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2018 Georgia Code 9-14-40 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 14. Habeas Corpus, 9-14-1 through 9-14-53.

ARTICLE 2 PROCEDURE FOR PERSONS UNDER SENTENCE OF STATE COURT OF RECORD

9-14-40. Legislative intent.

  1. The General Assembly finds that:
    1. Expansion of the scope of habeas corpus in federal court by decisions of the United States Supreme Court together with other decisions of the court substantially curtailing the doctrine of waiver of constitutional rights by an accused and limiting the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies to those currently available have resulted in an increasingly large number of convictions of the courts of this state being collaterally attacked by federal habeas corpus based upon issues and contentions not previously presented to or passed upon by courts of this state;
    2. The increased reliance upon federal courts tends to weaken state courts as instruments for the vindication of constitutional rights with a resultant deterioration of the federal system and federal-state relations; and
    3. To alleviate such problems, it is necessary that the scope of state habeas corpus be expanded and the state doctrine of waiver of rights be modified.
  2. The General Assembly further finds that expansion of state habeas corpus to include many sharply contested issues of a factual nature requires that only the superior courts have jurisdiction of such cases.

(Ga. L. 1967, p. 835, § 1.)

Law reviews.

- For note, "Seen But Not Heard: An Argument for Granting Evidentiary Hearings to Weigh the Credibility of Recanted Testimony," see 46 Ga. L. Rev. 213 (2011).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

This article clearly expresses a new and liberal policy on the part of the state as to entertaining habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners. Hill v. Dutton, 277 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ga. 1967).

Restrictions on right of access to court must be drawn so as to avoid unjustifiably obstructing access to the courts and be clearly warranted by the particular circumstances of each case. Howard v. Sharpe, 266 Ga. 771, 470 S.E.2d 678 (1996).

After defendant's conviction has been affirmed on appeal, habeas corpus petition is one of three available remedies.

- Petitioner's motion to vacate the conviction was not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case after the petitioner's murder conviction had been affirmed on direct appeal. The court overruled Division 2 of Chester v. State, 284 Ga. 162 (2008), which had allowed such motions under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-4, and held that in order to challenge a conviction after the petition had been affirmed on direct appeal, the petitioner was required to file an extraordinary motion for new trial, O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41, a motion in arrest of judgment, O.C.G.A. § 17-9-61, or a petition for habeas corpus under O.C.G.A. § 9-14-40. Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 686 S.E.2d 786 (2009).

Prisoner given wide latitude in filing petition.

- Under the expanded view in O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 9, the assumption is that a prisoner should have wide latitude in filing a petition for habeas corpus. Giles v. Ford, 258 Ga. 245, 368 S.E.2d 318 (1988).

Court may not prohibit filing of complaint.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-15-2(d), which permits a trial court to deny the filing of a pro se in forma pauperis complaint after determining that on its face the pleading completely lacks justiciable law or fact, was not meant to apply to habeas corpus proceedings; therefore, a court may address a petition for habeas corpus only after it has been filed. Giles v. Ford, 258 Ga. 245, 368 S.E.2d 318 (1988).

Intent to make state remedy coextensive with federal remedy.

- This article was not designed to alter longstanding criminal trial procedure rules of this state with respect to waiver, but rather to allow the courts of this state to hear and adjudicate collateral attacks of criminal convictions in as broad a fashion as the federal courts, and to make the state remedy coextensive with the federal remedy. Stewart v. Ricketts, 451 F. Supp. 911 (M.D. Ga. 1978).

This article was intended to enable state habeas corpus courts to hear all claims which a federal court would hear. Stewart v. Ricketts, 451 F. Supp. 911 (M.D. Ga. 1978).

This article expanded the scope of state habeas corpus, modified the state doctrine of waiver of rights, and gave the superior court exclusive jurisdiction to try such cases because of "many sharply contested issues of a factual nature." McCorquodale v. Stynchcombe, 239 Ga. 138, 236 S.E.2d 486, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S. Ct. 534, 54 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1977).

