PART III.
CRIMINAL ASSAULTS AND RELATED OFFENSES
§707-710 Assault in the first degree. (1)
A person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if the person
intentionally or knowingly causes:
(a) Serious bodily injury to another person; or
(b) Substantial bodily injury to a person who is
sixty years of age or older and the age of the injured person is known or
reasonably should be known to the person causing the injury.
(2) Assault in the first degree is a class B
felony. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; ree L 1986, c 314, §51; gen ch 1993; am L 2021,
c 147, §1]
Case Notes
Attempted assault. 56 H. 664, 548 P.2d 271 (1976).
Expert medical testimony that "permanent, serious
disfigurement" would have resulted absent medical attention irrelevant and
improperly admitted where that result was an element of the offense charged
under this section. 80 H. 126, 906 P.2d 612 (1995).
Insufficient evidence to convict defendant under this section
where evidence in record describing victim's scar only established that it was
located on forehead, was two inches in length, and was visible from a "normal
social" distance. 80 H. 126, 906 P.2d 612 (1995).
Under §701-109(1)(c), petitioner could not be convicted of
both robbery in the second degree and assault in the first degree; the jury
inconsistently found that petitioner intentionally or knowingly and recklessly
inflicted serious bodily injury on complainant. 131 H. 353, 319 P.3d 272
(2013).
Where petitioner, convicted of robbery in the second degree
(§708-841) and assault in the first degree, could not be convicted of both
offenses, the assault conviction was reversed; among other things, there was
sufficient evidence to convict petitioner as to robbery in the second degree
and because the penalties for the robbery and assault convictions are the same,
it could not be said that petitioner would be prejudiced by dismissal of the
assault charge. 131 H. 353, 319 P.3d 272 (2013).
There was substantial evidence that minor caused serious
bodily injury to complainant as defined in §707-700 where minor inflicted
bodily injury which caused protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ--namely, the eye injury that caused the blurred and
diplopic vision that was still bothering complainant at the time of trial. 106
H. 530 (App.), 107 P.3d 1203 (2005).
Where defendant punched and kicked another so ferociously in
the face that the lip was split clean through, four teeth were bashed in, the
eye was hemorrhaged and pushed inward, and the orbital floor was fractured
causing blurred and diplopic vision lasting almost eleven months, there was
substantial evidence that the defendant was, at the very least, aware that it
was practically certain that defendant's conduct would cause the result
required, "serious bodily injury", for conviction of first degree
assault. 106 H. 530 (App.), 107 P.3d 1203 (2005).
There was substantial and convincing evidence that
complainant suffered "serious bodily injury" where evidence showed
that complainant suffered eight fractured ribs which resulted in protracted
impairment of the function of complainant's lungs and impaired complainant's
ability to breathe for a prolonged and extended period of time; thus, trial court
properly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. 112 H. 278
(App.), 145 P.3d 821 (2006).
Where defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to
prove defendant was an accomplice to an assault in any degree, and evidence was
adduced that defendant pushed a person who was involved in a motor vehicle
accident, causing the person to fall to the ground, and defendant held the
person on the ground before the driver of a car involved in the accident jumped
onto the person, substantial evidence supported the jury's conclusion. 132 H.
97, 319 P.3d 1105 (2014).
Where the prosecutor orally modified the court's accomplice
jury instruction by defining the words "promote" and
"facilitate", and the prosecutor did not make a curative statement
specifically directed at correcting the improper definitions and the court did
not give a curative instruction, the misstatement of the law for which no
curative instruction was given was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
defendant's conviction was vacated. 132 H. 97, 319 P.3d 1105 (2014).
Assault in the first degree is a lesser included offense of
murder in the second degree. The circuit court erred in failing to instruct
the jury on the included offense of assault in the first degree. 132 H. 451,
323 P.3d 95 (2014).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
88
cases (
21 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case:
State v. Sprattling, 55 P.3d 276 (Haw. 2002).
State v. Sprattling, 55 P.3d 276 (Haw. 2002).
· cites it 12× “While "injury" is not synonymous with "bodily injury," assault necessitates "bodily injury" by its very definition. [3] Therefore, when the oral charge is viewed as a whole, the oral charge clearly indicates that the reference to "assault" anchors "injury" within the context of…”
State v. Haanio, 16 P.3d 246 (Haw. 2001).
