Amendment of verdicts to obviate avoidance.

- To obviate avoidance of verdicts, verdicts may be amended to make the verdicts conform to the pleadings; and when part is illegal, that may be written off. Central R.R. v. Freeman, 75 Ga. 331 (1885).

Amendment of misnomer in judgment at subsequent court term.

- When the verdict against the defendant in attachment was in favor of "Albany Hardware & Mill Supply Company" as the plaintiff, judgment rendered thereon against the garnishee which was entered in the name of "Albany Mill Supply Company" was, at a subsequent term of court, amendable on motion of the plaintiff by striking therefrom "Albany Mill Supply Company" as the plaintiff, and substituting therefor "Albany Hardware & Mill Supply Company." Merchants' Grocery Co. v. Albany Hdwe. & Mill Supply Co., 44 Ga. App. 412, 160 S.E. 658 (1931).

Verdict of the jury should be upheld if it can be done in accordance with the law. Bob Lairsey Ins. Agency v. Allen, 180 Ga. App. 11, 348 S.E.2d 658 (1986).

Verdict not set aside when no timely objection made.

- Verdict which is not as specific as the verdict could be but which is capable of being reduced to judgment will not be set aside on appeal when no timely objection was made thereto. Todhunter v. Price, 248 Ga. 411, 283 S.E.2d 864 (1981).

Cited in Bridges v. Donalson, 165 Ga. 228, 140 S.E. 497 (1927); Nottingham v. Nicholson, 40 Ga. App. 754, 151 S.E. 533 (1930); Nelson Bros. v. Webb, 176 Ga. 842, 169 S.E. 111 (1933); Durden v. Durden, 58 Ga. App. 46, 197 S.E. 493 (1938); Davidson v. Turner, 191 Ga. 197, 12 S.E.2d 308 (1940); Rushing v. Jones, 68 Ga. App. 300, 22 S.E.2d 675 (1942); Pierson v. M. & M. Bus. Co., 74 Ga. App. 537, 40 S.E.2d 561 (1946); Johns v. League, Duvall & Powell, Inc., 202 Ga. 868, 45 S.E.2d 211 (1947); Carawan v. Carawan, 203 Ga. 325, 46 S.E.2d 588 (1948); Fields v. Fields, 203 Ga. 561, 47 S.E.2d 640 (1948); Finch v. State, 87 Ga. App. 426, 74 S.E.2d 121 (1953); Field v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 92 Ga. App. 621, 89 S.E.2d 573 (1955); Taylor v. Taylor, 212 Ga. 637, 94 S.E.2d 744 (1956); Rosenthal v. O'Neal, 108 Ga. App. 54, 132 S.E.2d 150 (1963); Georgia Power Co. v. Rabun, 111 Ga. App. 63, 140 S.E.2d 568 (1965); National Upholstery Co. v. Padgett, 111 Ga. App. 842, 143 S.E.2d 494 (1965); Moon v. Moon, 222 Ga. 650, 151 S.E.2d 714 (1966); Bateman v. Bateman, 224 Ga. 20, 159 S.E.2d 387 (1968); Bragg v. Bragg, 224 Ga. 294, 161 S.E.2d 313 (1968); McLane v. McLane, 224 Ga. 748, 164 S.E.2d 821 (1968); Norred v. Dispain, 119 Ga. App. 29, 166 S.E.2d 38 (1969); Resolute Ins. Co. v. Brayton, 119 Ga. App. 412, 167 S.E.2d 398 (1969); Davis v. State, 119 Ga. App. 740, 168 S.E.2d 784 (1969); West Ga. Pulpwood & Timber Co. v. Stephens, 128 Ga. App. 864, 198 S.E.2d 420 (1973); Fitts v. Fitts, 231 Ga. 528, 202 S.E.2d 414 (1973); Jackson v. Riviera Dev. Corp., 130 Ga. App. 146, 202 S.E.2d 545 (1973); Bradley v. Bradley, 233 Ga. 83, 210 S.E.2d 1 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486, 224 S.E.2d 168 (1976); Sturdivant v. Polk, 140 Ga. App. 152, 230 S.E.2d 115 (1976); Butler v. Butler, 238 Ga. 292, 232 S.E.2d 562 (1977); McGarr v. McGarr, 239 Ga. 640, 238 S.E.2d 427 (1977); Coleman v. Coleman, 240 Ga. 417, 240 S.E.2d 870 (1977); LeBlanc v. Easterwood, 242 Ga. 99, 249 S.E.2d 567 (1978); Chandler v. Chandler, 243 Ga. 496, 255 S.E.2d 11 (1979); Cotts v. Cotts, 245 Ga. 138, 263 S.E.2d 163 (1980); O'Neill v. Western Mtg. Corp., 153 Ga. App. 151, 264 S.E.2d 691 (1980); Brown v. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 616, 269 S.E.2d 106 (1980); Wellington v. Lenkerd Co., 157 Ga. App. 755, 278 S.E.2d 458 (1981); Swish Mfg. S.E., Inc. v. Wilkie, 158 Ga. App. 275, 279 S.E.2d 724 (1981); A.C. Gas Serv., Inc. v. Bickley, 160 Ga. App. 737, 288 S.E.2d 84 (1981); Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 174 Ga. App. 269, 329 S.E.2d 900 (1985); Rolle v. State, 177 Ga. App. 79, 338 S.E.2d 519 (1985); Chrysler Corp. v. Marinari, 177 Ga. App. 304, 339 S.E.2d 343 (1985); Fullard v. Southern Mut. Ins. Co., 191 Ga. App. 483, 382 S.E.2d 140 (1989); Redding v. State, 259 Ga. 871, 389 S.E.2d 227 (1990); Barnes v. Wall, 201 Ga. App. 228, 411 S.E.2d 270 (1991); Macon-Bibb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. J.C. Penney Co., 239 Ga. App. 322, 521 S.E.2d 234 (1999); Hewitt Assocs., LLC v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 848, 708 S.E.2d 697 (2011).

