Verdicts covered by section.

- Although the word "verdicts" is not found in this section, it is not thereby to be regarded as excluded by implication; jurisdiction to relieve against verdicts inequitably obtained exists as certainly as it does against awards, judgments, and decrees obtained by imposition. Gentle v. Georgia Power Co., 179 Ga. 853, 177 S.E. 690 (1934).

Showing required when seeking equitable relief.

- One invoking equitable relief against verdicts, as well as against judgments, should meet the usual requirement as to showing that one's relief at law would be less adequate than one's relief at equity. Gentle v. Georgia Power Co., 179 Ga. 853, 177 S.E. 690 (1934).

Equity unavailable when remedy at law adequate.

- When a judgment at law is void for reasons appearing on the face of the record, and the remedy at law is adequate, complete, and available, equity will not afford relief. Martocello v. Martocello, 197 Ga. 629, 30 S.E.2d 108 (1944).

Effect on purchaser of knowledge of lien on property.

- Purchaser who takes without notice of the judgment can attach as freely as a creditor. But one who purchases property which one knows to be subject to the lien of a judgment in the hands of one's vendor, acquires the property as a privy in estate with the vendor, and it would be no hardship to hold the purchaser as much bound by the judgment as the purchaser would be were the purchaser a direct party to it. The general rule with reference to bona fide purchasers is that a want of notice is essential to their claim for protection. Prendergast v. Wiseman, 80 Ga. 419, 7 S.E. 228 (1888); Carrollton Bank v. Wager, 169 Ga. 304, 150 S.E. 146 (1929).

Bona fide purchaser attacking writs fieri facias.

- Even if writs of fieri facias were good as between the parties thereto, one claiming to be a purchaser bona fide would not be bound by the judgment, but might attack the judgment under this section. Strickland v. Griffin, 70 Ga. 541 (1883).

Attacking appointment of guardian.

- Invalidity of the appointment of a guardian appearing upon the face of the record, the judgment of appointment may be attacked collaterally. Payne v. Shirley, 25 Ga. App. 644, 104 S.E. 17 (1920).

Collateral attack of unreversed judgment of competent court.

- Unreversed judgment of competent court cannot be collaterally attacked except for causes provided for in this section. Hammock v. McBride, 6 Ga. 178 (1849); McArthur & Griffin v. Matthewson & Butler, 67 Ga. 134 (1881); Smith v. Cuyler, 78 Ga. 654, 3 S.E. 406 (1887); William v. Lancaster, 113 Ga. 1020, 39 S.E. 471 (1901); Brooke v. F & M Bank, 27 Ga. App. 250, 108 S.E. 135 (1921).

When judgment subject to motion in arrest of judgment.

- On a motion in arrest of judgment, a petition, although defective and subject to general demurrer (now motion to dismiss), in that the petition omits to set forth all the necessary ingredients of a cause of action, will not render the judgment based thereon subject to the technical statutory remedy of this section, unless the petition affirmatively shows on its face that a cause of action did not in fact exist, or that the petition is so utterly defective that it could not be amended at all, or that the defect in the petition is of such character as renders unenforceable or meaningless the verdict and judgment based thereon. Mell v. McNulty, 185 Ga. 343, 195 S.E. 181 (1938); Adams v. Morgan, 114 Ga. App. 180, 150 S.E.2d 556, cert. dismissed, 222 Ga. 820, 152 S.E.2d 693 (1966).

Direct attack on judgment restricted to real parties in interest.

- It is the general rule, save for certain exceptions in favor of creditors or bona fide purchasers and others who may be excepted by statute, that none but the parties to a judgment can move directly for the judgment's nullification, that a third person, not a party to the record, cannot go into court and move to set aside a judgment which is not against that third party. The underlying basis of this rule is that to permit third persons to become interested after judgment, and to overturn adjudications to which the original parties made no objection, would encourage litigation, and disturb the repose beneficial to society. Thomas v. Lambert, 187 Ga. 616, 1 S.E.2d 443 (1939), overruled on other grounds, Canal Ins. Co. v. Cambron, 240 Ga. 708, 242 S.E.2d 32 (1978).

