Section authorizes condemnation of ‘‘private property,’’ whether real or personal, for airport expansion. City of Atlanta v. Airways Parking Co., 225 Ga. 173, 167 S.E.2d 145 (1969). Territorial scope of condemnation power of municipalities. - This article authorizes municipalities to condemn land beyond the municipalities’ limits for establishment or expansion of airports and landing fields. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940). This article vests in each municipality the same general authority, that is, each is given the power to condemn land within and without the municipality’s boundaries, and accordingly each is by the terms of the article vested with jurisdiction over every part of the state, including the territory within the limits of every other municipality. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 6). Grant of power to municipalities to condemn property within and without their geographical limits authorizes one municipality to condemn land within territorial limits of another municipality. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940). While this article prima facie empowers one municipality to condemn land within another municipality, it does not follow that a municipality in one part of state would have right to establish airport in a municipality in a distant part of the state. This would manifestly be an abuse of power granted, which would be enjoined by courts. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 6).
Effect of condemnation by municipality. - If condemning municipality acts in good faith within power granted under statutory terms, and there is a reasonable necessity for appropriation of property, the fact that other municipality may be deprived of right to tax or police property so taken is merely express result of exercise of power so granted, and does not constitute reason why the article should be construed as denying the power. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 6). Delegation of condemnation authority. - Counties and municipalities have authority to condemn private property for airports and delegation of that authority to an office building authority was authorized. Savage v. ThomastonUpson County Office Bldg. Auth., 205 Ga. App. 634, 422 S.E.2d 896, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 422 S.E.2d 896 (1992). Condemnation power not granted by section. - Absent any direct or implied legislative authority to exercise the power of eminent domain in the enabling legislation, a municipal airport commission was not authorized to condemn property under O.C.G.A. § 6-3-22. LopezAponte v. Columbus Airport Comm’n, 221 Ga. App. 840, 473 S.E.2d 196 (1996). Condemnation petitions of a municipal airport commission that failed to show the consent of the city to such actions should have been dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Lopez-Aponte v. Columbus Airport Comm’n, 221 Ga. App. 840, 473 S.E.2d 196 (1996).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation, § 82 et seq. 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 140. C.J.S. - 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and
Aerospace, § 53 et seq. 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 57 et seq. ALR. - Exercise of eminent domain for purposes of airport, 135 ALR 755.