Presumptions in favor of verdict.

- Presumptions are in favor of the validity of jury verdicts. Southern Ry. v. Oliver & Morrow, 1 Ga. App. 734, 58 S.E. 244 (1907); Browning v. State, 31 Ga. App. 150, 120 S.E. 649 (1923); David v. Marbut-Williams Lumber Co., 32 Ga. App. 157, 122 S.E. 906 (1924); North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Parnell, 53 Ga. App. 178, 185 S.E. 122 (1936); Beaver v. Magid, 56 Ga. App. 272, 192 S.E. 497 (1937); Douglas Motor Co. v. Watson, 68 Ga. App. 335, 22 S.E.2d 766 (1942); Rowland v. Gardner, 79 Ga. App. 153, 53 S.E.2d 198 (1949); Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 80 S.E.2d 837 (1954); Gough v. Gough, 238 Ga. 695, 235 S.E.2d 9 (1977).

After rendition of a verdict, all evidence and every presumption and inference arising therefrom must be construed most favorably towards upholding the verdict. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 248 Ga. 114, 281 S.E.2d 579 (1981).

Jury's verdict should stand. Shuman v. Strickland Transport-Leasing Co., 203 Ga. App. 456, 416 S.E.2d 885 (1992).

Burden is on the party attacking verdict to show the verdict's invalidity. Calhoun v. Babcock Bros. Lumber Co., 199 Ga. 171, 33 S.E.2d 430 (1945); Hunnicutt v. Hunnicutt, 182 Ga. App. 578, 356 S.E.2d 679 (1987); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 193 Ga. App. 804, 388 S.E.2d 923 (1989).

Verdicts should be construed to stand if practicable. Swain v. Georgia Power & Light Co., 46 Ga. App. 794, 169 S.E. 249 (1933); Beaver v. Magid, 56 Ga. App. 272, 192 S.E. 497 (1937); Douglas Motor Co. v. Watson, 68 Ga. App. 335, 22 S.E.2d 766 (1942); Jackson v. Houston, 200 Ga. 399, 37 S.E.2d 399 (1946); Powell v. Moore, 202 Ga. 62, 42 S.E.2d 110 (1947); Rowland v. Gardner, 79 Ga. App. 153, 53 S.E.2d 198 (1949); Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 80 S.E.2d 837 (1954); Minor v. Ray, 127 Ga. App. 1, 193 S.E.2d 41 (1972); King v. Cox, 130 Ga. App. 91, 202 S.E.2d 216 (1973); Jordan v. Ellis, 148 Ga. App. 286, 250 S.E.2d 859 (1978); Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 151 Ga. App. 242, 259 S.E.2d 221 (1979); Suber v. Fountain, 151 Ga. App. 283, 259 S.E.2d 685 (1979); Herman v. Boyer, 154 Ga. App. 617, 269 S.E.2d 107 (1980).

