735 ILCS 5/3-111

Powers of circuit court

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(735 ILCS 5/3-111) (from Ch. 110, par. 3-111)
    Sec. 3-111. Powers of circuit court.
    (a) The Circuit Court has power:
        (1) with or without requiring bond (except if
    
otherwise provided in the particular statute under authority of which the administrative decision was entered), and before or after answer filed, upon notice to the agency and good cause shown, to stay the decision of the administrative agency in whole or in part pending the final disposition of the case. For the purpose of this subsection, "good cause" requires the applicant to show (i) that an immediate stay is required in order to preserve the status quo without endangering the public, (ii) that it is not contrary to public policy, and (iii) that there exists a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits;
        (2) to make any order that it deems proper for the
    
amendment, completion or filing of the record of proceedings of the administrative agency;
        (3) to allow substitution of parties by reason of
    
marriage, death, bankruptcy, assignment or other cause;
        (4) to dismiss parties, to correct misnomers,
    
including any erroneous identification of the administrative agency that was made in good faith, to realign parties, or to join agencies or parties;
        (5) to affirm or reverse the decision in whole or in
    
part;
        (6) where a hearing has been held by the agency, to
    
reverse and remand the decision in whole or in part, and, in that case, to state the questions requiring further hearing or proceedings and to give such other instructions as may be proper;
        (7) where a hearing has been held by the agency, to
    
remand for the purpose of taking additional evidence when from the state of the record of the administrative agency or otherwise it shall appear that such action is just. However, no remandment shall be made on the ground of newly discovered evidence unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court that such evidence has in fact been discovered subsequent to the termination of the proceedings before the administrative agency and that it could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been obtained at such proceedings; and that such evidence is material to the issues and is not cumulative;
        (8) in case of affirmance or partial affirmance of an
    
administrative decision which requires the payment of money, to enter judgment for the amount justified by the record and for costs, which judgment may be enforced as other judgments for the recovery of money;
        (9) when the particular statute under authority of
    
