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Idaho Code § 72-408 (2026)

Income benefits for total and partial disability. 

Edition and currency
text as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1979–2019 27citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 27 opinions since 1979. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (5 cases).

Income benefits for total and partial disability. 

Income benefits for total and partial disability during the period of recovery, and thereafter in cases of total and permanent disability, shall be paid to the disabled employee subject to deduction on account of waiting period and subject to the maximum and minimum limits set forth in section 72-409, Idaho Code, as follows:

(1)  For a period not to exceed a period of fifty-two (52) weeks, an amount equal to sixty-seven per cent (67%) of his average weekly wage and thereafter an amount equal to sixty-seven per cent (67%) of the currently applicable average weekly state wage.
(2)  Partial disability. For partial disability during the period of recovery an amount equal to sixty-seven per cent (67%) of his decrease in wage-earning capacity, but in no event to exceed the income benefits payable for total disability.
The 20 cases that cite Idaho Code § 72-408 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCarey v. Clearwater Cnty. Road Dep't, 686 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1984).
cites § 72-408 15×subsections: (1) 8×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“I.C. § 72-408 sets forth the income benefits collectible by an injured employee during recovery, and subsections (1) and (2) thereof Speak of total disability benefits during the recovery period, measured in terms of the “currently applicable average weekly state wage.”
The case’s holding
Non-medical disability factors in odd-lot cases are prorated between the employer and the fund in proportion to their respective percentages of responsibility for the physical impairment.
Later courts cite it for
“the appropriate solution to the problem of apportioning the non-medical disability factors, in an odd-lot case where the fund is involved, is to prorate the non-medical portion of disability between the employer and the fund, in proportion to their respective percentages of responsibility for the physical impairment.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENGarcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 772 P.2d 173 (Idaho 1989).
cites § 72-408 20×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“The Commission held ISIF liable for the difference between the amount of disability benefits for which Simplot was liable and those provided for in I.C. § 72-408, as well as the entire amount of Garcia's disability benefits following the 431 weeks of permanent disability…”
The case’s holding
The but for standard is the appropriate test to determine whether total permanent disability results from the combined effects of a pre-existing condition and a work-related injury.
Later courts cite it for
“we acknowledge that the 'but for' standard is the appropriate test to determine whether the total permanent disability is the result of the combined effects of the pre-existing condition and the work-related injury.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENOchoa v. State, 794 P.2d 1127 (Idaho 1990).
cites § 72-408 51×subsections: (1) 14× (2) 6×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“Idaho Code § 72-408 defines the benefits to which a disabled worker is entitled.”
4
GREENPhinney v. Shoshone Med. Ctr., 960 P.2d 1258 (Idaho 1998).
cites § 72-408 30×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“Pursuant to I.C. §§ 72-408 and 72-409, the Industrial Commission’s determination of Phinney’s disability benefits requires knowledge of her average weekly wage.”
Later courts cite it for
“because claimant did not indicate to the referee prior to the hearing that her benefits calculation was a disputed issue, or move for reconsideration or rehearing under i.c. 72-718, she is bound by the commission's findings and cannot now challenge them on appeal” · 2 citing courts
5
YELLOWPaulson v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., 591 P.2d 143 (Idaho 1979).
cites § 72-408 8×cited by 54 cases
Overruled by Jones v. Emmett Manor on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 72-408
“" [3] I.C. § 72-408 provides: "72-408. Income benefits for total and partial disability.”
The case’s holding
Medical testimony sufficiently establishes causation if it plainly and unequivocally conveys a conviction that events are causally related without requiring a specific verbal formula.
Later courts cite it for
“no special verbal formula is necessary when, as here, a doctor's testimony plainly and unequivocally conveys his conviction that events are causally related.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENCorgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 335 P.3d 1150 (Idaho 2014).
cites § 72-408 12×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“” I.C. § 72-408. Other than a deduction for the “waiting period” provided in Idaho Code section 72-408, Idaho Code section 72-406(2) provides another deduction: Any income benefits previously paid an injured workman for permanent disability -to any member or part of his body…”
Later courts cite it for
“although partial permanent disability benefits are calculated in relation to permanent physical impairment benefits, idaho code sections 72-427 to -429, partial permanent disability benefits and permanent physical impairment benefits are two separate forms of compensation.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENNielson v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 684 P.2d 280 (Idaho 1984).
cites § 72-408 13×subsections: (1) 7×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“ISIF contends that under I.C. § 72-408, claimant is entitled only to 60% of the currently applicable average weekly state wage.”
Later courts cite it for
“in order for a claimant to make out a prima facie case that he is an 'odd-lot' worker, he must show what other types of employment he has attempted.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENLopez v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 691 P.2d 1205 (Idaho 1984).
cites § 72-408 4×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“The Commission refused to award partial temporary income benefits under I.C. § 72-408(3) because claimant had been discharged for failure to keep his employer *1206 informed of the reason for his absence.”
The case’s holding
The determination of whether an employer has reasonable grounds to contest attorney fees is a factual question reviewed for substantial competent evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“the commissioners work with these cases on a daily basis and they have both experience and expertise in the workers' compensation law, which this court has regularly stated it will defer to.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENPage v. McCain Foods, Inc., 179 P.3d 265 (Idaho 2008).
