"Irreparable injury" defined.

- Irreparable injury, is one which from the nature of the case, or the circumstances surrounding the person injured, or the financial condition of the trespasser, cannot be readily, adequately, and completely compensated for in money. Camp v. Dixon, Mitchell & Co., 112 Ga. 872, 38 S.E. 71 (1901).

Injury which destroys or renders entirely worthless property of complainant is irreparable. Camp v. Dixon, Mitchell & Co., 112 Ga. 872, 38 S.E. 71 (1901).

Injury is irreparable when it cannot be measured by pecuniary standards. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Americus Constr. Co., 133 Ga. 392, 65 S.E. 855 (1909); Colter v. Livingston, 154 Ga. 401, 114 S.E. 430 (1922).

Damages not irreparable where set out in fixed monetary amount.

- Where the damages are set out in detail and fixed in money, there is no merit in contention that damage is irreparable. Ocmulgee Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 112 Ga. 528, 37 S.E. 749 (1900).

Insolvency of trespasser is not essential if the damage is irreparable. Lowe v. Holbrook, 71 Ga. 563 (1883).

Injunction may be sought only where there is manifest necessity therefor to prevent irreparable injury to some right of the plaintiff, by reason of impending acts or conduct of another. Fleisher v. Duncan, 195 Ga. 309, 24 S.E.2d 15 (1943).

Court properly denied injunction where no evidence of insolvency or irreparable injury.

- Where no evidence was produced at an interlocutory hearing to support either an allegation of insolvency or of irreparable injury, the superior court did not err in refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction. Shockley v. Garner, 211 Ga. 271, 85 S.E.2d 412 (1955).

Injunction to restrain trespass will be denied where injury is reparable in damages, unless trespass is continuing. Daughtrey v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 239 Ga. 482, 238 S.E.2d 37 (1977).

Since there was no evidence of a continuing trespass, and since the housing authority had an adequate remedy at law, summary judgment granting an injunction barring entry on the housing authority's property by a husband and wife was reversed; courts of equity jurisdiction will not intervene to allay mere apprehensions of injury, but only where the injury is imminent and irreparable and there is no adequate remedy at law. Strange v. Hous. Auth. of Summerville, 268 Ga. App. 403, 602 S.E.2d 185 (2004).

Equity will, by injunction, repress continuous trespass. Gainesville M.R.R. v. Tyner, 204 Ga. 535, 50 S.E.2d 108 (1948); Smith v. Wilkinson, 208 Ga. 489, 67 S.E.2d 698 (1951); Duke v. Wilder, 212 Ga. 26, 90 S.E.2d 12 (1955).

If repeated acts of wrong are done or threatened, so as to make the trespass continuous, they may be repressed by injunction. Martin v. Pattillo, 126 Ga. 436, 55 S.E. 240 (1906); Caverly v. Stovall, 143 Ga. 706, 85 S.E. 844 (1915).

Mere repetition of same trespass is insufficient, provided the case is abundantly susceptible of compensation in damages. Hatcher v. Hampton, 7 Ga. 49 (1849).

It was error for trial judge to deny injunctive relief where evidence showed repeated acts of wrongful interference by former owners of the land. Danielsville & Comer Tel. Co. v. Sanders, 209 Ga. 144, 71 S.E.2d 226 (1952).

Where defendant is not threatening to do other acts continuing trespass, refusal of judge to grant injunction will not be controlled. Ocmulgee Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 112 Ga. 528, 37 S.E. 749 (1900).

While injunctions will not be granted to restrain completed acts, where a completed act amounts to continuing trespass, court may grant injunction restraining the defendant from a continuing violation of the rights of the plaintiff. Turner v. Standard Oil Co., 220 Ga. 498, 140 S.E.2d 208 (1965).

Injunction to restrain trespass proper where legal remedies inadequate.

- While ordinarily a court of equity will not interfere to prevent a mere trespass, but as a general rule will leave the injured party to that party's legal remedy, if there is anything special in the case which renders the remedy at law inadequate or incomplete, such as, for example, when the nature of the alleged injury makes it impossible to prove the damage which would result from the trespass or when the injury complained of is such as to constitute a continuous trespass, such acts may be repressed by an injunction. City of Blue Ridge v. Kiker, 190 Ga. 206, 9 S.E.2d 253 (1940).

Mere apprehension of injury will not be sufficient to authorize issuance of injunction, where no facts are alleged to show that the apprehended injury would be irreparable in damages. Slaughter v. Land, 190 Ga. 491, 9 S.E.2d 754 (1940).

While a mere apprehension of injury will not justify equitable relief, this does not mean that one is barred from seeking such relief until after the injury is inflicted. Newport Timber Corp. v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 535, 277 S.E.2d 646 (1981).

If injunction is sought to prevent circuity of actions, all parties to circle of actions should be enjoined, and not one only. Wells v. Rountree & Co., 117 Ga. 839, 45 S.E. 215 (1903).

