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2018 Georgia Code 9-11-18 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 11. Civil Practice Act, 9-11-1 through 9-11-133.

ARTICLE 4 PARTIES

9-11-18. Joinder of claims and remedies.

  1. Joinder of claims. A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has against an opposing party.
  2. Joinder of remedies; fraudulent conveyances. Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive rights of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him without first having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 18; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1104, § 7.)

U.S. Code.

- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 18, see 28 U.S.C.

Law reviews.

- For article discussing counterclaims and cross-claims under the Georgia Civil Practice Act, see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 205 (1967). For article, "Synopses of 1968 Amendments to the Appellate Procedure Act and Georgia Civil Practice Act," see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 503 (1968). For article, "Georgia's Constitutional Scheme for State Appellate Jurisdiction," see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 24 (2001).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutional venue provisions may not be changed by the legislature or the courts, and the adoption of procedural devices for adjudicating claims of various parties in the same action does not effect a change in the venue requirements of the Constitution. Haley v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 13, 232 S.E.2d 362 (1977).

Venue for counterclaim proper.

- Hospital's home court did not err in transferring the remaining counterclaim to a patient's home court for trial as the hospital consented to the patient's home court trying the patient's counterclaim against the hospital for the improper release of the patient's mental health records when the hospital invoked the jurisdiction of that court to pursue the hospital's suit against the patient for non-payment for medical services when: (1) both claims arose out of the contractual relationship between the hospital and the patient; (2) the common nexus between the claims was the mental health treatment the hospital gave to the patient; (3) the hospital sought to recover monies due for the treatment at issue in the patient's counterclaim; and (4) this commonality met the broad similarity or connectedness test, as well as the arising out of the same transaction or occurrence test used for determining whether a counterclaim was compulsory under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(a). Kennestone Hosp., Inc. v. Hopson, 264 Ga. App. 123, 589 S.E.2d 696 (2003).

Both legal and equitable claims may be set forth in the same complaint under the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9). Miller v. Turner, 228 Ga. 701, 187 S.E.2d 688 (1972).

Joinder of contract and tort actions permitted.

- There is now no inhibition to joinder of actions ex contractu and those ex delicto. Continental Ins. Co. v. Mercer, 130 Ga. App. 339, 203 S.E.2d 297 (1973).

Joinder not mandatory.

- Even though the multiple claims might be permissively joined, a party is not forced to judgment on all possible causes of action in one suit. Stapleton v. Palmore, 162 Ga. App. 525, 291 S.E.2d 445, aff'd, 250 Ga. 259, 297 S.E.2d 270 (1982); Nationwide-Penncraft, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 555, 291 S.E.2d 760, cert. denied, 249 Ga. App. 687, 294 S.E.2d 529 (1982).

Clear implication of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-18 is that party asserting claim to relief is not required to join independent claims the party has against opposing party. Nationwide-Penncraft, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 249 Ga. 687, 294 S.E.2d 529 (1982).

As to joinder of third-party claim of secondary liability with direct damage claim against third-party defendant under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-18 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18, see Cohen v. McLaughlin, 250 Ga. 661, 301 S.E.2d 37 (1983).

Joinder of direct claim by amendment of third-party complaint.

- In an action against the defendant for injuries caused by an automobile collision, when the defendant brought a third-party complaint for indemnity and contribution against a brake repair shop, the defendant's claim for damages to the defendant's own car was properly joined by amendment of the third-party complaint. Shleifer v. Bridgestone-Firestone, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 256, 477 S.E.2d 405 (1996).

Impermissible to seek damages against grantee of fraudulent conveyance.

- In the context of a divorce action, it is impermissible for the plaintiff to seek damages against the grantee of an alleged fraudulent conveyance by the defendant. Shah v. Shah, 270 Ga. 649, 513 S.E.2d 730 (1999).