cites § 72-408 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“” I.C. § 72-408. The statute does not define “period of recovery,” but this Court has said the period of recovery ends when the worker is medically stable.”
The case’s holding
When the Commission apportions permanent disability to exclude preexisting conditions, it must explain its rationale in sufficient detail to permit appellate review for substantial and competent evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“there is a presumption that the commission by its experience is able to judge the causative factors in a particular case, and the commission is 'allowed a degree of latitude in making an apportionment.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENHarrison v. Osco Drug, Inc., 776 P.2d 1189 (Idaho 1989).
cites § 72-408 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“Oseo disputes that Harrison is still within the period of recovery required by I.C. § 72-408, 1 and therefore she is not entitled to compensation for continuing treatment.”
11
GREENDrake v. State, Indus. Spec. Indem. Fund, 920 P.2d 397 (Idaho 1996).
cites § 72-408 20×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 72-408
“Pursuant to former I.C. § 72-408, the ISIF paid Drake an amount equal to sixty percent (60%) of his average weekly wage for the first fifty-two weeks.”
12
GREENReese v. V-1 Oil Co., 115 P.3d 721 (Idaho 2005).
cites § 72-408 4×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“We note, however, that the Commission has misconstrued Idaho Code §§ 72-408 and 72-432(4)(a). Had Reese failed to comply with Idaho Code § 72-432 (4)(a) when seeking medical care from Dr.”
13
GREENHernandez v. Phillips, 118 P.3d 111 (Idaho 2005).
cites § 72-408 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“” I.C. § 72-408. Our worker’s compensation statutes do not define the period of recovery, but we have said that it ends when the worker is medically stable.”
Later courts cite it for
“ends when the worker is medically stable.” · 2 citing courts
14
YELLOWLuAnn Shubert v. Macy's West, Inc., 343 P.3d 1099 (Idaho 2015).
cites § 72-408 2×cited by 8 cases
Abrogated by Sohar Chavez v. Kevin Stokes on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 72-408
“” I.C. § 72-408. This period “ends when the worker is medically stable.”
Later courts cite it for
“the claimant's burden is to prove to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the injury she claims benefits for is causally related to an accident occurring in the course of employment” · 1 citing court
15
GREENJarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Ctr., 38 P.3d 617 (Idaho 2001).
cites § 72-408 1×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“Jarvis argues that she should have been awarded total temporary disability benefits to October 12, 2000, the date of the Commission’s order approving and adopting the refex-ee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
The case’s holding
A presumption of compensability applies to all claims under the workers' compensation statute, including claims for permanent total disability benefits.
Later courts cite it for
“substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” · 5 citing courts
16
GREENFrank v. Bunker Hill Co., 792 P.2d 815 (Idaho 1990).
cites § 72-408 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“Average Weekly Wage III Although Employer apparently calculated the appropriate weekly wage for Claimant for purposes of total temporary disability payments pursuant to IDAHO CODE, section 72-408, neither the amount of those payments nor the amount of Claimant's average weekly…”
Later courts cite it for
“date of first manifestation of an occupational disease” · 1 citing court
17
GREENHipwell v. Challenger Pallet & Supply, 859 P.2d 330 (Idaho 1993).
cites § 72-408 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“Idaho Code § 72-408 requires payment of income benefits only “during the period of recovery.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is within the commission's discretion to order consolidation, and our review of the record reveals no abuse thereof.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENHarris v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 303 P.3d 604 (Idaho 2013).
cites § 72-408 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“” The Respondents agree with the Commission, and assert that with respect to Harris’ neck pain, her various treatments have not resulted in any improvement.”
19
GREENLoya v. J.R. Simplot Co., 813 P.2d 873 (Idaho 1991).
cites § 72-408 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 72-408
“The Industrial Commission ruled that Loya was not so entitled because he was not within a period of recovery as required by I.C. § 72-408. The Commission issued a *64 written decision (prepared and recommended by the referee) which in part stated: The medical evidence shows that…”
20
NO FLAGDrake v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 920 P.2d 397 (Idaho 1996).
cites § 72-408 20×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 72-408
“Pursuant to former I.C. § 72-408, the ISIF paid Drake an amount equal to sixty percent (60%) of his average weekly wage for the first fifty-two weeks.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197919992019

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By subsection
(1)5 cases
Carey v. Clearwater Cnty. Road Dep't, 686 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1984).“I.C. § 72-408 sets forth the income benefits collectible by an injured employee during recovery, and subsections (1) and (2) thereof Speak of total disability benefits during the recovery period, measured in terms of the “currently applicable average weekly state wage.”
Nielson v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 684 P.2d 280 (Idaho 1984).“ISIF contends that under I.C. § 72-408, claimant is entitled only to 60% of the currently applicable average weekly state wage.”
Ochoa v. State, 794 P.2d 1127 (Idaho 1990).“Idaho Code § 72-408 defines the benefits to which a disabled worker is entitled.”
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 335 P.3d 1150 (Idaho 2014).“” I.C. § 72-408. Other than a deduction for the “waiting period” provided in Idaho Code section 72-408, Idaho Code section 72-406(2) provides another deduction: Any income benefits previously paid an injured workman for permanent disability -to any member or part of his body…”
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., No. 41012 (Idaho Aug. 25, 2014).
(2)1 case
Ochoa v. State, 794 P.2d 1127 (Idaho 1990).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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