O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) No private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted after July 1, 2010, unless such right is expressly provided therein. (b) Nothing in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be construed to prevent the breach of any duty imposed by law from being used as the basis for a cause of action under any theory of recovery otherwise recognized by law, including, but not limited to, theories of recovery under the law of torts or contract or for breach of legal or private duties as set forth in Code Sections 51-1-6 and 51-1-8 or in Title 13.
History
Code 1981, § 9-2-8, enacted by Ga. L. 2010, p. 745, § 2/SB 138.
Annotations
Code Commission notes. Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2010, “after July 1, 2010,” was substituted for “after the effective date of this Code section” in subsection (a). Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2010, p. 745, § 1/SB 138, not
codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Transparency in Lawsuits Protection Act.’” Law reviews. For annual survey of law on trial practice and procedure, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 339 (2010).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS No private right of action for transmitting nude photos. - Trial court erred in awarding civil damages to a girlfriend under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-90, which criminalized the transmission of photography or video depicting nudity or sexually explicit conduct of an adult without his or her consent, because it was a crimi-
nal statute that did not provide for a private right of action; further, creation of such a right from the statute would violate the separation of powers clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, and also O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8(a). Somerville v. White, 337 Ga. App. 414, 787 S.E.2d 350, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 343 (2016).
ARTICLE 2 PARTIES Cross references. Persons who may bring equitable actions, § 23-4-20.
Notes of Decisions
Bellsouth Telecomm., LLC Et Al. v. Cobb Cnty. Et Al., 802 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 23× “In 2010, 7 the General Assembly codified this presumption in OCGA § 9-2-8 (a), which provides that “[n]o private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted after July 1, 2010, unless such right is expressly provided therein.”
Somerville v. White, 787 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 14× “” 11 Furthermore, in 2010, the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 9-2-8 (a), which explicitly provides that “[n]o private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted after July 1, 2010, unless such right is expressly provided therein.”
Parm v. Nat'l Bank of California, N.A., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
· cites it 6× “Moreover, “it is worth noting that the General Assembly appears to be so concerned about the judicial creation of implied civil causes of action that it recently enacted O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8(a), which states that ‘[n]o private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted after…”
Flagg v. First Premier Bank, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
· cites it 6× “Moreover, “it is worth noting that the General Assembly appears to be so con-' cerned about the judicial creation of implied civil causes of action that it recently enacted O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8(a), which states that ‘[n]o private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted…”
Marcus W. Somerville v. Wanda W. White (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 14× “”11 Furthermore, in 2010, the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 9-2-8 (a), which explicitly provides that “[n]o private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted after July 1, 2010, unless such right is expressly provided therein.”
Rudy Aguila v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 6× “414, 417 (2016) (noting that “longstanding precedential authority” and OCGA § 9-2-8 (a) require a private right of action to be expressly provided for in the text of a statute and prohibit courts from creating implied causes of action); OCGA § 9-2-8 (a) (“No private right of…”
John C. Herzler, Jr. v. Lynn Herzler (Ga. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 5× “OCGA § 9-2-8 (a) provides that “[n]o private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted after July 1, 2010, unless such right is expressly provided therein.”
Lokin Crook v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).
· cites it 2× “414, 417-18 (1) ( 787 SE2d 350 ) (2016) (noting that “longstanding precedential authority” and OCGA § 9-2-8(a) require a private right of action to be expressly provided for in a statute’s text and prohibit courts from creating implied causes of action).”
— 9-2-8(a) — 4 cases
Parm v. Nat'l Bank of California, N.A., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
“Moreover, “it is worth noting that the General Assembly appears to be so concerned about the judicial creation of implied civil causes of action that it recently enacted O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8(a), which states that ‘[n]o private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted after…”
Flagg v. First Premier Bank, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
“Moreover, “it is worth noting that the General Assembly appears to be so con-' cerned about the judicial creation of implied civil causes of action that it recently enacted O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8(a), which states that ‘[n]o private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted…”
Lokin Crook v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).
“414, 417-18 (1) ( 787 SE2d 350 ) (2016) (noting that “longstanding precedential authority” and OCGA § 9-2-8(a) require a private right of action to be expressly provided for in a statute’s text and prohibit courts from creating implied causes of action).”
— 9-2-8(b) — 1 case
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