O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-180 (2019)

Time limit for arguments

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Counsel shall be limited in their arguments to two hours on a side.

History

Ga. L. 1924, p. 75, §§ 2, 3; Code 1933, § 81-1007; Ga. L. 1983, p. 884, § 3-4.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS In cases where there are coplaintiffs or codefendants, O.C.G.A. § 9-10180 provides for two hours of argument per side, not per party. Mansell v. Benson Chevrolet Co., 165 Ga. App. 568, 302 S.E.2d 114, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1953 (1983). Words, “shall be limited in their arguments to two hours on a side,” mean that counsel shall not be limited to less than two hours on a side. Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 199 Ga. 238, 33 S.E.2d 905, 1945 Ga. LEXIS 300 (1945). No conflict with Superior Court Rule 13.1. - There is no conflict between Superior Court Rule 13.1, limiting argu-

ment to one hour per side, and O.C.G.A. § 9-10-180; the trial court could limit closing argument at trial to one hour per side where there was no request for additional time as authorized by Superior Court Rule 13.2. McIntyre v. Pope, 215 Ga. App. 600, 451 S.E.2d 110, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1311 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0557, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 437 (Ga. Mar. 10, 1995). There is an inconsistency between O.C.G.A. § 9-10-180 and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 13, regarding the time allowed for closing argument, and, to the extent that requirements of the rule conflict with the Georgia Code, the rule must yield, but there is no irreconcilable conflict between

the two because of the authority of a trial court to grant an extension of time under Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 13.2. Rouse v. Polott, 274 Ga. App. 226, 617 S.E.2d 185, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 708 (2005). Trial judge has no discretion to limit argument to one hour per side. - Under this section, counsel in civil actions originating in the superior court are entitled as a matter of right to two hours on a side in which to argue the case, and the trial judge has no discretion to limit the argument to one hour on a side. Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 72 Ga. App. 692, 34 S.E.2d 664, 1945 Ga. App. LEXIS

675 (1945); Henry & Hutchinson, Inc. v. Slack, 91 Ga. App. 353, 85 S.E.2d 620, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 737 (1955) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-180). Judge has no discretion to limit argument in capital felony case to less than two hours. - Counsel in a capital felony case are entitled, as a matter of right, to two hours on a side in which to argue their case, and the trial judge has no discretion in such a case to limit argument to a shorter period of time. Kittles v. State, 74 Ga. App. 383, 39 S.E.2d 766, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 541 (1946).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 398 et seq. C.J.S. 88 C.J.S., Trial, §§ 288 et seq., 292. ALR. Prejudicial effect of trial court’s denial, or equivalent, of counsel’s right to argue case, 38 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Propriety of trial court order limiting time for opening or closing argument in civil case - state cases, 71 A.L.R.4th 130. Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communications between court officials or attendants and jurors, 31 A.L.R.5th 572.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases, 1983–2008 · leading case: Wilson v. Wilson, 596 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. 2004).
Wilson v. Wilson, 596 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 4× “Ample opportunity for full argument is certainly an important right to the parties, and if denied on the main trial of a case, civil or criminal, the denial would furnish sufficient reason, generally, for a new trial.”
Mansell v. Benson Chevrolet Co., 302 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 4× “§ 81-1007 (OCGA § 9-10-180)), and that the trial court's refusal to grant counsel additional time for rebuttal argument was reversible error.”
McClure v. Gower, 385 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 1989). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 9-10-180; Lovett v. Sandersville R.”
Mcintyre v. Pope, 451 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 8× “In their sole enumeration of error, the Mcintyres contend the trial court erred in limiting closing arguments to one hour because OCGA § 9-10-180 provides each side shall have two hours for closing argument.”
Rouse v. Polott, 617 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 8× “1, to “up to (but no more) than two hours” as authorized by OCGA § 9-10-180. At trial, the court, without considering OCGA § 9-10-180, denied Rouse’s extension request in exercise of its discretion under USCR 13.”
McClellan v. Evans, 669 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “*599 The McClellans contend that in light of OCGA § 9-10-180, their counsel was allowed two hours for closing argument and that the trial court improperly limited that time.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.