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2018 Georgia Code 9-3-28 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 9-3-28 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 9-3-28

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 3. Limitations of Actions, 9-3-1 through 9-3-115.

ARTICLE 2 SPECIFIC PERIODS OF LIMITATION

9-3-28. Actions by informers.

All actions by informers to recover any fine, forfeiture, or penalty shall be commenced within one year from the time the defendant's liability thereto is discovered or by reasonable diligence could have been discovered.

(Laws 1767, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 563; Code 1863, § 2866; Code 1868, § 2874; Code 1873, § 2925; Code 1882, § 2925; Civil Code 1895, § 3776; Civil Code 1910, § 4370; Code 1933, § 3-714.)

Cross references.

- Determination of precedence of actions by informers to recover fine, forfeiture, or penalty, § 9-2-47.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Word "penalty" involves idea of punishment, whether enforced by civil or criminal procedure. Southern Ry. v. Inman, Akers & Inman, 11 Ga. App. 564, 75 S.E. 908 (1912).

All persons empowered to sue for penalties are treated as informers, and such actions are limited by this section. Greene v. Lam Amusement Co., 145 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ga. 1956).

Action imposing penalty as quasi-criminal proceeding.

- Action for purpose of imposing a penalty is in the nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding. Sherman & Sons Co. v. Bitting, 26 Ga. App. 299, 105 S.E. 848, cert. denied, 26 Ga. App. 801, 105 S.E. 848 (1921).

Recovery of penalty against telegraph company for failure to deliver message is governed by this section. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nunnally, 86 Ga. 503, 12 S.E. 578 (1891).

Action under Ga. L. 1906, p. 102, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 46-9-48), regulating refunding of overpayments on freight, was controlled by former Code 1895, § 3776 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-28). Central of Ga. Ry. v. Huson, 5 Ga. App. 529, 63 S.E. 597 (1909).

Penalties against railroads fixed by former Civil Code 1910, § 2755 (see now O.C.G.A. § 46-9-216) for failure to sell tickets of connecting lines were governed by former Civil Code 1910, § 4370 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-28). Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Coleman, 142 Ga. 94, 82 S.E. 499 (1914).

Action based on violation of rule of railroad commission requiring carrier to furnish freight cars was governed by this section. Southern Ry. v. Inman, Akers & Inman, 11 Ga. App. 564, 75 S.E. 908 (1912).

Treble damages for alleged violation of federal anti-trust laws are not penalty or forfeiture, but are compensatory damages. Greene v. Lam Amusement Co., 145 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ga. 1956).

This section does not apply to action by creditors against bank directors, when no fine is provided for. Neal v. Moultrie, 12 Ga. 104 (1852).

Actions under Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.

- District court erred in ruling that a former employee's improper-notification claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-28, because the employee's suit was within the one-year limitations period when the suit was filed because a Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act improper- notice claim accrued when a plaintiff either knew or should have known the facts necessary to bring an improper-notice claim, and the employee's claim did not accrue until the employee learned from a lawyer that the employee should have received notice of the employee's continuation right from the former employer. Cummings v. Wash. Mut., 650 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 2011).

Cited in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nunnally, 86 Ga. 503, 12 S.E. 578 (1891); Busbee v. Gillis, 241 Ga. 353, 245 S.E.2d 304 (1978); City Express Serv., Inc. v. Rich's, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 123, 250 S.E.2d 867 (1978).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-28

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W. Sky Fin., LLC v. State, 300 Ga. 340 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 31, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 357

...Since the rights granted by the Payday Lending Act are purely statutory, the twenty-year statute of limitation applies to claims brought pursuant to that Act. As another ground for asserting a one-year statute of limitation should apply to the State’s action pursuant to the Payday Lending Act, Defendants point to OCGA § 9-3-28, which states: “All actions by informers to recover any fine, forfeiture, or penalty shall be commenced within one year from the time the defendant’s liability thereto is discovered or by reasonable diligence could have been discovered.” Since the State was or should have been aware of its claims against the Proposed Defendants more than one year before the State sought to add them, Defendants argue the claims against Proposed Defendants are now barred by application of OCGA § 9-3-28....
...Implicit in this assertion is the notion that the State may recover only for damages dating back one year from the date the action was filed against the original Defendants, as recovery of damages beyond the one-year limitation period, if it applies, would be barred. Informer actions, the subject of OCGA § 9-3-28, are a subset of qui tarn actions, which are *362actions to recover damages on behalf of the state, as well as for the named plaintiff, for a violation of law....
...Informer actions were subject to abuse for collusion with the wrongdoer or harassment of alleged wrongdoers. As a result, statutes were passed to deter vexatious informers, including the institution of short statutes of limitation. See 529 U. S. at 775-776. By its terms, OCGA § 9-3-28, imposing a one-year statute of limitation, applies to “actions by informers.” It does not apply to actions by aggrieved parties. In Nixon v....