Legislative intent.

- It was the intention of the General Assembly to provide that the general rule should be that, in all cases when a present interest in real estate was sold by a judicial officer, under any execution, the purchaser at such sale should be entitled to be placed in possession by the officer making the sale in a summary way, and thereby be saved the delay and annoyance incident to acquiring possession by an ordinary suit at law founded upon the title acquired by the officer at the sale. It is incumbent upon anyone who is attacking the right of the sheriff to dispossess the sheriff to show that the person comes within an exception. Alexander v. Holmes, 180 Ga. 397, 179 S.E. 77 (1935).

This section does not authorize writ of possession against holder of independent title. Bigelow v. Smith, 23 Ga. 318 (1857); Seymour v. Morgan, 45 Ga. 201 (1872); Strickland v. Griffin, 70 Ga. 541 (1883); Lang v. Yearwood, 127 Ga. 155, 56 S.E. 305 (1906).

To whom possession intended to be given.

- Under this section, possession is intended to be given, only as against defendant in execution, and those holding under the defendant. Voyles v. Federal Land Bank, 182 Ga. 569, 186 S.E. 405 (1936).

By "judicial officer," in this section, is meant an agent or officer of the court in making a sale under judicial orders or process so that a receiver making a sale under order of the court is in that sense a judicial officer, though the receiver's duties are ministerial; and it is the receiver's duty to put the purchaser in possession of the property so sold. Alexander v. Holmes, 180 Ga. 397, 179 S.E. 77 (1935).

Purchaser at judicial sale is ordinarily entitled to immediate possession; such right of possession in the purchaser would imply a correlative duty on the part of the defendant in fi. fa. to vacate the premises promptly on notice of the sale or on demand by the purchaser. Hunter v. Ranitz, 88 Ga. App. 182, 76 S.E.2d 542 (1953).

When applicant has made out prima facie case, the applicant is entitled to a writ of possession. Voyles v. Federal Land Bank, 182 Ga. 569, 186 S.E. 405 (1936).

Person claiming to be within exception to sheriff's right to dispossess under this section must make a showing to the court and it is for the court to decide whether or not such a showing makes the claimant exempt from summary dispossession. Voyles v. Federal Land Bank, 182 Ga. 569, 186 S.E. 405 (1936).

Court has authority to make claimant party to petition seeking possession in order to settle the rights of all parties in one action, without remitting the petitioner to a common-law action of ejectment. Voyles v. Federal Land Bank, 182 Ga. 569, 186 S.E. 405 (1936).

Federal marshal has only powers of sheriff in matters under this section. Paramore v. Persons, 57 Ga. 473 (1876).

Defendant in fi. fa. is entitled to possession when only estate in remainder was sold. Bledsoe v. Willingham, 62 Ga. 550 (1879).

Summary dispossession of lessee from grantor in security deed.

- Lessee from grantor in security deed, duly filed and recorded, can be summarily dispossessed by the sheriff for the purpose of placing in possession a purchaser of the property at a sale had under a judgment setting up a special lien upon the same, rendered in an action by the creditor on the debt secured by such deed. Voyles v. Federal Land Bank, 182 Ga. 569, 186 S.E. 405 (1936).

Title resulting from tax sale would constitute sufficient ground for court's refusing application from the holder of a security deed who, after obtaining judgment upon notes secured thereby and becoming the purchaser of the property at an execution sale made in pursuance of such judgment, applied to the superior court for an order to require the sheriff to place the applicant in possession of the property, when it appeared from the evidence that the execution of writ of possession as applied for would require the officer to dispossess another person who held the property under a valid independent title. Edwards v. Hall, 176 Ga. 632, 168 S.E. 254 (1933).

Cited in Raisin v. Statham, 22 F. 144 (S.D. Ga. 1884); Suttles v. Sewell, 105 Ga. 129, 31 S.E. 41 (1898); Hines v. Lavant, 158 Ga. 336, 123 S.E. 611 (1924); Zugar v. Scarbrough, 186 Ga. 310, 197 S.E. 854 (1938); Interstate Bond Co. v. Cullars, 189 Ga. 283, 5 S.E.2d 756 (1939); Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cobb, 236 Ga. 684, 225 S.E.2d 51 (1976).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial Sales, §§ 110, 111.

C.J.S.

- 50A C.J.S., Judicial Sales, § 106, 107 et seq.