Habeas made more readily available.

- It was the intent of the legislature in enacting this article to make the remedy of habeas corpus more readily available to prisoners resorting to the courts of this state and to facilitate a determination in each case of the ultimate issue of the legality or illegality of the imprisonment. Johnson v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 548, 192 S.E.2d 900 (1972).

Unencumbered hearing assured.

- By its plain terms, this article assures a hearing unencumbered by the strict conditions arising from some case law in this state. Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968).

The law is an effective remedy for securing state court review of federal challenges to state convictions, and more than that, it is a legislative recognition by this state of the state's responsibilities to vindicate federally guaranteed, federally protected rights in the administration of justice. Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968).

Adjudication of guilt or innocence not authorized.

- This article has enlarged the scope of matters that will be considered on habeas corpus, but it does not authorize another adjudication of the question of guilt or innocence of the accused. Bush v. Chappell, 225 Ga. 659, 171 S.E.2d 128 (1969).

Following the statutory structure set out in law serves a triple public interest: (1) the system, if followed and faithfully applied, puts responsibility on the state; (2) it affords to the one contesting the conviction an effective remedy; and (3) it represents a mutual, even though not jointly expressed, state legislative judgment and a federal judicial comity conclusion that the rapid, explosive expansion of federal habeas cases in state convictions represents a substantial threat to the administration of justice. Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968).

Two sets of full-blown post-conviction trials not necessary.

- While it is important that federal constitutional claims may be asserted after conviction and that finally there be access to the federal court for its own independent judgment, these rights do not call for two sets of full-blown post-conviction trials; this law serves that end. Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968).

Denial of right to proceed under article to parolee as subversion of purpose.

- Statute's statement of legislative intent and purpose includes the intent to accord persons convicted in this state an adequate state remedy, and this purpose would be subverted if a state parolee were denied the right to proceed hereunder. Fox v. Dutton, 406 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916, 89 S. Ct. 1764, 23 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1969).

Cited in In re Stoner, 252 Ga. 397, 314 S.E.2d 214 (1984); Powell v. Brown, 281 Ga. 609, 641 S.E.2d 519 (2007); Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

13 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Habeas Corpus, § 1.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-14-40

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Harper v. State, 686 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 671 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 23, 2009 | 286 Ga. 216, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3645

...In order to challenge a conviction after it had been affirmed on direct appeal, criminal defendants were required to file an extraordinary motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-5-41, a motion in arrest of judgment, OCGA § 17-9-61, or a petition for habeas corpus. OCGA § 9-14-40....
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Cook v. State, 870 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 114 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2022 | 313 Ga. 471

...Wilkes, Federal and State Postconviction Remedies and Relief Handbook with Forms 7 (2014-2015 ed.)). 10 Among those states was Georgia, which in 1967 enacted the Habeas Corpus Act. See Ga. L. 1967, p. 835 (codified as amended at OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq.)....
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Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 114 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2013 | 746 S.E.2d 109, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 2206

...ally recognized proceeding to challenge a criminal conviction: a direct appeal of the conviction; an extraordinary motion for new trial, see OCGA § 5-5-41; a motion in arrest of judgment, see OCGA § 17-9-61; or apetitionfor habeas corpus, see OCGA § 9-14-40....
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Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 75 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 21, 2019

...Further, “in order to challenge a conviction after it ha[s] been affirmed on direct appeal, criminal defendants [are] required to file an extraordinary motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-5-41, a motion in arrest of judgment, OCGA § 17-9-61, or a petition for habeas corpus. OCGA § 9-14-40.” Harper v....
...whether the process in the trial court should be maintained. In particular, we do not address whether a motion for an out-of-time appeal may be categorized as an extraordinary or equitable remedy or whether the availability of habeas corpus relief, pursuant to OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq., constitutes an “adequate remedy at law.” Cf....
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Chester v. State, 664 S.E.2d 220 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 62 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2008 | 284 Ga. 162, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2401

