Purpose of section.

- Reason why law provides that time defendant is absent from state shall not be computed in the defendant's favor is that while the defendant is a nonresident the defendant cannot be sued in the courts of this state, and if time of the defendant's absence from state was permitted to be computed in the defendant's favor any defendant could remove beyond limits of state and thereby defeat valid actions against any defendant. Tift v. Bank of Tifton, 60 Ga. App. 563, 4 S.E.2d 495 (1939).

Basis for this saving provision is inability to bring action in this state because of temporary absence of debtor. Miller v. Rackley, 199 Ga. 370, 34 S.E.2d 438 (1945).

Defendant must have been citizen when debt was incurred.

- To come within words of this section, the defendant must have been a citizen of this state at the time of accrual of debt and subsequently have removed from state. Pare v. Mahone, 32 Ga. 253 (1861); Miller v. Rackley, 199 Ga. 370, 34 S.E.2d 438 (1945).

There is no saving in favor of creditor under this section for nonresidence of debtor, if debtor never resided here. Bishop v. Sanford, 15 Ga. 1 (1854); Edwards v. Ross, 58 Ga. 147 (1877); Cain v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 138 Ga. 96, 74 S.E. 764 (1912).

Removal must be intended as change of residence.

- In order for removal of debtor from this state to suspend operation of statute of limitations, it must be accompanied by intention to change the debtor's legal residence or domicile. Stanfield v. Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S.E. 826 (1927).

Long-arm statute.

- Two-year statute of limitations on actions for personal injury was not tolled throughout the period of defendants' alleged absence from the state since there was no showing that the defendants could not have been served with process pursuant to the long-arm statute. Towns v. Brown, 177 Ga. App. 504, 339 S.E.2d 926 (1986); Gould v. Latorre, 227 Ga. App. 32, 488 S.E.2d 116 (1997).

This section does not apply when the defendant is temporarily absent. Sedwick v. Gerding, 55 Ga. 264 (1875).

Rule that statutory period is tolled during time defendant resides in another state, until the defendant returns to this state, does not apply when absence is only temporary. Bryant v. Sanders, 139 Ga. App. 379, 228 S.E.2d 329 (1976).

Speculation as to defendant's whereabouts.

- Claimant's mere speculation as to the driver's possible whereabouts was insufficient to invoke the tolling provision of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-94. Costello v. Bothers, 278 Ga. App. 750, 629 S.E.2d 599 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ragan v. Mallow, 319 Ga. App. 443, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 1061 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).

Section applies only when service made impossible.

- Tolling by reason of removal from this state applies only if removal makes it impossible to perfect service on defendant. Railey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 875, 201 S.E.2d 628 (1973).

If process can be lawfully served on the defendant, thus enabling the plaintiff to proceed with the action, the period of the defendant's absence from state is not to be excluded from period of limitation, and the statute will continue to run during the defendant's absence. Railey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 875, 201 S.E.2d 628 (1973).

Tolling statute could not be applied to extend the statute of limitations in consolidated personal injury renewal actions because the fact that the driver against whom the actions were filed had moved to Maryland did not make it impossible to perfect service. Dickson v. Amick, 291 Ga. App. 557, 662 S.E.2d 333 (2008).

No application to dormant judgments.

- This section does not have reference to period of time in which judgment becomes dormant when not kept in life in any manner specified by law. Tift v. Bank of Tifton, 60 Ga. App. 563, 4 S.E.2d 495 (1939); Stanley v. Stanley, 141 Ga. App. 411, 233 S.E.2d 454 (1977).

Former Code 1933, § 3-805 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-94) related to causes of action when personal service or its legal substitute was required, and had no reference to, nor did it repeal, the plain provisions of former Code 1933, § 110-1001 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60) in respect to dormant judgments. Crawford v. Boyd, 62 Ga. App. 885, 10 S.E.2d 144 (1940).

