
Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448All superior court and state court judges shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of four years. All Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Court of Appeals shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of six years. The terms of all judges thus elected shall begin the next January 1 after their election. All other judges shall continue to be selected in the manner and for the term they were selected on June 30, 1983, until otherwise provided by local law.
- Amendment of the Georgia Constitution proposed by Ga. L. 2018, p. 1130, § 1/HR 993, if ratified, would rewrite this paragraph to read: "Selection; term of office. (a) All superior court and state court judges shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of four years. All Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Court of Appeals shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of six years. The terms of all judges thus elected shall begin the next January 1 after their election. All other judges shall continue to be selected in the manner and for the term they were selected on June 30, 1983, until otherwise provided by local law.
"(b) All state-wide business court judges shall serve a term of five years; provided, however, that the initial term of such judges shall be as provided by law. Such judges shall be appointed by the Governor, subject to approval by a majority vote of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a majority vote of the House Committee on Judiciary. Such judges may be reappointed for any number of consecutive terms as long as he or she meets the qualifications of appointment at the time of each appointment and is approved as required by this subparagraph. The state-wide business court shall consist of the number of judges as provided for by law. For purposes of qualifications, state-wide business court judges shall be deemed to serve the geographical area of this state."
- Art. VI, Sec. II, Paras. III, VIII; Art. VI, Sec. III, Paras. I, II, and III; Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III; Art. VI, Sec. VII, Paras. I and III.
- Time of election of superior court judges, § 21-2-9.
Qualification of candidates for election in nonpartisan primary, § 21-2-130 et seq.
Form of nonpartisan primary ballot, §§ 21-2-284.1,21-2-285.1.
- An election held at the time prescribed by this paragraph to fill the office for the next ensuing four-year term is not affected by the provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. IV), which provide not for the election of a judge for the next ensuing four-year term, but for the filling of a vacancy for the portion of the unexpired term occasioned by the death or resignation of the incumbent. Hooper v. Almand, 196 Ga. 52, 25 S.E.2d 778 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I).
"Six month provision" in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. IV is not in conflict with the mandate in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I that superior court and state court judges are to be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a four-year term because the drafters envisioned that the six month provision would give the voters the right to select the holders of elective office, yet would afford the appointee a sufficient opportunity to demonstrate the merit, or lack thereof, of the appointee's service. Perdue v. Palmour, 278 Ga. 217, 600 S.E.2d 370 (2004).
- In an action challenging Georgia's judicial election system under the Voting Rights Act and the federal Constitution a proposed consent decree that would establish retention elections instead of direct elections was rejected because it would impermissibly decrease the power of the electorate in violation of constitutional and statutory law of the state. Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 848 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1994), appeal dismissed, 59 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1995).
- One who claims to have been elected Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia in a state-wide general election is not entitled to a commission from the Governor, and could not qualify as Chief Justice where before such election there existed a vacancy in the office, the unexpired term whereof extended beyond the time when a regular election would be held for judicial officers of that class, and the vacancy had been filled by executive appointment. Stephens v. Reid, 189 Ga. 372, 6 S.E.2d 728 (1939).
- Trial court's denial of the challenger's petition for a writ of quo warranto was affirmed because the newly created positions on the Georgia Court of Appeals qualified as vacancies under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. III; thus, the governor had the authority to appoint judges to the vacancies created by amended O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(a). Clark v. Deal, 298 Ga. 893, 785 S.E.2d 524 (2016).
- Requesting and receiving intra-county judicial assistance did not unconstitutionally create a judgeship as the juvenile court judges who assisted the superior court did not become superior court judges; thus, no judicial position constitutionally required to be filled by election under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I, or by gubernatorial appointment until election under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. V, Sec. II, Para. VIII, was created by the exercise of O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(C). Earl v. Mills, 278 Ga. 128, 598 S.E.2d 480 (2004).
- Previous state constitutions explicitly provided that the term of office for superior court judges "shall be for four years, and until his successor is qualified." Omission of the phrase "until his successor is qualified" in the 1983 Constitution does not prevent judges from remaining in office after their four-year term of office ends. Garcia v. Miller, 261 Ga. 531, 408 S.E.2d 97 (1991).
- There are no constitutional or statutory bars to a judge's continuing to serve as judge of the state court until the effective date of the judge's resignation from that office, notwithstanding the judge having taken the oath of office of judge of the superior court a few days before the judge's term of office was to begin. Carey Can., Inc. v. Hinely, 181 Ga. App. 364, 352 S.E.2d 398 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 257 Ga. 150, 356 S.E.2d 202, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898, 108 S. Ct. 233, 98 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1987).
- As the constitution permits selection and terms of offices of magistrate judges to be varied by local law, the provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 15-10-20,15-10-23,15-10-100,15-10-105 and Ga. L. 1983, p. 4027, are not unconstitutional. In re Magistrate Court, 262 Ga. 334, 418 S.E.2d 42 (1992).
- Since any appointment for the judicial position would have been made less than six months prior to the election, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, the judge candidate could not show that the candidate was deprived of the candidate's right to vote or participate in the electoral process where the candidate's candidacy was "revoked" by the Secretary of State after the Governor decided to appoint a judge to the vacant seat; thus, the judge candidate failed to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or U.S. Const., amend. 14 against the Governor or the Secretary of State. Hornsby v. Barnes, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2002).
- Because defendant's claim that defendant's trial judge was not properly appointed under O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) was first raised on a motion for new trial, the complaint was untimely; in any event, the judge's previous appointments by separate orders to preside over other superior court matters for specified periods of time did not render the judge a de facto superior court judge in violation of the constitutional requirement that all superior court judges be elected, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I, and thus defendant failed to establish that counsel's failure to object to the allegedly improper appointment of the judge was ineffective assistance. Moreland v. State, 279 Ga. 641, 619 S.E.2d 626 (2005).
Cited in Madden v. Cleland, 105 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 838 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
- Names appearing upon nomination petition for candidate seeking office of judge of superior court or solicitor general (now district attorney) are not restricted to electors residing in judicial circuit directly involved. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-126.
- In enacting Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I and O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-138 and21-2-139, the General Assembly did not intend to place the election of clerks of state courts on a nonpartisan basis unless the General Assembly so provided by special legislation. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-6.
- An appointee to fill a vacancy occurring in a superior or state court judgeship will serve until January 1 following the next general election which is more than six months after the date of the person's appointment at which time the appointee will be required to run for a new four year term of office regardless of the time remaining in the original term of office. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-31.