Action against joint defendants to be brought in county of residence of either.

- Ga. L. 1949, §§ 4-6 (see O.C.G.A. § 15-21-56) did not overrule Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI), providing that civil actions generally shall be brought in the county of the defendant's residence; where there are joint defendants, however, such an action may be brought in the county of residence of either. Banks County v. Stark, 88 Ga. App. 368, 77 S.E.2d 33 (1953).

Insurer and contractor held not to be joint obligors.

- Where a county board of education contracted with a construction company to renovate a portion of an elementary school, but, during renovation, a fire (allegedly caused by the contractor's negligence) partially destroyed not only the section being renovated, but other portions of the school building as well, and a "builder's risk" insurance policy covering the renovation named as insureds both the construction company and the county board of education, although the construction company was a resident of Stephens County, the board of education sued both the insurance company and the construction company in Rabun County, the locale of the insured property, as "joint obligors," it was held that the defendants were not joint obligors. The school district's actions were not only for different injuries but one was ex contractu (against the insurance company) and the other was ex delicto (against the construction company). Currahee Constr. Co. v. Rabun County Sch. Dist., 180 Ga. App. 471, 349 S.E.2d 487 (1986).

A contractor and a county were not joint obligors as the obligation of the contractor arose from its breach of a contractual promise to pay supplier while the alleged obligation of county arose from the alleged breach of its statutory duty to require a good and sufficient payment bond. J & A Pipeline Co. v. DeKalb County, 208 Ga. App. 123, 430 S.E.2d 13, modified on other grounds, DeKalb County v. J & A Pipeline Co., 263 Ga. 645, 437 S.E.2d 327 (1993).

Service by sheriff outside of the sheriff's county allowed.

- Service in another county by the sheriff of the county where suit was brought and where a joint obligor resided was permitted. Re/Max 100 of Sandy Springs, Inc. v. Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., 177 Ga. App. 111, 338 S.E.2d 542 (1985).

Venue against nonresident governed by long-arm statute.

- An individual defendant who lives outside the state does not "reside" in Georgia so as to be subject to the joint obligor venue provisions, and venue against the nonresident individual is proper only where authorized by the long-arm statute. Goodman v. Vilston, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 718, 399 S.E.2d 241 (1990).

Action jointly against residents and nonresidents to be brought where jurisdiction over nonresident is obtainable.

- Where residents and nonresidents are joint obligors or joint tortfeasors, action against them may be brought in any county in the state in which jurisdiction can be obtained over the nonresident defendant. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Transfer of jurisdiction improper.

- Consent judgment entered against the sole resident defendant/joint tortfeasor did not amount to a discharge from liability entitling the nonresident defendants/joint tortfeasors to transfer the action. Nalley v. Baldwin, 261 Ga. App. 713, 583 S.E.2d 544 (2003).

Trial court erred in granting transfer motion.

- In a wrongful death medical malpractice suit, the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion to transfer venue of the case because the remaining defendant had waived the defendant's venue defenses and, therefore, the plaintiff had no standing to require the trial court to transfer the case to the county where the defendant resided when the suit was filed. Richardson v. Gilbert, 319 Ga. App. 72, 733 S.E.2d 783 (2012).

Venue proper as to nonresident, resident, and joint obligor defendants.

- Where a nonresident admits jurisdiction, the defendant against whom substantial relief is prayed is a resident, and a second defendant is a joint obligor of the first, venue is proper as to all parties. Cheek v. Savannah Valley Prod. Credit Ass'n, 244 Ga. 768, 262 S.E.2d 90 (1979).

Venue proper in county where co-defendant's office located.

- Trial court's order that venue was proper in Twiggs County was proper in a declaratory judgment action between an owner and a corporation arising from leases between the parties for facilities because one of the facilities at issue was located in Twiggs County and the corporation's subsidiary, a co-defendant, had an office and transacted business in Twiggs County. Mariner Healthcare, Inc. v. Foster, 280 Ga. App. 406, 634 S.E.2d 162 (2006).

