O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 (2019)

Settlement offers and agreements for personal injury, bodily injury, and death from motor vehicle; payment methods

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) Prior to the filing of a civil action, any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf of a claimant or claimants shall be in writing and contain the following material terms: (1) The time period within which such offer must be accepted, which shall be not less than 30 days from receipt of the offer; (2) Amount of monetary payment; (3) The party or parties the claimant or claimants will release if such offer is accepted; (4) The type of release, if any, the claimant or claimants will provide to each releasee; and (5) The claims to be released. (b) The recipients of an offer to settle made under this Code section may accept the same by providing written acceptance of the material terms outlined in subsection (a) of this Code section in their entirety. (c) Nothing in this Code section is intended to prohibit parties from reaching a settlement agreement in a manner and under terms otherwise agreeable to the parties. (d) Upon receipt of an offer to settle set forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the recipients shall have the right to seek clarification regarding terms, liens, subrogation claims, standing to release claims, medical bills, medical records, and other relevant facts. An attempt to seek reasonable clarification shall not be deemed a counteroffer. (e) An offer to settle made pursuant to this Code section shall be sent by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested, and shall specifically reference this Code section.

(f ) The person or entity providing payment to satisfy the material term set forth in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this Code section may elect to provide payment by any one or more of the following means: (1) Cash; (2) Money order; (3) Wire transfer; (4) A cashier’s check issued by a bank or other financial institution; (5) A draft or bank check issued by an insurance company; or (6) Electronic funds transfer or other method of electronic payment. (g) Nothing in this Code section shall prohibit a party making an offer to settle from requiring payment within a specified period; provided, however, that such period shall be not less than ten days after the written acceptance of the offer to settle. (h) This Code section shall apply to causes of action for personal injury, bodily injury, and death arising from the use of a motor vehicle on or after July 1, 2013.

History

(Code 1981, § 9-11-67.1, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 860, § 1/HB 336.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Cause of action for physical injury, § 51-1-13. Separate causes of action for personal injury and property damage caused by motor vehicle,

§ 51-1-32. Duty of care of operator of motor vehicle to passengers, § 51-1-36. Law reviews. - For article on the 2013 enactment of this Code section, see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 39 (2013).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 40 cases (27 in the last 5 years), 2015–2026 · leading case: Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 797 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 2017).

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Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 797 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 98× “At issue is the proper interpretation of OCGA § 9-11-67.1, which governs the formation of settlement agreements pursuant to a pre-suit “offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the…”

Patricia Ann Carr v. John Yim, 827 S.E.2d 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 14× “So viewed, the record reflects that on May 2, 2016, which was prior to the lawsuit filed in this case pertaining to the automobile collision, Carr's attorney sent Yim's insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual General Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual"), a time-limited settlement…”

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Boris Woodard, 861 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2017). · cites it 14× “HULL, Circuit Judge: This case returns to us from the Supreme Court of Georgia, to whom we certified certain questions concerning O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1. Before turning to those questions, we offer a brief review of the facts, which are not in dispute and are set out more fully in…”

Duenas v. Cook., 818 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 18× “On October 27, 2016, Duenas' attorney sent Nationwide a time-limited settlement offer *631 ("Settlement Offer") pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1. In pertinent part, the Settlement Offer stated: The material terms of this written offer of compromise are made pursuant to OCGA §…”

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Boris Woodard, 826 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2016). · cites it 11× “This case implicates O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1, a new Georgia statute governing settlement offers for personal injury and death claims arising ■from motor vehicle accidents.”

First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga., Inc. v. Hughes, 826 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 6× “1, adopted in 2013, provides that "[p]rior to the filing of a civil action, any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf of a claimant or…”

Emely Gomez v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 153× “In 2013, it passed OCGA § 9-11-67.1—which was revised in 2021 and 2024—to address this very issue.”

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard (Ga. 2017). · cites it 79× “We conclude that OCGA § 9-11-67.1 does not prohibit a claimant from conditioning acceptance of a Pre-Suit Offer upon the performance of some act, including a timely payment.”

Geico Indem. Co. v. Adam Abdel-Rahman (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 72× “1 (2021) and other terms that do not conform with that Code section; and includes in the offer a statement that the offer is not controlled by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021). The defendant accepts the statutory material terms but rejects the statement that OCGA § 9-11-67.”