Cited in King v. King, 225 Ga. 142, 166 S.E.2d 347 (1969); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Black, 120 Ga. App. 151, 169 S.E.2d 742 (1969); Bulloch County Hosp. Auth. v. Fowler, 124 Ga. App. 242, 183 S.E.2d 586 (1971); Thornton v. North Am. Acceptance Corp., 228 Ga. 176, 184 S.E.2d 589 (1971); O'Neil v. Williams, 232 Ga. 170, 205 S.E.2d 226 (1974); Carter v. Harrell, 132 Ga. App. 148, 207 S.E.2d 648 (1974); Chupp v. Henderson, 134 Ga. App. 808, 216 S.E.2d 366 (1975); C & S Land, Transp. & Dev. Corp. v. Grubbs, 141 Ga. App. 393, 233 S.E.2d 486 (1977); Tingle v. Georgia Power Co., 147 Ga. App. 775, 250 S.E.2d 497 (1978); Singleton v. Airco, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 467 (D. Ga. 1978); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 159 Ga. App. 416, 283 S.E.2d 647 (1981); Greyhound Lines v. Cobb County, 681 F.2d 1327 (11th Cir. 1982); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 249 Ga. 662, 293 S.E.2d 331 (1982); Hughes v. Hughes, 193 Ga. App. 72, 387 S.E.2d 29 (1989); Lawson v. Watkins, 261 Ga. 147, 401 S.E.2d 719 (1991); Satilla Cmty. Serv. Bd. v. Satilla Health Servs., 275 Ga. 805, 573 S.E.2d 31 (2002); Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008); Sentinel Offender Svcs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Actions, § 96 et seq. 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances, §§ 129, 133. 65 Am Jur. 2d, Receivers, § 101.

C.J.S.

- 1A C.J.S., Actions, § 108 et seq. 35A C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 43 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parties, § 78 et seq.

ALR.

- Joinder of cause of action against party causing injury with cause of action against latter's insurer or indemnitor, 7 A.L.R. 1003.

Joinder of cause of action for breach of a contract with cause of action for fraud inducing the contract, 10 A.L.R. 756.

Different benefits or claims of benefit under a policy of insurance as constituting a single cause of action or separate causes, 69 A.L.R. 889; 159 A.L.R. 563.

May acts of independent tort-feasors, each of which alone causes or tends to produce some damage, be combined to create a joint liability, 91 A.L.R. 759.

Inclusion in bill for divorce or annulment of allegations and prayer to impress trust upon property or otherwise settle property rights, 93 A.L.R. 327.

Joinder in one action of sureties on different bonds relating to same matter, 106 A.L.R. 90; 137 A.L.R. 1044.

Concerted action or agreement to resist enforcement of a statute because of doubt as to its constitutionality or construction as ground for joinder of defendants in action or suit by governmental authorities, 107 A.L.R. 670.

Joinder of claims to separate parcels in suit to quiet or to remove cloud on title, or to determine adverse claims to land, 118 A.L.R. 1400.

Acquisition or perfection after commencement of action of right or title to claim or property which is the subject of action or counterclaim, 125 A.L.R. 612.

Right of one to recover for personal injury to himself and for death of another killed in the same accident as giving rise to a single cause of action or to separate causes of action, 161 A.L.R. 208.

Right of wife or child by virtue of right to support to maintain action to set aside conveyance by husband or parent as fraudulent, without reducing claim to judgment, 164 A.L.R. 524.

Joinder in defamation action, of denial and plea of truth of statement, 21 A.L.R.2d 813.

Construction, application, and effect of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 18(b) and like state rules or statutes pertaining to joinder in a single action of two claims although one was previously cognizable only after the other had been prosecuted to a conclusion, 61 A.L.R.2d 688.

Propriety of consolidation for trial of actions for personal injuries, death, or property damages arising out of same accident, 68 A.L.R.2d 1372.

Appealability of state court order granting or denying consolidation, severance, or separate trials, 77 A.L.R.3d 1082.

