Illinois Compiled Statutes
735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (2026)
Residential Real Estate
✓ current as of May 2026
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(735 ILCS 5/15-1219)
(from Ch. 110, par. 15-1219)
Sec. 15-1219. Residential Real Estate. "Residential real estate"
means any real estate, except a single tract of agricultural real estate
consisting of more than 40 acres, which is improved with a single family
residence or residential condominium units or a multiple dwelling structure
containing single family dwelling units for six or fewer families living
independently of each other, which residence, or at least one of which
condominium or dwelling units, is occupied as a principal residence either
(i) if a mortgagor is an individual,
by that mortgagor, that mortgagor's spouse or that mortgagor's descendants,
or (ii) if a mortgagor is a trustee of a trust or an executor or
administrator of an estate, by a beneficiary of that trust or estate or by such
beneficiary's spouse or descendants or (iii) if a mortgagor is a
corporation, by persons owning collectively at least 50 percent of the
shares of voting stock of such corporation or by a spouse or descendants
of such persons.
The use of a portion of residential real estate for non-residential
purposes shall not affect the characterization of such real estate as
residential real estate. For purposes of the definition of the term "abandoned residential property" in Section 15-1200.5 of this Article, "abandoned residential property" shall not include the requirement that the real estate be occupied, or if zoned for residential development, improved with a dwelling structure.
(Source: P.A. 97-1164, eff. 6-1-13.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2013–2021 · leading case: Banco Popular North Am. v. Gizynski, 2015 IL App (1st) 142871 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
Banco Popular North Am. v. Gizynski, 2015 IL App (1st) 142871 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (West 2010). -2- “No foreclosure action under Part 15 of Article XV of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be instituted on a mortgage secured by residential real estate before mailing the notice described in this subsection (c).”
Banco Popular North Am. v. Gizynski, 2015 IL App (1st) 142871 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “1 In the court's order, the court specifically found that "[t]he property does not fall within the definition of 'Residential Real Estate' under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1219[] [(West 2010)])." ¶6 Section 15-1502.”
Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). “735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (West 2010). January 5, 2007 Zanzola and Korzen sign an assignment of rents in favor of Parkway, another act which suggests that the property is not “residential” under section 15-1219 of the Foreclosure Law.”
First Bank of Highland Park v. Sklarov, 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “¶ 10 After hearing oral arguments, the trial court granted the Bank’s motion for appointment, finding that the Property was “not residential property as defined by 735 ILCS 5/15-1219 due to the Property having been previously rented.”
The Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty. v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 181323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “” 735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (West 2008). 15 No. 1-18-1323 ¶ 26 In the case at bar, the trial court found that the property was not residential real estate because it was a single tract of agricultural real estate consisting of more than 40 acres.”
Cathay Bank v. Accetturo, 2016 IL App (1st) 152783 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “In its order, the court found that “at the time of the filing of the complaint, the property was not residential real estate as defined in 735 ILCS 5/15-1219 [of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law] since the property was not [Accetturo’s] principal residence.”
Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (West 2010). January 5, 2007 Zanzola and Korzen sign an assignment of rents in favor of Parkway, another act which suggests that the property is not “residential” under section 15-1219 of the Foreclosure Law.”
Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (West 2010). January 5, 2007 Zanzola and Korzen sign an assignment of rents in favor of Parkway, another act which suggests that the property is not “residential” under section 15-1219 of the Foreclosure Law.”
BMO Harris N.A. v. Kautz, 2014 IL App (2d) 140399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “) 735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (West 2012). ¶ 11 Section 15-1701(b)(1) of the Code limits the above definition of “residential real estate” for the purposes of establishing the presumptive right to possession (and the accompanying right to have a receiver appointed).”
BMO Harris N.A. v. Kautz, 2014 IL App (2d) 140399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “) 735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (West 2012). ¶ 11 Section 15-1701(b)(1) of the Code limits the above definition of “residential real estate” for the purposes of establishing the presumptive right to possession (and the accompanying right to have a receiver appointed).”
McHenry Sav. Bank v. Daniel, 2021 IL App (1st) 210070-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021). “) 735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (West 2020). ¶ 31 Contrary to defendants’ assertion that “this language was limited to specifying the controlling presumption and burden of proof – and not recharacterizing the real estate,” section - 10 - No.”
Bank of Com. v. Fyre Lake Ventures, LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 807 (C.D. Ill. 2015). “The mortgaged real estate is not residential property as defined in Section 15-1219 of the Illinois Mort *817 gage Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1219). The right of redemption has been waived.”
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