CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 16, 2020 | 309 Ga. 66
...170, 174 n.10 (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, we reject Crowder’s argument that OCGA §
9-16-12 requires the State to provide personal service and service by
publication in all in rem forfeiture proceedings.
(b) Crowder also points to OCGA §
9-16-13, Georgia’s in
personam forfeiture statute, to argue that OCGA §
9-16-12,
Georgia’s in rem forfeiture statute, requires both personal service
and service by publication....
...service is made by publication and personal service has not been made,” OCGA
§
9-16-12 (c) (1) exempts an owner of real property who resides in Georgia and
was personally served from the extra time to file an answer afforded to persons
who were served only by publication.
OCGA §
9-16-13 (b) (1) and (2) provide that for in personam
forfeiture proceedings, “(1) [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
Code section,” “service of the complaint and summons shall be as
provided by subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Co...
...,
notice of the complaint for forfeiture shall be published once a week
for two consecutive weeks in the legal organ of the county in which
the complaint for forfeiture is pending. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Crowder argues that the General Assembly used the “except” clause
at the beginning of OCGA §
9-16-13 (b) (1) to create in paragraph (b)
(2) an exception to the personal service requirement contained in
paragraph (b) (1), thus explicitly allowing service by publication
under the circumstances set forth in paragraph (b) (2). He further
argues that, by extension, because there is no “except” clause at the
beginning of OCGA §
9-16-12 (b) (2), the General Assembly must
7 For purposes of Crowder’s argument, we will assume that the reference
in OCGA §
9-16-13 (b) (1) to OCGA §
9-11-4 (d), which addresses waiver of
service, is a typographical or clerical error in the statute, and that the reference
should actually be to the personal service provisions of OCGA §
9-11-4 (e).
have “carved out...
...for in rem cases,” and that, as a result, the General Assembly must
have intended for both personal service and service by publication
to be required for in rem forfeiture proceedings.
But the word “and” between paragraphs (b) (1) and (b) (2) of
OCGA §
9-16-13 undermines Crowder’s interpretation, because it
suggests that “[i]f the defendant is unknown or resides out of this
state,” the in personam forfeiture statute should be read as
requiring compliance with OCGA §§
9-16-13 (b) (1) and (b) (2)....
...Lanier 5, LLC,
299 Ga. 891, 895 (792 SE2d
680) (2016) (when different paragraphs of a statute are “set forth in
the conjunctive, compliance with each paragraph is required”).
Whatever the appropriate interplay is between the “except” clause
of OCGA §
9-16-13 (b) and the use of “and” between paragraphs (b)
(1) and (b) (2) of that Code section, we conclude that OCGA § 9-16-
13 (b) is sufficiently textually and structurally distinct from OCGA
§
9-16-12 (b) that it does not provide contex...
...proceed by a complaint in superior court under OCGA §
9-16-12. See
OCGA §
9-16-2 (2) (a “‘[c]ivil forfeiture proceeding’ means a quasi-
judicial forfeiture initiated pursuant to Code Section
9-16-11 or a
complaint for forfeiture initiated pursuant to Code Section
9-16-12
or
9-16-13”).
(d) For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Court of
Appeals was correct to conclude that OCGA §
9-16-12 (b) (3) permits
the State to serve owners and interest holders in the first instance
by publication....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 19, 2024 | 320 Ga. 426
...which says that if the state attorney fails to file a complaint for forfeiture
within 60 days from the date of seizure, “the property shall be released on the
request of an owner or interest holder, pending a complaint for forfeiture
pursuant to Code Section
9-16-12 or
9-16-13, unless the property is being held
as evidence....