When loss-of-consortium claim must be joined with underlying personal injury claim, 60 A.L.R.4th 1174.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-18

Total Results: 14  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Lawson v. Watkins, 401 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1991 | 261 Ga. 147

...matter of the counterclaim in that action. Because the subject matter of the two actions was not identical, the trial court in the present action correctly denied Lawson's motion to dismiss as to the res judicata issue. 2. Our joinder statute, OCGA § 9-11-18, provides for permissive joinder of claims for relief....
...o Lawson. Watkins chose not to include his claims for relief that arose out of the racetrack which he had given to Lawson in trust. To construe OCGA § 9-12-40 to require the inclusion of all claims for relief which could have been raised under OCGA § 9-11-18, as the dissent suggests, would require compulsory joinder of unrelated claims. Such a construction would not only defeat the purposes for which OCGA § 9-11-18(a) was enacted but would render the same meaningless....
...Lawson's counterclaim, relating to reformation of a promissory note, sought to have the holder of the note enjoined from foreclosing on that same property, titled in Lawson's name. 1. (a) The issue is whether the matter of ownership properly might have been joined in the prior action. OCGA § 9-11-18(a) provides: A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has against an opposing party....
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The State v. Sass Grp., LLC (two Cases), 315 Ga. 893 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2023

...tice and related doctrines generally demonstrate a preference that litigants bring all 23 relevant claims related to their case in one action. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 9-11-13 (regarding counter- and cross-claims); 9-11-18 (joinder of claims and remedies); 9-11-19 (joinder of persons); 9-11-22 (interpleader); 9-11-24 (intervention); Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God v....
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Denton v. Browns Mill Dev. Co., 561 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2002 | 275 Ga. 2

...the claim, the central question under the statute is whether the claim is based on an act reasonably construed to be in furtherance of the rights of free speech or petition. A party may raise multiple causes of action in a single complaint. See OCGA § 9-11-18....
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Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 24, 2014 | 766 S.E.2d 456

...him with failing to pay court-ordered supervision fees. 11 Sentinel moved to dismiss these habeas petitioners’ remaining claims against it as moot following the trial court’s grant of the habeas relief requested. However, OCGA § 9-11-18 allows a party asserting a claim for relief as an original claim to join either as an independent or alternative claim, as many claims as he has against the opposing parties....
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Coen v. CDC Software Corp., 816 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2018 | 304 Ga. 105

...ract, but Coen later dismissed that claim. The parties in this case appeared to have squared off along these lines. In Lawson, supra, we also explained the interaction between res judicata and the practice of permissive joinder of claims, see OCGA § 9-11-18, which is allowed by statute in Georgia....
...uld have been barred because it involved the same general subject matter and question of what parties owned interests in the racetrack. This test is incorrect, and it would largely eradicate the availability of permissive joinder of claims. See OCGA § 9-11-18. We recognize that there may be some prior decisions where "subject matter" terminology has been employed and the exact manner and reasoning with which it has been employed is either brief or unclear....
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Satilla Cmty. Serv. Bd. v. Satilla Health Servs., Inc., 573 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 25, 2002 | 275 Ga. 805, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 3540

...able. Instead, once the Board was added to the action as an impleaded party, Joyner filed a direct claim for breach of contract. After a party has been properly impleaded into an action based on a claim for secondary liability, OCGA §§ 9-11-14 and 9-11-18 permit certain direct claims to be brought against the impleaded party....
...the extent those claims seek to hold the Board secondarily liable. Because the Board was not made a party to this action based upon a viable claim for secondary liability, any claims for direct liability cannot be brought under OCGA §§ 9-11-14 and 9-11-18....
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Cohen v. McLaughlin, 301 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 9, 1983 | 250 Ga. 661

...Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343 (270 SE2d 883) (1980); Dorsey Heating &c. Co. v. Dickson, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 599 (2) (266 SE2d 282) (1980); Thigpen v. Koch, 126 Ga. App. 182 (190 SE2d 117) (1972). 2. As argued by Cohen, these decisions ignore CPA § 18 (a) (OCGA § 9-11-18 (a) (Code Ann....
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Bostick v. Cmm Props., Inc., 297 Ga. 55 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 11, 2015 | 772 S.E.2d 671

