Legislative intent.

- From this provision of the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) there can be no doubt but that it was the legislative intent to confer upon courts of law the right to maintain the status pending a declaration of the rights of the parties. Findley v. City of Vidalia, 204 Ga. 279, 49 S.E.2d 658 (1948).

This section authorizes granting any relief to which petition showed parties were presently entitled. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Marshall, 424 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1970).

Injunctive relief cannot be given against party who is not necessary party to the declaratory proceeding. Johnson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 101 Ga. App. 734, 115 S.E.2d 221, rev'd on other grounds, 216 Ga. 437, 117 S.E.2d 459 (1960).

Maintaining status quo pending declaratory judgment.

- If a petition otherwise states a cause of action for declaratory relief, the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) provides for maintaining the status pending the declaration of rights. United States Cas. Co. v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 569, 94 S.E.2d 422 (1956).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in entering an interlocutory injunction to preserve the status quo pending an adjudication on the merits because the appellees were likely to succeed on the merits, even if the appellees did not defeat the DeKalb County Tax Commissioner's claims as the appellees sought a declaration that ad valorem taxes on the same cars were not owed twice and it was most unlikely that relief of that nature would be denied. Scott v. Prime Sales & Leasing, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 283, 623 S.E.2d 167 (2005).

Injunctive relief under subsection (b) interlocutory in nature.

- That only interlocutory, or temporary injunctions are intended to be included in actions at law under subsection (b) of this section is indicated by the provision therein for the granting of injunction and other interlocutory extraordinary relief. Norbo Trading Corp. v. Wohlmuth, 115 Ga. App. 69, 153 S.E.2d 727, appeal dismissed on other grounds, 223 Ga. 258, 154 S.E.2d 224 (1967).

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of appeal from declaratory judgment adjudicating the constitutionality of the municipal ordinance and injunctive relief is merely ancillary to that question and does not vest jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. Savannah TV Cable Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 225 Ga. 821, 171 S.E.2d 498 (1969).

Ancillary relief not equitable relief invoking jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

- Purely incidental and ancillary relief provided for by the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) for the purpose only of retaining the status quo of an existing controversy until there can be a determination and declaration of the rights and liabilities of the parties in controversy is not a provision for equitable relief as contemplated by the Constitution in defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Davis, 204 Ga. 67, 48 S.E.2d 876 (1948).

Prayer for a restraining order as provided for under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137), which is in effect only an application for a stay of proceedings until the rights in actual controversy can be declared and decreed, is not one for equitable relief within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution fixing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. United States Cas. Co. v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 569, 94 S.E.2d 422 (1956).

Conclusion of the pleader that equitable relief is necessary is insufficient to convert an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 137) into an equity case so as to confer jurisdiction of the appeal on the Supreme Court and the fact that the trial judge may have erroneously adjudicated that the present case was one in equity would not make it an equity case within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on review. United States Cas. Co. v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 569, 94 S.E.2d 422 (1956).

Grant of an interlocutory injunction for the purpose of maintaining the status quo of an existing controversy pending the adjudication of the question as provided for by this section is neither such equitable relief nor such extraordinary remedy as contemplated by the Constitution in defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. City of Atlanta v. Georgia Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs., 219 Ga. 535, 134 S.E.2d 592 (1964).

Petition seeking declaratory judgment is not per se equitable action, nor is it converted into an equitable action merely because the court may grant a temporary restraining order to "maintain the status" pending an adjudication with respect to rights, status and other legal relations. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Turner, 208 Ga. 782, 69 S.E.2d 771 (1952); Ulmer v. State Hwy. Dep't, 210 Ga. 513, 81 S.E.2d 514 (1954); Todd v. Conner, 220 Ga. 173, 137 S.E.2d 614 (1964).

Injunction to maintain status quo not equitable relief.

- Injunction to maintain the status of the parties pending an adjudication of the legal issues involved is not equitable relief. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 215 Ga. 650, 112 S.E.2d 588 (1959); Reid v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Ga. 289, 127 S.E.2d 678 (1962); Norbo Trading Corp. v. Wohlmuth, 115 Ga. App. 69, 153 S.E.2d 727, appeal dismissed, 223 Ga. 258, 154 S.E.2d 224 (1967).

Prayer for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo does not convert an action for declaratory relief into an equitable action. City of Columbus v. Atlanta Cigar Co., 220 Ga. 533, 140 S.E.2d 267 (1965).

Interlocutory injunction not appropriate.

- Issuance of an interlocutory injunction would not have been appropriate to maintain the status quo pending a ruling on the merits that would never have occurred. Marietta Props. LLC v. City of Marietta, 319 Ga. App. 184, 732 S.E.2d 102 (2012).

Restraining orders.

- Temporary restraining order granted to maintain the status pending an adjudication of the questions presented does not make an action an equitable one. Peoples v. Bass, 211 Ga. 802, 89 S.E.2d 171 (1955).

Restraining order pursuant to this section does not convert the cause into an equitable action. United States Cas. Co. v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 212 Ga. 569, 94 S.E.2d 422 (1956).

