Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

- Four-year period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31 was applicable for purposes of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, not the 20-year period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Kason Indus. v. Component Hdwe. Group, 120 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 1997).

Section does not apply to action to cancel deed.

- Trial court erred in applying four-year statutes of limitation found in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-30 and9-3-31 to enter summary judgment on the seller's action seeking to cancel a deed because Georgia law recognized an equitable seven-year limit on suits for cancellation of deeds. Serchion v. Capstone Partners, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 73, 679 S.E.2d 40 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1642, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 781 (Ga. 2009).

No tolling due to fraud.

- In response to certified questions from a federal action which arose with respect to a mortgagee's charges that included substantial notary fees from a refinancing transaction, it was determined that even if there was actual fraud by the mortgagee, there was no tolling of limitation periods for claims of fraud and money had and received pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-25 and9-3-31 as the mortgagors could have discovered the impropriety of the notary fees by simple reference to O.C.G.A. § 45-17-11. Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 287 Ga. 448, 697 S.E.2d 166 (2010).

Fact issues on peanut and tobacco quotas.

- In a dispute involving a family farm partnership, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the children/grandchildren as to the claim regarding the peanut and tobacco quotas and assignments where certain claims were not untimely because genuine issues of fact existed as to whether a son inappropriately used a power of attorney as to the quotas and assignments and the father/grandfather sought to recover damage to personalty. Godwin v. Mizpah Farms, LLLP, 330 Ga. App. 31, 766 S.E.2d 497 (2014).

Claim not waived on appeal.

- Appellants were entitled to urge on appeal that appellees failed to show that certain legal bills fell outside the limitation period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31, even if they did not raise that specific factual argument in the trial court; the statute of limitations was an affirmative defense, and so the burden was on appellees to come forward with evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case that appellants' billing claim fell outside the limitation period. Falanga v. Kirschner & Venker, P.C., 286 Ga. App. 92, 648 S.E.2d 690 (2007).

