Debt not extinguished by statute of limitations.

- Although an action to recover a debt may be barred by the statute of limitations, the debt is not extinguished thereby as the limitation laws act only upon remedies and do not extinguish rights. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Scott, 60 Ga. App. 76, 2 S.E.2d 755 (1939); Martin v. Mayer, 63 Ga. App. 387, 11 S.E.2d 218 (1940).

Old debt, by virtue of new promise, is revived and remedy thereon restored. Comer & Co. v. Allen, 72 Ga. 1 (1883); Shumate v. Ryan, 127 Ga. 118, 56 S.E. 103 (1906).

New promise to pay or written acknowledgment of liability may revive or extend original debt. Bingham v. Advance Indus. Sec., Inc., 138 Ga. App. 875, 228 S.E.2d 1 (1976).

Writing signed by defendant, which constitutes new promise to pay, acts to revive or extend defendant's liability on the debt. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Scott, 60 Ga. App. 76, 2 S.E.2d 755 (1939).

Written acknowledgment of an existing liability constitutes a new promise to pay which revives the debt so as to recommence the running of the statute of limitations. Garrett v. Lincoln Cem., 148 Ga. App. 744, 252 S.E.2d 650 (1979).

Obligation is renewed when the same obligation is carried forward by new paper or undertaking; there may be a change of parties or an increase of security, but there is no renewal unless the obligation is the same, as what makes the renewal is an extension of time in which to discharge the obligation. King v. Edel, 69 Ga. App. 607, 26 S.E.2d 365 (1943).

Statute which applies to original demand is the statute which governs when a new promise is proven, so that an unsealed written acknowledgment or recognition of an original obligation under seal revives or extends such obligation for the period of time during which a sealed paper would run, which is 20 years. King v. Edel, 69 Ga. App. 607, 26 S.E.2d 365 (1943).

When a new promise is given, duration of statute of limitation is not determined by the nature of the new promise, but by the nature of the original obligation. Jackson v. Brown, 118 Ga. App. 558, 164 S.E.2d 450 (1968).

New promise revives debt.

- Under this section, new promise which revives a debt revives or extends the debt for a period of time during which the original debt would run. Webb v. Carter, 62 Ga. 415 (1879).

Statute runs from date of the extension.

- Agreement extending time of payment of a note, signed and acted on by defendant surety, was binding on the defendant in an action to enforce the note, and the statute of limitations ran from the date of the extension, not the original due date. Woolfolk v. Mathews, 54 Ga. App. 694, 188 S.E. 729 (1936).

Written entries on back of sealed note were equivalent to written acknowledgment of existing liability, thus extending original liability for 20 years from the date of the last of such acknowledgments. Murray v. Baldwin, 69 Ga. App. 473, 26 S.E.2d 133 (1943).

Note containing covenant not to sue was not such a new promise, within the contemplation of this section, as to revive or extend original liability for a debt which was barred by the statute of limitations. Arnold v. Johnston, 84 Ga. App. 138, 65 S.E.2d 707 (1951).

Extension of interest-bearing note carries an extension of provision to pay interest. Vines v. Tift & Co., 79 Ga. 301, 7 S.E. 227 (1887).

Renewal not a novation.

- When a new note is given in lieu of an existing note, and there is no new consideration, it does not constitute a novation, but merely revives or extends the debt. Georgia Nat'l Bank v. Fry, 32 Ga. App. 695, 124 S.E. 542 (1924); Motor Contract Div. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 76 Ga. App. 199, 45 S.E.2d 291 (1947).

Section inapplicable when payee contracts not to sue.

- This section does not apply to subsequent promise of maker of note to executor of estate of payee who had contracted never to sue maker on the note. Monroe v. Martin, 137 Ga. 262, 73 S.E. 341 (1911).

Cited in Pittman v. Elder, 76 Ga. 371 (1886); Popwell Bros. v. Lott-Lewis Co., 22 Ga. App. 695, 97 S.E. 105 (1918); Brazell v. Hearn, 33 Ga. App. 490, 127 S.E. 479 (1925); Heath v. Philpot, 165 Ga. 844, 142 S.E. 283 (1928); Cameron v. Meador-Pasley Co., 39 Ga. App. 712, 148 S.E. 309 (1929); Board of Educ. v. Southern Mich. Nat'l Bank, 184 Ga. 641, 192 S.E. 382 (1937).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 301 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 54 C.J.S., Limitation of Actions, §§ 305 et seq., 342, 344, 373.

ALR.

- Revival of debt barred by statute of limitations by realization on security deposited as collateral, 10 A.L.R. 838.

Acknowledgment, new promise, or payment by principal as tolling statute of limitations as against guarantor, 84 A.L.R. 729.

Payment, acknowledgment, or new promise by mortgagor as tolling statute of limitations as against grantee of mortgaged premises, 101 A.L.R. 337.

Restatement of fraudulent statements or reassurance of truth of original statements after other party had actual or constructive knowledge of their falsity as excusing latter's delay in bringing action or asserting counterclaim based thereon, 107 A.L.R. 589.

Bank's application of deposit or right to apply deposit against indebtedness as tolling statute of limitations as regards balance of indebtedness, 107 A.L.R. 1527.

Promise by holder of obligation to extend time for payment or not to press for payment as tolling statute of limitations, 120 A.L.R. 765.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute modifying or limiting effect of acknowledgment, payment, or other conditions to toll or extend the period of limitation with respect to mortgage foreclosure, 150 A.L.R. 134.

Insurer's admission of liability, offers of settlement, negotiations, and the like, as waiver of, or estoppel to assert, contractual limitation provision, 29 A.L.R.2d 636.

Payment by obligor on note or other instrument containing warrant of attorney to confess judgment as extending time within which power to confess may be exercised, 35 A.L.R.2d 1452.