Injunction will not issue to restrain trespass at suit of stranger to title or possession, even as against a wrongdoer. Mayor of Forsyth v. Hooks, 182 Ga. 78, 184 S.E. 724 (1936).

Plaintiff must show title or actual possession to maintain action for continuing trespass.

- To maintain action for an injunction to prevent the defendant from committing a continuing trespass on certain lands, it was necessary for the plaintiff to show title in the plaintiff or actual possession of that portion of the tract upon which the alleged wrong was being committed. Tolnas v. Pope, 212 Ga. 50, 90 S.E.2d 420 (1955).

Mere possession without prescriptive rights insufficient to permit injunctive relief.

- Where one in possession of land has no title, and that person's only relationship to the property is the person's possession acquired under circumstances such that no prescription could arise therefrom, equity will not, at the instance of one merely in possession of land, afford affirmative relief such as the grant of an injunction against interference with possession. Mayor of Forsyth v. Hooks, 182 Ga. 78, 184 S.E. 724 (1936).

Trespass may be enjoined by person in possession under color of title or in bare possession where trespasser is insolvent. Flannery & Co. v. Hightower, 97 Ga. 592, 25 S.E. 371 (1895); Powell v. Waits, 147 Ga. 619, 95 S.E. 214 (1918).

Acts of agent enjoined where continuing mismanagement of corporation endangers stock value.

- Where the acts of the agent, in mismanaging the corporation, were continuous, still threatened, and directly affected the value of the stock, whether the alleged acts be deemed trespasses or waste, it was unnecessary to go further and allege that the defendant was insolvent, since equity is empowered to enjoin such acts, where they would otherwise be likely to give rise to multiplicity of separate suits by individual heirs against the agent. Shingler v. Shingler, 184 Ga. 671, 192 S.E. 824 (1937).

Damage is irreparable where claimant of judgment has property levied on contrary to the wishes of the true owner. Colter v. Livingston, 154 Ga. 401, 114 S.E. 430 (1922).

Where purchaser with notice at judicial sale is seeking to eject family which has applied for homestead, damage is irreparable and if the lower court abuses discretion in dissolving injunction too soon, the appellate court will interfere. Kilgore v. Beck, 40 Ga. 293 (1869).

Injunction will lie for owner of land bought by a county at tax sale to prevent county from reselling before expiration of the owner's redemption period where it is alleged that the county is threatening to sell the land in small tracts to numerous purchasers while the right of redemption still exists, which if done would subject the owner to a multiplicity of suits with such purchasers. Newsom v. Dade County, 177 Ga. 612, 171 S.E. 145 (1933), later appeal, 180 Ga. 403, 179 S.E. 89 (1935).

It was proper under this section to enjoin widow from taking land as dower where husband had made binding contract of sale but died before executing deed. Webb v. Harp, 38 Ga. 641 (1869) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-5-4).

Where insolvent claimant is evicting owner under claim of purchase, equity will intervene. Justice v. Aikin, 104 Ga. 714, 30 S.E. 941 (1898).

Remedy of injunction is available to restrain landlord from interfering with possession of a tenant during the tenancy, when the damages are of such a nature as to be incapable of accurate computation. Deriso v. Castleberry, 202 Ga. 174, 42 S.E.2d 356 (1947).

Mere apprehension of eviction by landlord insufficient cause for injunction.

- Where there is no allegation of insolvency of the landlord, or no attempt to remove the tenant forcibly or without resort of the courts, equity will not afford its extraordinary remedy by injunction on the account of an apprehension by the tenant of an unauthorized eviction by the landlord. Whitson v. City of Atlanta, 177 Ga. 666, 170 S.E. 888 (1933).

Where city shuts off water supply from sprinkler system fire protector, damage is irreparable. Dodd v. City of Atlanta, 154 Ga. 33, 113 S.E. 166 (1922).

Putting trash, filth and garbage upon land of another which constitutes nuisance is irreparable damage. Lowe v. Holbrook, 71 Ga. 563 (1883).

Cutting of timber may be enjoined, though defendant is solvent, where there are frequent acts of trespass, or the circumstances indicate that the trespasses will recur from day to day. Slaughter v. Land, 190 Ga. 491, 9 S.E.2d 754 (1940); Waycross Military Ass'n v. Hiers, 209 Ga. 812, 76 S.E.2d 486 (1953).

If damages irreparable.

- An injunction may issue to restrain the cutting of timber where the damages would be irreparable, or where the trespass is a continuing one. Prescott v. Herring, 212 Ga. 571, 94 S.E.2d 417 (1956).

Fact that taking oysters from bed may be crime does not prevent owner from enjoining insolvent trespassers. Jones v. Oemler, 110 Ga. 202, 35 S.E. 375 (1900).

Right of action to enjoin trespass vested in heirs of deceased landowner.