Proof of cause of action against resident required to maintain action against nonresident.

- In order to maintain action against a nonresident joint tortfeasor, it is essential that a cause of action be alleged and proven against the resident defendant. Chitty v. Jones, 210 Ga. 439, 80 S.E.2d 694 (1954).

Court without jurisdiction to enter judgment against nonresident where resident discharged.

- Where joint tortfeasors residing in different counties are sued in the county of one, and on the trial of the case the resident defendant is discharged and a verdict returned solely against the nonresident defendant, the court is without jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the nonresident defendant. O'Neill v. Western Mtg. Corp., 153 Ga. App. 151, 264 S.E.2d 691 (1980).

Effect of judgment against resident.

- Where a single suit is brought against several joint tortfeasors in a county where one of them is a resident, and the others reside outside the county, a consent judgment and an agreement not to enforce the judgment constitute a finding that the resident is liable and do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants in the county where suit was brought. Motor Convoy, Inc. v. Brannen, 194 Ga. App. 795, 391 S.E.2d 671, aff'd, Frazier v. State, 195 Ga. App. 109, 393 S.E.2d 262 (1990).

Corporation resident of same county as other tortfeasors and also resident of different county.

- A corporation which is sued as a joint tortfeasor and is deemed to be a resident of the same county as other joint tortfeasors with which it is joined and is also considered to be a resident of another county in which neither of the other joint tortfeasors resides is a resident of a "different" county within the meaning of this section. Richards v. Johnson, 219 Ga. 771, 135 S.E.2d 881 (1964) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31).

Action against nonresident corporation and resident noncorporate defendant proper in county of latter.

- Even where a defendant corporation has no office, agent, or place of business in the county where action is brought, and regardless of whether the other defendant was an independent contractor or an employee of the corporation, venue is proper if the petition alleges facts which state a claim against the defendants as joint tortfeasors and the noncorporate defendant is a resident of the county in which the action is brought. Del-Cook Timber Co. v. Brown, 124 Ga. App. 67, 183 S.E.2d 81 (1971).

Action against corporation and noncorporate defendant proper in county where former has office.

- A nonresident corporation is, for purposes of action, a resident of the county of this state in which it has an office, agent, and place of business, and an action will lie against such corporation and a resident joint defendant tortfeasor in such county, even though the resident joint tortfeasor resides in a different county. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Fact that partnership has place of business in state does not establish venue as to the partners. Reading Assocs., Ltd. v. Reading Assocs. of Ga., Inc., 236 Ga. 906, 225 S.E.2d 899 (1976).

Constitutional and statutory provisions as to venue of actions against partners apply to limited partnership. Farmers Hdwe. of Athens, Inc. v. L.A. Properties, Ltd., 136 Ga. App. 180, 220 S.E.2d 465 (1975).

Action against partnership to be brought only in county where at least one partner resides.

- A partnership may be sued in any county in which one partner resides but it cannot be sued in a county where none of the partners reside even if the partnership may be doing business in the latter county. Farmers Hdwe. of Athens, Inc. v. L.A. Properties, Ltd., 136 Ga. App. 180, 220 S.E.2d 465 (1975).

There is no basis for distinction as to partners who may be sued in county of either. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Court of county of partner's residence has jurisdiction regardless of citizenship.

- Partnership may be sued in any county in which one of the partners has such a residence as will confer upon the courts of that county jurisdiction over the partner's person, regardless of the place of the partner's citizenship. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Venue in an action against the guarantor of unpaid promissory notes was not lost merely because no final judgment for money damages was entered against resident joint obligors, where summary judgment was granted against all joint obligors and final judgment for money damages was entered against only the guarantor, who resided in another county, and the others could not satisfy the liability of their debt. Hodge Residential, Inc. v. Bankers First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 199 Ga. App. 474, 405 S.E.2d 302 (1991).

Retention of jurisdiction after venue vanishes.

