O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-184 (2019)

Value of pain and suffering may be argued

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries, counsel shall be allowed to argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the jury; provided, however, that any such argument shall conform to the evidence or reasonable deductions from the evidence in the case.

History

Ga. L. 1960, p. 174, § 1.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Counsel may place unit value on pain and suffering. - Under this section, counsel is allowed to argue the value of pain and suffering, and it is not improper to place a unit value on such pain. Mullis v. Chaika, 118 Ga. App. 11, 162 S.E.2d 448, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1291 (1968) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-184). Counsel’s argument of unit value of pain and suffering must be reasonable. - Although a witness may not express a witness’s opinion as to the monetary value of damages for pain and suffering, it is not improper for counsel to argue to the jury the per diem, monthly, or yearly value of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering, provided such argument is within the bounds of reasonable deduction from the evidence in the case. Hardwick v. Price, 114 Ga. App. 817, 152 S.E.2d 905, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 925 (1966).

Unit of time argument, allowed in Georgia, is nothing more than an effort to persuade the jury to evaluate a long period of pain and suffering in terms of its smaller time equivalents. Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5276 (5th Cir. 1966). Unit value not reducible to present cash value. - The fact that the plaintiff attempts to place a unit value upon pain and suffering does not require its reduction to present cash value since placing unit value is merely an attempt to evaluate a long period of pain and suffering in terms of its smaller time equivalents, and is not a reducible measurement. Goforth v. Wigley, 178 Ga. App. 558, 343 S.E.2d 788, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1701 (1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 415 et seq. C.J.S. 88 C.J.S., Trial, § 276 et seq. ALR. Reduction of allowance for future pain and suffering to present worth, 28 A.L.R. 1177. Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury action, to prove future pain and suffering and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 A.L.R.3d 10.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for personal injuries resulting in death of persons engaged in farming, ranching, or agricultural labor, 46 A.L.R.3d 733. Recovery for emotional distress or its physical consequences caused by attempts to collect debt owed by third party, 46 A.L.R.3d 772. Recovery for mental anguish or emotional distress, absent independent physical injury, consequent upon breach of con-

tract or warranty in connection with construction of home or other building, 7 A.L.R.4th 1178. Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for personal injuries resulting in death of persons engaged in professional,

white-collar, and nonmanual occupations, 50 A.L.R.4th 787. Sufficiency of evidence to prove future medical expenses as result of injury to back, neck, or spine, 26 A.L.R.5th 401.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1986–2026 · leading case: Goforth v. Wigley, 343 S.E.2d 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
Goforth v. Wigley, 343 S.E.2d 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “We note that OCGA § 9-10-184 provides that: “In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries, counsel shall be allowed to argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the jury; provided, however, that any such argument shall conform to the evidence or…”
Marquiz Barker v. Owauniss Grier (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 21× “Barker contends that recent amendments to OCGA § 9-10-184 require a new trial. In September 2024, when this case was tried, OCGA § 9-10-184 (2024) provided, in its entirety, as follows: “In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries, 3 counsel shall be allowed to argue…”
— 9-10-184(c) — 1 case
Marquiz Barker v. Owauniss Grier (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “Barker contends that recent amendments to OCGA § 9-10-184 require a new trial. In September 2024, when this case was tried, OCGA § 9-10-184 (2024) provided, in its entirety, as follows: “In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries, 3 counsel shall be allowed to argue…”
— 9-10-184(c)(1) — 1 case
Marquiz Barker v. Owauniss Grier (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “Barker contends that recent amendments to OCGA § 9-10-184 require a new trial. In September 2024, when this case was tried, OCGA § 9-10-184 (2024) provided, in its entirety, as follows: “In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries, 3 counsel shall be allowed to argue…”
— 9-10-184(c)(2) — 1 case
Marquiz Barker v. Owauniss Grier (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “Barker contends that recent amendments to OCGA § 9-10-184 require a new trial. In September 2024, when this case was tried, OCGA § 9-10-184 (2024) provided, in its entirety, as follows: “In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries, 3 counsel shall be allowed to argue…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.