- The prima facie right to bring action to enjoin a trespass upon land owned and in their possession is in plaintiffs as heirs of individual who owned the land at the time of death. Prescott v. Herring, 212 Ga. 571, 94 S.E.2d 417 (1956).

Petition inadequate where statutory grounds for restraint of trespass not alleged.

- Where a petition does not allege facts showing irreparable damages nor any trespass by the defendant upon any lands claimed by the petitioner, nor that the defendant is insolvent, and does not show why a court of equity should take jurisdiction in order to avoid multiplicity of action, the petition failed to state a cause of action for any equitable relief. Shobkov v. Pennington, 217 Ga. 315, 122 S.E.2d 87 (1961).

Mere averment that damages are irreparable is a conclusion of pleader and is insufficient. Burrus v. City of Columbus, 105 Ga. 42, 31 S.E. 124 (1898).

Petition should set forth facts so that court may determine whether damages would be of an irreparable character. It is therefore necessary to determine whether, under the averments of the petition, such a case is made as would authorize a court of equity to interpose and grant the injunction prayed for. Huxford v. Southern Pine Co., 124 Ga. 181, 52 S.E. 439 (1905).

Allegation that defendant is insolvent is assertion of ultimate fact, and not legal conclusion. Shockley v. Garner, 211 Ga. 271, 85 S.E.2d 412 (1955).

Petition to enjoin trespass properly dismissed where land inadequately described.

- A petition to enjoin an alleged trespass on realty, which fails to describe the land involved with that degree of certainty which will establish the identity of the land, is insufficient and will be dismissed on general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Laurens County Bd. of Educ. v. Stanley, 187 Ga. 389, 200 S.E. 294 (1938), later appeal, 188 Ga. 581, 4 S.E.2d 164 (1939).

It was not error to charge, in action to enjoin trespass, that petitioner must recover upon the petitioner's proven title and not upon the weakness of the defendant's title. McDonald v. Wimpy, 206 Ga. 270, 56 S.E.2d 524 (1949).

Cited in Kilgore v. Beck, 40 Ga. 293 (1869); Gray Lumber Co. v. Gaskin, 122 Ga. 342, 50 S.E. 164 (1905); Mitchell v. Bale, 175 Ga. 52, 165 S.E. 5 (1932); Neal Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. O'Neal ex rel. Sealy, 175 Ga. 883, 166 S.E. 647 (1932); Williams v. Aycock, 180 Ga. 570, 179 S.E. 770 (1935); Couey v. Talalah Estates Corp., 183 Ga. 442, 188 S.E. 822 (1936); Shingler v. Shingler, 184 Ga. 671, 192 S.E. 824 (1937); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Gunn, 185 Ga. 108, 194 S.E. 365 (1937); Goble v. Louisville & N.R.R., 187 Ga. 243, 200 S.E. 259 (1938); Dobbs v. FDIC, 187 Ga. 569, 1 S.E.2d 672 (1939); Payne v. Nix, 193 Ga. 4, 17 S.E.2d 67 (1941); Hamilton v. Evans, 208 Ga. 780, 69 S.E.2d 739 (1952); Reeves v. Du Val, 214 Ga. 630, 106 S.E.2d 797 (1959); Ramsey v. Womack, 214 Ga. 722, 107 S.E.2d 180 (1959); Arlington Cem. Corp. v. Hoffman, 216 Ga. 735, 119 S.E.2d 696 (1961); Clements v. Elder, 221 Ga. 438, 145 S.E.2d 246 (1965); Central of Ga. Ry. v. City of Metter, 222 Ga. 74, 148 S.E.2d 661 (1966); Hughes v. Albert, 238 Ga. 721, 235 S.E.2d 34 (1977); Baker v. Daniels, 244 Ga. 105, 259 S.E.2d 54 (1979).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, § 100 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, § 132 et seq.

ALR.

- Avoidance of multiplicity of suits as ground of jurisdiction in equity of a suit by one out of possession to quiet title against persons in possession of different portions of the land in severalty, 30 A.L.R. 109.

Injunction against repeated or continuing trespasses on real property, 32 A.L.R. 463; 60 A.L.R.2d 310.

Injunction against removal of, or interference with, remains interred in burial lot, 33 A.L.R. 1432.

Interference with easement of light, air, or view by structure in street or highway as ground for injunction at instance of abutting owner, 40 A.L.R. 1321.

Owner or keeper of trespassing dog as subject to injunction or damages, 107 A.L.R. 1323.

Tort damaging real property as creating a single cause of action or multiple causes of action in respect of different portions of land of the same owner affected thereby, 117 A.L.R. 1216.

Injunction in respect of property as covering action for rent or for use and occupation, 155 A.L.R. 844.

Right of private sewerage system owner to enjoin unauthorized persons from using facilities, 76 A.L.R.2d 1329.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diversion of water by municipal corporation or public utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426.