Cited in Baker v. Boozer, 58 Ga. 196 (1877); Printup Bros. & Co. v. Smith, 74 Ga. 137 (1884); Hutcherson v. Durden, 113 Ga. 987, 39 S.E. 495, 54 L.R.A. 811 (1901); Raleigh & G.R.R. v. Western & Atl. R.R., 6 Ga. App. 616, 65 S.E. 586 (1909); Crawford v. Crawford, 134 Ga. 114, 67 S.E. 673, 28 L.R.A. (n.s.) 353, 19 Ann. Cas. 932 (1910); Hicks v. Moyer, 10 Ga. App. 488, 73 S.E. 754 (1912); Harris v. Black, 143 Ga. 497, 85 S.E. 742 (1915); Endsley v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 37 Ga. App. 439, 140 S.E. 386 (1927); Arnold v. Rogers, 43 Ga. App. 390, 159 S.E. 136 (1931); King v. Patellis, 181 Ga. 157, 181 S.E. 667 (1935); Patellis v. King, 52 Ga. App. 118, 182 S.E. 808 (1935); Hendryx v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 79 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1935); Muse v. Connell, 62 Ga. App. 296, 8 S.E.2d 100 (1940); Smith v. Aldridge, 192 Ga. 376, 15 S.E.2d 430 (1941); Rigdon v. Barfield, 194 Ga. 77, 20 S.E.2d 587 (1942); Greene v. Lam Amusement Co., 145 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ga. 1956); Bankers Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 104 Ga. App. 894, 123 S.E.2d 433 (1961); Schimmel v. Greenway, 107 Ga. App. 257, 129 S.E.2d 542 (1963); Pope v. Ledbetter, 108 Ga. App. 869, 134 S.E.2d 873 (1964); Quinn v. Forsyth, 116 Ga. App. 611, 158 S.E.2d 686 (1967); Robinson v. Bomar, 122 Ga. App. 564, 177 S.E.2d 815 (1970); Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Stone v. Ridgeway, 136 Ga. App. 264, 220 S.E.2d 722 (1975); Hudnall v. Kelly, 388 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Mooney v. Tallant, 397 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Champion v. Wells, 139 Ga. App. 759, 229 S.E.2d 479 (1976); Webb v. Murphy, 142 Ga. App. 649, 236 S.E.2d 840 (1977); Benning Constr. Co. v. Lakeshore Plaza Enters., Inc., 240 Ga. 426, 241 S.E.2d 184 (1977); Laine v. Wright, 586 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1978); Cash v. Armco Steel Corp., 462 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Shannon v. Thornton, 155 Ga. App. 670, 272 S.E.2d 535 (1980); Ballenger Corp. v. Dresco Mechanical Contractors, 156 Ga. App. 425, 274 S.E.2d 786 (1980); Taylor v. Greiner, 156 Ga. App. 663, 275 S.E.2d 737 (1980); Hanson v. Aetna Life & Cas., 625 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1980); Murray v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1980); U-Haul Co. v. Abreu & Robeson, Inc., 247 Ga. 565, 277 S.E.2d 497 (1981); Smith v. Griggs, 164 Ga. App. 15, 296 S.E.2d 87 (1982); Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 298 S.E.2d 25 (1982); Gibson v. Home Folks Mobile Home Plaza, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 1211 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Hill v. Crabb, 166 Ga. App. 387, 304 S.E.2d 510 (1983); Growth Properties of Fla., Ltd. v. Wallace, 168 Ga. App. 893, 310 S.E.2d 715 (1983); Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1983); Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Owen v. Mobley Constr. Co., 171 Ga. App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 255 (1984); Long v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 172 Ga. App. 564, 323 S.E.2d 868 (1984); Brooks v. Freeport Kaolin Co., 253 Ga. 678, 324 S.E.2d 170 (1985); Equitable Bank v. Brown, 177 Ga. App. 776, 341 S.E.2d 300 (1986); Cole v. Smith, 182 Ga. App. 59, 354 S.E.2d 835 (1987); Washburn v. Sardi's Restaurants, 191 Ga. App. 307, 381 S.E.2d 750 (1989); Radcliffe v. Founders Title Co., 720 F. Supp. 170 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Broadfoot v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 297, 393 S.E.2d 39 (1990); Stiefel v. Schick, 260 Ga. 638, 398 S.E.2d 194 (1990); White v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 197 Ga. App. 780, 399 S.E.2d 526 (1990); Pruitt v. Carpenters' Local Union 225, 893 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1990); Aldridge v. Lily-Tulip, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Ga. 1990); Hartley v. Gago, 202 Ga. App. 770, 415 S.E.2d 510 (1992); Lloyd v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 211 Ga. App. 247, 438 S.E.2d 703 (1993); McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 837 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D. Ga. 1993); Mikart, Inc. v. Marquez, 211 Ga. App. 209, 438 S.E.2d 633 (1994); Johnson v. Hardwick, 212 Ga. App. 44, 441 S.E.2d 450 (1994); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 216 Ga. App. 384, 454 S.E.2d 587 (1995); Lee v. Gore, 221 Ga. App. 632, 472 S.E.2d 164 (1996); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1998); Joiner v. Gold Kist, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 621, 514 S.E.2d 39 (1999); Howard v. McFarland, 237 Ga. App. 483, 515 S.E.2d 629 (1999); AAA Truck Sales, Inc. v. Mershon Tractor Co., 239 Ga. App. 469, 521 S.E.2d 403 (1999); Cotton v. NationsBank, N.A., 249 Ga. App. 606, 548 S.E.2d 40 (2001); Majeed v. Randall, 279 Ga. App. 679, 632 S.E.2d 413 (2006); Hook v. Bergen, 286 Ga. App. 258, 649 S.E.2d 313 (2007); Cochran Mill Assocs. v. Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241, 648 S.E.2d 764 (2007); McKesson Corp. v. Green, 299 Ga. App. 91, 683 S.E.2d 336 (2009).

Applicability of section to actions based on fraud.

- As to mere action for damages for fraud or duress, period of limitation is the same as that for recovery of personal property, namely, four years. O'Callaghan v. Bank of Eastman, 180 Ga. 812, 180 S.E. 847 (1935); Shapiro v. Southern Can Co., 185 Ga. App. 677, 365 S.E.2d 518 (1988).

This section, applicable generally to actions for injuries to personalty, applies to actions based on fraud. McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979).

Four-year period of limitations applies to actions seeking damages for fraud. McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 782 F. Supp. 1548 (M.D. Ga. 1992).

