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Hawaii Revised Statutes

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711 (2026)

  Assault in the second degree

✓ current as of July 2026
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     §707-711  Assault in the second degree.  (1)  A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if the person:

     (a)  Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes substantial bodily injury to another;

     (b)  Recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another;

     (c)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a correctional worker, as defined in section 710-1031(2), who is engaged in the performance of duty or who is within a correctional facility;

     (d)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a dangerous instrument;

     (e)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to an educational worker who is engaged in the performance of duty or who is within an educational facility.  For the purposes of this paragraph, "educational worker" means any administrator, specialist, counselor, teacher, or employee of the department of education or an employee of a charter school; a person who is a volunteer, as defined in section 90-1, in a school program, activity, or function that is established, sanctioned, or approved by the department of education; or a person hired by the department of education on a contractual basis and engaged in carrying out an educational function;

     (f)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any emergency medical services provider who is engaged in the performance of duty.  For the purposes of this paragraph, "emergency medical services provider" means emergency medical services personnel, as defined in section 321-222, and physicians, physician's assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, certified registered nurse anesthetists, respiratory therapists, laboratory technicians, radiology technicians, and social workers, providing services in the emergency room of a hospital;

     (g)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person employed at a state-operated or -contracted mental health facility.  For the purposes of this paragraph, "a person employed at a state-operated or -contracted mental health facility" includes health care professionals as defined in section 451D-2, administrators, orderlies, security personnel, volunteers, and any other person who is engaged in the performance of a duty at a state-operated or -contracted mental health facility;

     (h)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person who:

          (i)  The defendant has been restrained from, by order of any court, including an ex parte order, contacting, threatening, or physically abusing pursuant to chapter 586; or

         (ii)  Is being protected by a police officer ordering the defendant to leave the premises of that protected person pursuant to section 709-906(4), during the effective period of that order;

     (i)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any firefighter or water safety officer who is engaged in the performance of duty.  For the purposes of this paragraph, "firefighter" has the same meaning as in section 710-1012 and "water safety officer" means any public servant employed by the United States, the State, or any county as a lifeguard or person authorized to conduct water rescue or ocean safety functions;

     (j)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person who is engaged in the performance of duty at a health care facility as defined in section 323D-2.  For purposes of this paragraph, "a person who is engaged in the performance of duty at a health care facility" includes health care professionals as defined in section 451D-2, physician assistants, surgical assistants, advanced practice registered nurses, nurse aides, respiratory therapists, laboratory technicians, and radiology technicians;

     (k)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person who is engaged in providing home health care services, as defined in section 431:10H-201;

     (l)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person employed or contracted to work by a mutual benefit society, as defined in section 432:1-104, to provide case management services to an individual in a hospital, health care provider's office, or home, while that person is engaged in the performance of those services;

     (m)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person who is sixty years of age or older and the age of the injured person is known or reasonably should be known to the person causing the injury;

     (n)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a sports official who is engaged in the lawful discharge of the sports official's duties.  For the purposes of this paragraph, "sports official" and "lawful discharge of the sports official's duties" have the same meaning as in section 706-605.6;

     (o)  Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a national guard member who is engaged in the performance of duty.  For purposes of this paragraph, "national guard member" means a member of the national guard on any duty or service done under or in pursuance of an order or call of the governor or the President of the United States or any proper authority as provided by law; or

    [(p)] Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any protective services worker who is engaged in the performance of the worker's duties.  For purposes of this paragraph, "protective services worker" means any administrator, specialist, social worker, case manager, or aide employed by the department of human services to investigate or provide services in response to reports of child abuse or neglect, or to investigate or provide services in response to reports of abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult.

     (2)  Assault in the second degree is a class C felony. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1979, c 84, §1; am L 1986, c 314, §52; am L 1987, c 257, §1; am L 1988, c 279, §1; am L 2006, c 230, §29 and c 298, §16; am L 2007, c 9, §19 and c 79, §1; am L 2008, c 100, §7; am L 2010, c 146, §1; am L 2011, c 63, §3 and c 187, §1; am L 2016, c 231, §33; am L 2018, c 147, §1; am L 2021, c 147, §2; am L 2023, c 140, §2; am L 2025, c 8, §1 and c 142, §1]

 

Law Journals and Reviews

 

  Cruelty to Animals:  Recognizing Violence Against Nonhuman Victims.  23 UH L. Rev. 307 (2000).

