Constitutionality.

- The state notice provision, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-2, is rationally related to several legitimate governmental interests and does not violate due process. Georgia Dep't of Medical Assistance v. Columbia Convalescent Ctr., 265 Ga. 638, 458 S.E.2d 635 (1995).

Compliance with this section is an absolute condition precedent before valid judgment may be entered against the state or any of its officials acting in their official capacity. Otherwise, the judgment is void. Hawes v. Bigbie, 120 Ga. App. 294, 170 S.E.2d 302 (1969); Cofer v. Williams, 141 Ga. App. 72, 232 S.E.2d 610 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-2).

Judgment void absent compliance with notice requirements.

- Where the record does not show affirmatively that the Attorney General was extended the requisite notice of the proceeding upon which the trial court's judgment was based, that the Attorney General made an appearance, or that the Attorney General waived notice, the judgment is void. Caldwell v. Atlanta Bd. of Educ., 152 Ga. App. 291, 262 S.E.2d 573 (1979).

A trial court's order which granted full relief to a company seeking certain e-mail records from the Georgia Department of Agriculture was void; the notice for the case management hearing from which the order emanated, did not satisfy the notice requirements in O.C.G.A. § 9-10-2(1) for a hearing on the full merits of the case as the notice stated only "small motions" and procedural matters would be considered, and the department was never afforded an opportunity to present its opposition to the request through an O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54(c)(1) hearing. Ga. Dep't of Agric. v. Griffin Indus., 284 Ga. App. 259, 644 S.E.2d 286 (2007).

Void and ineffective orders.

- Where two orders of the superior court were entered following the filing of the plaintiffs' petition for judicial review, and in neither instance was there compliance with the notice provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-2, the two orders are void and ineffective to prevent an automatic dismissal. Department of Medical Assistance v. Columbia Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 203 Ga. App. 535, 417 S.E.2d 195 (1992), cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 535, 417 S.E.2d 195 (1992).

"Ministerial act" defined.

- A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

"Discretionary act" defined.

- A discretionary act calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed. Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts dependent on specific character of act.

- In Georgia, the distinction between a ministerial and a discretionary act, and therefore the scope of the immunity granted a public official in any given situation, turns upon the specific character of the act complained of, not the more general nature of the job. A discretionary act is generally characterized as one which is the result of personal discretion or judgment. A ministerial act, on the other hand, requires merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed or designated facts. A public official is protected from liability in the performance of the official's discretionary duties, whereas ministerial acts are committed at the official's own risk. Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Failure to hold hearing.

- Although the superior court is not required to conduct a hearing concerning the merits of the Department of Public Safety's decision to revoke a driver's license if the parties waive their right to be heard, the superior court cannot avoid the dictates of O.C.G.A. §§ 5-3-29 and9-10-3 by simply failing to hold a hearing. Bowman v. Parrot, 200 Ga. App. 405, 408 S.E.2d 115, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 895, 408 S.E.2d 115 (1991).

Cited in McCoy v. Sanders, 113 Ga. App. 565, 148 S.E.2d 902 (1966); W.E. Strickland v. Wellons, 116 Ga. App. 252, 157 S.E.2d 76 (1967); Southeastern Adjusters, Inc. v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 4, 189 S.E.2d 76 (1972); State v. Chiles, 129 Ga. App. 645, 200 S.E.2d 501 (1973); Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Aina, 154 Ga. App. 551, 269 S.E.2d 485 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, §§ 471, 657, 658. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies, §§ 97, 119.

C.J.S.

- 49 C.J.S., Judgment, § 22. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 380.

ALR.

- Consent to suit against state, 42 A.L.R. 1464; 50 A.L.R. 1408.

Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give required notice of claim of injury to municipality, county, or other governmental agency or body, 65 A.L.R.2d 1278.

Forum non conveniens in products liability cases, 76 A.L.R.4th 22.