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Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-661 (2025)

  Extended terms of imprisonment

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included cited 1975–2026 94citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 94 opinions since 1975, 10 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (6 cases).

     §706-661  Extended terms of imprisonment.  The court may sentence a person who satisfies the criteria for any of the categories set forth in section 706-662 to an extended term of imprisonment, which shall have a maximum length as follows:

     (1)  For murder in the second degree--life without the possibility of parole;

     (2)  For a class A felony--indeterminate life term of imprisonment;

     (3)  For a class B felony--indeterminate twenty-year term of imprisonment; and

     (4)  For a class C felony--indeterminate ten-year term of imprisonment.

When ordering an extended term sentence, the court shall impose the maximum length of imprisonment.  The minimum length of imprisonment for an extended term sentence under paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall be determined by the Hawaii paroling authority in accordance with section 706-669. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1976, c 92, §8; am L 1999, c 286, §2; am L 2006, c 230, §§23, 54; am L Sp 2007 2d, c 1, §2]

 

Applicability of Act 1, Second Special Session of 2007

 

  L Sp 2007 2d, c 1, §5 provides:

  "SECTION 5.  This Act shall apply to all sentencing or resentencing proceedings pending on or commenced after the effective date of this Act [October 31, 2007], whether the offense was committed prior to, on, or after the effective date of this Act [October 31, 2007].  A defendant whose extended term of imprisonment is set aside or invalidated shall be resentenced pursuant to this Act upon request of the prosecutor.  This Act shall not entitle a defendant who has previously been sentenced to an extended term to be resentenced pursuant to the procedures set forth in this Act unless the defendant is otherwise legally entitled to be resentenced."

 

Case Notes

 

  Extended sentence imposed on multiple offender held not cruel and unusual punishment.  56 H. 343, 537 P.2d 724 (1975).

  Breach of plea agreement by prosecutor resulting from participation in extended term hearing may be remedied by remand for resentencing by another judge.  60 H. 93, 588 P.2d 412 (1978); 60 H. 104, 588 P.2d 408 (1978).

  Participation by prosecutor in hearing for extended term sentencing, even though pursuant to order of court, constituted breach of plea agreement.  60 H. 93, 588 P.2d 412 (1978).

  No abuse of discretion in court sentencing defendant to extended terms of imprisonment under this section and §706-662 where, inter alia, court considered each of the factors enumerated in §706-606 and all the mitigating factors raised by defendant.  83 H. 335, 926 P.2d 1258 (1996).

  As §706-600 and this section do not authorize a court to impose a single sentence on a defendant who has been convicted of multiple charges, trial court did not violate plea agreement by  imposing a life term for each class A felony defendant was convicted of, and then running each life term concurrently.  91 H. 20, 979 P.2d 1046 (1999).

  The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto measures was not offended by the plain language of Act 1, L Sp 2007 2d, amending §§706-662, 706-664, and this section regarding sentencing or resentencing for extended terms of imprisonment, where it was clear that the new jury provisions did not (1) increase criminal liability for conduct previously innocent, (2) aggravate the degree of defendant's crimes, (3) increase the punishment available at the time defendant committed defendant's crimes, or (4) alter evidentiary standards to defendant's detriment.  117 H. 381, 184 P.3d 133 (2008).

  The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto measures was not offended by the retrospective application to defendant of Act 1, L Sp 2007 2d, amending §§706-662, 706-664, and this section, where Act 1 did not punish as a crime an act previously committed which was innocent when done, make more burdensome the punishment for the crime after its commission, nor deprive one charged with the crime of any defense available according to the law when the act was committed.  118 H. 68 (App.), 185 P.3d 816 (2008).

