¹ Defendant’s challenge to that matter is considered in People v. Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190051, 2 which is being filed concurrently with the instant opinion.

³ A letter from Dr. Nishad Nadkarni, a forensic psychiatrist with Forensic Clinical Services, is contained in the record for appeal No. 1-19-0679. While the letter provides that Dr. Nadkarni opined, to a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, that defendant was fit to stand trial, the psychiatric summary outlining the basis for that opinion does not appear in the record for either appeal.

⁴ A letter from Dr. Fidel Echevarria, a psychiatrist with Forensic Clinical Services, is contained in the record on appeal. While the letter provides that Dr. Echevarria could not opine as to defendant’s fitness to stand trial due to defendant’s lack of cooperation, the psychiatric summary outlining “the basis of [his] opinion or lack thereof” does not appear in the record on appeal.

⁵ The transcript of the June 26, 2018, hearing is contained in the record in Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190051.

⁶ A letter from Dr. Brian Curran, a licensed clinical psychologist with Forensic Clinical Services, is contained in the record on appeal. While the letter provides that Dr. Curran opined, to a reasonable degree of psychological and scientific certainty, that defendant was fit to stand trial, Dr. Curran was unable to render an opinion as to defendant’s sanity at the time of the alleged offense or his ability to understand the Miranda warnings, as defendant refused to sign the release of information forms for his treatment records. Additionally, as with the other letters, the psychiatric summary outlining the basis for Dr. Curran’s opinion does not appear in the record for either appeal.

⁷ The record shows that the video was edited to show only the part where Januszewski exited his vehicle and approached Yohanna and defendant.

⁸ This exhibit is not contained in the record on appeal, but defendant does not dispute its admission. - 14 - Yohanna what he had testified to as to the reason for arresting defendant. Yohanna testified that he had never provided a reason for the arrest during the preliminary hearing. ¶ 45 Defendant then testified on his own behalf, testifying that he was not the person depicted in the body-camera video. Instead, defendant claimed that “it’s someone in makeup [to] look like me.” Defendant then testified: “[T]his video is not me. I was not intoxicated. Yeah, if I want to *** lie on the stand. I was not driving, they cannot prove in the video I was driving but one lie make[s] you [believe] another lie. They cannot prove in this video I was driving. I didn’t come out of the car or anything.” However, defendant then continued: “[In] [t]he opening statement I [said] about what happened and I was over there and I pull up to the police station and I drove—get out of the car and get the person out and walk him there. The testimony was truth. It was nothing changed. It was nothing changed, exactly what I said, that was it. I get out of the car, I get this guy out [of] the car, push him toward the police station. Sergeant and this guy Mr. Yohanna come out from the police station. Then we [were] talking and then we [were] talking, the sergeant take the guy, he was looking familiar, he quickly take the guy in and Mr. Yohanna go back to the car and I’m still walking to the police station slowly. Then he call me back, I go back to Mr. Yohanna, then he make me—ask[s] me [for the] key, he took the key from me. Then I *** start walking back to the police station, then this is what happened. I start walking back to the police station, he call[s] me back, make me do the walking test, I pass that test. Then I pass the test then he do[es] the eye exam test, I pass that test too. So it’s nothing changed and I don’t want to say nothing further.” ¶ 46 On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he had driven to the police station. When asked whether the Acura belonged to him, defendant testified that “no, [it does] not belong to me because my license [is] suspended and I have to keep driving the last five years without catching tickets so it was in my friend’s name.” Defendant testified that he parked on the wrong side of the street because his passenger began trying to exit the vehicle, so he pulled up to the police station to escort him out. ¶ 47 After the parties had presented closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury. With respect to the elements of the offense, the court instructed: “A person commits the offense of driving under the influence when he drives or was [in] actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. To sustain the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol the state must prove the following propositions, first proposition, that the defendant drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle and, second proposition, that at the time the defendant drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.” ¶ 48 The court also instructed the jury as to the verdict forms: - 15 - “The defendant is charged in different ways with the offense of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol. You will receive two forms of verdict pertaining to each particular way that the offense of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol is charged. As to each particular way the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol is charged you will be provided both a not guilty and a guilty form of verdict. From these two verdict forms as to each particular way the offense of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol is charged you should select the one verdict form that reflects your verdict and sign it as I have stated. Do not write on the other verdict form. Sign only one verdict form as to each particular way that the offense of aggravated driving under the influence is charged. The verdict forms are as follows, we, the jury, find the defendant, Muhammad Khan, not guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol. We, the jury, find the defendant, Muhammad Khan, guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol. We, the jury, find the defendant, Muhammad Khan, not guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, no license or permit. We, the jury, find the defendant, Muhammad Khan, guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, no license or permit.” ¶ 49 After the jury had begun deliberating, it sent out a note to the court, reading: “ ‘Question, do we have to sign both?’ ” The court sent a response stating: “ ‘You have been instructed on the law and your functions as jurors, please continue your deliberations.’ ” The jury then returned guilty verdicts on both counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, and the trial court entered judgment on both counts. ¶ 50 On February 13, 2019, defendant filed posttrial motions based on lack of jurisdiction and based on lack of a preliminary hearing, both of which the trial court denied. The court then proceeded to sentence defendant. The court merged count IV (driving with no license) into count II (driving with a revoked license) and sentenced defendant to five years in the IDOC, followed by one year of mandatory supervised release. This appeal follows. ¶ 51 ANALYSIS ¶ 52 On appeal, defendant raises a number of issues, claiming (1) the trial court should have conducted a fitness hearing due to defendant’s conduct, (2) defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, (3) defendant should have been permitted standby counsel, (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and (5) defendant was entitled to a new trial because he waived his right to a jury trial. We consider each argument in turn. ¶ 53 I. Fitness Hearing ¶ 54 Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in not sua sponte conducting a fitness hearing because his conduct demonstrated a bona fide doubt as to his fitness. We note that defendant raised the same issue in his appeal in People v. Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190051, so we draw from our analysis in that case where applicable here. ¶ 55 It is well-settled that “ ‘[d]ue process bars the prosecution of an unfit defendant.’ ” People v. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 70 (quoting People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 186 (2010)). Under Illinois law, a defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial, unless, due to a mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the - 16 - proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d at 186; 725 ILCS 5/104- 10 (West 2018). While a defendant’s fitness is presumed, “the circuit court has a duty to order a fitness hearing, sua sponte, any time a bona fide doubt arises regarding a defendant’s ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or assist in his defense.” People v. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d 379, 382 (1996). Whether a bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s fitness has arisen is generally a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d at 382. An abuse of discretion is found only “where the [trial] court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Baez, 241 Ill. 2d 44, 106 (2011). ¶ 56 Defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve this issue below and asks us to review it for plain error. To preserve a purported error for consideration by a reviewing court, a defendant must both (1) object to the error at trial and (2) raise the error in a posttrial motion. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. “Failure to do either results in forfeiture.” Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. However, the plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider an unpreserved claim (1) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that this error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence at defendant’s trial. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). Since the right to be fit for trial is “fundamental,” the question as to a defendant’s fitness may be reviewed for plain error under the second prong. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d at 382. ¶ 57 In a plain-error analysis, it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 51. The first step under either prong of the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether there was an error at trial and whether this error was clear or obvious. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. ¶ 58 As noted, a trial court has a duty to order a fitness hearing, sua sponte, any time a bona fide doubt arises regarding a defendant’s ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or assist in his defense. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d at 382. There is a bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s fitness if there is a “real, substantial and legitimate doubt” assessed against an objective standard. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 518 (1991). “Fitness speaks only to a person’s ability to function within the context of trial; it does not refer to sanity or competence in other areas.” People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 524 (1995); People v. Taylor, 409 Ill. App. 3d 881, 896 (2011). A person may be fit for trial although his mind is otherwise unsound. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d at 524; Taylor, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 896. To determine whether a bona fide doubt exists, a court may consider a defendant’s irrational behavior, a defendant’s demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on the defendant’s competence. People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 304 (2002). However, there are no fixed or immutable signs that invariably indicate the need for further inquiry. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 305. ¶ 59 In the case at bar, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order a fitness hearing. As we found in Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190051, defendant’s conduct leading up to the probation violation hearing did not rise to the level of a bona fide doubt as to his fitness. While it was clear that defendant lacked knowledge of legal concepts and refused to accept the trial court’s explanations, this lack of knowledge does not render defendant unfit. Moreover, nothing about defendant’s conduct during the trial on the DUI charges demonstrated - 17 - a bona fide doubt as to his fitness. Defendant clearly believed that the trial proceedings were inappropriate and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter, based on his belief that the charges were barred by double jeopardy and had been dismissed at the preliminary hearing. As a result, defendant intentionally chose not to participate in any part of the pretrial proceedings so as not to subject himself to the court’s jurisdiction through his conduct. While defendant’s belief as to the court’s jurisdiction was incorrect, defendant nonetheless developed a strategy that nothing in the case would be done with his agreement and pursued that strategy throughout the trial. Defendant also challenged the video evidence presented at trial. While his claim that the individual depicted in the video was made up to look like him may not have been a persuasive one, defendant also focused on actual discrepancies in the videos, such as pointing out the incorrect timestamp on the videos. Consequently, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order a fitness hearing when the court possessed two mental health reports by two psychiatrists that defendant was fit to stand trial. ¶ 60 Defendant also points to comments he made about contacting the media and the FBI, arguing that these demonstrated irrational thinking. However, as defendant acknowledges, the trial court twice ordered BCXs after such behavior, which, as noted, came back showing that defendant was fit to stand trial. The mere ordering of a BCX cannot be construed as a showing that the trial court found a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s fitness. People v. Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d 212, 222 (2004). Here, after receiving the results of each BCX, the trial court was apparently satisfied with defendant’s fitness, and we cannot find that this decision was an abuse of discretion. ¶ 61 We similarly find unpersuasive defendant’s claim that, even if defendant was fit to stand trial, he was not fit to represent himself, relying on the United States Supreme Court case of Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). In that case, the Edwards court noted that mental illness was not a unitary concept and that, in certain circumstances, an individual may be competent to stand trial but, at the same time, may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-76. Thus, the Edwards court found that “the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177-78. Where the defendant is competent to stand trial, but still “suffer[s] from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves,” the trial court is permitted to insist upon representation by counsel. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178. ¶ 62 In the case at bar, however, we are not asked to review the trial court’s denial of defendant’s right to self-representation. Instead, defendant asks us to read Edwards to require the trial court to deny defendant the right to represent himself, even where the trial court is satisfied as to defendant’s fitness to stand trial. Nothing in Edwards imposes such a requirement. See People v. Allen, 401 Ill. App. 3d 840, 852 (2010) (“Nothing in Edwards requires a trial court to do what defendant now argues should have been done, i.e., the forced denial by the trial court of defendant’s right to proceed pro se although he was found mentally competent to stand trial.”); People v. Tatum, 389 Ill. App. 3d 656, 670 (2009) (“Edwards did not hold that there was a higher standard of competence requiring an additional inquiry before a trial court permits a defendant to proceed pro se. Rather, Edwards simply held that a defendant’s right to self- representation was not absolute and could be limited if a defendant was not mentally competent to proceed pro se, yet was still competent to stand trial with representation.”). Indeed, the - 18 - Edwards court recognized that the trial court “will often prove best able to make more fine- tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177. ¶ 63 Here, the record on appeal shows that defendant was competent to represent himself at trial. Given the numerous motions he filed, defendant was clearly able to use the legal system to place his arguments before the court. He was present and attentive at all of the proceedings, asking questions when he did not understand something, and any comments he made were relevant to the case before him. He presented an opening statement and closing argument, objected to the admission of evidence, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, and presented witnesses in his defense by recalling Officer Yohanna and testifying on his own behalf. Defendant also filed a motion for directed verdict at the close of the State’s case and posttrial motions at the conclusion of the trial. During sentencing, the trial court commented that it found defendant to be “intelligent enough to make certain arguments,” even though those arguments were not successful. The court further found that defendant had “use[d] the process that’s available to him” but that he had done so to frustrate the proceedings. Defendant’s trial strategy was that he did not believe that the charges against him were valid and refused to accept the court’s explanations as to their validity. We cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold a fitness hearing as to defendant’s ability to represent himself where there is no indication that defendant’s trial strategy was the result of his mental competence. As we noted in Tatum, “[p]erhaps defendant’s self-representation was foolish and unwise, yet, the record does not show that it was the result of mental incompetence.” Tatum, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 671. Since we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a fitness hearing, there was no error, and consequently, there can be no plain error. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 (the first step in a plain-error analysis is determining “whether there was a clear or obvious error at trial”). ¶ 64 II. Waiver of Counsel ¶ 65 Next, defendant claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel because he did not understand the nature of the charges against him. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI) guarantees an accused in a criminal proceeding the right to the assistance of counsel. People v. Jiles, 364 Ill. App. 3d 320, 328 (2006). Any waiver of that right must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Jiles, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 328 (citing People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 235 (1996)). A defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel must be clear and unequivocal. People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530, 538 (2002); People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1998). The purpose of requiring a clear and unequivocal waiver is to “(1) prevent the defendant from appealing [either] the denial of his right to self-representation or the denial of his right to counsel, and (2) prevent the defendant from manipulating and abusing the system by going back and forth between his request for counsel and his wish to proceed pro se.” Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d at 538. To determine whether a defendant’s waiver was clear and unequivocal, a court will look to the overall context of the proceedings, including the defendant’s conduct following the defendant’s request to represent himself. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d at 538-39. ¶ 66 As with the issue of his fitness, defendant acknowledges that he has not preserved this issue and asks us to review it for plain error. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48 (to preserve a purported error for consideration by a reviewing court, a defendant must both (1) object to the - 19 - error at trial and (2) raise the error in a posttrial motion). As noted, under the plain-error doctrine, we may consider an unpreserved claim (1) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that this error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence at defendant’s trial. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. Since the right to counsel is fundamental, the claim that there was no effective waiver of counsel may be reviewed under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. People v. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d 259, 261 (2002); People v. Jamison, 2014 IL App (5th) 130150, ¶ 12. However, as noted, the first step under either prong of the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether there was an error at trial and whether this error was clear or obvious. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. ¶ 67 In the case at bar, defendant claims that his waiver of counsel was ineffective because he did not understand the nature of the charges against him. A trial court’s decision on a defendant’s election to proceed pro se will be reversed only if the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Hunt, 2016 IL App (1st) 132979, ¶ 16. As noted, an abuse of discretion is found only “where the [trial] court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baez, 241 Ill. 2d at 106. ¶ 68 If a defendant’s decision to represent himself is freely, knowingly, and intelligently made, it must be accepted, even if the court may consider such a decision unwise. Baez, 241 Ill. 2d at 116. “However, although a defendant need not possess the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to choose self-representation competently and intelligently, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baez, 241 Ill. 2d at 117. “The requirement of knowing and intelligent choice calls for nothing less than a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baez, 241 Ill. 2d at 117. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel “must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances of that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” People v. Lego, 168 Ill. 2d 561, 565 (1995) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). ¶ 69 In the case at bar, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting defendant to represent himself at trial. Defendant was admonished many times as to his right to counsel, the nature of the charges against him, and the sentencing range he faced and does not argue otherwise on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) (a trial court must make certain admonishments before a defendant may waive counsel). There is no indication that defendant failed to understand that he was being charged with DUI of alcohol based on his conduct during the early morning hours of December 18, 2017. Defendant’s argument on appeal is based on the fact that defendant believed that the charges against him were not valid, pointing to his numerous motions to dismiss and his conduct during trial. However, the fact that defendant had a poor defense to the charges does not mean that defendant failed to understand the nature of the charges against him. - 20 - ¶ 70 The case at bar bears no resemblance to People v. Perkins, 2018 IL App (1st) 133981, a case relied on by defendant. There, we found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request to represent himself, where the defendant was schizophrenic, requested a trial even though discovery was not yet completed, and responded that he was “ ‘not interested in that right now’ ” when the court asked if he understood what was involved in a death penalty case. Perkins, 2018 IL App (1st) 133981, ¶ 48. In that case, however, we were reviewing whether the court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request to proceed pro se, while here, we are reviewing whether the court abused its discretion in permitting defendant to proceed pro se. Given the deferential standard of review, this difference is significant. More importantly, however, this case bears no factual similarity to Perkins. Defendant in the case at bar understood the charges he was facing—he simply believed, or used as a trial strategy, that those charges had previously been dismissed at the preliminary hearing and would not accept any explanation otherwise. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting defendant to proceed pro se. Therefore, where there was no error, there can be no plain error. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 (the first step in a plain-error analysis is determining “whether there was a clear or obvious error at trial”). ¶ 71 III. Standby Counsel ¶ 72 Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in denying him standby counsel. A pro se defendant does not have a right to standby counsel, but since there is no state statute or court rule to the contrary, such appointment is permissible. People v. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d 362, 383 (1990); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 170 (1984). If the trial court appoints standby counsel, it retains broad discretion to determine the scope of standby counsel’s involvement. People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1996); People v. Smith, 249 Ill. App. 3d 460, 470-71 (1993). However, a pro se defendant maintains the right to control the case presented, and standby counsel’s participation should not be allowed to destroy the perception that defendant is representing himself. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d at 377-78; McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178. “Thus, standby counsel may assist a pro se defendant ‘in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the completion of some specific task, such as introducing evidence or objecting to testimony, that the defendant has clearly shown he wishes to complete,’ and may also help ‘ensure the defendant’s compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure.’ ” Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d at 378 (quoting McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183). Whether the trial court erred in refusing to appoint standby counsel is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d at 379. As noted, an abuse of discretion is found only “where the [trial] court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baez, 241 Ill. 2d at 106. ¶ 73 As with his previous claims, defendant acknowledges that he has not preserved this issue and asks us to review it for plain error. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48 (to preserve a purported error for consideration by a reviewing court, a defendant must both (1) object to the error at trial and (2) raise the error in a posttrial motion). As noted, under the plain-error doctrine, we may consider an unpreserved claim (1) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that this error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice - 21 - against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence at defendant’s trial. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. However, as noted, the first step under either prong of the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether there was an error at trial and whether this error was clear or obvious. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. ¶ 74 In the case at bar, defendant claims that his lack of abilities and experience warranted the appointment of standby counsel. Our supreme court has instructed that “[r]elevant criteria appropriately considered by a trial court in deciding whether to appoint standby counsel to assist a pro se defendant in a criminal case include the nature and gravity of the charge, the expected factual and legal complexity of the proceedings, and the abilities and experience of the defendant.” Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d at 380. We note that the trial court in the case at bar had the ability to observe defendant’s demeanor and conduct throughout the proceedings, including his ability to understand the proceedings, and discussed defendant’s education and legal knowledge several times prior to permitting him to represent himself. Additionally, when considering defendant’s request for standby counsel, the court expressly asked the State about the complexity of the charges and whether there would be any scientific evidence, such as blood testing or Breathalyzer results, that would be involved. Having been informed that no such evidence would be presented, the court found that, while the possibility of incarceration was “serious,” the complexity of the case did not require the appointment of standby counsel. We cannot find that the court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. ¶ 75 Defendant contends that he lacked any legal knowledge, which resulted in him filing repeated meritless motions and making ineffective arguments. However, as noted, defendant believed, or used as a trial strategy, that the charges against him were invalid, even after the trial court and the State had explained the process by which the charges had been filed multiple times. Even if standby counsel had been appointed, defendant remained in control of the case he wished to present, and defendant here repeatedly made clear that the case he wished to present was based on the validity of the charges. See Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d at 377-78; McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178. There is nothing to suggest that standby counsel would have been any more effective in changing defendant’s mind as to that issue than the court or the State had been. Moreover, where defendant did not understand the legal process, the trial court explained it to him. Thus, for instance, while defendant did not understand what a motion for a directed verdict was, the court explained it to him and interpreted his comments as wishing to file one, which it then considered. ¶ 76 Defendant also claims that standby counsel would have assisted with jury selection, where several jurors expressed doubt as to their ability to be fair and impartial. However, neither juror defendant identifies as problematic indicated that they were unable to be fair and impartial. One juror, who was a bartender, answered “yes” to the question of whether anything about the nature of the allegations would affect his ability to be fair and impartial, explaining that, as a bartender, he “take[s] it very seriously to make sure that people are safe when they leave my establishment. But then sometimes you are not able to guarantee as soon as somebody exits those doors, I have fulfilled that responsibility so just something that is on my mind.” However, he also promised to be fair and impartial and that he would be able to sign either a guilty or not guilty verdict, depending on the evidence presented at trial. The other juror, whose brother - 22 - was shot 40 years previously, answered “I don’t know. Maybe,” to the question of whether anything about the experience that would affect her ability to be fair and impartial. The court asked what she meant, and she responded “[t]hat I might be partial about, you know, if somebody got killed or murdered or something like that.” We cannot find that the acceptance of these jurors demonstrated the necessity of standby counsel. ¶ 77 Finally, defendant contends that he failed to meaningfully test the State’s case, claiming that “[t]he critical issue in this case was whether [defendant] drove or was in actual physical control of the car.” However, defendant was able to examine the State’s witnesses and attempted to cast doubt on the body camera videos by, in part, pointing out the incorrect time stamps. Defendant also attempted to impeach Officer Yohanna through the use of his testimony at the preliminary hearing, which was ultimately unsuccessful. ¶ 78 The case at bar represented a relatively straightforward case, with no scientific evidence and few witnesses. The issues were clearly defined: (1) whether defendant was driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle, (2) whether he was under the influence of alcohol, and (3) whether he had a driver’s license at the time. There was body-camera video, which showed defendant’s interactions with the police, and defendant admitted to the police officers at the scene to drinking alcohol, to driving, and to driving without a license. While the possibility of incarceration is a serious matter, we cannot find that the court abused its discretion in determining that standby counsel was not needed. Indeed, we note that it appears that no Illinois trial court has ever been reversed for exercising its discretion not to appoint standby counsel. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1060 (1996) (“[N]o trial court in Illinois has been reversed for exercising its discretion to not appoint standby counsel, and this absence of reversals appears consistent with nationwide experience.” (Emphases in original.)); People v. Pratt, 391 Ill. App. 3d 45, 57 (2009) (reiterating same proposition); People v. Ellison, 2013 IL App (1st) 101261, ¶ 42 (same). In addition, during the course of the trial, defendant never renewed his request for standby counsel. Consequently, because there was no error, there can be no plain error. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 (the first step in a plain-error analysis is determining “whether there was a clear or obvious error at trial”). ¶ 79 IV. Jury Instructions ¶ 80 Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of the aggravated DUI of alcohol charges against him. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court erred by not, sua sponte, issuing an instruction defining “actual physical control” or instructing the jury as to the elements of aggravated DUI of alcohol with a revoked or suspended driver’s license. “[T]he purpose of jury instructions is to provide the jury with correct legal principles that apply to the evidence, thus enabling the jury to reach a proper conclusion based on the applicable law and the evidence presented.” People v. Parker, 223 Ill. 2d 494, 500 (2006). A reviewing court will reverse a trial court’s determination as to what instructions to give only if it finds that the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Gilliam, 2013 IL App (1st) 113104, ¶ 41. “In making this determination, we are to examine whether the instructions given, when taken as a whole, fairly, fully and comprehensively apprised the jury of the relevant law.” Gilliam, 2013 IL App (1st) 113104, ¶ 41 (citing Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 501). However, the question of whether jury instructions accurately conveyed the applicable law is reviewed de novo. Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 501. De novo consideration means we perform - 23 - the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. People v. Carlisle, 2019 IL App (1st) 162259, ¶ 68. ¶ 81 As noted, both an objection and a written posttrial motion raising an issue are necessary to preserve an error for appellate review. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. This principle applies to errors in jury instructions as well as to other trial errors. See People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 175 (2005) (“Generally, a defendant forfeits review of any putative jury instruction error if the defendant does not object to the instruction or offer an alternative instruction at trial and does not raise the instruction issue in a posttrial motion.”); Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 507. However, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) provides that “substantial defects” in jury instructions “are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interests of justice require.” Our supreme court has found that Rule 451(c) is coextensive with the plain- error rule and is construed identically. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 175. In the case at bar, defendant acknowledges that he did not properly preserve this issue and asks us to review it for plain error. ¶ 82 As explained above, under the plain-error doctrine, we may consider an unpreserved claim (1) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that this error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence at defendant’s trial. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. “[A] jury instruction error rises to the level of plain error only when it ‘creates a serious risk that the jurors incorrectly convicted the defendant because they did not understand the applicable law, so as to severely threaten the fairness of the trial.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 193 (quoting People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2004)). However, as noted, the first step under either prong of the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether there was an error at trial and whether this error was clear or obvious. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. ¶ 83 A. “Actual Physical Control” Instruction ¶ 84 Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in failing to define “actual physical control” when setting forth the elements of the DUI of alcohol charges. The trial court in the case at bar instructed the jury based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 23.13, 23.14, 23.67E, 23.68E (approved Dec. 8. 2011) (hereinafter IPI Criminal Nos. 23.13, 23.14, 23.67E, 23.68E). The court first instructed the jury based on IPI Criminal No. 23.13, instructing: “A person commits the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol when he drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.” ¶ 85 The court then instructed the jury based on IPI Criminal No. 23.14, instructing: “To sustain the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, the State must prove the following propositions: First Proposition: That the defendant drove or is in actual physical control of a vehicle; and Second Proposition: That at the time the defendant drove or is in actual physical control of a vehicle, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. - 24 - If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.” ¶ 86 The court then gave two instructions concerning aggravated DUI of alcohol. First, the court instructed the jury based on IPI Criminal No. 23.67E: “A person commits the offense of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol when he drives a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and in so driving a vehicle, he does not possess a driver’s license or permit or a restricted driving permit or a judicial driving permit or a monitoring device driving permit.” ¶ 87 Finally, the court instructed the jury based on IPI Criminal No. 23.68E: “To sustain the charge of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, the State must prove the following propositions: First Proposition: That the defendant drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle; and Second Proposition: That at the time the defendant drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, the defendant was under the influence or alcohol; and Third Proposition: That at the time the defendant drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, the defendant did not possess a driver’s license or permit or a restricted driving permit or a judicial driving permit or a monitoring device driving permit. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.” ¶ 88 IPI Criminal Nos. 23.13, 23.67E, and 23.68E provide in the committee notes that, “[w]hen actual physical control is an issue, give Instruction 23.43.” IPI Criminal No. 23.13, Committee Note; IPI Criminal No. 23.67E, Committee Note; IPI Criminal No. 23.68E, Committee Note. However, the trial court did not give an instruction based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 23.43 (approved Dec. 8, 2011) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 23.43), which provides: “The phrase ‘actual physical control’ means that the defendant was in the vehicle and in a position to exercise control over the vehicle by starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move.” Defendant claims that the lack of this instruction constitutes error that entitles him to a new trial. ¶ 89 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 451(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) requires that, in a criminal case, if the court determines the jury should be instructed on a subject and the IPI Criminal contains an applicable instruction, “the IPI Criminal instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.” See also Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 7. Our - 25 - supreme court in Hopp additionally found that, where a committee note to an IPI Criminal instruction indicates to give another instruction, the failure to give the additional instruction is error. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 7. In the case at bar, as noted, IPI Criminal Nos. 23.13, 23.67E, and 23.68E all provide in the committee notes that, “[w]hen actual physical control is an issue, give Instruction 23.43.” Thus, the trial court should have given an instruction based on IPI Criminal No. 23.43 unless (1) actual physical control was not an issue or (2) IPI Criminal No. 23.43 did not accurately state the law. ¶ 90 Reviewing the record on appeal, we cannot find that actual physical control was an issue in the case such that IPI Criminal 23.43 was required. While defendant contends that “the State’s main theory was that [defendant] had actual physical control of the car,” that is not entirely accurate. As noted, the charged offenses required the State to prove that defendant “drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle.” See IPI Criminal Nos. 23.14, 23.68E. Thus, the State could prove its case by proving either that defendant drove or that defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle. In the case at bar, the State primarily focused on the first—that defendant drove the vehicle. We first note that defendant admitted to driving the vehicle during his opening statement, essentially conceding the issue before any evidence had been presented. Additionally, during its closing argument, the State emphasized that defendant admitted numerous times to driving the vehicle, both to the officers on the scene and at trial, and even explained why he parked the vehicle on the wrong side of the street. The State acknowledged that the officers did not observe defendant physically exiting from the vehicle but argued that circumstantial evidence established that defendant was the driver, pointing to the fact that he claimed the vehicle as his, 9 that he had the keys, and that he was standing where it was parked. ¶ 91 The State did also make an argument based on actual physical control, but this was a secondary argument. The State argued: “But if you are not convinced that he drove the vehicle that’s fine because the statute says he drove it or is in actual physical control of the vehicle. So even if you don’t believe that he drove the vehicle, he was the one that was in physical control of the vehicle, he had the keys, right, he left the door open because it’s right there, he is not going to go anywhere and he is the only one that could have left that scene in that vehicle until he handed the keys off to the officer, his friend couldn’t have left the scene, he doesn’t have the keys, the keys were in the defendant’s hand, he had control of that vehicle.” However, while the State did present “actual physical control” as an alternative argument, we cannot find that it was “an issue” in the case such that IPI Criminal No. 23.43 was required, given the focus on defendant as the driver, and especially where defendant admitted to being the driver at the scene in his opening statement and in his testimony. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte give IPI Criminal No. 23.43 when it was instructing the jury. Consequently, because there was no error, there can be no plain error. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 (the first step in a plain-error analysis is determining “whether

