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Haw. Rev. Stat.Haw. Rev. Stat.Chapter 853

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 853-4 (2025)

  Chapter not applicable; when

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included cited 1980–2021 23citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 23 opinions since 1980, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (5) (5 cases).

     §853-4  Chapter not applicable; when.  (a)  This chapter shall not apply when:

     (1)  The offense charged involves the intentional, knowing, reckless, or negligent killing of another person;

     (2)  [Repeal and reenactment on June 30, 2026.  L 2020, c 19, §15.]  The offense charged is:

          (A)  A felony that involves the intentional, knowing, or reckless bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury of another person; or

          (B)  A misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor that carries a mandatory minimum sentence and that involves the intentional, knowing, or reckless bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury of another person;

          provided that the prohibition in this paragraph shall not apply to offenses described in section 709-906(18);

     (3)  The offense charged involves a conspiracy or solicitation to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly kill another person or to cause serious bodily injury to another person;

     (4)  The offense charged is a class A felony;

     (5)  The offense charged is nonprobationable;

     (6)  The defendant has been convicted of any offense defined as a felony by the Hawaii Penal Code or has been convicted for any conduct that if perpetrated in this State would be punishable as a felony;

     (7)  The defendant is found to be a law violator or delinquent child for the commission of any offense defined as a felony by the Hawaii Penal Code or for any conduct that if perpetrated in this State would constitute a felony;

     (8)  The defendant has a prior conviction for a felony committed in any state, federal, or foreign jurisdiction;

     (9)  A firearm was used in the commission of the offense charged;

    (10)  The defendant is charged with the distribution of a dangerous, harmful, or detrimental drug to a minor;

    (11)  The defendant has been charged with a felony offense and has been previously granted deferred acceptance of guilty plea or no contest plea for a prior offense, regardless of whether the period of deferral has already expired;

    (12)  The defendant has been charged with a misdemeanor offense and has been previously granted deferred acceptance of guilty plea or no contest plea for a prior felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor for which the period of deferral has not yet expired;

    (13)  [Repeal and reenactment on June 30, 2026.  L 2020, c 19, §15.]  The offense charged is:

          (A)  Escape in the first degree;

          (B)  Escape in the second degree;

          (C)  Promoting prison contraband in the first degree;

          (D)  Promoting prison contraband in the second degree;

          (E)  Bail jumping in the first degree;

          (F)  Bail jumping in the second degree;

          (G)  Bribery;

          (H)  Bribery of or by a witness;

          (I)  Intimidating a witness;

          (J)  Bribery of or by a juror;

          (K)  Intimidating a juror;

          (L)  Jury tampering;

          (M)  Promoting prostitution;

          (N)  Abuse of family or household member except as provided in paragraph (2) and section 709-906(18);

          (O)  Sexual assault in the second degree;

          (P)  Sexual assault in the third degree;

          (Q)  A violation of an order issued pursuant to chapter 586;

          (R)  Promoting child abuse in the second degree;

          (S)  Promoting child abuse in the third degree;

          (T)  Electronic enticement of a child in the first degree;

          (U)  Electronic enticement of a child in the second degree;

          (V)  Commercial sexual exploitation pursuant to section 712-1200.5;

          (W)  Street prostitution and commercial sexual exploitation under section 712-1207(1)(b) or (2)(b);

          (X)  Commercial sexual exploitation near schools or public parks under section 712-1209;

          (Y)  Commercial sexual exploitation of a minor under section 712-1209.1;

          (Z)  Habitual commercial sexual exploitation under section 712-1209.5;

         (AA)  Violation of privacy in the first degree under section 711-1110.9;

         (BB)  Violation of privacy in the second degree under section 711-1111(1)(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h);

         (CC)  Habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant under section 291E-61.5(a);

         (DD)  Promoting gambling in the first degree; or

         (EE)  Promoting gambling in the second degree;

    (14)  The defendant has been charged with:

          (A)  Knowingly or intentionally falsifying any report required under part XIII of chapter 11, with the intent to circumvent the law or deceive the campaign spending commission; or

          (B)  Violating section 11-352 or 11-353; or

    (15)  The defendant holds a commercial driver's license and has been charged with violating a traffic control law, other than a parking law, in connection with the operation of any type of motor vehicle.