- After venue vanishes, the trial court still retains jurisdiction to order the case transferred to a court where venue is appropriate and the court also retains jurisdiction to consider and grant a defendant's motion to dismiss on a matter of abatement, such as insufficiency of service of process, rendering the need to transfer moot. Exum v. Melton, 244 Ga. App. 775, 536 S.E.2d 786 (2000).

Improper venue.

- In a personal injury action by the passenger against the estate of the driver of the vehicle in which the passenger was riding and the owner of the truck, venue over the nonresident truck owner vanished when the passenger dismissed the owner from the main action, notwithstanding a pending cross-claim for wrongful death against the owner by the estate, a joint tortfeasor which had consented to judgment against it. Airgrowers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 230 Ga. App. 415, 496 S.E.2d 528 (1998).

Not proper exercise of legislature's authority.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(c) was not a proper exercise of the legislature's authority to enact laws which allowed the superior and state courts to change venue; furthermore, because O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1(a) vested power to change venue in the court, and not in a defendant, as did O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(c), O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1(a) was proper under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VIII, and did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV. EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333, 626 S.E.2d 482 (2006).

Medical malpractice action.

- Gwinnett County trial court properly granted an emergency motion by a husband and wife, in their medical malpractice action, to transfer the case back to Fulton County, based on the Supreme Court of Georgia finding that O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(c) was unconstitutional, as: (1) the husband and wife's participation in the litigation did not waive any issue of transfer; (2) the husband and wife did not acquiesce in the transfer, and the hospital failed to show how the husband and wife waived the issue when they failed to pursue an interlocutory appeal; and (3) the husband and wife were not to be denied a remedy merely because there was no specific procedural mechanism to address their grievance; moreover, the Gwinnett County trial court's transfer order was not erroneous despite the fact that the statute that the court relied upon was later found to be unconstitutional, but rather, the result was that the case was to be tried in the original forum, which the hospital did not show was substantively prejudicial to its defense. Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Rapson, 283 Ga. App. 297, 641 S.E.2d 286 (2007).

Cited in Rylee v. Abernathy, 210 Ga. 673, 82 S.E.2d 220 (1954); United States Cas. Co. v. American Oil Co., 104 Ga. App. 209, 121 S.E.2d 328 (1961); Byrd v. Moore Ford Co., 116 Ga. App. 292, 157 S.E.2d 41 (1967); Williamson v. Perret's Farms, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 687, 197 S.E.2d 754 (1973); White v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 919, 213 S.E.2d 879 (1975); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 159 Ga. App. 416, 283 S.E.2d 647 (1981); Gordon v. Long State Bank, 163 Ga. App. 334, 294 S.E.2d 201 (1982); Smith v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 169 Ga. App. 751, 315 S.E.2d 265 (1984); Unger v. Bryant Equip. Sales & Servs., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 364, 326 S.E.2d 483 (1985); Edwards v. Edmondson, 173 Ga. App. 353, 326 S.E.2d 550 (1985); Calhoun County Hosp. Auth. v. Walker, 205 Ga. App. 259, 421 S.E.2d 777 (1992); Bryant v. Haynie, 216 Ga. App. 430, 454 S.E.2d 533 (1995); Sikes v. Norton, 185 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); Ga. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Valley Wood, Inc., 290 Ga. App. 177, 659 S.E.2d 410 (2008); HD Supply, Inc. v. Garger, 299 Ga. App. 751, 683 S.E.2d 671 (2009); Tomsic v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 374, 739 S.E.2d 521 (2013); Granite Loan Solutions, LLC v. King, 334 Ga. App. 305, 779 S.E.2d 86 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, §§ 6, 33.

C.J.S.

- 92A C.J.S., Venue, § 116 et seq.

ALR.

- Plaintiff's bona fide belief in cause of action against defendant whose presence in action is necessary to justify venue as against another defendant as sustaining venue against latter notwithstanding failure to establish cause of action, or dismissal of action, against former, 93 A.L.R. 949.

Venue of action for partnership dissolution, settlement, or accounting, 33 A.L.R.2d 914.

Independent venue requirements as to cross complaint or similar action by defendant seeking relief against a codefendant or third party, 100 A.L.R.2d 693.