Verdict is certain if verdict can be made certain. Giles ex rel. Jaques & Johnson v. Spinks, 64 Ga. 205 (1879); Cox v. State, 79 Ga. App. 202, 53 S.E.2d 221 (1949).

How to make verdict certain.

- Verdict may be made certain by what it contains or by the record. Rouse v. Chance & Hopkins, 27 Ga. App. 256, 108 S.E. 65 (1921); Smith v. Cooper, 161 Ga. 594, 131 S.E. 478 (1926); Swain v. Georgia Power & Light Co., 46 Ga. App. 794, 169 S.E. 249 (1933); Owen v. Anderson, 54 Ga. App. 53, 186 S.E. 864 (1936); Harrell v. Bowman, 69 Ga. App. 881, 27 S.E.2d 50 (1943); Jackson v. Houston, 200 Ga. 399, 37 S.E.2d 399 (1946); Minor v. Ray, 127 Ga. App. 1, 193 S.E.2d 41 (1972); King v. Cox, 130 Ga. App. 91, 202 S.E.2d 216 (1973).

Matters considered in construing verdict.

- Verdicts will be construed in light of the pleadings, issues made by the evidence, and the charge of the court. Harvey v. Head, 68 Ga. 247 (1881); Seifert v. Holt, 82 Ga. 757, 9 S.E. 843 (1889); Tifton, T. & G. Ry. v. Butler, 4 Ga. App. 191, 60 S.E. 1087 (1908); David v. Tucker, 140 Ga. 240, 78 S.E. 909 (1913); Browning v. State, 31 Ga. App. 150, 120 S.E. 649 (1923); McMillan v. Rodgers, 32 Ga. App. 647, 124 S.E. 354 (1924); Swain v. Georgia Power & Light Co., 46 Ga. App. 794, 169 S.E. 249 (1933); Story v. Howell, 85 Ga. App. 661, 70 S.E.2d 29 (1952); Wade v. Wade, 222 Ga. 389, 149 S.E.2d 816 (1966); Gough v. Gough, 238 Ga. 695, 235 S.E.2d 9 (1977).

Construction of verdict may be aided by consideration of pleadings and undisputed facts proved upon trial, but this rule of construction is to be resorted to only when the intent of the jury is not reasonably apparent from the language of the verdict itself. Ryner v. Duke, 205 Ga. 280, 53 S.E.2d 362 (1949).

Trial court's construction of verdict authorized.

- Trial court could find that by returning a verdict "in favor of the plaintiffs" in a medical malpractice suit brought by the parents for the wrongful death of a child, rather than "in favor of the defendant," the jury found that the doctor had breached a duty of care owed to the parents, that the doctor had been negligent, and that any contributory negligence by the mother was not the sole proximate cause of the child's death, but that the parents should not recover damages. Roberts v. Aderhold, 273 Ga. App. 642, 615 S.E.2d 761 (2005).

What constitutes sufficient verdict.

- Verdict which may, by reasonable construction, be understood, and on which legal judgment can be entered, is sufficient. Williams, Birnie & Co. v. Brown, 57 Ga. 304 (1876); Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. State, 20 Ga. App. 501, 93 S.E. 159, cert. denied, 20 Ga. App. 832, 93 S.E. 159 (1917); Swain v. Georgia Power & Light Co., 46 Ga. App. 794, 169 S.E. 249 (1933); Harrell v. Bowman, 69 Ga. App. 881, 27 S.E.2d 50 (1943); Jackson v. Houston, 200 Ga. 399, 37 S.E.2d 399 (1946).

Verdicts capable of reduction to reasonable certainty.