 

Case Notes

 

  Assault in the third degree is not a lesser included offense.  68 H. 276, 711 P.2d 1289 (1985).

  Circuit court was obligated, even absent a request by either party, to instruct the jury regarding the included offense of assault in the third degree where appellant was charged with committing offense of assault in the second degree; court's failure to do so constituted plain error.  76 H. 387, 879 P.2d 492 (1994).

  Conviction of defendant of offense of carrying, using or threatening to use a firearm in the commission of a separate felony under §134-6(a) and (e), the separate felony being second degree assault under subsection (1)(a), vacated where there was no substantial evidence that defendant caused substantial bodily injury to victim as required under subsection (1)(a).  94 H. 241, 11 P.3d 466 (2000).

  The plain and unambiguous language of §853-4(2) does not prohibit the grant of a deferred acceptance of no contest plea for assault in the second degree under this section causing "substantial bodily injury", as statutory prohibition expressly applies only to felony and misdemeanor assaults inflicting "bodily injury" or "serious bodily injury".  101 H. 409, 70 P.3d 635 (2003).

  Court's failure to personally engage defendant in on-the-record colloquy to determine whether defendant understood consequences of foregoing right to have jury instructed on third degree assault, the lesser-included offense of second degree assault, constituted plain error.  85 H. 44 (App.), 936 P.2d 1292 (1997).

  Trial court's omission of the "strongly corroborative" paragraph in the attempted assault in the second degree instructions was presumptively prejudicial and omission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  104 H. 517 (App.), 92 P.3d 1027 (2004).

  Although the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant committed the offense of first degree assault, there was ample evidence to show that the victim's injury satisfied the definition of "substantial bodily injury" under §707-700 and that defendant thus committed the lesser included offense of second degree assault in violation of subsection (1)(a); thus the jury, having returned a guilty verdict against defendant for first degree assault, must also have found sufficient evidence to prove the lesser included offense of second degree assault.  116 H. 445 (App.), 173 P.3d 592 (2007).

  Cited:  55 H. 531, 534, 523 P.2d 299 (1974).

 

