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Illinois Compiled Statutes

730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (2026)

Procedure for executive clemency

✓ current as of May 2026
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(730 ILCS 5/3-3-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 1003-3-13)
    Sec. 3-3-13. Procedure for executive clemency.
    (a) Petitions seeking pardon, commutation, or reprieve shall be addressed to the Governor and filed with the Prisoner Review Board. The petition shall be in writing and signed by the person under conviction or by a person on his behalf. It shall contain a brief history of the case, the reasons for seeking executive clemency, and other relevant information the Board may require.
    (a-5) After a petition has been denied by the Governor, the Board may not accept a repeat petition for executive clemency for the same person until one full year has elapsed from the date of the denial. The Chairman of the Board may waive the one-year requirement if the petitioner offers in writing new information that was unavailable to the petitioner at the time of the filing of the prior petition and which the Chairman determines to be significant. The Chairman also may waive the one-year waiting period if the petitioner can show that a change in circumstances of a compelling humanitarian nature has arisen since the denial of the prior petition.
    (b) Notice of the proposed application shall be given by the Board to the committing court and the state's attorney of the county where the conviction was had.
    (b-5) Victims registered with the Board shall receive reasonable written notice not less than 30 days prior to the executive clemency hearing date. The victim has the right to submit a victim statement, in support or opposition, to the Prisoner Review Board for consideration at an executive clemency hearing as provided in subsection (c) of this Section. Victim statements provided to the Board shall be confidential and privileged, including any statements received prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 101st General Assembly, except if the statement was an oral statement made by the victim at a hearing open to the public.
    (c) The Board shall, upon due notice, give a hearing to each application, allowing representation by counsel, if desired, after which it shall confidentially advise the Governor by a written report of its recommendations which shall be determined by majority vote. The written report to the Governor shall be confidential and privileged, including any reports made prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 101st General Assembly. The Board shall meet to consider such petitions no less than 4 times each year.
    (d) The Governor shall decide each application and communicate his decision to the Board which shall notify the petitioner.
    In the event a petitioner who has been convicted of a Class X felony is granted a release, after the Governor has communicated such decision to the Board, the Board shall give written notice to the Sheriff of the county from which the offender was sentenced if such sheriff has requested that such notice be given on a continuing basis. In cases where arrest of the offender or the commission of the offense took place in any municipality with a population of more than 10,000 persons, the Board shall also give written notice to the proper law enforcement agency for said municipality which has requested notice on a continuing basis.
    (e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the power of the Governor under the constitution to grant a reprieve, commutation of sentence, or pardon.
(Source: P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24; 104-11, eff. 6-20-25.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases, 1996–2020 · leading case: People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
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People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996). · cites it 2× “See 735 ILCS 5/2-1202(c) (West 1992) (allowing such claims to be made in a motion for a new trial within 30 days); 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 1992) (permitting such claims up to two years after a final judgment, the period being excused in certain limited situations, including…”
Evans v. City of Chicago, 231 F.R.D. 302 (N.D. Ill. 2005). · cites it 2× “The assertions are: (1) relevance; (2) citation to a statute, as 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2005); and (3) citation to two administrative provisions, 20 Ill.”
Bowens v. Quinn, 561 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2009). · cites it 2× “Eventually they would be exhausted from repeated futile suits and would give up, and the governor could then resume his alleged policy of “pocket vetoing” clemency petitions.”
Coram v. The State of Illinois, 2013 IL 113867 (Ill. 2013). · cites it 2× “See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2010); People ex rel.”
People v. Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1000 (Ill. 2006). “Holding that the statutory procedure governing clemency applications (see 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2002)) does not limit the Governor's constitutional authority to grant clemency (Ill.”
Coram v. State of Illinois, 2013 IL 113867 (Ill. 2013). “See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2010); People ex rel.”
Gregg v. Rauner, 2018 IL 122802 (Ill. 2018). “The Governor decides each application and communicates the decision to the Board, which relates the decision to the petitioner.”
Gregg v. Rauner, 2017 IL App (5th) 160474 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(d) (West 2014). Thus, the IPRB acts as an advisor to the Governor, and the IPRB’s relationship to the Governor in the executive clemency process establishes that it is not an independent agency but a traditional part of the executive branch.”
Gregg v. Rauner, 2017 IL App (5th) 160474 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(d) (West 2014). Thus, the IPRB acts as an advisor to the Governor, and the IPRB’s relationship to the Governor in the executive clemency process establishes that it is not an independent agency but a traditional part of the executive branch.”
Andersen v. City of Chicago (N.D. Ill. 2019). · cites it 3× “The Board asserts two additional bases for withholding the Resumes and Recommendations: (1) the confidentiality provision found in section 3-3-13(c) of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(c), and (2) the deliberative process privilege.”
Mohammad v. Brown, 2020 IL App (1st) 182454-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 2× “He explained that he needed access to the records “to file a pro se executive clemency petition” in accordance with section 3-3-13 of Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2016)). 2 No. 1-18-2454 ¶6 On March 16, 2018, the Clerk filed a motion to dismiss the…”
Stephanie Bowens v. Pat Quinn (7th Cir. 2009). · cites it 2× “Eventually they would be exhausted from repeated futile suits and would give up, and the governor could then resume his alleged policy of “pocket vetoing” clemency petitions.”
— 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(c) — 2 cases
Evans v. City of Chicago, 231 F.R.D. 302 (N.D. Ill. 2005). “The assertions are: (1) relevance; (2) citation to a statute, as 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2005); and (3) citation to two administrative provisions, 20 Ill.”
Andersen v. City of Chicago (N.D. Ill. 2019). “The Board asserts two additional bases for withholding the Resumes and Recommendations: (1) the confidentiality provision found in section 3-3-13(c) of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(c), and (2) the deliberative process privilege.”
— 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(d) — 4 cases
Bowens v. Quinn, 561 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2009). “Eventually they would be exhausted from repeated futile suits and would give up, and the governor could then resume his alleged policy of “pocket vetoing” clemency petitions.”
Gregg v. Rauner, 2017 IL App (5th) 160474 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(d) (West 2014). Thus, the IPRB acts as an advisor to the Governor, and the IPRB’s relationship to the Governor in the executive clemency process establishes that it is not an independent agency but a traditional part of the executive branch.”
Gregg v. Rauner, 2017 IL App (5th) 160474 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(d) (West 2014). Thus, the IPRB acts as an advisor to the Governor, and the IPRB’s relationship to the Governor in the executive clemency process establishes that it is not an independent agency but a traditional part of the executive branch.”
Stephanie Bowens v. Pat Quinn (7th Cir. 2009). “Eventually they would be exhausted from repeated futile suits and would give up, and the governor could then resume his alleged policy of “pocket vetoing” clemency petitions.”
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