 

 

The 20 cases that cite Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-661 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133 (Haw. 2008).
cites § 706-661 91×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“1999), to a mandatory minimum sentence of six years and eight months imprisonment, (2) for an extended term of imprisonment of life with the possibility of parole as to Count I, pursuant to HRS §§ 706-661, 706-662(1), and 706-662(4)(a) (Supp.”
The case’s holding
A charging instrument must include all allegations that, if proved, would result in the application of a statute enhancing the penalty of the crime committed.
Later courts cite it for
“full retroactive effect, under which the rule applies both to the parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed.” · 5 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Keohokapu, 276 P.3d 660 (Haw. 2012).
cites § 706-661 114×subsections: (1) 28×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“[5] On June 23, 2008, Respondent gave Petitioner notice that he was eligible to be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment as a persistent offender pursuant to HRS §§ 706-661 (Supp.2008) [6] & 706-662(1) (Supp.”
The case’s holding
A rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises when outside influences are of a nature that could substantially prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Later courts cite it for
“where, however, the court determines that outside influences are of a nature which could substantially prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Maugaotega, 168 P.3d 562 (Haw. 2007).
cites § 706-661 56×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“We explained that the two-stage extended term sentencing process articulated in Huelsman is limited to enhanced sentencing, such as extended prison terms pursuant to HRS §§ 706-661, 706-662, and 706-664[ (1993) [4] ], in which the "determination that the defendant is a member of…”
The case’s holding
Any fact that serves as a basis for an extended term sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“any fact, however labeled, that serves as a basis for an extended term sentence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact.” · 3 citing courts
4
REDState v. Rivera, 102 P.3d 1044 (Haw. 2004).
cites § 706-661 24×subsections: (4) 8×cited by 66 cases
Overruled by State v. Maugaotega on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 706-661
“Moreover, the commentary to HRS § 706-660 contains a footnote, which states that "[i]t must, however, be remembered that the Code grants the court the power to impose an extended term of imprisonment" pursuant to HRS § 706-661 (1993 & Supp.”
The case’s holding
Indeterminate sentencing schemes do not violate the Sixth Amendment because the judge imposes a sentencing range within statutory limits while a parole board determines the actual release date (State v. Rivera).
Later courts cite it for
“inasmuch as both hrs 706-606 and 706-662 require the determination of whether the sentence imposed is needed to protect the public, the sole determining factor remaining that increases the penalty under hawaii's extended term sentencing in hrs 706-662(1) is the fact of a prior conviction, ... expressly authorized ... in apprendi and again in blakely ... and similarly the multiple offender determination, pursuant to hrs 706-662(4)(a), mirrors the prior conviction exception in apprendi .” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Austin, 422 P.3d 18 (Haw. 2018).
cites § 706-661 16×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“The circuit court ruled that it was not improper for the prosecutor to argue that Austin's testimony was unworthy of belief and that he had lied to the police and jury. The circuit court also determined that the State's narrative was supported by the evidence adduced at trial…”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor's assertion that a defendant or witness lied to the jury is improper because the pejorative tone conveys subjective disapproval of the witness's honesty.
Later courts cite it for
“that a prosecutor's assertion that a defendant or witness lied to the jury is improper and should not be permitted.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Hussein. , 229 P.3d 313 (Haw. 2010).
cites § 706-661 10×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“5 (1993) and HRS § 706-606, and (3) extended term sentencing, pursuant to HRS § 706-661 (Supp.2006) and HRS § 706-662(1) and (4)(a) (Supp.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court must state its reasons on the record at the time of sentencing for imposing a consecutive sentence rather than a concurrent one.
Later courts cite it for
“circuit courts must state on the record at the time of sentencing the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.” · 17 citing courts
7
YELLOWState v. Cutsinger, 185 P.3d 816 (Haw. App. 2008).
cites § 706-661 31×cited by 8 cases
Overruled by State v. Jess on other grounds: 15 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 706-661
“” On May 4, 2006, prior to sentencing, Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaii (the State) filed a motion for an extended term of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS §§ 706-661 and 706-662(1) (Supp.2003), 3 seeking a ten- *70 year term of imprisonment for the seeond-degree-burglary count.”
8
GREENState v. White, 129 P.3d 1107 (Haw. 2006).
cites § 706-661 14×subsections: (4) 6×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“Hence, in the "subsequent sections" referred to, such as HRS § 706-661, an "extended term[ ]" for a class C felony is set at ten years, HRS § 706-661(4) (Supp.”
The case’s holding
An indeterminate extended-term sentence does not violate the Sixth Amendment because multiple-offender determinations fall within the prior-conviction exception to Apprendi.
Later courts cite it for
“the availability of federal habeas proceedings and the resulting impact on the parties and both state and federal courts makes a reexamination of our extended-term sentencing decisions even more imperative.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENFlubacher v. State., 414 P.3d 161 (Haw. 2018).
cites § 706-661 8×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“HRS § 706-661 (Sentence of imprisonment for felony; extended terms) (Supp.”
Later courts cite it for
“any analysis of waiver must be made in light of hrpp rule 40(a)(3), which specifically exempts illegal sentence claims from being waived.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Gaylord, 890 P.2d 1167 (Haw. 1995).
cites § 706-661 8×cited by 186 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“While this is a slight departure from the restricted recognition accorded consecutive sentences by the [MPC], this [HPC] takes the position that the sections providing for extended terms of imprisonment [ see HRS §§ 706-661 (1985), 706-662 (Supp.1992), and 706-664 (Supp.”
The case’s holding
Imposing consecutive prison terms for extraneous reasons to a defendant's substantial detriment constitutes a plain and manifest abuse of discretion.
Later courts cite it for
“an order of restitution or reparation is available as a free-standing sanction, to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions, including imprisonment.” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Loa, 926 P.2d 1258 (Haw. 1996).
