O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-50 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Statute text

As used in this article, the term:

(1) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, business trust, unincorporated organization, association, or joint-stock company.

(2) "Substantial completion" means the date when construction was sufficiently completed, in accordance with the contract as modified by any change order agreed to by the parties, so that the owner could occupy the project for the use for which it was intended.

History

(Ga. L. 1968, p. 127, §§ 5, 6.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Substantial completion meant action time barred. - Trial court erred in denying a developer's motion for summary judgment on the homeowners' claim for negligent construction because the developer presented testimony that the sale of the last townhouse closed on December 8, 2004, and that on the date of closing, construction of the townhouses was substantially complete; thus, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51, the statute of repose, barred any action filed after December 8, 2012, and the homeowners filed the homeowners' suit two months after that date. Ashton Atlanta Residential, LLC v. Ajibola, 331 Ga. App. 231, 770 S.E.2d 311 (2015).

Cited in Turner v. Marable-Pirkle, Inc., 238 Ga. 517, 233 S.E.2d 773 (1977); Benning Constr. Co. v. Lakeshore Plaza Enters., Inc., 240 Ga. 426, 241 S.E.2d 184 (1977); Landon v. Williams Bros. Concrete Co., 149 Ga. App. 699, 256 S.E.2d 99 (1979); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Kent & Assocs., 232 Ga. App. 419, 501 S.E.2d 858 (1998); Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey, 275 Ga. 249, 569 S.E.2d 495 (2002); Wilks v. Overall Constr., Inc., 296 Ga. App. 410, 674 S.E.2d 320 (2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Contracts, § 115 et seq. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 75.

C.J.S. - 17B C.J.S., Contracts, § 589.

ALR. - What constitutes "improvement to real property" for purposes of statute of repose or statute of limitations, 122 A.L.R.5th 1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1983–2022 · leading case: Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey, 569 S.E.2d 495 (Ga. 2002).
Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey, 569 S.E.2d 495 (Ga. 2002). · cites it 4× “” OCGA § 9-3-50 (2). Utilization of this definition is logical, avoids the anomaly of having a judicial definition which conflicts with an available statutory definition, and is consistent with Court of Appeals opinions which correctly analyze Lumbermen’s and indicate that…”
Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. v. J. G. Wilson Corp., 300 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. 1983). · cites it 8× “OCGA § 9-3-50 et *692 seq. (Code Ann. § 3-1006 et seq.”
Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906 (Md. 1994). “135 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit 14, § 752-A (West 1980); Mass.”
Hickey v. Bowden, 548 S.E.2d 347 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 9-3-50 (2). Because the Hickeys could not legally occupy the house for the purpose for which it was intended — as their residence — until the certificate of occupancy was issued, we hold the date the certificate of occupancy was issued is the earliest date their house…”
Ashton Atlanta Residential, LLC v. Ajibola, 770 S.E.2d 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 9-3-50 (2). As a result, the evidence of record demonstrated that the statute of repose would bar any action filed after December 8,2012.”
Stand. Fire Ins. v. Kent & Assocs., Inc., 501 S.E.2d 858 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 6× “Since the interlock device was not installed until July 10, 1990, Standard claims that is when it was substantially completed.”
Wilks v. Overall Constr., Inc., 674 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “5 OCGA § 9-3-50 (2). 6 (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.”
Kevin Sinyard v. Piedmont Hosp., Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 9-3-52; see also OCGA § 9-3-50 (1) (“person” includes corporations and partnerships).”
Georgia Power Co. v. Colen Campbel (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 2× “Nevertheless, there is an exception to this statutory protection that precludes the use of the defense “by any person who would otherwise be entitled to its benefits but who is in actual possession or control, as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of such an improvement at the time…”
Ashton Atlanta Residential, LLC v. Olakunle Ajibola (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 9-3-50 (2). As a result, the evidence of record demonstrated that the statute of repose would bar any action filed after December 8, 2012.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.