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Call Now: 904-383-7448A member of the General Assembly who is a party to or the attorney for a party to a case, or any member of the staff of the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of Representatives, or the chairperson of the Judiciary Committee or Special Judiciary Committee of the Senate or of the Judiciary Committee or Judiciary, Non-civil Committee of the House of Representatives who is the lead counsel for a party to a case pending in any trial or appellate court or before any administrative agency of this state, shall be granted a continuance and stay of the case. The continuance and stay shall apply to all aspects of the case, including, but not limited to, the filing and serving of an answer to a complaint, the making of any discovery or motion, or of any response to any subpoena, discovery, or motion, and appearance at any hearing, trial, or argument. Unless a shorter length of time is requested by the member, the continuance and stay shall last the length of any regular or extraordinary session of the General Assembly and during the first three weeks following any recess or adjournment including an adjournment sine die of any regular or extraordinary session. A continuance and stay shall also be granted for such other times as the member of the General Assembly or staff member certifies to the court that his or her presence elsewhere is required by his or her duties with the General Assembly. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, rule of court, or administrative rule or regulation, the time for doing any act in the case which is delayed by the continuance provided by this Code section shall be automatically extended by the same length of time as the continuance or stay covered.
(Ga. L. 1905, p. 93, § 1; Civil Code 1910, § 5711; Code 1933, § 81-1402; Ga. L. 1952, p. 26, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 478, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 760, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 376, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 112, § 1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 403, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 494, § 1/HB 912; Ga. L. 2009, p. 303, § 18/HB 117.)
The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, added the fourth sentence.
The 2009 amendment, effective April 30, 2009, substituted "the Senate or of the Judiciary Committee or Judiciary, Non-civil Committee of the" for "either the Senate or the" in the first sentence. For intent, see the Editor's notes.
- Corresponding provision relating to criminal procedure, § 17-8-26.
- Ga. L. 2009, p. 303, § 20, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act is intended to reflect the current internal organization of the Georgia Senate and House of Representatives and is not otherwise intended to change substantive law. In the event of a conflict with any other Act of the 2009 General Assembly, such other Act shall control over this Act."
- For review of 1996 criminal procedure legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 30 (1996).
Failure to establish that the absent counsel was leading counsel warranted refusal of the continuance. Stewart v. County of Bacon, 148 Ga. 105, 95 S.E. 983 (1918).
- Trial court violated a legislative stay under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-150 by allowing a summary judgment hearing to continue while the borrower's attorney, a state representative, attended a session of the General Assembly, as it was undisputed that the representative was the borrower's attorney as the representative's name appeared on all relevant court documents. Hill v. First Atl. Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 747 S.E.2d 892 (2013).
- Trial court's denial of a minority owner's first request for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion as, while the minority owner's life was threatened on the day before the hearing, the party that threatened the minority owner was not in the courtroom, the minority owner testified knowledgeably and cogently, and the minority owner declined a second opportunity to testify, weeks later. Talmadge v. Elson Props., 279 Ga. 268, 612 S.E.2d 780 (2005).
Trial court's denial of a minority owner's second request for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion as any inability of a minority owner to obtain an appraisal before the hearing was the result of the owner's own dilatoriness. Talmadge v. Elson Props., 279 Ga. 268, 612 S.E.2d 780 (2005).
In a deprivation action, given the fact that at the time a parent became ill and could no longer proceed, the hearing was nearly concluded, coupled with the fact that counsel did not intend to present any additional witnesses, the court's denial of a request to continue the hearing was not an abuse of discretion, particularly since the hearing had already been delayed two months after the Department of Children and Family Services had presented its evidence. In the Interest of S.P., 282 Ga. App. 82, 637 S.E.2d 802 (2006).
Failure to grant a parent a continuance in the parent's termination of parental rights hearing was not an abuse of discretion as the juvenile court reopened the evidence and allowed the parent to testify and the parent's attorney participated in the entire hearing. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006).
Cited in Hendley v. Housing Auth., 160 Ga. App. 221, 286 S.E.2d 463 (1981); In re Thompson, 339 Ga. App. 106, 793 S.E.2d 462 (2016).
- 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Continuance, §§ 4 et seq., 40.
- 17 C.J.S., Continuances, §§ 44, 53, 115.
- Effect of war on litigation pending at the time of its outbreak, 154 A.L.R. 1447.
Counsel's absence because of attendance on legislature, as ground for continuance, 49 A.L.R.2d 1073.
Amendment of pleading with respect to parties or their capacity as ground for continuance, 67 A.L.R.2d 477.
No results found for Georgia Code 9-10-150.