     (b)  The court may adopt by rule other criteria for purposes of this section. [L 1976, c 154, pt of §2; am L 1980, c 292, §2; am L 1993, c 130, §4 and c 234, §1; am L 1996, c 201, §3; am L 1997, c 55, §1; am L 1998, c 172, §9; am L 2000, c 4, §7; am L 2004, c 85, §1; am L 2005, c 203, §25; am L 2006, c 80, §4; am L 2007, c 288, §3; am L 2008, c 171, §11; am L 2009, c 88, §13; am L 2010, c 166, §22 and c 211, §§7, 8, 13; am L 2011, c 145, §5; am L 2013, c 53, §1; am L 2014, c 114, §5; am L 2016, c 206, §20 and c 231, §68; am L 2020, c 19, §4; am L 2021, c 33, §1, c 60, §2, and c 68, §15; am L 2022, c 111, §7]

 

Note

 

  The L 2022, c 111 amendment is exempt from the repeal and reenactment condition of L 2020, c 19, §15.  L 2022, c 111, §10.

 

Case Notes

 

  Paragraph (7) is limited to cases involving minors who were waived for adult prosecution under §571-22.  61 H. 385, 605 P.2d 496 (1980).

  Subsections are not to be read conjunctively.  69 H. 602, 752 P.2d 597 (1988).

  As sentencing court limited to alternatives expressly enumerated in §188-70 and probation not an enumerated alternative, offense of fishing with gill nets under §188-30.2 nonprobationable; thus, under paragraph (5), deferred acceptance of no contest plea not allowed for that offense.  87 H. 102, 952 P.2d 390 (1998).

  The plain and unambiguous language of paragraph (2) does not prohibit the grant of a deferred acceptance of no contest plea for assault in the second degree under §707-711 causing "substantial bodily injury", as statutory prohibition expressly applies only to felony and misdemeanor assaults inflicting "bodily injury" or "serious bodily injury".  101 H. 409, 70 P.3d 635 (2003).

  By the express terms of §712-1207(4) and (5), the offense of street solicitation under §712-1207(1) is probationable, and thus not excludable under paragraph (5); appeals court therefore erred in affirming trial court's refusal to consider defendant's motion for a deferred acceptance of no contest plea.  116 H. 519, 174 P.3d 358 (2007).

  When family court implicitly entered a deferred acceptance of guilty plea pursuant to §853-1 and conditioned deferral upon defendant's submitting to counseling according to schedule and not committing any subsequent offenses, family court violated paragraph (2), where defendant was charged with abuse of family and household member (§709-906).  10 H. App. 148, 861 P.2d 759 (1993).

  Where the indictment alleges that a "dangerous instrument" was used in the commission of the offense charged so as to allow proof that a "firearm" was used, the possibility exists that the defendant is not eligible for a deferred acceptance of no contest (DANC) plea; in such cases, if prior to the court's decision on the defendant's motion for a DANC plea the court is informed that the "dangerous instrument" was a "firearm", the defendant is not eligible for, and the court is not authorized to enter, a DANC plea.  101 H. 65 (App.), 62 P.3d 628 (2002).

  Mentioned:  74 H. 75, 837 P.2d 776 (1992).

 

 