Owners Ins. Co. v. Mitchell Winfred Chadwick, 610 F. App'x 895 (11th Cir. 2015). · cites it 2× “1 After the collision, Chadwick’s lawyer sent Owners a time-limited demand letter (“Letter”), purportedly pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1. The Letter described various damages suffered by Chadwick as a result of the crash and included itemized medical bills totaling $46,770.”

Stephan Duwayne White v. Walter Cheek (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 56× “; 1 OCGA § 9-11-67.1 “governs the formation of settlement agreements pursuant to a pre-suit offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf of a…”

Rachel Gabrell v. D'Andre Hancock (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 55× “Because we conclude that the parties formed a binding contract under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 , we reverse. We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s order on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement.”

Show all 40 citing cases →

— 9-11-67.1(a) — 8 cases

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 797 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 2017). “At issue is the proper interpretation of OCGA § 9-11-67.1, which governs the formation of settlement agreements pursuant to a pre-suit “offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the…”

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Boris Woodard, 826 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2016). “This case implicates O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1, a new Georgia statute governing settlement offers for personal injury and death claims arising ■from motor vehicle accidents.”

Emely Gomez v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “In 2013, it passed OCGA § 9-11-67.1—which was revised in 2021 and 2024—to address this very issue.”

John Anthony Bonilla v. Fredy Ventura, as Surviving Parent of Nuvia Joana Ventura Cortez (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).

Rachel Gabrell v. D'Andre Hancock (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “Because we conclude that the parties formed a binding contract under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 , we reverse. We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s order on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement.”

— 9-11-67.1(a)(1) — 2 cases

Geico Indem. Co. v. Adam Abdel-Rahman (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “1 (2021) and other terms that do not conform with that Code section; and includes in the offer a statement that the offer is not controlled by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021). The defendant accepts the statutory material terms but rejects the statement that OCGA § 9-11-67.”

— 9-11-67.1(a)(1)(A) — 1 case

McDavid v. McDavid (Bankr. W.D. La. 2022).

— 9-11-67.1(a)(1)(B) — 1 case

— 9-11-67.1(a)(1)(C) — 1 case

— 9-11-67.1(a)(1)(E) — 1 case

— 9-11-67.1(a)(2021) — 1 case

Kyle Zachary Rowland v. Kyle Trevor McGovern (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).

— 9-11-67.1(a)(3) — 1 case

— 9-11-67.1(b) — 2 cases

John Anthony Bonilla v. Fredy Ventura, as Surviving Parent of Nuvia Joana Ventura Cortez (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).

Emely Gomez v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “In 2013, it passed OCGA § 9-11-67.1—which was revised in 2021 and 2024—to address this very issue.”

— 9-11-67.1(b)(1) — 4 cases

Emely Gomez v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “In 2013, it passed OCGA § 9-11-67.1—which was revised in 2021 and 2024—to address this very issue.”

John Anthony Bonilla v. Fredy Ventura, as Surviving Parent of Nuvia Joana Ventura Cortez (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).

— 9-11-67.1(b)(2) — 3 cases

Emely Gomez v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “In 2013, it passed OCGA § 9-11-67.1—which was revised in 2021 and 2024—to address this very issue.”

Kyle Zachary Rowland v. Kyle Trevor McGovern (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).

— 9-11-67.1(c) — 6 cases

Emely Gomez v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “In 2013, it passed OCGA § 9-11-67.1—which was revised in 2021 and 2024—to address this very issue.”

McDavid v. McDavid (Bankr. W.D. La. 2022).

John Anthony Bonilla v. Fredy Ventura, as Surviving Parent of Nuvia Joana Ventura Cortez (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).

— 9-11-67.1(d) — 1 case

Emely Gomez v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “In 2013, it passed OCGA § 9-11-67.1—which was revised in 2021 and 2024—to address this very issue.”

— 9-11-67.1(h) — 2 cases

Emely Gomez v. Usaa Cas. Ins. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “In 2013, it passed OCGA § 9-11-67.1—which was revised in 2021 and 2024—to address this very issue.”

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