720 ILCS 5/14-2

Elements of the offense; affirmative defense

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(720 ILCS 5/14-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 14-2)
    Sec. 14-2. Elements of the offense; affirmative defense.
    (a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and intentionally:
        (1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious
    
manner, for the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to the private conversation;
        (2) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious
    
manner, for the purpose of transmitting or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all other parties to the private conversation;
        (3) Intercepts, records, or transcribes, in a
    
surreptitious manner, any private electronic communication to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all parties to the private electronic communication;
        (4) Manufactures, assembles, distributes, or
    
possesses any electronic, mechanical, eavesdropping, or other device knowing that or having reason to know that the design of the device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious overhearing, transmitting, or recording of private conversations or the interception, or transcription of private electronic communications and the intended or actual use of the device is contrary to the provisions of this Article; or
        (5) Uses or discloses any information which he or she
    
knows or reasonably should know was obtained from a private conversation or private electronic communication in violation of this Article, unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties.
    (a-5) It does not constitute a violation of this Article to surreptitiously use an eavesdropping device to overhear, transmit, or record a private conversation, or to surreptitiously intercept, record, or transcribe a private electronic communication, if the overhearing, transmitting, recording, interception, or transcription is done in accordance with Article 108A or Article 108B of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
    (b) It is an affirmative defense to a charge brought under this Article relating to the interception of a privileged communication that the person charged:
        1. was a law enforcement officer acting pursuant to
    
an order of interception, entered pursuant to Section 108A-1 or 108B-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; and
        2. at the time the communication was intercepted, the
    
officer was unaware that the communication was privileged; and
        3. stopped the interception within a reasonable time
    
after discovering that the communication was privileged; and
        4. did not disclose the contents of the communication.
    (c) It is not unlawful for a manufacturer or a supplier of eavesdropping devices, or a provider of wire or electronic communication services, their agents, employees, contractors, or venders to manufacture, assemble, sell, or possess an eavesdropping device within the normal course of their business for purposes not contrary to this Article or for law enforcement officers and employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections to manufacture, assemble, purchase, or possess an eavesdropping device in preparation for or within the course of their official duties.
    (d) The interception, recording, or transcription of an electronic communication by an employee of a penal institution is not prohibited under this Act, provided that the interception, recording, or transcription is:
        (1) otherwise legally permissible under Illinois law;
        (2) conducted with the approval of the penal
    
institution for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a State criminal law or a penal institution rule or regulation with respect to inmates in the institution; and
        (3) within the scope of the employee's official
    
