Second injunction after denial of first generally only proper when new facts shown.

- While a second application for an injunction may be made when an injunction was refused on the first application, such second application is addressed to the discretion of the judge, in the manner of cases falling strictly within this section, and should not, as a general rule, be granted unless based upon grounds which were unknown to the applicant at the time of the first application, and which could not, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, have been discovered by the applicant, and thus be analogous to the rules for granting a new trial upon newly discovered evidence. Blizzard v. Nosworthy, 50 Ga. 514 (1874); Conwell v. Neal, 118 Ga. 624, 45 S.E. 910 (1903) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-5-9).

Denial of an interlocutory injunction does not preclude a party from filing another request later if new evidence becomes available or the circumstances change such that there is a greater need for preliminary relief. Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634, overruled on other grounds by SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 709 S.E.2d 267 (2011).

Facts known at time of first injunction.

- When facts were in existence and known to the defendant at the time of the first injunction, grant of the second injunction was error, no sufficient reason appearing why such grounds were not urged upon the hearing of the application for the grant of the first injunction. Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Thornton, 135 Ga. 786, 70 S.E. 666 (1911).

Injunction cannot be granted upon substantially same facts and conditions; this is especially true with interlocutory hearings. Cox v. Mayor of Griffin, 17 Ga. 249 (1855); Glass v. Clark, 41 Ga. 544 (1871); Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 113 Ga. 916, 39 S.E. 399 (1901); Clements v. Fletcher, 155 Ga. 802, 118 S.E. 201 (1923); Moody v. Williams, 157 Ga. 576, 122 S.E. 56 (1924).

While this section provides that a second injunction may be granted in the discretion of the judge, the statute does not permit the trial judge on the second application for injunction based upon the same contentions previously made to make a ruling contrary to the law established on the previous ruling. Sandersville R.R. v. Gilmore, 212 Ga. 481, 93 S.E.2d 696 (1956;). but see Cox v. Zucker, 214 Ga. 44, 102 S.E.2d 580 (1958) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-5-9).

Two year delay in seeking an interlocutory injunction was not inconsistent with the plaintiff's claim of injury and the need for immediate relief since the plaintiffs showed that the plaintiffs had entered into a consent order in an effort to keep peace and in anticipation of an early trial date, but that trial had not taken place, and that the defendants had failed to abide by the terms of the consent order. Mathis v. Durham, 269 Ga. 753, 505 S.E.2d 724 (1998).

When first injunction was granted, but case was voluntarily dismissed, judge might grant second injunction. Parker v. Weaver, 151 Ga. 547, 107 S.E. 484 (1921).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, § 296.

14 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Injunctions, § 4.

C.J.S.

- 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, §§ 69, 70.