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 141 cases (39 in the last 5 years), 1974–2026 · leading case: State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003).
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State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003). · cites it 21× “] [2] HRS § 707-700 defines "bodily injury", "substantial bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" as follows: "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”
State v. Kupau, 879 P.2d 492 (Haw. 1994). · cites it 16× “HRS § 707-711(1) (Supp.1992) provides in relevant part: Assault in the second degree.”
State v. Mundon, 219 P.3d 1126 (Haw. 2009). · cites it 12× “first degree (TT1), in violation of HRS §§ 707-715 (1993) [4] and 707-716(1)(d) (1993) [5] ; (3) one count of kidnapping, in violation of HRS § 707-720(1)(d) (1993) [6] ; (4) one count of assault in the third degree (assault 3d), in violation of HRS § 707-712(1)(a) (1993) [7] ;…”
State v. Kikuta, 253 P.3d 639 (Haw. 2011). · cites it 8× “[5] HRS § 707-711 provides in relevant part: Assault in the second degree.”
State v. Webster, 11 P.3d 466 (Haw. 2000). · cites it 19× “1998), 2 the separate felony being Assault in the Second Degree, HRS § 707-711(l)(a) (1993), against Roman Villanueva, must be vacated because there was no substantial evidence that Defendant caused substantial bodily injury to Roman, that type of injury being an element of…”
State v. Haanio, 16 P.3d 246 (Haw. 2001). · cites it 6× “7A, dealing with the included offense of assault in the second degree, [7] as defined in HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and (b), [8] were also given over Petitioner's objections.”
State v. Jhun, 927 P.2d 1355 (Haw. 1996). · cites it 10× “HRS § 707-711(1)(d) (1993) provides the following: § 707-711 Assault in the second degree. (1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if: [[Image here]] (d) The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another person with a dangerous…”
State v. Walsh, 260 P.3d 350 (Haw. 2011). · cites it 10× “The State charged Walsh with Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(b). The charge was based on Walsh's involvement in a physical altercation with several men outside of a night club, where he punched and severely injured Kapena Kramer (Kapena).”
Williamson v. Hawai'i Paroling Auth., 35 P.3d 210 (Haw. 2001). · cites it 8× “Factual and procedural background Williamson was convicted of one count of assault in the second degree, in violation of HRS § 707-711 (1993), and one count of burglary in the second degree, in violation of HRS § 708-811 (1993).”
State v. Quitog, 938 P.2d 559 (Haw. 1997). · cites it 6× “HRS § 707-711 provides in relevant part: Assault in the second degree.”
State v. Abion., 478 P.3d 270 (Haw. 2020). · cites it 7× “Officer Taua noted that Abion 1 HRS § 707-711 provides, in relevant part: (1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if: (a) The person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes substantial bodily injury to another; (b) The person recklessly causes…”
State v. Bowe, 881 P.2d 538 (Haw. 1994). · cites it 6× “On September 17, 1991, Defendant-Appellee Troy Bowe (Defendant) was charged with Assault in the Second Degree in violation of *540 Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-711 (Supp.1992). Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence arguing that his statement to the police was…”
Show all 141 citing cases →
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(1) — 22 cases
State v. Kikuta, 253 P.3d 639 (Haw. 2011). “[5] HRS § 707-711 provides in relevant part: Assault in the second degree.”
State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003). “] [2] HRS § 707-700 defines "bodily injury", "substantial bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" as follows: "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”
State v. Kaeo., 323 P.3d 95 (Haw. 2014).
State v. Quitog, 938 P.2d 559 (Haw. 1997). “HRS § 707-711 provides in relevant part: Assault in the second degree.”
State v. Webster, 11 P.3d 466 (Haw. 2000). “1998), 2 the separate felony being Assault in the Second Degree, HRS § 707-711(l)(a) (1993), against Roman Villanueva, must be vacated because there was no substantial evidence that Defendant caused substantial bodily injury to Roman, that type of injury being an element of…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(1)(a) — 44 cases
State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003). “] [2] HRS § 707-700 defines "bodily injury", "substantial bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" as follows: "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”
State v. Haanio, 16 P.3d 246 (Haw. 2001). “7A, dealing with the included offense of assault in the second degree, [7] as defined in HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and (b), [8] were also given over Petitioner's objections.”
State v. Jumila, 950 P.2d 1201 (Haw. 1998).
State v. Gomes, 177 P.3d 928 (Haw. 2008).