Four-year statute of limitation governs actions for fraud and negligent misrepresentation; an action predicated on alleged misrepresentations made by a city to a mechanic more than five years before suit was filed was time barred, and the trial court properly entered summary judgment for the city on the mechanic's fraud claim. Willis v. City of Atlanta, 265 Ga. App. 640, 595 S.E.2d 339 (2004).

Action to recover damages sustained in consequence of fraudulent representations and concealment made by defendant is governed by this section. Turpentine & Rosin Factors, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 45 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Ga. 1942).

Fraud and deceit inducing purchase.

- This section applies to action for fraud and deceit inducing purchase of worthless stock. Frost v. Arnaud, 144 Ga. 26, 85 S.E. 1028 (1915).

This section applies to action for fraud and deceit inducing purchase of property. Phipps v. Wright, 28 Ga. App. 164, 110 S.E. 511 (1922).

Suit alleging fraudulent inducement in the purchase of property is an action for injury to property, and the four-year statute of limitation contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31 is applicable. Kerce v. Bent Tree Corp., 166 Ga. App. 728, 305 S.E.2d 462 (1983).

Common-law fraud.

- Four-year limitations period is applicable to common-law fraud. Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419 (11th Cir. 1983).

Applicability to actions under blue sky statute.

- Action under the Georgia blue sky statute is the more closely analogous action to a cause of action asserted for misrepresentation under the federal Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., and the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(d) governs the timeliness of plaintiffs' actions, rather than the four-year statute of limitations applicable to common-law fraud. Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419 (11th Cir. 1983).

False or deceptive representations relating to insurance policy.

- Action for damages resulting from failure to fully inform individual of right to convert insurance policy, from giving of false information regarding cancellation or termination of insurance, and from evasive and deceptive conduct preventing filing of proofs of disability and death was in the nature of an action for deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation sounding in tort, and whether looked at as an injury to property or to the person it was barred in four or two years, respectively. Turpentine & Rosin Factors, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 45 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Ga. 1942).

Loss of services.

- This section applies to action for loss of services. Frazier v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 101 Ga. 70, 28 S.E. 684 (1897); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934).

Damage sustained by father for loss of services of minor child is damage to a property right, and action for damages thus arising may be brought within four years. Bainbridge Power Co. v. Ivey, 33 Ga. App. 586, 144 S.E. 825 (1928).

Interference with right to follow profession.

- Right to follow one's profession is a property right, and cause of action based on interference with this right is subject to four year limitation of this section. Woods v. Local 613, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 404 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Injury to bailed property.

- This section applies to action for injury to property held by bailee. Raleigh & G.R.R. v. Western & Atl. R.R., 6 Ga. App. 616, 65 S.E. 586 (1909).

Conversion of money by vendor.

- In action by assignee of purchaser against vendor for alleged collection and conversion of money, the period of limitations is four years. Williams v. Parsons, 50 Ga. App. 122, 177 S.E. 257 (1934).

Negligent construction of footing for a house.

- In an action based on seller's fraudulent concealment of gross negligence in the construction of a footing for a house, the evidence supported a finding of buyer's due diligence in discovering, eight years after the purchase, the result which was settling of the house. Ramey v. Leisure, Ltd., 205 Ga. App. 128, 421 S.E.2d 555, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 421 S.E.2d 555 (1992).

Claim for damage to personal property accrued on the date of the fire which damaged the personal property and was governed by a four-year statute of limitation; a suit alleging that a subcontractor negligently installed electrical wiring in a house, thus causing a fire, accrued on the date of the fire as to the personal property damaged in the fire, not on the date of substantial completion of the house, and as suit was filed within the limitation period, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment on the claim for damage to personalty. Stamschror v. Allstate Ins. Co., 267 Ga. App. 692, 600 S.E.2d 751 (2004).

Fraud in pool construction not shown.

- Homeowner's claims against a contractor for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud, brought more than six years after construction of a swimming pool was complete, were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Another contractor's affidavit that the contractor's statements to the owner regarding the structural integrity of the pool were false was insufficient to prove fraud by the contractor. Smith v. Hilltop Pools & Spas, Inc., 306 Ga. App. 881, 703 S.E.2d 424 (2010).

Injury to personalty caused by seller's negligence.

- This section applies when injury to personalty is caused by seller's negligence as opposed to breach of warranty. Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31).

Damage to county from commissioners' negligence.

