
Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448Counsel shall be limited in their arguments to two hours on a side.
(Ga. L. 1924, p. 75, §§ 2, 3; Code 1933, § 81-1007; Ga. L. 1983, p. 884, § 3-4.)
In cases where there are coplaintiffs or codefendants, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-180 provides for two hours of argument per side, not per party. Mansell v. Benson Chevrolet Co., 165 Ga. App. 568, 302 S.E.2d 114 (1983).
Words, "shall be limited in their arguments to two hours on a side," mean that counsel shall not be limited to less than two hours on a side. Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 199 Ga. 238, 33 S.E.2d 905 (1945).
No conflict with Superior Court Rule 13.1. - There is no conflict between Superior Court Rule 13.1, limiting argument to one hour per side, and O.C.G.A. § 9-10-180; the trial court could limit closing argument at trial to one hour per side where there was no request for additional time as authorized by Superior Court Rule 13.2. McIntyre v. Pope, 215 Ga. App. 600, 451 S.E.2d 110 (1994).
There is an inconsistency between O.C.G.A. § 9-10-180 and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 13, regarding the time allowed for closing argument, and, to the extent that requirements of the rule conflict with the Georgia Code, the rule must yield, but there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two because of the authority of a trial court to grant an extension of time under Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 13.2. Rouse v. Polott, 274 Ga. App. 226, 617 S.E.2d 185 (2005).
- Under this section, counsel in civil actions originating in the superior court are entitled as a matter of right to two hours on a side in which to argue the case, and the trial judge has no discretion to limit the argument to one hour on a side. Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 72 Ga. App. 692, 34 S.E.2d 664 (1945); Henry & Hutchinson, Inc. v. Slack, 91 Ga. App. 353, 85 S.E.2d 620 (1955) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-180).
- Counsel in a capital felony case are entitled, as a matter of right, to two hours on a side in which to argue their case, and the trial judge has no discretion in such a case to limit argument to a shorter period of time. Kittles v. State, 74 Ga. App. 383, 39 S.E.2d 766 (1946).
- 75A Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 547 et seq.
- 88 C.J.S., Trial, §§ 288 et seq., 292.
- Prejudicial effect of trial court's denial, or equivalent, of counsel's right to argue case, 38 A.L.R.2d 1396.
Propriety of trial court order limiting time for opening or closing argument in civil case - state cases, 71 A.L.R.4th 130.
Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communications between court officials or attendants and jurors, 31 A.L.R.5th 572.
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This Georgia Code resource is curated by a Florida and Georgia attorney, a personal injury and workers' compensation attorney admitted in Georgia (State Bar of Georgia No. 881027, since 2006) and Florida. Attorney Syfert regularly works with Title 9 in the context of Georgia civil practice and statute of limitations and represents clients throughout Northeast Florida and South Georgia. For legal consultation, call 904-383-7448.