O.C.G.A. § 9-5-9 (2019)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Second injunction after denial of first generally only proper when new facts shown. - While a second application for an injunction may be made when an injunction was refused on the first application, such second application is addressed to the discretion of the judge, in the manner of cases falling strictly within this section, and should not, as a general rule, be granted unless based upon grounds which were unknown to the applicant at the time of the first application, and which could not, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, have been discovered by the applicant, and thus be analogous to the rules for granting a new trial upon newly discovered evidence. Blizzard v. Nosworthy, 50 Ga. 514, 1874 Ga. LEXIS 2 (1874); Conwell v. Neal, 118 Ga. 624, 45 S.E. 910, 1903 Ga. LEXIS 636 (1903) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-5-9). Denial of an interlocutory injunction does not preclude a party from filing another request later if new evidence becomes available or the circumstances change such that there is a greater need for preliminary relief. Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 151, overruled in part, SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust

Co., 289 Ga. 1, 709 S.E.2d 267, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 270 (2011). Facts known at time of first injunction. - When facts were in existence and known to the defendant at the time of the first injunction, grant of the second injunction was error, no sufficient reason appearing why such grounds were not urged upon the hearing of the application for the grant of the first injunction. Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Thornton, 135 Ga. 786, 70 S.E. 666, 1911 Ga. LEXIS 79 (1911). Injunction cannot be granted upon substantially same facts and conditions; this is especially true with interlocutory hearings. Cox v. Mayor of Griffin, 17 Ga. 249, 1855 Ga. LEXIS 101 (1855); Glass v. Clark, 41 Ga. 544, 1871 Ga. LEXIS 137 (1871); Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 113 Ga. 916, 39 S.E. 399, 1901 Ga. LEXIS 414 (1901); Clements v. Fletcher, 155 Ga. 802, 118 S.E. 201, 1923 Ga. LEXIS 166 (1923); Moody v. Williams, 157 Ga. 576, 122 S.E. 56, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 205 (1924). While this section provides that a second injunction may be granted in the discretion of the judge, the statute does not permit the trial judge on the second

application for injunction based upon the same contentions previously made to make a ruling contrary to the law established on the previous ruling. Sandersville R.R. v. Gilmore, 212 Ga. 481, 93 S.E.2d 696, 1956 Ga. LEXIS 420 (1956) (1956;). but see Cox v. Zucker, 214 Ga. 44, 102 S.E.2d 580, 1958 Ga. LEXIS 333 (1958) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-5-9). Two year delay in seeking an interlocutory injunction was not inconsistent with the plaintiff’s claim of injury and the need for immediate relief since the

plaintiffs showed that the plaintiffs had entered into a consent order in an effort to keep peace and in anticipation of an early trial date, but that trial had not taken place, and that the defendants had failed to abide by the terms of the consent order. Mathis v. Durham, 269 Ga. 753, 505 S.E.2d 724. When first injunction was granted, but case was voluntarily dismissed, judge might grant second injunction. Parker v. Weaver, 151 Ga. 547, 107 S.E. 484, 1921 Ga. LEXIS 325 (1921).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§ 285, 297. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms. 14 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Injunctions, § 4.

C.J.S. 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, §§ 69, 70.