- Verdicts are not to be set aside for indefiniteness if capable of being reduced to reasonable certainty by an application of ordinary canons of construction. Monk-Sloan Supply Co. v. Quitman Oil Co., 10 Ga. App. 390, 73 S.E. 522 (1912).

Verdicts are to be given a reasonable intendment and are not to be rendered ineffectual when the true meaning of the finding can be readily ascertained; in every instance, a verdict should be construed in the light of the maxim that that is certain which can be rendered certain. Owen v. Anderson, 54 Ga. App. 53, 186 S.E. 864 (1936); Cox v. State, 79 Ga. App. 202, 53 S.E.2d 221 (1949).

Verdicts are to be given a reasonable intendment. Gragg v. Hall, 164 Ga. 628, 139 S.E. 339 (1927).

Verdicts are to be upheld if capable of legal intendment, construed in light of the pleadings, the issues made by the evidence, and the charge of the court; the presumptions are in favor of the validity of a verdict, and if possible a construction will be given that will uphold the verdict. Pickron v. Garrett, 73 Ga. App. 61, 35 S.E.2d 540 (1945).

Reasonable intendment.

- Even though the verdict is somewhat confused, by a reasonable intendment the verdict may stand. Horne v. Guiser Mfg. Co., 74 Ga. 790 (1885).

Although a verdict may not be explicit or definite in the verdict's terms, if its intent is apparent from the pleadings and evidence, it must be construed with reference thereto. Jones v. Empire Furn. Co., 40 Ga. App. 556, 150 S.E. 563 (1929); Nottingham v. Nicholson, 42 Ga. App. 628, 157 S.E. 118 (1931); Dunson v. Harris, 45 Ga. App. 450, 164 S.E. 910 (1932); Powell v. Moore, 202 Ga. 62, 42 S.E.2d 110 (1947); Carithers v. Carithers, 202 Ga. 596, 43 S.E.2d 503 (1947); Sheldon v. Hargrose, 213 Ga. 672, 100 S.E.2d 898 (1957); Minor v. Ray, 127 Ga. App. 1, 193 S.E.2d 41 (1972); Carlson v. Holt, 152 Ga. App. 95, 262 S.E.2d 508 (1979).

How to determine reasonable intendment.

- In determining "reasonable intendment" of jury verdicts courts look to pleadings, issues made by evidence at trial, and charge of the court. Lingerfelt v. Hufstetler, 137 Ga. App. 723, 224 S.E.2d 827 (1976).

Plain verdict must speak for itself.

- When the verdict is plain and unmistakable in the verdict's legal effect, the verdict must speak for itself, unaided by any consideration of pleadings and facts proved upon trial for construction thereof. Turner v. Shackleford, 39 Ga. App. 49, 145 S.E. 913 (1928); Ryner v. Duke, 205 Ga. 280, 53 S.E.2d 362 (1949); Jolly v. Jolly, 137 Ga. App. 625, 224 S.E.2d 807 (1976).

Verdict which is not ambiguous must speak for itself. Anderson v. Green, 46 Ga. 361 (1872).

Uncertain verdict may be void.

- Verdict which is too uncertain to be basis of valid decree is void. Taylor v. Taylor, 195 Ga. 711, 25 S.E.2d 506 (1943).

Verdict that is contradictory and repugnant is void, and no valid judgment can be entered thereon; a judgment entered on such verdict will be set aside. Pickron v. Garrett, 73 Ga. App. 61, 35 S.E.2d 540 (1945); Thompson v. Ingram, 226 Ga. 668, 177 S.E.2d 61 (1970); Four Oaks Homes, Inc. v. Smith, 153 Ga. App. 326, 265 S.E.2d 76 (1980).

Contradictory verdict argument rejected.

- In the client's action against an attorney, alleging that the attorney obtained title to the client's house by fraud, the trial court properly denied the attorney's motion for a directed verdict and allowed the jury to decide if the client failed to exercise due diligence by failing to read papers the attorney gave the client to sign, and the appellate court rejected the argument that the jury's verdict was contradictory because the jury found the attorney liable for fraud in tort but not fraud in equity. Queen v. Lambert, 259 Ga. App. 385, 577 S.E.2d 72 (2003).