The 20 cases that cite Haw. Rev. Stat. § 853-4 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003).
cites § 853-4 141×subsections: (2) 64× (1) 13×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“On June 6, 2002, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration of the respondent judge's May 14, 2002 order, arguing that HRS § 853-4 (Supp.2002) did not allow the court to grant a DANC plea in connection with the offense of assault in the second degree.”
The case’s holding
A court exceeds no authority in granting a deferred no contest plea where the deferral statute does not expressly exclude the offense, so an offense involving substantial bodily injury is not barred.
Later courts cite it for
“where the statutory language is unambiguous, the court's sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Shannon, 185 P.3d 200 (Haw. 2008).
cites § 853-4 54×subsections: (7) 46× (6) 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“HRS § 853-4 (1993 & Supp.2007), entitled "Chapter not applicable; when[,]" lists circumstances related to the nature of the offense, the attributes or history of the defendant, and the nature of the victim, none of which are applicable to the instant case.”
Later courts cite it for
“as a matter of due process a motion to revoke probation . . . is like a presentence report in that the defendant must be notified beforehand in order to allow him to contest it, if he wishes.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Sasai., 429 P.3d 1214 (Haw. 2018).
cites § 853-4 18×subsections: (13) 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“Although Petitioners conceded that the legislature intended to render persons charged under HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) ineligible for deferral, they contended the legislature's intent with respect to either HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) or HRS § 853-4 was irrelevant to application of the…”
4
GREENState v. Klie, 174 P.3d 358 (Haw. 2007).
cites § 853-4 8×subsections: (5) 6×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“However, s]uch deferrals are constrained by HRS § 853-4, which sets out the circumstances under which chapter 853 “shall not apply.”
The case’s holding
A petty misdemeanor that the statute makes subject to probation is probationable, so the deferred acceptance of no contest plea statute does not exclude it and the court may consider the motion.
Later courts cite it for
“even when the court is convinced in its own mind that the legislature really meant and intended something not expressed by the phraseology of the act” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Miller., 223 P.3d 157 (Haw. 2010).
cites § 853-4 6×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“To aggravate this breach, Abuse of a Family or Household Member is an offense that is excluded from DANCP eligibility under HRS § 853-4 (Supp.2008), whereas Assault in the Third Degree is not.”
The case’s holding
An error in proceedings constitutes plain error if it adversely affects the substantial rights of the defendant (State v. Miller).
Later courts cite it for
“based on the breach alone, the case must be remanded in 'the interests of justice,' regardless of prejudice, because, in the case of a plea agreement, the prosecutor's 'promise must be fulfilled.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Oshiro, 746 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1987).
cites § 853-4 12×subsections: (1) 10×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“Aton, on the other hand, advances that, if the 1980 amendment was meant to exclude HRS § 707-704, the legislature would have specifically listed the negligence and simple negligence killing, which did not happen.”
The case’s holding
Negligent homicide in the second degree is not among the offenses subject to certain statutory enhancements.
Later courts cite it for
“the right of appeal in a criminal case is purely statutory and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory provision.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Mun Chung Tom, 752 P.2d 597 (Haw. 1988).
cites § 853-4 10×subsections: (4) 4× (5) 4×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“HRS § 853-4 provides twenty-four exceptions to application of the statute, all separated by semicolons.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may deny a request for deferred acceptance of a no contest plea (affirming the trial court's denial of a deferred acceptance of no contest plea).
Later courts cite it for
“the grant or denial of a motion for a danc ... plea is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Medeiros., 454 P.3d 1069 (Haw. 2019).
cites § 853-4 14×subsections: (5) 4×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“HRS § 853-4 (2014 & Supp. 2018) sets forth the circumstances under which a defendant is ineligible to benefit from HRS Chapter 853.”
9
GREENState v. Riveira, 993 P.2d 580 (Haw. App. 2000).
cites § 853-4 9×subsections: (6) 5× (7) 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“For example, pursuant to HRS §§ 853-4(6) and 853-4(8), a defendant with a prior felony conviction is statutorily disqualified from deferred acceptance of his guilty (DAG) plea.”
10
GREENState v. Gomes, 177 P.3d 928 (Haw. 2008).
cites § 853-4 4×subsections: (7) 4×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“2d 496, 498-99 (1980) (limiting construction of the plain language of HRS § 853-4(7) because, among other reasons, strictly adhering to its plain language would be inconsistent with our legislature's intent in enacting the statute).”
Later courts cite it for