State v. Quitog, 938 P.2d 559 (Haw. 1997). “HRS § 707-711 provides in relevant part: Assault in the second degree.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(1)(b) — 7 cases
State v. Walsh, 260 P.3d 350 (Haw. 2011). “The State charged Walsh with Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(b). The charge was based on Walsh's involvement in a physical altercation with several men outside of a night club, where he punched and severely injured Kapena Kramer (Kapena).”
State v. Williams., 456 P.3d 135 (Haw. 2020).
State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1994).
State v. Kealoha., 414 P.3d 98 (Haw. 2018).
State v. Brown., 446 P.3d 973 (Haw. 2019).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(1)(c) — 3 cases
Conner v. State, 826 P.2d 440 (Haw. App. 1992).
State v. Tupuola, 711 P.2d 1289 (Haw. 1985).
State v. Tuimalealiifano, 499 P.3d 421 (Haw. App. 2021).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(1)(d) — 19 cases
State v. Manuel., 477 P.3d 874 (Haw. 2020).
State v. Maugaotega, 114 P.3d 905 (Haw. 2005).
State v. Jhun, 927 P.2d 1355 (Haw. 1996). “HRS § 707-711(1)(d) (1993) provides the following: § 707-711 Assault in the second degree. (1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if: [[Image here]] (d) The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another person with a dangerous…”
State v. Adam, 38 P.3d 581 (Haw. App. 2002).
State v. Baxley, 73 P.3d 668 (Haw. 2003).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(1)(e) — 1 case
State v. Tartamella, 496 P.3d 520 (Haw. App. 2021).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(1)(m) — 4 cases
State v. Tillman (Haw. App. 2025).
State v. Jercy (Haw. 2026).
State v. Jameson (Haw. App. 2025).
State v. Jercy (Haw. App. 2026).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(2) — 8 cases
State v. Kupau, 879 P.2d 492 (Haw. 1994). “HRS § 707-711(1) (Supp.1992) provides in relevant part: Assault in the second degree.”
State v. Van Dyke, 69 P.3d 88 (Haw. 2003).
State v. Carvalho, 63 P.3d 405 (Haw. App. 2002).
State v. Hee Sung Yoo, 129 P.3d 1173 (Haw. App. 2006).
State v. Guerrios, 774 P.2d 246 (Haw. App. 1989).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(a) — 2 cases
State v. Jardine., 508 P.3d 1182 (Haw. 2022).
State v. Kasty, 489 P.3d 793 (Haw. App. 2021).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(b) — 2 cases
State v. Toma (Haw. 2015).
State v. Bailey, 319 P.3d 284 (Haw. 2013).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(d) — 5 cases
State v. Webster, 11 P.3d 466 (Haw. 2000). “1998), 2 the separate felony being Assault in the Second Degree, HRS § 707-711(l)(a) (1993), against Roman Villanueva, must be vacated because there was no substantial evidence that Defendant caused substantial bodily injury to Roman, that type of injury being an element of…”
State v. Manuel., 477 P.3d 874 (Haw. 2020).
State v. Kinny, 478 P.3d 296 (Haw. App. 2020).
State v. Kasty, 489 P.3d 793 (Haw. App. 2021).
State v. TUNOA, 184 P.3d 839 (Haw. App. 2008).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(i)(a) — 1 case
State v. Scott., 319 P.3d 252 (Haw. 2013).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(l)(a) — 17 cases
State v. Kupau, 879 P.2d 492 (Haw. 1994). “HRS § 707-711(1) (Supp.1992) provides in relevant part: Assault in the second degree.”
State v. Webster, 11 P.3d 466 (Haw. 2000). “1998), 2 the separate felony being Assault in the Second Degree, HRS § 707-711(l)(a) (1993), against Roman Villanueva, must be vacated because there was no substantial evidence that Defendant caused substantial bodily injury to Roman, that type of injury being an element of…”
State v. Malufau, 906 P.2d 612 (Haw. 1995).
State v. Haanio, 16 P.3d 246 (Haw. 2001). “7A, dealing with the included offense of assault in the second degree, [7] as defined in HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and (b), [8] were also given over Petitioner's objections.”
State v. Smith, 984 P.2d 1276 (Haw. App. 1999).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(l)(b) — 6 cases
State v. Moore, 921 P.2d 122 (Haw. 1996).
State v. Walsh, 260 P.3d 350 (Haw. 2011). “The State charged Walsh with Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(b). The charge was based on Walsh's involvement in a physical altercation with several men outside of a night club, where he punched and severely injured Kapena Kramer (Kapena).”
State v. Smith, 984 P.2d 1276 (Haw. App. 1999).
State v. Eager., 398 P.3d 756 (Haw. 2017).
State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1994).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-711(l)(d) — 6 cases
State v. Jhun, 927 P.2d 1355 (Haw. 1996). “HRS § 707-711(1)(d) (1993) provides the following: § 707-711 Assault in the second degree. (1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if: [[Image here]] (d) The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another person with a dangerous…”
State v. Vinuya, 32 P.3d 116 (Haw. App. 2001).
State v. Napulou, 936 P.2d 1297 (Haw. App. 1997).
State v. Tuua, 250 P.3d 273 (Haw. 2011).
State v. Carvalho, 63 P.3d 405 (Haw. App. 2002).
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