Purpose.

- The aim of U.S. Const., amend. 13 is to provide protection for racial groups which have historically been oppressed or those chafing under the hands of involuntary servitude. Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975).

U.S. Const., amend. 13 was adopted with reference to conditions existing since the foundation of the government, and the term "involuntary servitude" was intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery, which, in practical operation, would tend to produce like undesirable results. It introduced no novel doctrine with respect to services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties that individuals owe to the state, such as services in the army, militia, on the jury, etc. The great purpose in view was liberty under the protection of effective government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers. United States v. Ryals, 56 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. Ga. 1944).

U.S. Const., amend. 13 is not a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

Badges and incidents of slavery.

- Under U.S. Const., amend. 13, Congress has the power to determine what constitutes the badges and incidents of slavery and to translate that determination into effective legislation, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Whatever else they may have encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery include restraints upon the right to purchase, lease, sell, and convey property. Roberson v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 48 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

Power to enforce amendment through legislation.

- The power vested in Congress to enforce U.S. Const., amend. 13 by appropriate legislation, includes the power to enact direct and primary laws, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

Congressional power to abolish slavery.

- Section 2 of U.S. Const., amend. 13 clothed Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

U.S. Const., amend. 13 empowers Congress to determine what the badges and incidents of slavery are and to create a statutory cause of action for those deprived of the basic rights that the law secures to all free persons. Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975).

Legislation against discriminatory housing practices.

- A statute that makes unlawful economic exploitation of racial bias and panic selling is one regulating conduct, and any inhibiting effect it may have upon speech is justified by the government's interest in protecting its citizens from discriminatory housing practices and is not violative of U.S. Const., amend. 1. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

Congress has power under U.S. Const., amend. 13 to eradicate conditions that prevent blacks from buying and renting property because of their race or color, and no federal statute calculated to achieve that objective can be thought to exceed the constitutional power of Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of private individuals. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

Congressional power to legislate in furtherance of the elimination of racial discrimination is derived from U.S. Const., amend. 13, the power over interstate commerce, the power under U.S. Const., amend. 14, and the power under U.S. Const., amend. 15. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1973).

Congressional power as to racial barriers to property acquisition.

- The authority of Congress to enforce U.S. Const., amend. 13 by appropriate legislation includes the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

Discriminatory purpose not found.

- African-American residents of a city failed to establish that, by retaining an at-large election system for city officials, the city acted with a discriminatory purpose in violation of the federal constitution. Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ga. 1997).

Package bond issue submitted to voters.

- In requesting the county board of commissioners to submit a package bond issue to the voters instead of three separate bond issues, the county board of education did not time and structure the school bond referendum with the intent of diluting minority voting strength and manipulating the minority vote in violation of the first, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Lucas v. Townsend, 783 F. Supp. 605 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 967 F.2d 549 (11th Cir. 1992).

Statute aimed at the commercial activities of those who would profiteer off the ills of society, conduct that U.S. Const., amend. 13 empowers Congress to regulate, regulates commercial activity, not speech. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

When commercial speech may be prohibited.

- The federal government may in some circumstances prohibit purely commercial speech made in connection with conduct which Congress can permissibly regulate or prohibit. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1982 bars all discrimination in the sale and rental of property, and given this reading, § 1982 is constitutional under U.S. Const., amend. 13. Roberson v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 48 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

Employment discrimination.

- U.S. Const., amend. 13 does not create a cause of action for employment discrimination. Mitchell v. Carrier Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 108 F.3d 343 (11th Cir. 1997).

Inapplicable to call to service to meet public need.

- U.S. Const., amend. 13 has no application to a call for service made by one's government according to law to meet a public need, just as a call for money in such a case is taxation and not confiscation of property. Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1944).

U.S. Const., amend. 13 abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, but was never intended to limit the war powers of government or its right to exact by law public service from all to meet the public need. Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1944).

Work and labor on the part of prisoners is not in itself unconstitutional or unlawful. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 393 U.S. 266, 89 S. Ct. 477, 21 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1968).

Hard labor as a penalty for crime is expressly permitted by U.S. Const., amend. 13 and not prohibited by U.S. Const., amend. 8. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 393 U.S. 266, 89 S. Ct. 477, 21 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1968).

That one who has received an advance on a contract for services that the person is unable to repay is bound by the threat of penal sanction to remain at the person's employment until the debt has been discharged is coerced labor. Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 62 S. Ct. 415, 86 L. Ed. 615 (1942).

Former Code 1933, § 26-2812 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-8-15) making criminal the receiving of money to improve real property with intent to defraud using the funds otherwise than for the payment of labor and material cost, if there are any outstanding, and providing that the failure to pay such labor and material cost is prima facie evidence of intent to defraud is not violative of U.S. Const., amend. 13, abolishing involuntary servitude. Johnson v. State, 203 Ga. 147, 45 S.E.2d 616 (1947).

Hospital authority may restrict a staff member's privileges by reasonable and nondiscriminatory rules and regulations. Yeargin v. Hamilton Mem. Hosp., 229 Ga. 870, 195 S.E.2d 8 (1972).

Issuance of injunction against discriminatory housing practices.

- Because of the subtle, pervasive, and essentially irremediable nature of racial discrimination, proof of the existence of discriminatory housing practices is sufficient to permit a court to presume irreparable injury for purposes of issuing a preliminary injunction. Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882, 105 S. Ct. 249, 83 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1984).

Involuntary servitude not criminal defense.

- Involuntary servitude is a constitutional violation, as well as a criminal offense, but it is not a criminal defense; therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to give the defendant's requested charges on involuntary servitude in a prosecution for selling and trafficking in cocaine in which the defendant alleged to have been illegally procured as an agent to work for the state involuntarily in connection with drug transactions. Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. App. 479, 546 S.E.2d 859 (2001).

Redistricting attempting to interfere with right of school board member to hold office or vote.

- While voting rights and the right to run for public office are core constitutional rights, an attempted deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights is not the same as an actual deprivation. Furthermore, incurring legal fees to vindicate rights does not itself establish that those rights were violated. Thus, plaintiff, a school board member, pursing attempted violations of plaintiff's right to run and hold a designated seat in a predefined district, could not succeed as an injunction in another lawsuit and failure of preclearance interfered with the implementation of the efforts of defendants, the local voting registrars; since the attempt to deprive plaintiff of plaintiff's constitutional rights did not succeed, neither can plaintiff's lawsuit succeed. Cook v. Randolph County, 573 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2009).

Cited in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964); Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1966); Sellers v. Georgia, 374 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1967); Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Glover v. Daniel, 434 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Copeland v. Mead Corp., 51 F.R.D. 266 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Smith v. State, 229 Ga. 727, 194 S.E.2d 82 (1972); Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Ga. 1977); United States v. King, 587 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1979); Cross v. Baxter, 639 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1981); Bailey v. Vining, 514 F. Supp. 452 (M.D. Ga. 1981).

ALR.

- Injunction against strike as violating constitutional provision against involuntary servitude, 46 A.L.R. 1541.

Application of Section 1 of 13th Amendment to United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. XIII, § 1, prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude - labor required as punishment for crime, 87 A.L.R.6th 109.

Application of Section 1 of 13th Amendment to United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. XIII, § 1, prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude - labor required by law or force not as punishment for crime, 88 A.L.R.6th 203.