“wjhere the language of the law in question is plain and unambiguous,' courts are obligated to 'give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENState v. Adams, 879 P.2d 513 (Haw. 1994).
cites § 853-4 4×subsections: (6) 4×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“1992) 7 ; furthermore, he is no longer eligible for a DANC under HRS § 853-4(6) (1985). 8 Therefore, specific performance of the plea agreement is not a meaningful alternative.”
The case’s holding
A prosecution's violation of a plea agreement constitutes manifest injustice as a matter of law and entitles the defendant to withdraw the plea.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that the terms of a plea agreement, which serve as the inducement for entering a plea, must be fulfilled.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Sylva, 605 P.2d 496 (Haw. 1980).
cites § 853-4 4×subsections: (7)cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“HRS § 853-4 lists eight classes of offenders to whom the legislature intended to deny the benefit of Chapter 853.”
The case’s holding
Statutory disqualification for deferred acceptance of guilty pleas applies only to minors waived from family court to criminal court to be tried as adults.
Later courts cite it for
“when the language is plain and unmistakable the court is bound by the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the statute.” · 4 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Kimsel, 62 P.3d 628 (Haw. App. 2002).
cites § 853-4 8×subsections: (9) 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“HRS § 853-4(9) (1993) states, in relevant part, as follows: “This chapter [pertaining to deferred acceptance of guilty plea and DANC plea] shall not apply when: .”
Later courts cite it for
“the state, defense counsel, and the court knew or should have known that kim-sel was not eligible for a danc plea” · 1 citing court
14
GREENState v. Hamili, 952 P.2d 390 (Haw. 1998).
cites § 853-4 6×subsections: (5) 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“The trial court ruled that: (1) it lacked the discretion to grant a DANC plea because HRS § 853-4(5) provided that such a plea was not available in cases involving nonprobational offenses; (2) the sentencing provisions of HRS § 291-4 called for mandatory sentencing without the…”
The case’s holding
Where no statutory right to appeal exists, a writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle to challenge a trial court's actions taken without statutory authority.
cites § 853-4 2×subsections: (7) 2×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“But statutory language must be read in the context of the entire statute and construed in a manner consistent with the purposes of the statute.”
The case’s holding
A municipal ordinance is invalid if it prohibits what its enabling state statute permits or permits what the statute prohibits.
Later courts cite it for
“a test to determine whether an ordinance conflicts with a statute is whether it prohibits what the statute permits or permits what the statute prohibits.” · 7 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Dannenberg, 837 P.2d 776 (Haw. 1992).
cites § 853-4 2×subsections: (12) 2×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“1 HRS § 853-4(12) prohibits entry of DANC pleas where “[t]he defendant has been charged with a misdemeanor offense and has been previously granted deferred acceptance of guilty plea status for a prior felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor for which the period of deferral has…”
The case’s holding
The state may use a defendant's prior convictions to impeach credibility through judicial notice (reaffirming Rice).
Later courts cite it for
“the intent was clearly to limit the discretion of the trial court in sentencing prostitution offenses and to provide a mandatory sentencing structure unlike that for other petty misdemeanors.” · 6 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Anderson, 661 P.2d 716 (Haw. App. 1983).
cites § 853-4 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“Section 853-4 (1976, as amended) provides in part: § 853-4 Chapter not applicable; when. This chapter shall not apply when: * * * (6) The defendant has been convicted of any offense defined as a felony by the Hawaii Penal Code or has been convicted for any conduct which if…”
18
GREENState v. Wong, 861 P.2d 759 (Haw. App. 1993).
cites § 853-4 6×subsections: (2) 6×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“]” However, HRS § 853-4(2) (1985) explicitly does not permit a DAGP or a DANCP when “[t]he offense charged involves the intentional, knowing, or reckless bodily injury or serious bodily injury of another person[,]” and HRS § 707-700 (Supp.”
19
GREENState v. Matyas, 859 P.2d 1380 (Haw. App. 1993).
cites § 853-4 2×subsections: (9) 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 853-4
“* * Under the October 10,1990 Indictment, Matyas was not eligible for an HRS Chapter 853 deferred acceptance of a guilty plea (DAGP) because HRS § 853-4(9) forbids DAGPs when a firearm was used in the commission of the offense charged.”
Later courts cite it for
“despite this broad authority, . . . motions for new trials are not favored and new trials are to be granted with 4 not for publication in west's hawaii reports and pacific reporter caution.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENKewalo Ocean Activities v. Ching, 243 P.3d 273 (Haw. App. 2010).
cites § 853-4 4×subsections: (5) 4×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 853-4
“Based on HRS § 853-4(5) (Supp.2005), which provided that DANC pleas did not apply when “[t]he offense charged is nonprobationable,” the supreme court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198020002021