Judgment must accord with intent of verdict.

- Judgment entered on verdict must follow true meaning and intent thereof; and when the judgment fails to do this and it is not possible to frame a judgment in accordance both with the true intent of the verdict and with the issues made by the pleadings, the verdict as rendered cannot be upheld. Garrett v. Wall, 29 Ga. App. 642, 116 S.E. 331 (1923).

Party could not redraft verdict.

- Jury found a breach of the duty of good faith, but did not find that a broker was the procuring cause of a lease negotiated by a corporation, or that the broker was entitled to recover in quantum meruit, which left the verdict for breach of the duty of good faith that the broker had abandoned; the broker was not allowed to redraft the verdict form that it presented to include a finding on procuring cause or quantum meruit and, thus, the corporation was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Quantum Trading Corp. v. Forum Realty Corp., 278 Ga. App. 485, 629 S.E.2d 420 (2006).

Jury may be ordered to further deliberate void verdict.

- When an inconsistent and void verdict is returned by the jury, it is proper for the judge to refuse to receive the verdict, and to require the jury to return for further deliberations. Thompson v. Ingram, 226 Ga. 668, 177 S.E.2d 61 (1970); Kemp v. Bell-View, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 577, 346 S.E.2d 923 (1986).

Facts mandating affirmance of verdict on review.

- When only question for determination regarding verdict requires consideration of the evidence, and when no transcript of the evidence is contained in the record, judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. King v. Cox, 130 Ga. App. 91, 202 S.E.2d 216 (1973).

Verdict repugnant which exonerates true culprit but punishes mere participants.

- Verdict, exonerating one defendant in a trespass suit seeking damages for timber cut who actually committed the alleged trespass, and relieving that one defendant of all liability, and assessing damages against the other defendants who participated in the alleged actual trespass only through the acts of the defendant relieved, is inconsistent, repugnant, and must be set aside as null and void. Pickron v. Garrett, 73 Ga. App. 61, 35 S.E.2d 540 (1945).

Substantial certainty to common and reasonable intent essential.

- Verdicts are to be construed in light of pleadings and evidence, and all that is essential to a valid verdict is substantial certainty to a common and reasonable intent. Short v. Cofer, 161 Ga. 587, 131 S.E. 362 (1926); Jackson v. Houston, 200 Ga. 399, 37 S.E.2d 399 (1946); Powell v. Moore, 202 Ga. 62, 42 S.E.2d 110 (1947); King v. Cox, 130 Ga. App. 91, 202 S.E.2d 216 (1973); Patterson v. Loggins, 142 Ga. App. 868, 237 S.E.2d 469 (1977).

When verdict is ambiguous and susceptible of two constructions, one of which would uphold the verdict, and one of which would defeat the verdict, the verdict will not on this account be set aside, but will be given a construction which will uphold the verdict. Atlantic & B. Ry. v. Brown, 129 Ga. 622, 59 S.E. 278 (1907); David v. Marbut-Williams Lumber Co., 32 Ga. App. 157, 122 S.E. 906 (1924); Beaver v. Magid, 56 Ga. App. 272, 192 S.E. 497 (1937); Calhoun v. Babcock Bros. Lumber Co., 199 Ga. 171, 33 S.E.2d 430 (1945); Rowland v. Gardner, 79 Ga. App. 153, 53 S.E.2d 198 (1949); Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 80 S.E.2d 837 (1954); Buck Creek Indus., Inc v. Williams-East, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 813, 204 S.E.2d 787 (1974); Brown v. Techdata Corp., 238 Ga. 622, 234 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Jordan v. Ellis, 148 Ga. App. 286, 250 S.E.2d 859 (1978); Suber v. Fountain, 151 Ga. App. 283, 259 S.E.2d 685 (1979).

Use of criminal verdict form in civil case.

- Fact that the form used by the jury in a civil case was the form generally used in criminal cases was not enough to invalidate the verdict if by inspection or by reasonable construction the court may apprehend the verdict's intendment. Haughton v. Judsen, 116 Ga. App. 308, 157 S.E.2d 297 (1967).

Surplusage and immaterial findings.