Real parties in interest rule applicable to divorce decrees.

- One who is neither a party to a divorce decree nor is in any relation with either of the parties as to any right of property involved in or affected by the decree is not entitled to make a direct attack on the decree, either in the case itself or by an independent equity suit in the same court, when the decree is not void on the decree's face. Thomas v. Lambert, 187 Ga. 616, 1 S.E.2d 443 (1939), overruled on other grounds, Canal Ins. Co. v. Cambron, 240 Ga. 708, 242 S.E.2d 32 (1978).

Attack on facially valid judgment by stranger.

- An attack on a judgment regular on the judgment's face must be taken as collateral when the petitioner, as a stranger to the previous record, claims to have become incidentally interested therein after a termination of that case. Martocello v. Martocello, 197 Ga. 629, 30 S.E.2d 108 (1944).

Right of creditor to attack judgment of another creditor.

- Right of a creditor to attack the judgment of another creditor because of an alleged defect appearing on the face of the record or pleadings does not extend to irregularities previous to the judgment; the defects must be such as are not amendable. Mell v. McNulty, 185 Ga. 343, 195 S.E. 181 (1938); Adams v. Morgan, 114 Ga. App. 180, 150 S.E.2d 556, cert. dismissed, 222 Ga. 820, 152 S.E.2d 693 (1966).

Unamendable defect is prerequisite to relief.

- Rule in this section is the same as that which controls on a motion in arrest or to set aside a judgment in that the defect must be one which was not amendable. Mell v. McNulty, 185 Ga. 343, 195 S.E. 181 (1938).

Knowledge by creditor that debtor adjudicated insane.

- When the attorney for the plaintiff-creditor knew that the defendant had been judged insane at the time of obtaining the default judgment, this knowledge did not constitute such fraud or collusion as would open the judgment to collateral attack by another creditor in a proceeding in the nature of a money rule. Burkhalter v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 42 Ga. App. 312, 156 S.E. 272 (1930).

Attacking foreign judgment as procured by fraud.

- Judgment of a court of a foreign state having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties cannot be collaterally attacked in the courts of this state on the ground of fraud. Wood v. Wood, 200 Ga. 796, 38 S.E.2d 545 (1946).

While a judgment procured by fraud may be set aside for the fraud in a direct proceeding, still, if the judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties are concluded by the judgment until the judgment is set aside. Wood v. Wood, 200 Ga. 796, 38 S.E.2d 545 (1946).

Cited in Smith v. Gettinger, 3 Ga. 140 (1847); Hammock v. McBride, 6 Ga. 178 (1849); Williams v. Martin, 7 Ga. 377 (1849); Stanford & Golden v. Bradford, 45 Ga. 97 (1872); Lovelace v. Lovelace, 179 Ga. 822, 177 S.E. 685 (1934); Simpson v. Bradley, 189 Ga. 316, 5 S.E.2d 893 (1939); Boland v. Barge, 108 Ga. App. 689, 134 S.E.2d 463 (1963); Wasden v. Rusco Indus., Inc., 233 Ga. 439, 211 S.E.2d 733 (1975); Simonds v. Simonds, 145 Ga. App. 227, 243 S.E.2d 545 (1978); Albitus v. F & M Bank, 159 Ga. App. 406, 283 S.E.2d 632 (1981).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 412 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 393 et seq.

ALR.

- Effect of reversal or vacation of judgment on execution sale, 29 A.L.R. 1071.

Mental incompetency at the time of rendition of judgment in civil action as ground of attack upon it, 34 A.L.R. 221; 140 A.L.R. 1336.

Criterion of extrinsic fraud as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, as regards relief from judgment on ground of fraud, 88 A.L.R. 1201.

Power of court to award alimony or property settlement in divorce suit as affected by failure of pleading or notice to make a claim therefor, 152 A.L.R. 445.