Court's jurisdiction to grant relief not divested by judge's choice to reserve judgment.

- Trial judge's choice to grant declaratory relief and reserve judgment on other prayed-for relief until an appeal from the former order could be taken does not divest the court of the jurisdiction to grant "further plenary relief" upon proper motion to renew such a prayer. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Grant, 140 Ga. App. 78, 230 S.E.2d 60 (1976).

Petition does not allege cause of action for other relief if relief sought is dependent upon unsuccessful prayer for declaratory judgment. Gay v. Hunt, 221 Ga. 841, 148 S.E.2d 310 (1966).

Failure to state cause of action for injunctive relief.

- When the only other relief sought in a declaratory judgment petition was to enjoin the defendants from prosecuting a threatened dispossessory warrant proceeding against the petitioners because of an alleged breach of the lease contract on their part, which had already occurred and denial of the breach of the contract was available as a defense by counteraffidavit to the dispossessory warrant, and the ouster of the petitioners and their tenants could be prevented by the filing of such affidavit and the giving of the bond and security required by statute, the petition therefore failed to state a cause of action for the injunctive relief sought. Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487, 117 S.E.2d 336 (1960), later appeal, 217 Ga. 562, 123 S.E.2d 770 (1962).

Laches.

- When a neighbor misled officials into issuing a drilling permit and an owner petitioned for relief within a few days after the well was drilled and believed the matter had been resolved, laches did not apply to the owner's petition for injunctive relief. Netherland v. Nelson, 261 Ga. App. 765, 583 S.E.2d 478 (2003).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions seeking quo warranto relief.

- Declaratory judgment action seeking relief quo warranto regarding rights to positions on board of directors of nonprofit corporation brought in Court of Appeals must be transferred to Supreme Court as only it has jurisdiction of all cases involving extraordinary remedies. Morales v. Sevananda, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 92, 286 S.E.2d 327, aff'd, 162 Ga. App. 854, 293 S.E.2d 387 (1982).

Trial court erred in declaring policy void and ordering insurer to elect to affirm or rescind policy.

- In an insurer's declaratory judgment seeking a determination that a policy was void due to the insured's misrepresentations in the application, O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7(b), the trial court erred by, rather than simply declaring the policy void, requiring the insurer to elect whether to affirm or rescind the policy and repay the premiums if rescinding. Georgia Casualty & Surety Company v. Valley Wood, Inc., 345 Ga. App. 30, 812 S.E.2d 94 (2018).

Cited in Shippen v. Folsom, 200 Ga. 58, 35 S.E.2d 915 (1945); Brown v. Mathis, 201 Ga. 740, 41 S.E.2d 137 (1947); Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Turner, 86 Ga. App. 418, 71 S.E.2d 773 (1952); Brewton v. McLeod, 216 Ga. 686, 119 S.E.2d 105 (1961); Scott v. Scott, 218 Ga. 732, 130 S.E.2d 499 (1963); Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 87 S. Ct. 357, 17 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1966); Finley v. Addis, 223 Ga. 623, 157 S.E.2d 478 (1967); Phillips v. National-Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 167, 183 S.E.2d 220 (1971); Johnson v. Standard Oil Co., 125 Ga. App. 486, 188 S.E.2d 174 (1972); Phillips v. National-Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 845, 195 S.E.2d 285 (1973); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 540, 212 S.E.2d 326 (1975); Board of Comm'rs v. Allgood, 234 Ga. 9, 214 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Accelerated Courses in Real Estate, Inc., 234 Ga. 30, 214 S.E.2d 495 (1975); Jahncke Serv., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 137 Ga. App. 179, 223 S.E.2d 228 (1976); American Century Mtg. Investors v. Bankamerica Realty Investors, 246 Ga. 39, 268 S.E.2d 609 (1980); Taylor v. Mosley, 252 Ga. 325, 314 S.E.2d 184 (1984); Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 228 Ga. App. 371, 491 S.E.2d 812 (1997); Brown v. Liberty County, 247 Ga. App. 562, 544 S.E.2d 738 (2001); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014); Schinazi v. Eden, 338 Ga. App. 793, 792 S.E.2d 94 (2016).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 22A Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgments, §§ 96, 100.

C.J.S.

- 26 C.J.S., Declaratory Judgments, §§ 1 et seq., 159.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (U.L.A.) § 8.

ALR.

- Declaration of rights or declaratory judgments, 12 A.L.R. 52; 19 A.L.R. 1124; 50 A.L.R. 42; 68 A.L.R. 110; 87 A.L.R. 1205; 114 A.L.R. 1361; 142 A.L.R. 8.

Decree or order which merely declares rights of parties without an express command or prohibition as basis of contempt proceeding, 29 A.L.R. 134.

Remedy or procedure to make effective rights established by declaratory judgment, 101 A.L.R. 689.

Joinder of causes of action and parties in suit under Declaratory Judgment Act, 110 A.L.R. 817.

May declaratory and coercive or executory relief be combined in action under Declaratory Judgment Act, 155 A.L.R. 501.