⁹ As noted, defendant’s testimony at trial was that the vehicle was titled in a friend’s name because defendant’s license was suspended “and I have to keep driving the last five years without catching tickets so it was in my friend’s name.” - 26 - there was a clear or obvious error at trial”). ¶ 92 B. Revoked License Instruction ¶ 93 Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the elements of aggravated DUI of alcohol with a suspended or revoked license. We note that, while the parties discuss “suspended or revoked license” collectively, defendant was charged under separate counts for each, and the State indicated that it was proceeding on “Counts 2 and 4,” which were the counts alleging that defendant had a revoked license (count II) and did not possess a driver’s license (count IV); these two counts were also the counts for which defendant was convicted. Accordingly, we focus on whether the jury was properly instructed as to aggravated DUI of alcohol while defendant had a revoked license. ¶ 94 In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the trial court did not instruct the jury on the elements of aggravated DUI of alcohol with a revoked license. 10 Thus, there is no dispute that there has been a clear and obvious error. The question, then, is whether this error rises to the level of plain error. Our supreme court has instructed that “a jury instruction error rises to the level of plain error only when it ‘creates a serious risk that the jurors incorrectly convicted the defendant because they did not understand the applicable law, so as to severely threaten the fairness of the trial.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 193 (quoting Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 8). ¶ 95 In the case at bar, the State contends that “this Court has repeatedly held that failure to provide an instruction on an essential element of an offense is harmless error when that element is established by overwhelming evidence.” See, e.g., People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2003) (“An error in a jury instruction is harmless if it is demonstrated that the result of the trial would not have been different had the jury been properly instructed.”). Here, because defendant’s driving abstract was admitted into evidence, the State claims that defendant’s license revocation was established by overwhelming evidence. We do not find this argument persuasive. ¶ 96 This is not a case where the trial court failed to provide an instruction on an element of the offense. Instead, this is a case where the trial court failed to provide an instruction on the offense itself—the jury received no instruction whatsoever concerning aggravated DUI of alcohol while having a revoked license. The only instructions the jurors received defined (1) DUI of alcohol and (2) aggravated DUI of alcohol while not possessing a valid driver’s license. Moreover, the verdict forms received by the jury likewise contained no reference to aggravated DUI of alcohol while having a revoked license—the verdict forms given to the jury were for (1) aggravated DUI of alcohol while not possessing a driver’s license and (2) aggravated DUI of alcohol, which did not specify any particular aggravating factor. Thus, the jury was never instructed as to any of the elements of aggravated DUI of alcohol while having a revoked license—the charge was simply never presented to the jury at all. The failure to correctly inform the jury of the elements of the crime charged has been held to be error “so grave and fundamental” so as to rise to the level of plain error under the second prong of the plain-error rule. People v. Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216, 222 (1981); People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d

¹⁰ We note that the IPI Criminal does not contain such an instruction. While there are instructions for driving with a revoked or suspended driver’s license (see Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 23.39, 23.40 (approved Dec. 8, 2011)), there is no instruction for aggravated DUI of alcohol with a revoked or suspended driver’s license. - 27 - 275, 296 (2006). Accordingly, because the jury was never instructed as to the elements of aggravated DUI of alcohol while having a revoked license, defendant’s conviction on that count must be vacated. ¶ 97 However, despite defendant’s contention to the contrary, this does not require a new trial. The trial court merged defendant’s convictions on counts II and IV, so defendant received a single conviction and sentence, as was appropriate. See People v. Hamerlinck, 2018 IL App (1st) 152759, ¶ 55. Both counts were Class 4 felonies (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(A) (West 2018)), and defendant was sentenced to five years in the IDOC, followed by one year of mandatory supervised release. As we have discussed above, there was no error in defendant’s conviction on count IV, as the jury was properly instructed on aggravated DUI of alcohol while not possessing a driver’s license. Accordingly, defendant’s conviction on that count remains valid. The trial court chose to merge count IV into count II, so we order the mittimus to be corrected to reflect count IV as the count on which defendant was convicted pursuant to our authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). See People v. Gordon, 378 Ill. App. 3d 626, 642 (2007) (ordering mittimus corrected on aggravated DUI of alcohol charges to reflect a single conviction and merging the remaining counts). ¶ 98 V. Waiver of Jury Trial ¶ 99 Finally, defendant claims that he is entitled to a new trial because he waived his right to a jury trial. “The right to a trial by jury is a fundamental right guaranteed by our federal and state constitutions.” People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 269 (2004). A defendant may waive the right to a jury trial, but such a waiver must be knowingly and understandingly made. 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2018); Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 269. A trial court need not give any specific admonition or advice for a defendant to make an effective jury waiver but must ensure that the defendant’s waiver is made expressly and understandingly. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65 (2008). “The determination of whether a jury waiver is valid cannot rest on any precise formula, but rather depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66. Where the facts are not in dispute, the question of whether a defendant knowingly and understandingly waived his right to a jury trial is a legal one that we review de novo. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 270. As noted, de novo consideration means we perform the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. Carlisle, 2019 IL App (1st) 162259, ¶ 68. ¶ 100 Defendant acknowledges that he failed to properly preserve this issue by failing to object at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. As discussed above, under the plain-error doctrine, we may consider an unpreserved claim (1) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that this error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence at defendant’s trial. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. Whether a defendant’s fundamental right to a jury trial has been violated is a matter that our supreme court has found may be considered under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. See Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 270. However, as noted, the first step under either prong of the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether there was an error at trial and whether this error was clear or obvious. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. - 28 - ¶ 101 In the case at bar, defendant contends that he waived his right to a jury trial when he sent the trial court a letter in early 2018, which provided: “First and foremost I would like to apologize for my misbehaving in your court room on 01-16-18. This was my first time in a court room without [a] private attorney. I felt that the [state’s attorneys] were being very hard on me and it made me very stressful. For a false matter being discussed about me. That on 12-18-17 [the] officer created a case against me and on 12-22-17 [the preceding] judge on my case dropped all charges. I am very wrong for my words I used on that day in your court room, the words I said were out of stress and anger, the words I said were that I wanted a jury trial and I would like to take my words back. I promise that in the future I will always think about my words before I speak them. I would like to ask the Honorable Judge to be my jury in this matter. I pray and hope my request is granted.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant claims that this letter represented an express waiver of his right to a jury trial, and the trial court’s proceeding with a jury trial in the face of that waiver was error. We do not find this argument persuasive. ¶ 102 Defendant’s letter was sent to the court in February 2018, early in the proceedings; for context, the violation of probation hearing occurred on August 15, 2018, and the trial on the DUI charges occurred in January 2019. While the letter could arguably be construed as a jury waiver, defendant’s subsequent conduct showed that the trial court properly chose not to interpret it as such. After defendant was sentenced on the probation matter, the focus turned to the DUI charges. The trial court informed defendant that “it will be a jury trial unless [defendant] waives.” ¶ 103 When the matter came before the court on November 13, 2018, the court had a discussion with defendant specifically about the fact that the trial was set to be a jury trial. When the State informed the court that the matter was set for a jury trial, defendant responded, “Nothing by- agreement, your Honor.” The State informed the court that it was not ready for trial, and defendant interjected, stating: “Who is demanding jury trial? I’m not agreeing for anything.” The court responded: “THE COURT: All right. [Defendant], the only person who picks a jury trial is you. If you don’t want a jury trial then you don’t have a jury trial. DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I [do] not agree for any trial.” ¶ 104 The trial court explained to defendant that cases were resolved either by agreement or by going to trial, but defendant repeatedly stated, “Nothing by-agreement” while also stating that was not agreeing to trial. The court then discussed with defendant: “THE COURT: *** I take it then if you are not agreeing to any dates, that it you’re asking to go Motion State— DEFENDANT: Continue, not by-agreement, trial not by-agreement, prosecution not by-agreement. And I already filed (inaudible). I’m doing my rights. I love [the] United States Constitution. So as much as I— THE COURT: I understand that. If it’s not by-agreement, it is motion state, defendant demands trial. Bench or jury, [defendant]? - 29 - DEFENDANT: Nothing. Nothing by-agreement. THE COURT: All right. [Defendant]— DEFENDANT: *** I am not giving you [any] chance for personal jurisdiction. THE COURT: That’s fine, [defendant]. Then since [defendant] has not indicated— DEFENDANT: Nothing by-agreement. THE COURT: It will be a jury, since that is— DEFENDANT: Nothing by-agreement. THE COURT: All right. Motion State— DEFENDANT: I’m not going to pass no jury. THE COURT: [Defendant], *** I want you to listen carefully. I have already admonished you for— DEFENDANT: You [are] just running this court with your own jurisdiction. THE COURT: —trial in absentia. DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: [Defendant]— DEFENDANT: Nothing by-agreement. THE COURT: [Defendant], if you willfully fail to appear for trial, your absence could be taken as a waiver of your right to be here for trial. DEFENDANT: Nothing by-agreement. You can do what you do your Honor. I have no problem. There is nothing by-agreement.” ¶ 105 Thus, the record shows that the trial court asked defendant several times whether he wished to proceed with a bench trial or a jury trial, and defendant refused to give an answer, apparently under the impression that if he failed to cooperate in any way, the trial could not move forward. Our supreme court has instructed that “[its] decisions have imposed on a trial court the duty of ensuring that a defendant waived the right to a jury trial expressly and understandingly.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66. In the case at bar, the trial court attempted to fulfill that duty by attempting to clarify whether defendant wished to proceed with a bench trial or a jury trial. Where defendant refused to give a clear answer, the trial court properly proceeded by finding no waiver and provided defendant with his constitutionally guaranteed jury trial. We find no error in the trial court’s conduct. Accordingly, where there is no error, there can be no plain error. See Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 71 (“Having found no error, there can be no plain error.”). ¶ 106 CONCLUSION ¶ 107 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part. First, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a fitness hearing. Second, the trial court did not err in permitting defendant to represent himself. Third, the trial court did not err in denying defendant the use of standby counsel. Fourth, the trial court did not err in failing to issue a jury instruction defining “actual physical control.” However, the trial court did err in failing to instruct the jury as to the elements of aggravated DUI while having a revoked license, and defendant’s conviction on that count is vacated and the mittimus must be corrected to reflect a conviction on count IV instead of count II. Fifth, the trial court did not err in proceeding with - 30 - a jury trial. ¶ 108 Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part; mittimus corrected. - 31 -