...The only action extant was the third-party complaint filed by Bostick against the CMM parties. See OCGA § 9-11-14 (a).4 This was so, regardless of whether it was one for solely indemnity or included direct claims against the CMM parties. See OCGA § 9-11-18.5 The suit by Ingram against Bostick was 4 OCGA § 9-11-14 (a) provides: When defendant may bring in third party....
...A third-party defendant may proceed under this Code section against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant. 5 OCGA § 9-11-18 provides: (a) Joinder of claims....
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C-Staff, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 571 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2002 | 275 Ga. 624, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2963

...[2] See, e.g., OCGA § 18-3-1 et seq. (attachment and levy); OCGA § 18-4-1 et seq. (garnishment). [3] 203 F.Supp. 897 (N.D.Ga.1962). [4] See, e.g., OCGA § 9-11-3; Franek v. Ray, 239 Ga. 282, 285, 236 S.E.2d 629 (1977). [5] See generally OCGA §§ 9-11-13, 9-11-14, 9-11-18, 9-11-19, 9-11-20.
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Shah v. Shah, 513 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1999 | 270 Ga. 649, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1046

...If the plaintiff is authorized to do so, the second issue is whether it is necessary for the grantee to follow the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 in order to appeal from an adverse judgment awarding damages. 1. Ms. Shah contends that OCGA § 9-11-18(a) is general authority for the joinder in this divorce action of any and all of her independent existing claims. Under that statute, a party who has already asserted a claim for relief "may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has against an opposing party." Ms. Shah's reliance upon OCGA § 9-11-18(a) clearly is misplaced. The controlling statute is OCGA § 9-11-18(b), which specifically addresses the issue of joinder of a fraudulent conveyances claim in an original action. See generally Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 205 Ga. 429, 436, 54 S.E.2d 260 (1949). Compare Cohen v. McLaughlin, 250 Ga. 661, 301 S.E.2d 37 (1983) (joinder pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-18(a)). According to its terms, OCGA § 9-11-18(b) is authority only for the limited proposition that an original claim and a fraudulent conveyance claim "may be joined in a single action; but the court shall grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive r...
...ts of the parties." (Emphasis supplied.) The purpose of this joinder statute "is to facilitate the adjudication of the total dispute between the parties." 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1590, p. 561. Thus, OCGA § 9-11-18(b) applies in this case for the limited purpose of aiding in the final judicial determination of the issues in the divorce action....
...Shah's husband. DeGarmo v. DeGarmo, 269 Ga. 480, 481(2), 499 S.E.2d 317 (1998). The question is, however, whether Mr. Shah, having been joined in the divorce action for that purpose, was also amenable to suit for additional independent claims. Although OCGA § 9-11-18(a) specifically authorizes the assertion of additional existing claims against the original party-defendant, nothing in OCGA § 9-11-18(b) permits any other additional claims to be asserted against one who is a party-defendant only as to a joined fraudulent conveyance claim. Compare Cohen v. McLaughlin, supra. Permitting the assertion of such additional claims against the joined party would be completely inconsistent with OCGA § 9-11-18(b)'s limited statutory purpose of facilitating the dispute between the parties to the original action....
...The grantee who is joined as a party-defendant on a fraudulent conveyance claim in a divorce action must apply for a discretionary appeal from a judgment setting aside the conveyance, since it would be considered a part of the divorce action to which it was properly joined for the limited purpose authorized under OCGA § 9-11-18(b)....
...case may not also seek damages during the course of the divorce action against the person who received that conveyance, I respectfully dissent. The majority bases its holding that Ms. Shah is precluded from asserting such a claim for damages on OCGA § 9-11-18(b)....
...a debtor and seeks to set aside a fraudulent conveyance the debtor made. Both remedies may be brought in one action though, of course, as the rule states, it is the substantive law which ultimately governs whether any relief is available. [1] Thus, § 9-11-18(b) merely expresses an intent to deviate from a pre-CPA practice of requiring two separate actions to assert two remedies, and was not meant as a limitation on a party's ability to join claims under § 9-11-18(a). Subsection (b) of § 9-11-18 is, in fact, but a variation of the liberal joinder provisions of § 9-11-18(a), and the majority errs in construing it otherwise....
...may not assert but one of those claims. In addition to the foregoing fundamental mistakes, the majority erroneously attaches significance to the fact that the appellant, Ashwin Shah, was added as a party after the original complaint was filed. OCGA § 9-11-18(a) and (b), however, provide rules for determining when a claim may be added against a "party." They do not limit their salutary effect to an "original party-defendant." Besides, the appellant could just as easily have been an "original party-defendant" as he was an added party-defendant. Here, the appellant was a party to the case, and the rules of § 9-11-18(a) and (b) unequivocally apply to him as a party. Finally, although the majority acknowledges that the purpose of § 9-11-18 is "`to facilitate the adjudication of the total dispute between the parties,'" the majority completely frustrates that purpose in the present case. The broad reach of § 9-11-18(a) and (b) is illustrated by our holding in Cohen v....
...The lawyer continued to insist on his right to sue the insurance company for damages, but the trial court held that the lawyer could only assert a claim against the insurance company for its secondary liability on the plaintiff's claim. Relying upon § 9-11-18(a), this Court reversed, holding that a third-party plaintiff could assert a direct claim for damages against a third-party defendant even though that claim did not arise out of the same set of operative facts as the plaintiff's original complaint. [4] Despite the broad reach of § 9-11-18(a) and (b) and the broad holding of Cohen, the majority today deprives divorce litigants of the right to join claims that is enjoyed by all other litigants in this State....
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Parker v. Eason, 265 Ga. 236 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 1995 | 454 S.E.2d 460

