720 ILCS 5/14-1
Definitions
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(720 ILCS 5/14-1)
(from Ch. 38, par. 14-1)
Sec. 14-1. Definitions.
(a) Eavesdropping device.
An eavesdropping device is any device capable of being used to hear or
record oral conversation or intercept, or transcribe electronic
communications whether such conversation or electronic communication is
conducted in person,
by telephone, or by any other means; Provided, however, that this
definition shall not include devices used for the restoration of the deaf
or hard-of-hearing to normal or partial hearing.
(b) Eavesdropper.
An eavesdropper is any person, including any law enforcement officer and any party to a private conversation, who
operates or participates in the operation of any eavesdropping device
contrary to the provisions of this Article or who acts as a principal, as defined in this Article.
(c) Principal.
A principal is any person who:
(1) Knowingly employs another who illegally uses an | eavesdropping device in the course of such employment; or |
(2) Knowingly derives any benefit or information from | the illegal use of an eavesdropping device by another; or |
(3) Directs another to use an eavesdropping device | illegally on his or her behalf. |
(d) Private conversation.
For the purposes of this Article, "private conversation" means any oral
communication between 2 or more persons, whether in person or transmitted between the parties by wire or other means, when one or more of
the parties intended the communication to be of a private nature under
circumstances reasonably justifying that expectation. A reasonable expectation shall include any expectation recognized by law, including, but not limited to, an expectation derived from a privilege, immunity, or right established by common law, Supreme Court rule, or the Illinois or United States Constitution.
(e) Private electronic communication.
For purposes of this Article, "private electronic communication" means any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio, pager, computer,
electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system, when the sending
or receiving party intends the electronic communication to be private under circumstances reasonably justifying that expectation. A reasonable expectation shall include any expectation recognized by law, including, but not limited to, an expectation derived from a privilege, immunity, or right established by common law, Supreme Court rule, or the Illinois or United States Constitution. Electronic communication does not include any communication
from a tracking device. (f) Bait car. For purposes of this Article, "bait car" means any motor vehicle that is not occupied by a law enforcement officer and is used by a law enforcement agency to deter, detect, identify, and assist in the apprehension of an auto theft suspect in the act of stealing a motor vehicle.
(g) Surreptitious. For purposes of this Article, "surreptitious" means obtained or made by stealth or deception, or executed through secrecy or concealment. (Source: P.A. 98-1142, eff. 12-30-14.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 66
cases (29 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: People v. Gariano
People v. Gariano (2006)
“See 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2000). The majority does not reach this issue in its opinion.”
People v. Rodriguez (2000)
“] Eavesdropping Statute Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted an audiotape recording of his conversation with Carrion.”
People v. Graves (2012)
“08, (6) limiting defendant’s argument during closing arguments, (7) admitting portions of a videotape that were obtained in violation of the eavesdropping statute (720 ILCS 5/14-1 through 14-9 (West 2008)) and in violation of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v.”
Scheib v. Grant (1994)
“2510-2521 , and the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. Defendants Joan and Burton Grant had served as the attorneys of Lynn Scheib's former husband and Benjamin Grosse's father, James Grosse, during custody proceedings in Illinois state court.”
Scheib v. Grant (1994)
“§§ 2510-2521 , and the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. Defendants Joan and Burton Grant had served as the attorneys of Lynn Scheib’s former husband and Benjamin Grosse’s father, James Grosse, during custody proceedings in Illinois state court.”
Blount v. Stroud (2009)
“" Defendants claim that this was a violation of Article 14 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1963 (720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2000)), which pertains to eavesdropping.”
Vega v. Chicago Park District (2013)
“Lastly, Vega seeks redress based on state law claims for intrusion upon seclusion in Count VI and violation of the Illinois Eavesdropping Act, 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq., in Count VIL I granted summary judgment for defendants on Count VII, so only Counts I through VI remain.”
Deon L. Thomas v. Bruce Pearl, Individually and in His Representative Capacity as Assistant Basketball Coach of the Univ (1993)
“§§ 2510-2520 , and the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-1 through 5/14-9. Thomas filed a two-count complaint in Champaign County, Illinois.”
Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (2023)
“On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in dismissing its complaint where (1) plaintiff was a party to the phone conversation between its attorney and Mid-Century’s representative and (2) plaintiff’s second- amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to show that…”
People v. Banks (2020)
“On appeal defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his cooperation agreement with the police, (2) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through electronic surveillance, because the State…”
People v. Smith (2025)
“See 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2014). The conversations had been recorded by Gutter, who wore a hidden recording device, pursuant to an order under section 2 1-22-0116 108A-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108A-1 (West 2014)).”
People v. Jenkins (2012)
“The term "eavesdropping device" means "any device capable of being used to hear or record oral conversation or intercept, retain, or transcribe electronic communications whether such conversation or electronic communication is conducted in person, by telephone, or by any other…”
— 720 ILCS 5/14-1(a) — 12 cases
People v. Rodriguez (2000)
“] Eavesdropping Statute Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted an audiotape recording of his conversation with Carrion.”
People v. Gariano (2006)
“See 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2000). The majority does not reach this issue in its opinion.”
People v. Jenkins (2012)
“The term "eavesdropping device" means "any device capable of being used to hear or record oral conversation or intercept, retain, or transcribe electronic communications whether such conversation or electronic communication is conducted in person, by telephone, or by any other…”
People v. Armbrust (2011)
People v. Gariano (2006)
— 720 ILCS 5/14-1(a)(5) — 1 case
— 720 ILCS 5/14-1(b) — 2 cases
People v. Gariano (2006)
“See 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2000). The majority does not reach this issue in its opinion.”
People v. Gariano (2006)
— 720 ILCS 5/14-1(d) — 19 cases
People v. Rodriguez (2000)
“] Eavesdropping Statute Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted an audiotape recording of his conversation with Carrion.”
People v. Graves (2012)
“08, (6) limiting defendant’s argument during closing arguments, (7) admitting portions of a videotape that were obtained in violation of the eavesdropping statute (720 ILCS 5/14-1 through 14-9 (West 2008)) and in violation of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v.”
People v. Smith (2025)
“See 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2014). The conversations had been recorded by Gutter, who wore a hidden recording device, pursuant to an order under section 2 1-22-0116 108A-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108A-1 (West 2014)).”
People v. Harris (2020)
Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (2023)
“On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in dismissing its complaint where (1) plaintiff was a party to the phone conversation between its attorney and Mid-Century’s representative and (2) plaintiff’s second- amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to show that…”
— 720 ILCS 5/14-1(e) — 7 cases
People v. Gariano (2006)
“See 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2000). The majority does not reach this issue in its opinion.”
People v. Gariano (2006)
Vasil v. Kiip, Inc. (2018)
Zak v. Bose Corporation (2019)
— 720 ILCS 5/14-1(g) — 4 cases
Henyard v. MV Transportation (2019)
Zak v. Bose Corporation (2019)
Henyard v. MV Transportation (2020)
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