- Limitation for action for loss or damage resulting to county by negligent actions of county commissioners in good faith would be four years from the date of such acts. Gwinnett County v. Archer, 102 Ga. App. 821, 118 S.E.2d 102 (1960).

Fraud involving sale of stock.

- Common-law fraud claim, governed by four-year statute of limitations, was not reduced to the two-year period applicable to violations of securities laws simply because the alleged fraud involved the sale of stock. Stricker v. Epstein, 213 Ga. App. 226, 444 S.E.2d 91 (1994).

Federal securities law violations.

- This section is applicable to an action under section 10(b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ga. 1972).

Two-year limitation period in Ga. L. 1974, p. 284, § 16 (see now O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14), rather than four-year limitation period of former Code 1933, § 3-1002 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31) applied to federal security cases. Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 47 (N.D. Ga. 1978).

Four-year period of limitations applicable to action under this section, and not two-year limitation applicable to actions brought under former section 13 of Georgia Securities Act of 1957, (Ga. L. 1957 p. 134), applies to causes of action alleged under both section 10(b) and section 7 of the federal Securities Exchange Act, (15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.). McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979).

Actions for recovery of personalty were governed by Ga. L. 1855-56, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-32), and not former Civil Code 1910, § 4496 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31). Hicks v. Moyer, 10 Ga. App. 488, 73 S.E. 754 (1912).

This section does not apply to action to recover mortgage notes and security deed to realty which were wrongfully transferred as collateral for another debt. Cross v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 160 Ga. 647, 128 S.E. 898 (1925).

Amended claim not barred.

- When complaint alleging conspiracy to defraud was amended to allege that company receiver defendant in original complaint had sold company property for well under fair market value, had failed to obtain and preserve accurate inventory of property, had failed to have property appraised or advertised, and had failed to take bids thereon, amended claim arose out of same transaction as preamended claim and was not barred by this section, having been constructively filed on the filing date of the preamended complaint. McLaughlin Lumber Co. v. Cohen, 246 Ga. 590, 272 S.E.2d 319 (1980).

Accrual of right of action determinative.

- Point from which statute of limitations began to run under former Code 1933, § 3-1002 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31) when right of action accrued, not when act or omission occurred, as would be the case under Ga. L. 1976, p. 1363, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71), relating to malpractice. Simons v. Conn, 151 Ga. App. 525, 260 S.E.2d 402 (1979).

In copyright infringement action, a customer's counterclaims for false endorsement and unjust enrichment were timely under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31 because the false endorsement continued to occur until the copyright owner removed the objectionable material from its website. SCQuARE Int'l, Ltd. v. BBDO Atlanta, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

Test to be generally applied in determining when statute of limitations begins to run against tort action is whether act causing damage is in and of itself an invasion of some right of plaintiff, and thus constitutes legal injury and gives rise to a cause of action. Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934).

Subsequent damage from act which is not tortious.

- If act complained of does not in and of itself constitute invasion of some legal right, but recovery is sought only on account of damage subsequently accruing from and consequent upon act not in itself tortious, cause of action will be taken to accrue and the statute begins to run only when resultant damage is sustained. Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934).

Act constituting legal injury to plaintiff.

- If act causing damage is of itself unlawful, in sense that it constitutes legal injury to plaintiff and is thus a completed wrong, cause of action accrues and statute begins to run from time such act is committed, however slight the damage then may be. Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934).

When chapter 13 debtors failed to schedule the debtors' claim against the defendant credit union as an asset, and failed to bring the claim within four years after the triggering event, the death of debtor wife's former husband, as required by O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-31 and9-3-32, summary judgment on judicial estoppel and limitations grounds was proper. Kirton v. Fort Stewart Federal Credit Union (In re Carroll), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. June 26, 2001).

Limited partners' claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

- Claims by limited partners in a real estate investment limited partnership that the general partners had breached their fiduciary duty by making material misrepresentations and omissions about net sales proceeds for 13 years were time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31; the first communication was in 1987, and the action had been brought more than four years after that date, and the limitation period was not tolled under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 because the limited partners had been on notice of the true contents of the partnership agreement the entire time and thus had always had proper notice of the information necessary to determine the truth. Hendry v. Wells, 286 Ga. App. 774, 650 S.E.2d 338 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1835, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 102 (Ga. 2008).

Accrual of actions.

- Cause of action for damages to personalty accrues (within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31) at the time of injury. Hanna v. McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648, 446 S.E.2d 741 (1994).