cites § 706-661 8×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“As his final point of error on appeal, Loa asserts that the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court “was arbitrary and capricious, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and was a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.” For the reasons discussed in this section, we…”
The case’s holding
A trial court's determination regarding the necessity of a foundation for admitting evidence is discretionary and is not overturned absent a showing of clear abuse.
Later courts cite it for
“when a question arises regarding the necessary foundation for the introduction of evidence, 'the determination of whether proper foundation has been established lies within the discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be overturned absent a showing of clear abuse.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Auld., 361 P.3d 471 (Haw. 2015).
cites § 706-661 10×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“3d 562, 577 (2007), with respect to our state’s extended sentencing procedures, which were subsequently codified at HRS §§ 706-661, -662, and-664 (2014). Recently, the United States Supreme Court extended the Apprendi rule to mandatory minimum sentencing.”
The case’s holding
The state must allege and prove prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to impose a mandatory minimum sentence for repeat offenders.
Later courts cite it for
“excepts the 'fact of prior conviction' from the requirement that a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, those facts increasing the penalty for a crime.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENBarnett v. State, 979 P.2d 1046 (Haw. 1999).
cites § 706-661 7×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“” Moreover, HRS § 706-661 (1993) provides, in relevant part, that “a person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to an extended indeterminate term of imprisonment.”
The case’s holding
A petitioner establishes a colorable claim for post-conviction relief by alleging facts that, if taken as true, would change the verdict or outcome.
Later courts cite it for
“tlo establish a colorable claim, the allegations of the petition must show that if taken as true the facts alleged would change the verdict or outcome, however, a petitioner's conclusions need not be regarded as true.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131 (Haw. 2003).
cites § 706-661 4×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“A convicted defendant may be subject to an extended term of imprisonment under section 706-661, if the convicted defendant satisfies one or more of the following criteria: (1) The defendant is a persistent offender whose imprisonment for an extended term is necessary for…”
The case’s holding
A person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a lawfully obtained blood sample or the resulting DNA profile when used solely for identification purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“this court has repeatedly adhered to the construct that the jury is presumed to have followed the circuit court's instructions.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Schroeder, 880 P.2d 192 (Haw. 1994).
cites § 706-661 6×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“15 In so doing, the Huelsman court fashioned the following rule: Each of the subsections of [HRS] § 706-662 requires the trial court to engage in a two-step process to impose a sentence for an extended term. The first step involves a finding by the court that the defendant is…”
The case’s holding
Due process requires that a defendant receive notice of the intended application of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment prior to being sentenced to such a term.
Later courts cite it for
“an indictment must be read in a common-sensical fashion in order to ascertain whether the material aggravating circumstance has been sufficiently alleged therein to support the imposition of enhanced sentencing.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Cornelio, 935 P.2d 1021 (Haw. 1997).
cites § 706-661 7×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“[The HPC] takes the position that the sections providing for extended terms of imprisonment [see HRS §§ 706-661 (1985), 706-662 (Supp. 1992), and 706-664 (Supp.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court lacks the authority to impose consecutive mandatory minimum prison terms for multiple felony counts charged within the same indictment or complaint.
Later courts cite it for
“that hrs 706-606.5(3)24 743 divests a sentencing court of the authority to impose consecutive mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment on a defendant convicted of multiple felony counts charged in the same indictment or complaint.” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Mark, 231 P.3d 478 (Haw. 2010).
cites § 706-661 6×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“Accordingly, [the court] sentenced [Petitioner] to an extended term of imprisonment of life without the possibility of parole for Count I in Mark II, rather than the term of life with the possibility of parole that would otherwise apply to a second degree murder conviction.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court may disregard arguments that lack a discernible presentation and may address plain error raised in a reply brief.
Later courts cite it for
“the reply brief shall be confined to matters presented in the answering brief.” · 5 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Morishige, 652 P.2d 1119 (Haw. 1982).
cites § 706-661 8×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“The State subsequently moved for the imposition of an extended term of imprisonment pursuant to HRS §§ 706-661,706-662(1) and 706-662(4) and for the imposition of a mandatory minimum term pursuant to HRS § 706-660.”
The case’s holding
A juror's observation of a defendant in shackles does not automatically create a presumption of prejudice if individual voir dire determines no bias exists.
19
GREENState v. Carvalho, 63 P.3d 405 (Haw. App. 2002).
cites § 706-661 9×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“On April 26,' 2001, the State filed a motion to sentence Carvalho to an extended term of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-661 (Supp.2001) 12 and HRS § 706-662 (1993 & ' *103 Supp.”
20
GREENState v. Melear, 630 P.2d 619 (Haw. 1981).
cites § 706-661 5×cited by 79 cases
Where it cites § 706-661
“After being adjudged guilty of burglary in the first degree, a class B felony, appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison as being a persistent offender under the extended term statute, HRS §§ 706-661, *498 662. 8 The court also imposed a five-year mandatory minimum…”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's silence to suggest guilt, though instructing the jury to disregard such comments may cure any resulting prejudice.
Later courts cite it for
“appellant has the burden of proving prejudicial prosecuto-rial misconduct before the grand jury.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197520002026

