Origin in doctrine of equitable estoppel.

- Principle underlying this section had its origin in doctrine of equitable estoppel, and, in construing it, it should be given that meaning which will accomplish the object and purpose intended to be effected by equitable estoppel. Greenwood v. McGee, 48 Ga. App. 578, 173 S.E. 468 (1934).

Estoppel arises when the defendant knowingly accepts purchase money, or directs its payment to another creditor. Parks v. Williams, 137 Ga. 578, 73 S.E. 839 (1912).

Defendant in execution may estop oneself from denying the validity of the sale by knowingly accepting a balance of the purchase money left in the hands of the officer after discharging the executions of the plaintiff in attachment, or directing its payment to another creditor, under a settlement with that creditor. Greenwood v. McGee, 48 Ga. App. 578, 173 S.E. 468 (1934).

Since the defendant was present at the sale and made no objection, the defendant thereby waived the right to afterwards deny the validity of the sale. Greenwood v. McGee, 48 Ga. App. 578, 173 S.E. 468 (1934).

Defendant bound by sale.

- When a levy entered on a fieri facias was void for uncertainty, and when the defendant in execution was present at the sale and mentally competent to consent to the sale, and did consent, and got the benefit of it in the application of the proceeds to valid judgments against the defendant, the defendant's administrator, as well as defendant personally, would be bound thereby. Greenwood v. McGee, 48 Ga. App. 578, 173 S.E. 468 (1934).

If a judgment is executed by selling the property levied on, and the defendant in execution stands by and sees the property sold and helps sell the property, the defendant is bound, not because the sale was a valid one, but because the defendant had stood by and allowed an innocent party to purchase the property without any notice on the defendant's part. Greenwood v. McGee, 48 Ga. App. 578, 173 S.E. 468 (1934).

Defendant estopped from complaining of illegal levy.

- One whose personal property was levied upon under an illegal or void process, and who not only failed to take any steps to prevent its sale thereunder, but, by one's attorney, consented to an order of court directing a speedy sale, and who was present at the sale, making no objection, and either then or previously informed others that the purchaser at the sale would get a good title, was estopped from complaining of the illegal levy and denying the validity of the sale, though one gave no express consent to the sale. Greenwood v. McGee, 48 Ga. App. 578, 173 S.E. 468 (1934).

Defendant estopped from recovering property or value from purchaser.

- When a defendant's property is levied on and properly advertised, and the defendant voluntarily brings the property to the place of sale and stands by and sees the property sold, without giving notice or raising any objection, the defendant is estopped from recovering the property or the property's value from the purchaser, though the officer as such had no legal authority to sell. Greenwood v. McGee, 48 Ga. App. 578, 173 S.E. 468 (1934).

Defendant may not bring ejectment action.

- When the execution is based upon the foreclosure of a mortgage on the property sold, and the defendant, who is present at the sale, knows the fact that the execution was not signed, and makes no objection to the sale on that account, and when, after the purchase of the property at such sale by the plaintiff in fieri facias, the defendant surrenders possession to the plaintiff, who afterwards conveys the property to an innocent purchaser for value, the defendant is bound by the sale and cannot maintain an action of ejectment for the recovery of the property on account of the property's sale under void process. Greenwood v. McGee, 48 Ga. App. 578, 173 S.E. 468 (1934).

When price result of collusion between plaintiff and defendant.

- When a plaintiff and the defendant in fieri facias make an agreement to depress the bidding at a sheriff's sale under the execution, whereby the plaintiff or a person designated by the plaintiff is to become the purchaser, although such an agreement is illegal as contrary to public policy, the defendant in fieri facias will not thereafter be heard to attack the validity of the sale by cancelling the sheriff's deed made in pursuance of the sale under such agreement on account of the consequent inadequacy of the purchase price unless the defendant is of weak mind and advantage is taken of this fact. Guthrie v. Gaskins, 184 Ga. 537, 192 S.E. 36 (1937).

Cited in Gibbs v. Golden Live Stock Co., 40 Ga. App. 808, 151 S.E. 556 (1930); Henry v. Slack, 86 Ga. App. 198, 71 S.E.2d 96 (1952).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial Sales, § 227 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 50A C.J.S., Judicial Sales, § 128.

ALR.

- Estoppel of or waiver by parties or participants regarding irregularities or defects in execution or judicial sale, 2 A.L.R.2d 6.