Evidence did not show that a limited liability company (LLC) which bought land from a city in 1994 and agreed to pay $125,000 for the land and an additional one percent of its profits up to $1 million did anything to conceal its profitability or business plans from the city at the time it bought the land, and the trial court ruled correctly that a claim alleging fraudulent concealment which the city filed after the LLC paid $125,000 but no more because it did not make a profit was governed by the four-year statute of limitations and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 because there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment; thus, the city's claim was time barred. City of McCaysville v. Cardinal Robotics, LLC, 263 Ga. App. 847, 589 S.E.2d 614 (2003).

Because a plaintiff alleged that the defendant, an investment advisory company, committed a breach of fiduciary duty by collecting management fees for certain stock after the stock was categorized as an unmanaged asset, and the categorization occurred some time between March 31, 2001, and June 20, 2001, the plaintiff's claim accrued within four years of the date of the filing of the complaint and was therefore timely; regardless of whether a four-year or a six-year statute of limitation period was applied, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment as to that particular claim on the ground that the claim was time-barred. Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga. App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779 (2007).

Cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty accrues each time the defendant commits a wrongful act that causes appreciable damage. Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga. App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779 (2007).

Plaintiff borrower's fraud claims against defendant lenders, in connection with an alleged long-term tax-favorable loan failed under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31's four year statute of limitations (S/L) because the limitations period began when the assumption agreement was signed but the suit was not filed until almost 6 years later, and, at the very latest, if O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 applied to toll the limitations period, the S/L began to run nearly five years earlier when repayment was demanded only one year after the loan was made. Curtis Inv. Co., LLC v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG, F.3d (11th Cir. 2009).

Creditor's nondischargeability complaint against a debtor failed as a matter of law when there was no enforceable debt to except from the debtor's bankruptcy discharge because the creditor failed to file a suit against the debtor within four years after the debtor missed the date agreed upon for repayment in the oral contract between the parties. Even if the contract was entered into fraudulently, the same limitations period applied, and the statute began to run from the date the fraud was discovered, which was also the date of initial default on repayment of the loan. Stinson v. Robinson (In re Robinson), 525 Bankr. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015).

Fraud case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations because the plaintiff's failure to timely answer requests for admission conclusively established that the plaintiff became aware of the fraud in 2000 at the latest; thus, the suit was well outside Georgia's applicable four-year statute of limitations. Watkins v. Capital City Bank, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018)(Unpublished).

Generally, in tort action statute of limitation begins to run when damage from tortious act is actually sustained. Hunt v. Star Photo Finishing Co., 115 Ga. App. 1, 153 S.E.2d 602 (1967).

Running of statute on continuing tort.

- In action for continuing tort, statute of limitations runs from happening of any given injury. Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Successive recoveries for successive injuries.

- When a nuisance is found in a permanent structure, and its construction and continuance are not necessarily injurious, but may or may not be so, there may be as many successive recoveries as there are successive injuries; in such case, statute of limitations begins to run from happening of injury complained of. Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Suspension of bar by willful fraud.

- When willful fraud was committed, former Civil Code 1910, § 4380 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96) may suspend bar of former Civil Code 1910, § 4496 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31). McCraine v. Bank of Willacoochee, 29 Ga. App. 552, 116 S.E. 202, cert. denied, 29 Ga. App. 800 (1923).

When actual fraud is the gravamen of the underlying action, no independent fraud is required for tolling of the statute of limitation, and the limitation period is tolled until the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the fraud. Hahne v. Wylly, 199 Ga. App. 811, 406 S.E.2d 94 (1991).

Statute of limitations did not bar a declaratory judgment action pertaining to a life insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs; since the plaintiffs contended that there was actual fraud in the procurement of the life insurance policy in question, and the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until the plaintiffs discovered that their premiums had been fraudulently raised in contradiction to the terms to which they had agreed and paid for or until they could have reasonably discovered the alleged fraud. GE Life & Annuity Assur. Co. v. Donaldson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (M.D. Ga. 2002).

Statute of limitations did not bar a declaratory judgment action pertaining to a life insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff; since the plaintiff contended that there was actual fraud in the procurement of the life insurance policy, the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until the plaintiff discovered the premium structure and cash value concepts were fraudulently represented at the time of sale, and the plaintiff could not have discovered the alleged fraud until the plaintiff was contacted by the attorney about other policies sold to other counterclaim plaintiffs. GE Life & Annuity Assur. Co. v. Barbour, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (M.D. Ga. 2002).