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 2008. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Haw.62Haw. App.30D. Haw.1Wash.1
By subsection
(1)6 cases
State v. Keohokapu, 276 P.3d 660 (Haw. 2012).“[5] On June 23, 2008, Respondent gave Petitioner notice that he was eligible to be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment as a persistent offender pursuant to HRS §§ 706-661 (Supp.2008) [6] & 706-662(1) (Supp.”
Barnett v. State, 979 P.2d 1046 (Haw. 1999).“” Moreover, HRS § 706-661 (1993) provides, in relevant part, that “a person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to an extended indeterminate term of imprisonment.”
State v. Grewer, 555 P.3d 672 (Haw. App. 2024).
Marks v. State, 142 Haw. 466 (2018).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(2)1 case
State v. Perry, 998 P.2d 70 (Haw. App. 2000).
(3)3 cases
State v. Ortiz, 981 P.2d 1127 (Haw. 1999).
State v. Tyquiengco, 723 P.2d 186 (Haw. App. 1986).
State v. Reed., 351 P.3d 1147 (Haw. 2015).
(4)4 cases
State v. Rivera, 102 P.3d 1044 (Haw. 2004).“Moreover, the commentary to HRS § 706-660 contains a footnote, which states that "[i]t must, however, be remembered that the Code grants the court the power to impose an extended term of imprisonment" pursuant to HRS § 706-661 (1993 & Supp.”
State v. White, 129 P.3d 1107 (Haw. 2006).“Hence, in the "subsequent sections" referred to, such as HRS § 706-661, an "extended term[ ]" for a class C felony is set at ten years, HRS § 706-661(4) (Supp.”
State v. Thompson, 464 P.3d 286 (Haw. 2020).
State v. Keck, 142 P.3d 1286 (Haw. App. 2006).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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