· cites it 8× “6, regarding the purported included offense of assault in the first degree, as defined in HRS § 707-710(1), [6] and no. 7A, dealing with the included offense of assault in the second degree, [7] as defined in HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and (b), [8] were also given over Petitioner's…”
State v. Martin. ICA s.d.o., filed 03/29/2019., 463 P.3d 1022 (Haw. 2020).
· cites it 8× “2011) (Count 1), assault in the first degree as to Officer Hatada in violation of HRS § 707-710 (Supp. 1986) (Count 2), carrying or use of a firearm in the commission of a separate felony in violation of HRS § 134-21(a) (Supp.”
State v. Mundon, 219 P.3d 1126 (Haw. 2009).
· cites it 8× “2008); (2) two counts of TT1; (3) one count of attempted sex assault 3d; (4) one count of kidnapping; (5) one count of assault 3d; (6) one count of attempted assault in the first degree (attempted assault 1st), in violation of HRS §§ 707-710 (1993) and 705-500; and (7) one count…”
State v. Basham., 319 P.3d 1105 (Haw. 2014).
· cites it 9× “On September 22, 2007, Bloom and his wife, Jennifer Chavez (Chavez) were driving in the Ewa Beach area, where they 1 HRS § 707-710 (1993) provides: “(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily…”
State v. Silva, 864 P.2d 583 (Haw. 1993).
· cites it 7× “]” We note that Dr. Behrendt’s stipulated testimony specifically tracked the language of HRS § 707-700, which defines “serious bodily injury” as “bodily injury .”
State v. Yamada, 122 P.3d 254 (Haw. 2005).
· cites it 8× “1998), [1] and one count of assault in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 707-710 (1993). [2] On appeal, the prosecution contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Yamada's motion for new trial inasmuch as the court based its decision on the sole ground…”
State v. Quitog, 938 P.2d 559 (Haw. 1997).
· cites it 6× “33); 8 (2) assault in the first degree in violation of HRS § 707-710 (1993) (State’s Instruction No.”
State v. Matuu., 445 P.3d 91 (Haw. 2019).
· cites it 6× “5 and 706-656 (2014), of the lesser included offense of Assault in the First Degree, HRS § 707-710 (2014), for stabbing his cousin Frank Kapesi ("Frank") on January 25, 2015 at a home Matuu and Frank shared with other family members.”
State v. Malufau, 906 P.2d 612 (Haw. 1995).
· cites it 5× “HRS § 707-710(1) defines the offense at issue, providing that “[a] person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if he [or she] intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another person.”
State v. Holbron, 904 P.2d 912 (Haw. 1995).
· cites it 4× “By way of further example, the same could be said of assault in the first degree in violation of HRS § 707-710 (1993) (i.e., intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to another person) and assault in the second degree in violation of HRS § 707-71 l(l)(b) (1993)…”
State v. Kaeo., 323 P.3d 95 (Haw. 2014).
· cites it 10× “1(2)(a) (Revised Commentaries 1980), similar to HRS § 707-710 (intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury).”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-710(1) — 26 cases
State v. Haanio, 16 P.3d 246 (Haw. 2001).
“6, regarding the purported included offense of assault in the first degree, as defined in HRS § 707-710(1), [6] and no. 7A, dealing with the included offense of assault in the second degree, [7] as defined in HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and (b), [8] were also given over Petitioner's…”
State v. Malufau, 906 P.2d 612 (Haw. 1995).
“HRS § 707-710(1) defines the offense at issue, providing that “[a] person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if he [or she] intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another person.”
State v. Basham., 319 P.3d 1105 (Haw. 2014).
“On September 22, 2007, Bloom and his wife, Jennifer Chavez (Chavez) were driving in the Ewa Beach area, where they 1 HRS § 707-710 (1993) provides: “(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily…”
State v. Holbron, 904 P.2d 912 (Haw. 1995).
“By way of further example, the same could be said of assault in the first degree in violation of HRS § 707-710 (1993) (i.e., intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to another person) and assault in the second degree in violation of HRS § 707-71 l(l)(b) (1993)…”
State v. Quitog, 938 P.2d 559 (Haw. 1997).
“33); 8 (2) assault in the first degree in violation of HRS § 707-710 (1993) (State’s Instruction No.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-710(1)(2014) — 1 case
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-710(2) — 4 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.