Statute of limitations did not bar a class action against an insurance company arising from life insurance policies issued by the company; as the plaintiff contended that there was actual fraud in the procurement of the life insurance policies in question, and the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until the plaintiff discovered that the premiums had actually been raised in contradiction to the terms to which plaintiff had agreed and paid for or when plaintiff could have reasonably discovered the alleged fraud. McBride v. Life Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (M.D. Ga. 2002).

Statute of limitations did not bar a declaratory judgment action pertaining to a life insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff; since the plaintiff contended that there was actual fraud in the procurement of the life insurance policy in question, and the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until the plaintiff discovered that the premiums had been fraudulently raised in contradiction to the terms to which the plaintiff had agreed and paid for or until the plaintiff could have reasonably discovered the alleged fraud. GE Life & Annuity Assur. Co. v. Combs, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (M.D. Ga. 2002).

Statute of limitations did not bar a declaratory judgment action pertaining to life insurance policies issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs; since the plaintiffs contended that there was actual fraud in the procurement and replacement of the life insurance policies, the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until the plaintiffs discovered that the initial premiums stated in the policies would not in fact sustain the policies in the future, and the plaintiffs could not have discovered the alleged fraud until the date the plaintiffs received notification that the policies had not actually sustained themselves. GE Life & Annuity Assur. Co. v. Barbour, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (M.D. Ga. 2002).

Actual fraud, through nondisclosure of a known injury or through acts to conceal the injury, which deters or debars the bringing of the action tolls the running of the statute of limitations until discovery of the fraud; when actual fraud is the gravamen of the underlying action, no independent fraud is required for tolling of the statute of limitation, and the limitation period is tolled until the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the fraud. When evidence existed that a decedent concealed the true nature of certain financial transactions that could have been designed to defraud the decedent's creditors, the statute of limitation would not have begun to run until the cause of action should have been discovered, and summary judgment was not proper on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitation. Miller v. Lomax, 266 Ga. App. 93, 596 S.E.2d 232 (2004).

Due diligence to discover fraud.

- Summary judgment against sellers based on the statute of limitations was denied since failure to exercise reasonable diligence to discover an alleged fraud may be excused if a relationship of trust and confidence existed between the parties and the sellers had presented evidence such that a jury could determine that the purchaser was in a confidential relationship with the heirs to the land. McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 782 F. Supp. 1548 (M.D. Ga. 1992).

In an action by borrowers claiming that the lender defrauded the borrowers by charging an excessive notary fee, the district court did not err in dismissing, on statute of limitations grounds, the fraud claim, which was brought more than five years after the borrowers signed the loan agreement because, even assuming the lender's conduct constituted actual fraud, Georgia's Supreme Court, in response to a certified question, declined to allow equitable tolling because the borrowers could have discovered the discrepancy between the notary fee statute and the actual fee charged at any time by simple reference to the notary fee statute. Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 626 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2010).

Townhome buyers' fraud and Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA) claims against a seller were barred by the four-year statute of limitations for fraud, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31, and the three-year statute of limitations for ILSA violations, 15 U.S.C. § 1711; the buyers were on notice when the closing did not take place in 2003, and certainly when the closing did not occur by 2006, that something was wrong and should have discovered any alleged violations of ILSA. Allmond v. Young, 314 Ga. App. 230, 723 S.E.2d 691 (2012).

Certain of plaintiff's claims for fraud, conversion, and breach of oral contract arose outside of the four-year statute of limitation, and the undisputed facts showed that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the defendant's alleged fraud as to a certain account as the defendant was put on notice of the account when the defendant received two personal checks issued from that account, endorsed and cashed the checks, but never inquired as the checks' source. Hot Shot Kids Inc. v. Pervis (In re Pervis), 497 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013).

Court did not err in dismissing the tax advisor's claims as time-barred because the advisor filed the complaint long after the limitations periods governing the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and Georgia RICO claims had expired, and the advisor had not plausibly alleged that the advisor exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the causes of action and thus could not have invoked tolling where the advisor received direct information that conflicted with the bank entities' representation that the tax shelter transactions at issue had economic substance, the advisor did not explain how the advisor exercised reasonable diligence in light of that notice, and the advisor did not explain why the advisor could not have sued earlier. Klopfenstein v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014)(Unpublished).