Absence of defendant in fi. fa. from state does not prevent the plaintiff in fi. fa., or transferee, from keeping judgment in life as provided by law, nor does it prevent the plaintiff from reviving execution. Stanley v. Stanley, 141 Ga. App. 411, 233 S.E.2d 454 (1977).

Temporary return does not revive statute.

- If debtor has removed from this state, the debtor cannot revive statute by temporary return for a season. Whitman v. McClure, 51 Ga. 590 (1874).

Property ownership irrelevant.

- Fact that the defendant owned property within state during period of nonresidence does not operate to prevent tolling of statute. Kimball v. Kimball, 35 Ga. App. 462, 133 S.E. 295 (1926).

Removal to another state of principal on note, after its execution, will suspend statute of limitation as to the principal, but not as to sureties thereon. Langston v. Aderhold, 60 Ga. 376 (1878).

When note was made by nonresident outside limits of this state, and such maker subsequently removed here, period of nonresidence will not be excluded in computing time necessary to bar action upon such instrument. Howell v. Burnett, 11 Ga. 303 (1852); Moore v. Carroll, 54 Ga. 126 (1875).

Appointment of receiver for foreign corporation does not affect running of statute of limitations. Cain v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 138 Ga. 96, 74 S.E. 764 (1912).

Cited in Brooks v. Fowler, 82 Ga. 329, 9 S.E. 1089 (1889); Payne v. Bowdrie, 110 Ga. 549, 36 S.E. 89 (1900); Simpson v. Wicker, 120 Ga. 418, 47 S.E. 965, 1 Ann. Cas. 542 (1904); Gordon v. Fritts, 143 Ga. 130, 84 S.E. 554 (1915); Barnwell v. Hanson, 80 Ga. App. 738, 57 S.E.2d 348 (1950); Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 58 S.E.2d 834 (1950); Milton v. Wilkes, 152 Ga. App. 362, 262 S.E.2d 624 (1979); Maelstrom Properties, Inc. v. Holden, 158 Ga. App. 345, 280 S.E.2d 383 (1981); Smith v. Griggs, 164 Ga. App. 15, 296 S.E.2d 87 (1982); Curlee v. Mock Enters., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 594, 327 S.E.2d 736 (1985); Long v. Marino, 212 Ga. App. 113, 441 S.E.2d 475 (1994); South v. Montoya, 244 Ga. App. 52, 537 S.E.2d 367 (2000); DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hawkins, 288 Ga. App. 840, 655 S.E.2d 823 (2007).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 190 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, §§ 271, 301.

ALR.

- Provision in statute of limitations as to absence from state as applied to a nonresident individual who has an office or place of business in the state, 61 A.L.R. 391.

Provision suspending limitations while defendant is a nonresident or without the state as affected by nonresidence of party asserting cause of action, 83 A.L.R. 271.

Nonresidence or absence of defendant from state as suspending or tolling statute of limitations, where relief is sought, or could have been sought, by an action or proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, 119 A.L.R. 331.

Withdrawal of foreign corporation from state as tolling statute of limitations as to action against corporation, 133 A.L.R. 774.

Provision of statute of limitation excluding period of absence of debtor or defendant from state as applicable to action on liability or cause of action accruing out of state, 148 A.L.R. 732.

Right to enter judgment by confession as affecting suspension of statute of limitations during absence of debtor from state, 172 A.L.R. 997.

Provision of statute of limitations excluding period of defendant's absence from the state as applicable to a local cause of action against individual who was a nonresident when the same arose, 17 A.L.R.2d 502.

Absence of judgment debtor from state as suspending or tolling running of period of limitations as to judgment, 27 A.L.R.2d 839.

Tolling of statute of limitations during absence from state as affected by fact that party claiming benefit of limitations remained subject to service during absence or nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158.

What constitutes "fleeing from justice" within meaning of 18 USCA § 3290 which provides that no statute of limitations shall extend to persons fleeing from justice, 148 A.L.R. Fed. 573.