which the administrative decision was entered requires the plaintiff to file a satisfactory bond and provides for the dismissal of the action for the plaintiff's failure to comply with this requirement unless the court is authorized by the particular statute to enter, and does enter, an order imposing a lien upon the plaintiff's property, to take such proofs and to enter such orders as may be appropriate to carry out the provisions of the particular statute. However, the court shall not approve the bond, nor enter an order for the lien, in any amount which is less than that prescribed by the particular statute under authority of which the administrative decision was entered if the statute provides what the minimum amount of the bond or lien shall be or provides how said minimum amount shall be determined. No such bond shall be approved by the court without notice to, and an opportunity to be heard thereon by, the administrative agency affected. The lien, created by the entry of a court order in lieu of a bond, shall not apply to property exempted from the lien by the particular statute under authority of which the administrative decision was entered. The lien shall not be effective against real property whose title is registered under the provisions of the Registered Titles (Torrens) Act until the provisions of Section 85 of that Act are complied with.
    (b) Technical errors in the proceedings before the administrative agency or its failure to observe the technical rules of evidence shall not constitute grounds for the reversal of the administrative decision unless it appears to the court that such error or failure materially affected the rights of any party and resulted in substantial injustice to him or her.
    (c) On motion of either party, the circuit court shall make findings of fact or state the propositions of law upon which its judgment is based.
    (d) The changes to this Section made by Public Act 95-831 apply to all actions filed on or after August 21, 2007 (the effective date of Public Act 95-831). The changes made by this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly apply to all actions filed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly.
(Source: P.A. 100-212, eff. 8-18-17.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 74 cases (18 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: McLean v. Department of Revenue
McLean v. Department of Revenue (1998) ill · cites it 4× “I The Department first contends that the circuit court erred in declaring unconstitutional the "bond or lien" provisions of the Act (35 ILCS 120/12 (West 1996)) and the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(9) (West 1996)). The relevant provision under the…”
Danigeles v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation (2015) illappct · cites it 2× “' " Kafin, 2012 IL App (1st) 111875, ¶ 38 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2008) and Matos v.”
Antlitz v. Forest Preserve District (2020) illappct · cites it 3× “¶ 42 In addition to a simple affirmance or reversal, the Administrative Review Law permits a circuit court to remand the matter back to the administrative agency with “questions requiring further hearing or proceedings” (735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(6) (West 2018)) or “for the purpose of…”
Parikh v. Division of Professional Regulation of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (2012) illappct · cites it 2× “For the purpose of this subsection, ‘good cause’ requires the applicant to show (i) that an immediate stay is required in order to preserve the status quo without endangering the public, (ii) that it is not contrary to public policy, and (iii) that there exists a reasonable…”
Kafin v. Division of Professional Regulation of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (2012) illappct · cites it 2× “” 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2008); Matos v.”
Williams v. Department of Human Services Division of Rehabilitation Services (2020) illappct “” See 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2016) (defining terms such as “ ‘Administrative agency’ ” and other terms that are used in an administrative review action); 735 ILCS 5/3-111 (West 2016) (setting out powers of the circuit court).”
Cunningham v. RETIREMENT BD. FIREMEN'S ANN. (2009) illappct · cites it 3× “Accordingly, we find that section 3-104 of the Administrative Review Law conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court and the power to retain jurisdiction until there was a final disposition (735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West 2006)), and that section 3-111 of the Administrative Review Law…”
Gruwell v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation (2010) illappct “" 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(8) (West 2008). In turn, the circuit court's decision "is reviewable by appeal as in other civil cases.”
Central Nursing Realty, LLC v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (2020) illappct “3d 988, 993 (1993) (an “appellate court may reverse an administrative ruling only if there is error which prejudiced a party in the proceeding”); 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2018) (“Technical errors in the proceedings before the administrative agency or its failure to observe the…”
West Loop Associates, LLC v. Property Tax Appeal Board (2017) illappct · cites it 3× “735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2010). Reversal is unwarranted “unless it appears to the court that such error or failure materially affected the rights of any party and resulted in substantial injustice to him or her.”
Pesoli v. Department of Employment Security (2012) illappct “” 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2008). Moreover, “[i]t is well established that when hearsay evidence is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect.”
FLM Enterprises, LLC v. Peoria County Zoning Board of Appeals (2020) illappct “See 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(6) (West 2018) (where a hearing has been held by the agency, reviewing court has authority to remand the decision and give instructions).”
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(7) — 1 case
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a) — 2 cases
McRay v. Ross (2018) ilnd
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1) — 7 cases
Parikh v. Division of Professional Regulation of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (2012) illappct “For the purpose of this subsection, ‘good cause’ requires the applicant to show (i) that an immediate stay is required in order to preserve the status quo without endangering the public, (ii) that it is not contrary to public policy, and (iii) that there exists a reasonable…”
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1)(i) — 2 cases
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1)(ii) — 2 cases
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1)(iii) — 2 cases
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(2) — 1 case
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(5) — 6 cases
McRay v. Ross (2018) ilnd
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(6) — 6 cases
Antlitz v. Forest Preserve District (2020) illappct “¶ 42 In addition to a simple affirmance or reversal, the Administrative Review Law permits a circuit court to remand the matter back to the administrative agency with “questions requiring further hearing or proceedings” (735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(6) (West 2018)) or “for the purpose of…”
FLM Enterprises, LLC v. Peoria County Zoning Board of Appeals (2020) illappct “See 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(6) (West 2018) (where a hearing has been held by the agency, reviewing court has authority to remand the decision and give instructions).”
Cunningham v. RETIREMENT BD. FIREMEN'S ANN. (2009) illappct “Accordingly, we find that section 3-104 of the Administrative Review Law conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court and the power to retain jurisdiction until there was a final disposition (735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West 2006)), and that section 3-111 of the Administrative Review Law…”
Lamm v. McRaith (2012) illappct
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(7) — 11 cases
Antlitz v. Forest Preserve District (2020) illappct “¶ 42 In addition to a simple affirmance or reversal, the Administrative Review Law permits a circuit court to remand the matter back to the administrative agency with “questions requiring further hearing or proceedings” (735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(6) (West 2018)) or “for the purpose of…”
Cunningham v. RETIREMENT BD. FIREMEN'S ANN. (2009) illappct “Accordingly, we find that section 3-104 of the Administrative Review Law conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court and the power to retain jurisdiction until there was a final disposition (735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West 2006)), and that section 3-111 of the Administrative Review Law…”
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(7)(1996) — 1 case
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(8) — 6 cases
Gruwell v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation (2010) illappct “" 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(8) (West 2008). In turn, the circuit court's decision "is reviewable by appeal as in other civil cases.”
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(9) — 2 cases
McLean v. Department of Revenue (1998) ill “I The Department first contends that the circuit court erred in declaring unconstitutional the "bond or lien" provisions of the Act (35 ILCS 120/12 (West 1996)) and the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(9) (West 1996)). The relevant provision under the…”
— 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) — 27 cases
Danigeles v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation (2015) illappct “' " Kafin, 2012 IL App (1st) 111875, ¶ 38 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2008) and Matos v.”
Kafin v. Division of Professional Regulation of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (2012) illappct “” 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2008); Matos v.”
Central Nursing Realty, LLC v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (2020) illappct “3d 988, 993 (1993) (an “appellate court may reverse an administrative ruling only if there is error which prejudiced a party in the proceeding”); 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2018) (“Technical errors in the proceedings before the administrative agency or its failure to observe the…”
West Loop Associates, LLC v. Property Tax Appeal Board (2017) illappct “735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2010). Reversal is unwarranted “unless it appears to the court that such error or failure materially affected the rights of any party and resulted in substantial injustice to him or her.”
Pesoli v. Department of Employment Security (2012) illappct “” 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2008). Moreover, “[i]t is well established that when hearsay evidence is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect.”
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