...Consistent with this interpretation, until today our cases have held that the proper remedy for challenging a void criminal conviction was by filing an extraordinary motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-5-41, a motion in arrest of judgment, OCGA § 17-9-61, or a petition for habeas corpus. OCGA § 9-14-40....
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Simpson v. State, 292 Ga. 764 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 2013 | 740 S.E.2d 124, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 615

...“In order to challenge a conviction after it ha[s] been affirmed on direct appeal, criminal defendants [are] required to file an extraordinary motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-5-41, a motion in arrest ofjudgment, OCGA § 17-9-61, or a petition for habeas corpus. OCGA § 9-14-40.” Harper v....
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Schoicket v. State, 865 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 2, 2021 | 312 Ga. 825

...State, 290 Ga. 81, 83 (2) (a) (720 SE2d 170) (2011). 22 appeal was frustrated by the ineffective assistance of counsel, the habeas court may allow an out-of-time appeal under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq.14 In 1974, this Court held that the Act provided an adequate post-conviction remedy to a prisoner seeking relief upon a claim arising from the substantial denial of rights guaranteed by the Federal or State Constitutions or by the statute laws of the state, including, ....
...General Assembly in the Habeas Corpus Act provided an adequate remedy – and the exclusive one24 — for the right of appeal frustrated by the ineffective assistance of counsel.25 As the majority opinion intimates with its 24 See OCGA §§ 9-14-40 (a) (“The General Assembly finds that: (1) Expansion of the scope of habeas corpus in federal court by decisions of the United States Supreme Court together with other decisions of the court substantially curtailing the doctrine of waive...
...amendable defect that appears on the face of the record or pleadings.); Lay, 289 Ga. at 211 (A claim that an indictment failed to allege an essential element of the crime raised a proper ground for a motion in arrest of judgment.). 34 See OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq. 36 COLVIN, Justice, dissenting in part. After we correctly ruled in Neal v....
...virtue of a sentence imposed against them by a state court of record.”). I see no good reason to require the General Assembly to pass new legislation stating that it really meant what it said when it passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq. The law, as written, governs. In explaining the decision not to take any steps toward 38 untangling our post-conviction jurisprudence ourselves, the majority appears to be unde...
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Capote v. Ray, 577 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 15, 2002 | 276 Ga. 1, 573 S.E.2d 25, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 3412

...eterminative of the very existence of appellate jurisdiction. See McKeever v. State of Ga., supra at 446, 375 S.E.2d 899. Neither Hicks nor any other published opinion has held that this Court has jurisdiction to review habeas proceedings under OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq....
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Mitchum v. State, 306 Ga. 878 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 7, 2019

...However, this does not end our inquiry, because, as explained more fully below, the legal landscape in Georgia changed significantly with the passage of this state’s Habeas Corpus Act of 1967. See Ga. L. 1967, p. 835, codified as amended at OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq. (b) Petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus From the earliest days of the writ of habeas corpus in Georgia courts until 1967, post-conviction habeas corpus relief was available in far fewer circumstances than after the passage of the 1967 Habeas Corpus Act....
...expanding “the scope of [Georgia’s] state habeas corpus” to bring it more in line with recently developed federal habeas corpus standards, which allowed prisoners to challenge their confinement based on alleged deprivations of their constitutional rights. See OCGA § 9-14-40....
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Nix v. Watts, 664 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 2, 2008 | 284 Ga. 100, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 1842

...his Court. It is incumbent upon this Court to inquire into its own jurisdiction. Collins v. AT & T Co., 265 Ga. 37, 456 S.E.2d 50 (1995). Watts's habeas petition is governed by Article 2 of Chapter 14 of Title 9 of the Official Code of Georgia, OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq., because he is a person "whose liberty is being restrained by virtue of a sentence imposed against [him] by a state court of record." OCGA § 9-14-41....
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Chatman v. Mancill, 604 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 12, 2004 | 278 Ga. 488, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3335