...Since an application for a contempt citation is merely an ancillary motion in the divorce action and not a complaint whereby any new claim for relief is initiated, those provisions of the Civil Practice Act relating to the latter pleading would not be applicable. It follows that Wife could not rely upon OCGA § 9-11-18 as authority for including a claim for revival of the dormant judgment in her application or upon OCGA § 9-11-15 as authority for amending her application to add such a claim....

The State v. Sass Grp., LLC (two Cases) (Ga. 2023).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2023 | 454 S.E.2d 460

...Plaintiffs are correct that our rules of civil practice and related doctrines generally demonstrate a preference that litigants bring all relevant claims related to their case in one action. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 9-11-13 (regarding counter- and cross-claims); 9-11-18 (joinder of claims and remedies); 9-11-19 (joinder of persons); 9-11-22 (interpleader); 9-11-24 (intervention); Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God, Inc....
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Coen v. Cdc Software Corp., 304 Ga. 105 (Ga. 2018).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2018

...are not raised will be res judicata pursuant to OCGA § 9-12-40.” (Emphasis in original.) Lawson, supra at 149 (2).4 4 In Lawson, supra, we also explained the interaction between res judicata and the practice of permissive joinder of claims, see OCGA § 9-11-18, which is allowed by statute in Georgia....
...second lawsuit in Lawson should have been barred because it involved the same general subject matter and question of what parties owned interests in the racetrack. This test is incorrect, and it would largely eradicate the availability of permissive joinder of claims. See OCGA § 9-11-18. 13 identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction....

Bostick v. Cmm Props., Inc. (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 11, 2015

...The only action extant was the third-party complaint filed by Bostick against the CMM parties. See OCGA § 9-11-14 (a).4 This was so, regardless of whether it was one for solely indemnity or included direct claims against the CMM parties. See OCGA § 9-11-18.5 The suit by Ingram against Bostick was 4 OCGA § 9-11-14 (a) provides: When defendant may bring in third party....
...A third-party defendant may proceed under this Code section against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant. 5 OCGA § 9-11-18 provides: (a) Joinder of claims....