Tolling due to fraud.

- In a negligent misrepresentation case wherein a trustee obtained a $10 million verdict against an accounting firm, the evidence authorized the jury to find that the firm's fraud prevented the trustees from discovering the trusts' cause of action until January 2002, despite reasonable diligence and, therefore, the claim was properly filed within four years after the beginning of the limitation period. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP v. Bassett, 293 Ga. App. 274, 666 S.E.2d 721 (2008).

Summary judgment was properly granted for the insurer because the insured's complaint fell outside the four-year statute of limitation for fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Nash v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 266 Ga. App. 416, 597 S.E.2d 512 (2004).

Mere ignorance of facts constituting cause of action does not prevent running of statute of limitations. Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934).

Mere ignorance of facts constituting cause of action does not prevent running of statute of limitations for plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of existence of cause of action. Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga. App. 755, 250 S.E.2d 155 (1978).

Date of discovery of wrong.

- When plaintiff discovered in 1926 that proceeds from sale of bonds which the plaintiff had intended to be applied to payment of a promissory note had never been accounted for by the bank, but did not bring action until 1931, such action was barred by the statute of limitations, which ran against the plaintiff from the date of discovery of the wrong, whether the action was brought in tort or in contract. Wall v. Middle Ga. Bank, 180 Ga. 431, 179 S.E. 363 (1935).

Accrual of cause based on negligent misrepresentations.

- In a claim for economic injury sustained due to a reliance upon false information negligently provided by a defendant, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suffers pecuniary loss with certainty, and not as a matter of pure speculation. Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 267 Ga. 424, 479 S.E.2d 727 (1997).

Fraud and deceit inducing agreement.

- Teacher's fraudulent inducement claim against a school district arising from an agreement entered into between the parties with respect to the teacher's resignation was barred by the four-year statute of limitations pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31; although the limitation period could be tolled pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 if the teacher was "debarred or deterred" from filing suit because of the district's fraud, the teacher failed to show the existence of facts that would toll the limitations period. Kaylor v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 267 Ga. App. 647, 600 S.E.2d 723 (2004).

Accrual of cause for fraudulent inducement to contract.

- Cause of action for fraudulent inducement to execute a contract accrues when contract is executed, and action not commenced until more than four years after the date of such execution is barred by this section unless it falls within an exception to the general rule. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Green, 142 Ga. App. 770, 237 S.E.2d 10 (1977).

Claim of fraudulent inducement in the execution of a contract accrues on the date of the execution of the contract. Kerce v. Bent Tree Corp., 166 Ga. App. 728, 305 S.E.2d 462 (1983).

Cause of action for fraudulent inducement to enter an employment contract and lease accrued when the employee became aware of alleged fraud, assuming, arguendo, that the employer's fraud debarred or deterred the employee from bringing the action. Smith v. Alimenta Processing Corp., 197 Ga. App. 57, 397 S.E.2d 444 (1990).

Since the individual's fraud in the inducement claim against a corporation was time-barred pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the corporation was affirmed. Bridge Capital Investors II v. Small, F.3d (11th Cir. July 12, 2005)(Unpublished).

Claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation not barred.

- Complaint did not show with certainty that the mortgagor's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation were barred by the statute of limitation and the trial court, therefore, erred when the court dismissed those claims. Mbigi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 336 Ga. App. 316, 785 S.E.2d 8 (2016).

Tolling due to bankruptcy filing.

- Debtor's claim for property damages resulting from a wrongful foreclosure was not time barred because the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection within four years of the date of the foreclosure and the filing of the bankruptcy petition tolled the statute of limitations. McDaniel v. SunTrust Bank (In re McDaniel), 523 Bankr. 895 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2014).

Claims brought under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Georgia Uniform Limited Partnership Act, and common-law fraud were not barred by the four-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31, which was tolled by the Georgia fraud discovery rule (O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96). Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Ga. 1984), modified on other grounds, 835 F.2d 780 (11th Cir. 1988).

Accrual of cause for negligent design and manufacture.