duties.
    For the purposes of this subsection (d), "penal institution" has the meaning ascribed to it in clause (c)(1) of Section 31A-1.1.
    (e) Nothing in this Article shall prohibit any individual, not a law enforcement officer, from recording a law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duties in a public place or in circumstances in which the officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy. However, an officer may take reasonable action to maintain safety and control, secure crime scenes and accident sites, protect the integrity and confidentiality of investigations, and protect the public safety and order.
(Source: P.A. 98-1142, eff. 12-30-14; 99-352, eff. 1-1-16.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 85 cases (40 in the last 5 years), 1994–2026 · leading case: Mary Carroll v. Merrill Lynch
Mary Carroll v. Merrill Lynch (2012) ca7 · cites it 2× “” 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3). Ms. Carroll now argues that the fear of crime exemption does not apply to this provision of the eavesdropping statute.”
Magyar v. Saint Joseph Regional Medical Center (2008) ca7 · cites it 2× “) Houston argues that the fact that Goddard considered her rude and disrespectful (notably in secretly recording their conversation in violation of Illinois law, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)) is evidence of retaliation.”
People v. Melongo (2014) ill · cites it 6× “302 (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). ¶2 We allowed the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 345.”
American Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez (2012) ca7 “" 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1). My colleagues have decided to reverse, and to order the entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Eavesdropping Act.”
People v. Gariano (2006) illappct · cites it 8× “) 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a) (West 2000). The majority's opinion fails to discuss the definition for an eavesdropping device and fails to determine whether Investigator Everett's computer, which had Power Tools software installed on its hard drive, was an eavesdropping device.”
Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (2023) illappct · cites it 4× “720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2020). In enacting the statute, the legislature “intended to protect individuals from the surreptitious monitoring of their conversations by eavesdropping devices.”
People v. Daniel (2022) illappct “The eavesdropping statute in effect from the time the audio recording was recovered until defendant filed his pro se motions to suppress based on violations of the eavesdropping statute in 2014 was 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a), 14-5 (West 2006).”
People v. Clark (2014) ill · cites it 2× “Count 2 alleged that defendant had used an eavesdropping device to record a conversation between himself, Judge Robert Janes, and Colleen Thomas while Judge Janes was acting in the performance of his official duties, without the consent of Judge Janes or Colleen Thomas.”
Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Association (2013) ill “¶ 21 The appellate court held that the practice of recording drivers was not a violation of the eavesdropping statute (see 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2008)), nor was the Lake Holiday security department prohibited from using radar units.”
The City of Aurora v. The Association of Professional Police Officers (2019) illappct · cites it 3× “The court also noted that the arbitrator made no finding as to whether in the future Wagner would refrain from the offending conduct.”
People v. Melongo (2014) ill · cites it 5× “OPINION ¶1 Defendant Annabel Melongo was charged with violations of section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2008)), which defines the offense of eavesdropping.”
People v. Smith (2025) illappct · cites it 6× “In his motion to suppress, Smith argued that the eavesdropping violated section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2014)) and that then State’s Attorney Alvarez did not personally review the warrant application or explicitly delegate her authority to ASA…”
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a) — 12 cases
People v. Daniel (2022) illappct “The eavesdropping statute in effect from the time the audio recording was recovered until defendant filed his pro se motions to suppress based on violations of the eavesdropping statute in 2014 was 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a), 14-5 (West 2006).”
People v. Gariano (2006) illappct “) 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a) (West 2000). The majority's opinion fails to discuss the definition for an eavesdropping device and fails to determine whether Investigator Everett's computer, which had Power Tools software installed on its hard drive, was an eavesdropping device.”
People v. Rodriguez (2000) illappct
People v. Brindley (2017) illappct
People v. Brindley (2017) illappct
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) — 30 cases
American Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez (2012) ca7 “" 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1). My colleagues have decided to reverse, and to order the entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Eavesdropping Act.”
Magyar v. Saint Joseph Regional Medical Center (2008) ca7 “) Houston argues that the fact that Goddard considered her rude and disrespectful (notably in secretly recording their conversation in violation of Illinois law, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)) is evidence of retaliation.”
Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Association (2013) ill “¶ 21 The appellate court held that the practice of recording drivers was not a violation of the eavesdropping statute (see 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2008)), nor was the Lake Holiday security department prohibited from using radar units.”
People v. Melongo (2014) ill “302 (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). ¶2 We allowed the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 345.”
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) — 4 cases
People v. Clark (2014) ill “Count 2 alleged that defendant had used an eavesdropping device to record a conversation between himself, Judge Robert Janes, and Colleen Thomas while Judge Janes was acting in the performance of his official duties, without the consent of Judge Janes or Colleen Thomas.”
People v. Smith (2025) illappct “In his motion to suppress, Smith argued that the eavesdropping violated section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2014)) and that then State’s Attorney Alvarez did not personally review the warrant application or explicitly delegate her authority to ASA…”
Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (2023) illappct “720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2020). In enacting the statute, the legislature “intended to protect individuals from the surreptitious monitoring of their conversations by eavesdropping devices.”
People v. Clark (2014) ill
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(2) — 23 cases
Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (2023) illappct “720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2020). In enacting the statute, the legislature “intended to protect individuals from the surreptitious monitoring of their conversations by eavesdropping devices.”
People v. Harris (2020) illappct
People v. Harris (2020) illappct
People v. Dzierzanowski (2023) illappct
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3) — 11 cases
Mary Carroll v. Merrill Lynch (2012) ca7 “” 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3). Ms. Carroll now argues that the fear of crime exemption does not apply to this provision of the eavesdropping statute.”
People v. Melongo (2014) ill “302 (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). ¶2 We allowed the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 345.”
The City of Aurora v. The Association of Professional Police Officers (2019) illappct “The court also noted that the arbitrator made no finding as to whether in the future Wagner would refrain from the offending conduct.”
People v. Melongo (2014) ill “OPINION ¶1 Defendant Annabel Melongo was charged with violations of section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2008)), which defines the offense of eavesdropping.”
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(4) — 1 case
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(5) — 7 cases
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(i) — 1 case
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(l) — 2 cases
Mary Carroll v. Merrill Lynch (2012) ca7 “” 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3). Ms. Carroll now argues that the fear of crime exemption does not apply to this provision of the eavesdropping statute.”
Magyar v. Saint Joseph Regional Medical Center (2008) ca7 “) Houston argues that the fact that Goddard considered her rude and disrespectful (notably in secretly recording their conversation in violation of Illinois law, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)) is evidence of retaliation.”
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(b) — 1 case
Scheib v. Grant (1994) ca7
— 720 ILCS 5/14-2(d)(2) — 1 case
People v. Harris (2022) illappct
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