730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3
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(730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3)
(from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8A-3)
Sec. 5-8A-3. Application.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), a person charged with
or convicted of an
excluded offense may not be placed in an electronic monitoring or home
detention program, except for bond pending trial or appeal or while on parole, aftercare release,
or mandatory supervised release.
(b) A person serving a sentence for a conviction of a Class 1 felony,
other than an excluded offense, may be placed in an electronic monitoring or home detention
program for a period not to exceed the last 90 days of incarceration.
(c) A person serving a sentence for a conviction
of a Class X felony, other than an excluded offense, may be placed
in an electronic monitoring or home detention program for a period not to exceed the last 90
days of incarceration, provided that the person was sentenced on or after August 11, 1993 (the
effective date of Public Act 88-311) and provided that the court has
not prohibited the program for the person in the sentencing order.
(d) A person serving a sentence for conviction of an offense other than
for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, or felony criminal sexual abuse, may be placed in an
electronic monitoring or home detention program for a period not to exceed the last 12 months
of incarceration, provided that (i) the person is 55 years of age or older;
(ii) the person is serving a determinate sentence; (iii) the person has served
at least 25% of the sentenced prison term; and (iv) placement in an electronic
monitoring or home detention program is approved by the Prisoner Review Board or the Department of Juvenile Justice.
(e) A person serving a sentence for conviction
of a Class 2, 3, or 4 felony offense which is not an excluded offense may be
placed in an
electronic monitoring or home detention program pursuant to Department administrative
directives. These directives shall encourage inmates to apply for electronic detention to incentivize positive behavior and program participation prior to and following their return to the community, consistent with Section 5-8A-4.2 of this Code. These directives shall not prohibit application solely for prior mandatory supervised release violation history, outstanding municipal warrants, current security classification, and prior criminal history, though these factors may be considered when reviewing individual applications in conjunction with additional factors, such as the applicant's institution behavior, program participation, and reentry plan.
(f) Applications for electronic monitoring or home detention
may include the following:
(1) pretrial or pre-adjudicatory detention;
(2) probation;
(3) conditional discharge;
(4) periodic imprisonment;
(5) parole, aftercare release, or mandatory | supervised release; |
(6) work release;
(7) furlough; or
(8) post-trial incarceration.
(g) A person convicted of an offense described in clause (4) or (5) of
subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1 of this Code shall be placed in an electronic monitoring or
home detention program for at least the first 2 years of the person's mandatory
supervised release term.
(Source: P.A. 99-628, eff. 1-1-17; 99-797, eff. 8-12-16; 100-201, eff. 8-18-17; 100-431, eff. 8-25-17; 100-575, eff. 1-8-18.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20
cases (10 in the last 5 years), 2006–2025 · leading case: Murphy v. Raoul
Murphy v. Raoul (2019)
“91 ¶ 6 (citing 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(g) ).) The parties dispute whether the technology utilized requires a landline.”
People v. Wells (2024)
“5-100(b) provides: “The trial court shall give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3). Home detention for purposes of credit includes restrictions on liberty such as…”
People v. Rogers (2012)
“]” 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2008). ¶ 98 In his supplemental brief, defendant concedes “Moreover, the statute governing the terms and conditions of probation specifically confers on the court the authority to require a defendant to serve a term of home confinement, coupled with…”
People v. Merrick (2012)
“See 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2004). On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no proof that the defendant’s alcohol consumption was the proximate cause of the automobile accident; (2) his…”
Lee v. Godinez (2014)
“¶ 28 Electronic home detention is governed by section 5-8A-3 of the Electronic Home Detention Law (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2008)). It allows for certain individuals serving terms of imprisonment to be released from a correctional institution and placed in an electronic home…”
People v. Wells (2023)
“As of July 1, 2021, the pertinent statutory section provides: “The trial court shall give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3 [of the Unified Code] (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 [(West 2020)]).…”
People v. Smith (2014)
“*** [T]he trial court shall may give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3).” Pub. Act 97-697 (eff.”
People v. Merrick (2012)
“See 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2004). On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no proof that the defendant's alcohol consumption was the proximate cause of the automobile accident; (2) his…”
Savickas, Michael v. Walker, Roger (2006)
“The district court dismissed this suit on the ground that Savickas was challenging the fact of his confinement, and therefore his suit should have been brought under the habeas-corpus statute.”
Lee v. Godinez (2014)
“¶ 28 Electronic home detention is governed by section 5-8A-3 of the Electronic Home Detention Law (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2008)). It allows for certain individuals serving terms of imprisonment to be released from a correctional institution and placed in an electronic home…”
People v. Lotz (2023)
“Except when prohibited by subsection (d),[1] the trial court shall give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3 [(730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2018))]. The trial court may give credit to the…”
People v. Stafford (2025)
“The trial court shall give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3). Home detention for purposes of credit includes restrictions on liberty such as curfews restricting…”
— 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(c) — 2 cases
Lee v. Godinez (2014)
“¶ 28 Electronic home detention is governed by section 5-8A-3 of the Electronic Home Detention Law (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2008)). It allows for certain individuals serving terms of imprisonment to be released from a correctional institution and placed in an electronic home…”
Lee v. Godinez (2014)
“¶ 28 Electronic home detention is governed by section 5-8A-3 of the Electronic Home Detention Law (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2008)). It allows for certain individuals serving terms of imprisonment to be released from a correctional institution and placed in an electronic home…”
— 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(e) — 2 cases
People v. Rogers (2012)
“]” 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2008). ¶ 98 In his supplemental brief, defendant concedes “Moreover, the statute governing the terms and conditions of probation specifically confers on the court the authority to require a defendant to serve a term of home confinement, coupled with…”
Hunt v. Jeffreys (2022)
— 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(f) — 2 cases
People v. Rogers (2012)
“]” 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2008). ¶ 98 In his supplemental brief, defendant concedes “Moreover, the statute governing the terms and conditions of probation specifically confers on the court the authority to require a defendant to serve a term of home confinement, coupled with…”
Savickas, Michael v. Walker, Roger (2006)
“The district court dismissed this suit on the ground that Savickas was challenging the fact of his confinement, and therefore his suit should have been brought under the habeas-corpus statute.”
— 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(f)(1) — 1 case
People v. Stafford (2025)
“The trial court shall give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3). Home detention for purposes of credit includes restrictions on liberty such as curfews restricting…”
— 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(g) — 2 cases
Murphy v. Raoul (2019)
“91 ¶ 6 (citing 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(g) ).) The parties dispute whether the technology utilized requires a landline.”
Kodatt v. Pritzker (2020)
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