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Call Now: 904-383-7448the damages that may be awarded to the purchaser in any civil action shall be limited solely to the amount of the bid funds tendered at the sale plus interest on the funds at the rate of 18 percent annually, calculated daily. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, specific performance shall not be a remedy available under this Code section.
(Code 1981, §9-13-172.1, enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 413, § 1.)
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2003, "usual" was substituted for "ususal" in subsection (a).
- For survey article on real property law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (2003). For annual survey on real property, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 255 (2012).
- Legislature intended with O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1 to create a mechanism to give homeowners every opportunity to cure a default and avoid the harmful and disturbing effects of foreclosure because there is an unquestionable impact by the statute on homeowners of property in foreclosure who, prior to sale, cure the default or enter into agreements to cure the default. JIG Real Estate, LLC v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 289 Ga. 488, 712 S.E.2d 820 (2011).
- Trial court did not err by upholding the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1 because the purchaser completely failed to carry the purchaser's burden of showing that § 9-13-172.1 was unconstitutionally vague in any of the statute's applications; persons of common intelligence would have no difficulty understanding that § 9-13-172.1 in and of itself authorizes rescission of an eligible sale due to the occurrence of the bankruptcy stay in § 9-13-172.1(c) or one of the three situations set forth in § 9-13-172.1(d). JIG Real Estate, LLC v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 289 Ga. 488, 712 S.E.2d 820 (2011).
- Trial court did not err by finding that the holder of the deed to secure debt on mortgagors' property was authorized to and properly did rescind a foreclosure sale to a purchaser because O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1 authorized under clearly defined circumstances the rescission of an eligible sale. JIG Real Estate, LLC v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 289 Ga. 488, 712 S.E.2d 820 (2011).
- Rescission provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1, by their terms, allow a foreclosing lender to rescind a foreclosure sale and the memorandum of sale simply memorializes certain aspects of the foreclosure sale, thus, rescinding the foreclosure sale also rescinds the memorandum of sale. Stowers v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 317 Ga. App. 893, 731 S.E.2d 367 (2012).
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-07-05
Citation: 712 S.E.2d 820, 289 Ga. 488, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 2062, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 546
Snippet: court upholding the constitutionality of OCGA § 9-13-172.1 (authorizing the rescission of foreclosure sales
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2005-02-07
Citation: 279 Ga. 59, 608 S.E.2d 597, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 351, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 113
Snippet: of non-judicial tax sales; and, whether OCGA § 9-13-172.1 or any other statutory provision grants to the