- Verdicts are to be upheld if capable of legal intendment, and surplusage or immaterial findings included may be disregarded. Tifton, T. & G. Ry. v. Butler, 4 Ga. App. 191, 60 S.E. 1087 (1908); McAfee v. Fickling & Walker Dev. Co., 123 Ga. App. 647, 182 S.E.2d 146 (1971).

Saving verdict by rejecting surplusage which causes indefiniteness.

- Maxim, "utile per inutile non vitiatur" (the useful is not vitiated by the useless), authorizes rejection of surplusage, and saves from imputation of uncertainty a verdict which is definite, complete, and certain upon rejection of the surplusage in which indefiniteness inheres. Monk-Sloan Supply Co. v. Quitman Oil Co., 10 Ga. App. 390, 73 S.E. 522 (1912); McMillan v. Rodgers, 32 Ga. App. 647, 124 S.E. 354 (1924).

Disregarding surplusage not error.

- When verdict stated "From the evidence presented we find equal negligence on the part of both parties, therefore, we conclude no verdict," judge did not err in entering judgment by disregarding words "no verdict," which were surplusage. Hales v. Sandersville Bldrs. Supply Co., 127 Ga. App. 558, 194 S.E.2d 281 (1972).

When part of verdict in complaint for land was gratuitous finding relating to establishment of a line, but was not in conflict with the first part of the verdict which was a finding in favor of the defendant, that part of the verdict upon the only issue that could have been submitted to the jury, a finding in favor of the defendant, was good and enforceable, and the remaining part of the verdict, dealing with matters not involving any issue raised by the pleadings, was beyond the legitimate province of the jury and would be disregarded as surplusage. Patterson v. Fountain, 188 Ga. 473, 4 S.E.2d 38 (1939).

Singular includes plural.

- Under common canon of construction that singular or plural number each includes the other, unless the contrary plainly appears from the context, a verdict finding in favor of "the defendant" will be construed as a finding in favor of all defendants when an action is against two or more persons. Monk-Sloan Supply Co. v. Quitman Oil Co., 10 Ga. App. 390, 73 S.E. 522 (1912); Neda Constr. Co. v. Jenkins, 137 Ga. App. 344, 223 S.E.2d 732 (1976); Carlson v. Holt, 152 Ga. App. 95, 262 S.E.2d 508 (1979).

Exception demanding construction of verdict and judgment against one defendant.

- When daughter-in-law brings trover action against the mother-in-law and father-in-law to recover the value of the automobile and the mother-in-law denied that she was in possession of the automobile and denied that she claimed any title to the automobile, thereby disclaiming any interest in the litigation, and the father-in-law admitted possession and claimed title to the automobile, and the trial court entered judgment for the daughter-in-law, the Court of Appeals, on writ of error, would construe the verdict and judgment as against the father-in-law only. Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 80 S.E.2d 837 (1954).

Verdict finding property subject to mortgage execution properly construed.

- When the only issue involved in a case was whether the particular property levied upon was subject to the plaintiff's mortgage execution, and which verdict was in the language "we, the jury, find the property of the defendant is subject to the fi. fa.," was properly construed as a verdict finding the subject property levied upon. Dunson v. Harris, 45 Ga. App. 450, 164 S.E. 910 (1932).

Verdict silent on issue of pain and suffering demonstrates intent to award the plaintiff nothing for this element of damage. McAfee v. Fickling & Walker Dev. Co., 123 Ga. App. 647, 182 S.E.2d 146 (1971).

Failure to specify amount in verdict did not render void for uncertainty a verdict for the plaintiff in an action for a stated sum and interest thereon to which there was a plea of set-off. Southern Fittings & Foundry Co. v. Warfield, 18 Ga. App. 283, 89 S.E. 376 (1916).

Dollar amount not specified but capable of calculation.

- When verdict was for amount on face of note, and for interest to date of verdict, less credits on note, and an inspection of these credits showed the amount to be deducted, leaving the verdict as a net balance, if the verdict was not certain, the verdict could easily have been made certain. Smith v. Hightower, 3 Ga. App. 197, 59 S.E. 593 (1907).

Verdict rendered on trial of consolidated issues, finding for the plaintiff a given sum, was not so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to render judgments entered therein void. Paulk v. South Ga. Bldg. & Inv. Co., 152 Ga. 646, 111 S.E. 26 (1922).