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1993. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Haw.14Haw. App.9
By subsection
(1)2 cases
State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003).“On June 6, 2002, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration of the respondent judge's May 14, 2002 order, arguing that HRS § 853-4 (Supp.2002) did not allow the court to grant a DANC plea in connection with the offense of assault in the second degree.”
State v. Oshiro, 746 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1987).“Aton, on the other hand, advances that, if the 1980 amendment was meant to exclude HRS § 707-704, the legislature would have specifically listed the negligence and simple negligence killing, which did not happen.”
(2)2 cases
State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003).
State v. Wong, 861 P.2d 759 (Haw. App. 1993).“]” However, HRS § 853-4(2) (1985) explicitly does not permit a DAGP or a DANCP when “[t]he offense charged involves the intentional, knowing, or reckless bodily injury or serious bodily injury of another person[,]” and HRS § 707-700 (Supp.”
(4)1 case
State v. Mun Chung Tom, 752 P.2d 597 (Haw. 1988).“HRS § 853-4 provides twenty-four exceptions to application of the statute, all separated by semicolons.”
(5)5 cases
State v. Klie, 174 P.3d 358 (Haw. 2007).“However, s]uch deferrals are constrained by HRS § 853-4, which sets out the circumstances under which chapter 853 “shall not apply.”
State v. Hamili, 952 P.2d 390 (Haw. 1998).“The trial court ruled that: (1) it lacked the discretion to grant a DANC plea because HRS § 853-4(5) provided that such a plea was not available in cases involving nonprobational offenses; (2) the sentencing provisions of HRS § 291-4 called for mandatory sentencing without the…”
State v. Mun Chung Tom, 752 P.2d 597 (Haw. 1988).
State v. Medeiros., 454 P.3d 1069 (Haw. 2019).“HRS § 853-4 (2014 & Supp. 2018) sets forth the circumstances under which a defendant is ineligible to benefit from HRS Chapter 853.”
Kewalo Ocean Activities v. Ching, 243 P.3d 273 (Haw. App. 2010).“Based on HRS § 853-4(5) (Supp.2005), which provided that DANC pleas did not apply when “[t]he offense charged is nonprobationable,” the supreme court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case.”
(6)3 cases
State v. Adams, 879 P.2d 513 (Haw. 1994).“1992) 7 ; furthermore, he is no longer eligible for a DANC under HRS § 853-4(6) (1985). 8 Therefore, specific performance of the plea agreement is not a meaningful alternative.”
State v. Shannon, 185 P.3d 200 (Haw. 2008).“HRS § 853-4 (1993 & Supp.2007), entitled "Chapter not applicable; when[,]" lists circumstances related to the nature of the offense, the attributes or history of the defendant, and the nature of the victim, none of which are applicable to the instant case.”
State v. Riveira, 993 P.2d 580 (Haw. App. 2000).“For example, pursuant to HRS §§ 853-4(6) and 853-4(8), a defendant with a prior felony conviction is statutorily disqualified from deferred acceptance of his guilty (DAG) plea.”
(7)5 cases
State v. Shannon, 185 P.3d 200 (Haw. 2008).
State v. Gomes, 177 P.3d 928 (Haw. 2008).“2d 496, 498-99 (1980) (limiting construction of the plain language of HRS § 853-4(7) because, among other reasons, strictly adhering to its plain language would be inconsistent with our legislature's intent in enacting the statute).”
Waikiki Resort Hotel, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 624 P.2d 1353 (Haw. 1981).“But statutory language must be read in the context of the entire statute and construed in a manner consistent with the purposes of the statute.”
State v. Riveira, 993 P.2d 580 (Haw. App. 2000).
State v. Sylva, 605 P.2d 496 (Haw. 1980).“HRS § 853-4 lists eight classes of offenders to whom the legislature intended to deny the benefit of Chapter 853.”
(9)3 cases
State v. Kimsel, 62 P.3d 628 (Haw. App. 2002).“HRS § 853-4(9) (1993) states, in relevant part, as follows: “This chapter [pertaining to deferred acceptance of guilty plea and DANC plea] shall not apply when: .”
State v. Matyas, 859 P.2d 1380 (Haw. App. 1993).“* * Under the October 10,1990 Indictment, Matyas was not eligible for an HRS Chapter 853 deferred acceptance of a guilty plea (DAGP) because HRS § 853-4(9) forbids DAGPs when a firearm was used in the commission of the offense charged.”
State v. Kimsel, 122 P.3d 1148 (Haw. App. 2005).
(12)1 case
State v. Dannenberg, 837 P.2d 776 (Haw. 1992).“1 HRS § 853-4(12) prohibits entry of DANC pleas where “[t]he defendant has been charged with a misdemeanor offense and has been previously granted deferred acceptance of guilty plea status for a prior felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor for which the period of deferral has…”
(13)1 case
State v. Sasai., 429 P.3d 1214 (Haw. 2018).“Although Petitioners conceded that the legislature intended to render persons charged under HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) ineligible for deferral, they contended the legislature's intent with respect to either HRS § 712-1200(1)(b) or HRS § 853-4 was irrelevant to application of the…”

Show all 23 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

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Versions

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