...ented from re-trying Mancill for the murders. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-14-52(c), the warden of the institution in which Mancill is incarcerated filed a timely notice of appeal. One of the basic tenets of Georgia's statutory habeas corpus scheme (OCGA §§ 9-14-40 et seq.) is the "procedural default" rule: [A] failure to make timely objection to any alleged error or deficiency or to pursue the same on appeal ordinarily will preclude review by writ of habeas corpus....
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Wilkes v. Terry, 717 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 7, 2011 | 290 Ga. 54, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3426

...The issue before us is whether a properly filed petition must be transferred to another jurisdiction when the petitioner's county of detention is changed. McBurnett v. Warren, 208 Ga. 225, 66 S.E.2d 49 (1951), was decided before the 1967 enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act, OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq., which gave all superior courts of this state exclusive jurisdiction to hear such cases, see Preer, supra at 91, 610 S.E.2d 46, and Colton v....
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Jackson v. Crickmar, Warden, 860 S.E.2d 709 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 21, 2021 | 311 Ga. 870

...waiver rules,” id. at 487. See also OCGA § 9-14-48 (d). And while “a merger claim must come before the court in a type of proceeding in which criminal convictions may be challenged,” such proceedings include “a petition for habeas corpus, see OCGA § 9-14-40.” Nazario, 293 Ga....
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Thomas v. State, 727 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 24, 2012 | 291 Ga. 18, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1544

...In order to challenge a conviction after it has been affirmed on direct appeal, criminal defendants are required to file an extraordinary motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-5-41, a motion in arrest of judgment, OCGA § 17-9-61, or a petition for habeas corpus, OCGA § 9-14-40....
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Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, LLC, 724 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2012 | 290 Ga. 658

...of Lott, 251 Ga. 461, 306 S.E.2d 920 (1983). Jurisdiction of "[a]ll habeas corpus cases" (Art. VI, Sec.VI, Par. III (4)) has been construed to cover only those cases brought pursuant to OCGA § 9-14-1 et seq., in the county of incarceration and OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq....
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Powell v. Brown, 641 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 22, 2007 | 281 Ga. 609, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 188

...All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] The procedure controlling a petition for habeas corpus under this statutory scheme differs in several respects from those providing for pre-trial habeas corpus (OCGA § 9-14-1 et seq.) and post-conviction habeas corpus. OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq.
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Jones v. Henderson, 684 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 28, 2009 | 285 Ga. 804, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3060

...A prisoner whose liberty is being restrained by virtue of a sentence imposed by a state court of record may challenge his conviction and sentence through habeas corpus proceedings, generally filed in the county of incarceration, but must comply with the procedures governing such actions, see OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq....
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Bellamy v. State, 295 Ga. 119 (Ga. 2014).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 22, 2014 | 757 S.E.2d 864, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 1187

...All the Justices concur. conviction after it ha[s] been affirmed on direct appeal, criminal defendants [are] required to file an extraordinary motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-5-41, a motion in arrest of judgment, OCGA § 17-9-61, or a petition for habeas corpus. OCGA § 9-14-40.” Harper v....
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Leach v. Malcom, 292 Ga. 855 (Ga. 2013).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 29, 2013 | 742 S.E.2d 459, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1389

...” (citations omitted)). And if Leach were unable for some reason to pursue a motion in the sentencing court, he could file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the terms of his probation. See OCGA §§ 9-14-1 (c), 9-14-40 et seq....
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Capote v. Ray, 573 S.E.2d 25 (Ga. 2002).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 15, 2002

...eterminative of the very existence of appellate jurisdiction. See McKeever v. State of Ga., supra at 446, 375 S.E.2d 899. Neither Hicks nor any other published opinion has held that this Court has jurisdiction to review habeas proceedings under OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq....