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Call Now: 904-383-7448For every right there shall be a remedy; every court having jurisdiction of the one may, if necessary, frame the other.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 3174; Code 1868, § 3185; Code 1873, § 3250; Code 1882, § 3250; Civil Code 1895, § 4929; Civil Code 1910, § 5506; Code 1933, § 3-105.)
- For article discussing the inefficiency of mandamus and impeachment as remedies for judicial inaction, see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 467 (1969). For note on defamation in radio and television, see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 450 (1964). For comment on Henson v. Garnto, 88 Ga. App. 320, 76 S.E.2d 636 (1953), regarding recovery by wife under doctrine of respondeat superior for injuries caused by husband, see 5 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (1953). For comment on Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956), recognizing child's right of action for prenatal injuries suffered prior to viability, see 8 Mercer L. Rev. 377 (1957).
Derivation of section from common law, see Tingle v. Harvill, 125 Ga. App. 312, 187 S.E.2d 536 (1972).
Section to be construed with O.C.G.A. § 44-12-21. - Former Civil Code 1910, §§ 3652 and 5508 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-3 and44-12-21), relating to rights and remedies to enforce chose in action, were construed together, and were based on the common law since the Statute of Westminister 11 (13 Edw. 1, ch. 24) was enacted. Moore v. City of Winder, 10 Ga. App. 384, 73 S.E. 529 (1912).
- Term "remedy," when properly used, signifies and is limited to the judicial means or method whereby a cause of action may be enforced, including also the application of the measure of damages appropriate to the relief sought. Hamlin v. Johns, 41 Ga. App. 91, 151 S.E. 815 (1930).
- When a person has been arrested and detained under a void warrant, the remedy is an action for false imprisonment. Wilson v. Bonner, 166 Ga. App. 9, 303 S.E.2d 134 (1983).
- Former Code 1933, §§ 3-104, 79-205, and 79-206 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 1-2-6 and9-2-3) have been in each Code of Georgia, and do not purport to change the common law with respect to the right of one spouse to sue the other. Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945).
- Former Code 1933, § 105-801 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40) which provided for a statutory cause of action for malicious prosecution of a criminal case, was not all inclusive, and did not preclude a cause of action where lunacy proceedings were instituted maliciously, in view of former Code 1933, § 3-104 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-2-3). Guth v. Walker, 92 Ga. App. 490, 88 S.E.2d 821 (1955).
- To the extent to which Ga. L. 1943, pp. 282, 283 (O.C.G.A. §§ 17-6-31 and17-6-71) fail to describe procedure by which surety may be relieved after final judgment, provisions of former Code 1933, § 3-105 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-2-3) may be resorted to. Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491, 34 S.E.2d 692 (1945).
"Single wrong" of false imprisonment is not made plural by alleging that it was made up of constituent parts: trespass, assault, and kidnapping. Wilson v. Bonner, 166 Ga. App. 9, 303 S.E.2d 134 (1983).
- Fact that a procedure to permit the modification of a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19, support order may not be in place is a matter which addresses itself to the legislature, not the courts. State v. Garrish, 197 Ga. App. 816, 399 S.E.2d 572 (1990).
Cited in Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241 (1848); Griffin & Clay v. Marshall, 45 Ga. 549 (1872); Johnson v. Jackson, 56 Ga. 326, 21 Am. R. 285 (1876); Epping v. Aiken, 71 Ga. 682 (1883); Austell v. Swann, 74 Ga. 278 (1884); Houston v. Redwine, 85 Ga. 130, 11 S.E. 662 (1890); Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890); Jones v. Crawford, 107 Ga. 318, 33 S.E. 51, 45 L.R.A. 105 (1899); Wilcox v. Ryals, 110 Ga. 287, 34 S.E. 575 (1899); Garden v. Crutchfield, 112 Ga. 274, 37 S.E. 368 (1900); Detwiler v. Bainbridge Grocery Co., 119 Ga. 981, 47 S.E. 553 (1904); Bell v. Dawson Grocery Co., 120 Ga. 628, 48 S.E. 150 (1904); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 106 Am. St. R. 104, 69 L.R.A. 101, 2 Ann. Cas. 561 (1905); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62, 51 S.E. 24, 3 Ann. Cas. 128 (1905); Southern Ry. v. Moore, 133 Ga. 806, 67 S.E. 85, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 851 (1910); Grist v. White, 14 Ga. App. 147, 80 S.E. 519 (1914); Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. Hand, 147 Ga. 588, 95 S.E. 81 (1918); Coca-Cola Co. v. City of Atlanta, 152 Ga. 558, 110 S.E. 730, 23 A.L.R. 1339 (1922); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown & Randolph Co., 154 Ga. 229, 114 S.E. 36 (1922); Strickland v. Darsey, 156 Ga. 717, 120 S.E. 7, 32 A.L.R. 974 (1923); Murray v. Miller, 157 Ga. 11, 121 S.E. 113 (1923); Clements v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 158 Ga. 764, 124 S.E. 516 (1924); Franklin v. City of Atlanta, 40 Ga. App. 319, 149 S.E. 326 (1929); Henry Talmadge & Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 170 Ga. 225, 152 S.E. 243 (1930); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Brinson v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 45 Ga. App. 459, 165 S.E. 321 (1932); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 182 Ga. 240, 185 S.E. 318 (1936); Hale v. Turner, 183 Ga. 593, 189 S.E. 10 (1936); Mayor of Savannah v. Fawcett, 186 Ga. 132, 197 S.E. 253 (1938); Robitzsch v. State, 189 Ga. 637, 7 S.E.2d 387 (1940); Wagner v. Biscoe, 190 Ga. 474, 9 S.E.2d 650 (1940); Payne v. Home Sav. Bank, 193 Ga. 406, 18 S.E.2d 770 (1942); Evans v. Brown, 196 Ga. 634, 27 S.E.2d 300 (1943); Berry v. Smith, 85 Ga. App. 710, 70 S.E.2d 62 (1952); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Glover v. Maddox, 98 Ga. App. 548, 106 S.E.2d 288 (1958); Clarke County Sch. Dist. v. Madden, 99 Ga. App. 670, 110 S.E.2d 47 (1959); American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962); Bromley v. Bromley, 106 Ga. App. 606, 127 S.E.2d 836 (1962); Calhoun v. State Hwy. Dep't, 223 Ga. 65, 153 S.E.2d 418 (1967); Housing Auth. v. Mercer, 123 Ga. App. 38, 179 S.E.2d 275 (1970); Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal, 143 Ga. App. 579, 239 S.E.2d 401 (1977); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. Smith, 163 Ga. App. 361, 294 S.E.2d 553 (1982); Hose v. Jason Property Mgt. Co., 178 Ga. App. 661, 344 S.E.2d 483 (1986); Bowling v. Gober, 206 Ga. App. 38, 424 S.E.2d 335 (1992); Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 279 Ga. App. 586, 631 S.E.2d 792 (2006).
- 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Actions, §§ 41, 43.
- 1A C.J.S., Actions, § 6 et seq.
- Rule of municipal immunity from liability for torts pertaining to governmental functions as affected by constitutional guaranty of remedy for all injuries and wrongs, 57 A.L.R. 419.
Right of resident alien who is subject of an enemy country to prosecute suit during war, 143 A.L.R. 1517.
Suits and remedies against alien enemies, 155 A.L.R. 1451; 156 A.L.R. 1448; 157 A.L.R. 1449.
Exhaustion of remedies within labor union as condition of resort to civil courts by expelled or suspended member, 87 A.L.R.2d 1099.
State lotteries: actions by ticketholders against state or contractor for state, 40 A.L.R.4th 662.
Private contests and lotteries: entrants' rights and remedies, 64 A.L.R.4th 1021.
Total Results: 6
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-10-25
Snippet: principles were eventually codified. See, e.g, OCGA §§ 9-2-3 (“For every right there shall be a remedy; every
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-07-11
Citation: 664 S.E.2d 220, 284 Ga. 162, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2401, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 621
Snippet: supra, 283 Ga. at 95, n. 1. See generally OCGA § 9-2-3 (“For every right there shall be a remedy.”). Unlike
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1999-05-03
Citation: 516 S.E.2d 66, 271 Ga. 120, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1768, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 361
Snippet: every right there shall be a remedy. . . .” OCGA § 9-2-3. However, the consequence of the majority opinion
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1990-12-05
Citation: 398 S.E.2d 369, 260 Ga. 658, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 455
Snippet: every right there shall be a remedy. . . .” OCGA § 9-2-3.3 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Clarke
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1984-01-19
Citation: 312 S.E.2d 787, 252 Ga. 36, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 592
Snippet: lengthy hospitalization and recovery period. OCGA § 9-2-3 (Code Ann. § 3-105) states: “For every right there
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1983-05-11
Citation: 303 S.E.2d 258, 251 Ga. 3, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 685
Snippet: law-making function, and is consistent with OCGA § 9-2-3 (Code Ann. § 3-105), which provides that “[f]or