- In action for damages resulting from negligent design and manufacture of kiln, statute of limitations begins to run when thing constructed is first installed, and not when it causes damage to plaintiff. Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Four-year limitation period ran from last work performed on a building, when the last work constituted "substantial completion." Broadfoot v. Citizens S. Nat'l Bank, 208 Ga. App. 382, 430 S.E.2d 638 (1993).

Period not expired.

- Despite the closing attorney's argument to the contrary, the statute of limitations for fraud did not bar the alleged client's fraud claim against the closing attorney regarding the alleged client's sale of timber from the father's estate as the four-year limitations period was tolled and did not start running until the alleged fraud was discovered or should have been discovered; since the alleged client's fraud claim was brought within four years of that time, the client's claim was not time-barred. Mays v. Askin, 262 Ga. App. 417, 585 S.E.2d 735 (2003).

Investor's suit not time barred.

- Despite the three individual principals' claims that the investor's lawsuit against them was for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and was barred by a statute of limitation, the investor's lawsuit was for injury to personalty and was not time barred as the evidence showed that the jury considered only items of compensatory damages that accrued within the applicable four-year statute of limitations period that occurred prior to the filing of the complaint. Kothari v. Patel, 262 Ga. App. 168, 585 S.E.2d 97 (2003).

Trustees failed to exercise minimal degree of due diligence to discover claims.

- Dismissal of the trustees' claims as time barred was upheld because the trustees conceded that, despite signing numerous documents as trustees of the marital trust, the trustees made no attempt at all to obtain information the trustees were legally entitled to in that capacity, thus, the trustees failed to exercise even a minimal degree of due diligence to discover their claims as a matter of law. Rollins v. LOR, Inc., 345 Ga. App. 832, 815 S.E.2d 169 (2018).

Evidence barred because of the statute of limitations.

- Trial court properly excluded the pre-purchase promises made by a seller to the purchasers regarding the maintenance of a dam because the alleged promises occurred prior to the applicable four-year statute of limitation. Bishop Eddie Long Ministries, Inc. v. Dillard, 272 Ga. App. 894, 613 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

Rescission of contract action time-barred.

- Trial court properly dismissed a firefighter's action against a city, as an employer, and a firefighters pension fund for rescission of an alleged contract and for fraud, as the claims were barred by the four-year limitations period for actions based on mutual mistake or fraud, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-25,9-3-26, and9-3-31, and the firefighter did not show that the firefighter was prevented from bringing the action in a timely manner, rather than nine years after the firefighter's termination. Bradshaw v. City of Atlanta, 275 Ga. App. 609, 621 S.E.2d 563 (2005).

Failure to timely perfect service.

- Owners' personal injury and property damages action against a manufacturer, which concerned a fire in January 30, 2000, was barred by the two- and four-year statutes of limitations, because the owners failed to timely perfect service, as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c), until February 23, 2004, which was more than five days after the owners filed a renewed complaint under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) on October 28, 2003. Johnson v. Am. Meter Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 167.

C.J.S.

- 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, §§ 71, 72, 258.

ALR.

- What statute of limitation applies to an action, based on duress, to recover money or property, 77 A.L.R.2d 821.

When statute of limitations commences to run against claim for contribution or indemnity based on tort, 57 A.L.R.3d 867.

What statute of limitations applies to action for contribution against joint tort-feasor, 57 A.L.R.3d 927.

Tort claim against which period of statute of limitations has run as subject to setoff, counterclaim, cross bill, or cross action in tort action arising out of same accident or incident, 72 A.L.R.3d 1065.

When does statute of limitations begin to run upon an action by subrogated insurer against third party tort-feasor, 91 A.L.R.3d 844.

Tort liability of project architect or engineer for economic damages suffered by contractor or subcontractor, 61 A.L.R. 6th 445.

Application of relation back doctrine permitting change in party after statute of limitations has run in state court action - motor vehicle accident or injury cases: individual drivers, parents, owners or lessors, and passengers, 97 A.L.R.6th 375.

Application of relation-back doctrine permitting change in party after statute of limitations has run in state court action - motor vehicle accident or injury cases: corporations, municipalities, insurers, and employers, 98 A.L.R.6th 93.

Application of relation-back doctrine permitting change in party after statute of limitations has run in state court action - motor vehicle accident or injury cases: estates, and other or unspecified parties, 99 A.L.R.6th 1.

Accrual of claims for continuing trespass or continuing nuisance for purposes of statutory limitations, 14 A.L.R.7th 8.