Interpretation of misnomer in verdict.

- When there is a close connection between a defendant and a corporation of which the defendant is majority owner and president, and the fact that on numerous occasions the plaintiff's rebuttal witness and on at least one occasion the plaintiff's attorney, referred to the company as "he," as if an individual defendant personified it, the reasonable intention of a verdict awarding "him" the sum of $2,000.00, when the individual owner had no counterclaim, is that the company should take $2,000.00 on one of the company's counterclaims. Buck Creek Indus., Inc. v. Williams-East, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 813, 204 S.E.2d 787 (1974).

Amount of damages capable of ascertainment.

- When measure of damages was correctly stated by the court to the jury, a new trial will not be granted because the verdict separated the amount of damage under the three heads of items named, the aggregate amount being amply supported by the evidence. Such verdict was sufficiently clear, certain, and definite. Telfair County v. Clements, 1 Ga. App. 437, 57 S.E. 1059 (1907).

Disregarding recommendation proper.

- When, upon trial of action to enjoin city from enforcing a fi. fa. for back taxes, a verdict is returned in favor of the city, but added to the verdict is a recommendation that past taxes be waived, the recommendation is purely surplusage without legal meaning or effect; and the court properly disregarded such recommendation and entered judgment in accord with the actual verdict refusing an injunction. Morrison v. Smith, 208 Ga. 521, 67 S.E.2d 577 (1951).

Restriction on verdict changes by reassembled jury.

- After jury has published verdict and dispersed, their expressions, on being reassembled, as to its intent could not change plain import and intent of the verdict. Ryner v. Duke, 205 Ga. 280, 53 S.E.2d 362 (1949).

Total principal and interest stated.

- Verdict finding a certain principal and interest and stating the total, although irregular, is not illegal. Tifton, T. & G. Ry. v. Butler, 4 Ga. App. 191, 60 S.E. 1087 (1908).

Verdict finding liability but failing to indicate an award of either no damages or a sum of damages was illegal and void since the jury's explanation of such failure indicated the jury's confusion as to the damages issue as well as the jury's intent to make some award of damages. Rucker v. Camden Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 Ga. App. 504, 353 S.E.2d 50 (1987).

When substantial justice was done, and verdict was for about the right amount, and the objection turned upon a purely technical idea, the court allowed the verdict to stand. Horne v. Guiser Mfg. Co., 74 Ga. 790 (1885).

Lump sum not void for uncertainty.

- When a verdict is supported by evidence on both counts sued on, the verdict is not void for uncertainty and ambiguity because the verdict is in a lump sum based on the two counts. Rowland v. Gardner, 79 Ga. App. 153, 53 S.E.2d 198 (1949).

Construction of verdict in trover action.

- Verdict in a trover action which reads, "We, the jury, find the property in dispute in favor of the defendant," will, at the instance of the defendant, be construed as a verdict finding for the defendant or the value of the property in the amount established by the plaintiff's affidavit for bail, which is corroborated by the plaintiff's own personal testimony upon trial. This is true although the defendant may not, prior to rendition of the verdict, have elected to take a verdict for the value of the property. Pound v. Baldwin, 34 Ga. App. 810, 131 S.E. 291 (1926).

Trespass award not excessive.

- In a trespass counterclaim, a jury's award of $22,000 properly withstood motions for relief from judgment because there was evidence to support the verdict and even if the award, which had not been specifically enumerated as general or nominal damages, was awarded as nominal damages, such damages could vary widely in Georgia and were not subject to being set aside based solely on the amount. Wright v. Wilcox, 262 Ga. App. 659, 586 S.E.2d 364 (2003).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 75B Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 1545.

C.J.S.

- 89 C.J.S., Trial, §§ 1083 et seq., 1175 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity and effect of verdict in civil action finding defendant "not guilty,", 7 A.L.R.2d 1341.

Verdict for money judgment which finds for party for ambiguous or no amount, 49 A.L.R.2d 1328.

Validity of verdict awarding medical expenses to personal injury plaintiff, but failing to award damages for pain and suffering, 55 A.L.R.4th 186.