ILCS » Chapter 750 · Act 36
Illinois Compiled Statutes

750 ILCS 36/102 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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(750 ILCS 36/102)
    Sec. 102. Definitions. In this Act:
    (1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.
    (2) "Child" means an individual who has not attained 18 years of age.
    (3) "Child-custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.
    (4) "Child-custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under Article 3.
    (5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.
    (6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to establish, enforce, or modify a child-custody determination.
    (7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.
    (8) "Initial determination" means the first child-custody determination concerning a particular child.
    (9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this Act.
    (10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child-custody determination is made.
    (11) "Modification" means a child-custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination.
    (12) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government; governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; public corporation; or any other legal or commercial entity.
    (13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who:
        (A) has physical custody of the child or has had
    
physical custody for a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one year immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding; and
        (B) has been awarded legal custody by a court or
    
claims a right to legal custody under the law of this State.
    (14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a child.
    (15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
    (16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan Native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
    (17) "Warrant" means an order issued by a court authorizing law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child.
(Source: P.A. 93-108, eff. 1-1-04.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 33 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 2004–2026 · leading case: In Re Marriage of Diaz, 845 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
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In Re Marriage of Diaz, 845 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 4× “” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2004). In the present case, Katharine argues that Illinois is Madalyn’s home state because Madalyn was born in Illinois and lived there with her until she and Madalyn went to Michigan.”
In Re Sophia GL, 890 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 2008). · cites it 3× “" 750 ILCS 36/102(13) (West 2004). The UCCJEA defines "physical custody" as "the physical care and supervision of a child.”
Cochran v. Lindeman, 890 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 2008). · cites it 3× “” 750 ILCS 36/102(13) (West 2004). The UCCJEA defines “physical custody” as “the physical care and supervision of a child.”
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). · cites it 5× “” 750 ILCS 36/102(3) (West 2014). 1 1 It defines a “child-custody proceeding,” in contrast, as “a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.”
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). · cites it 5× “” 750 ILCS 36/102(3) (West 2014).1 ¶ 38 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ¶ 39 We turn first to subject matter jurisdiction.”
McCormick v. Robertson, 2014 IL App (4th) 140208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2010). Thus, pursuant to section 201 of the UCCJEA, an Illinois court “has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination” (absent an emergency, which is provided for in section 204) only if it finds one of the four criteria listed in…”
In Re Ds, 840 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. 2005). · cites it 2× “" 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2004). Respondent argues that, under section 201(a), Indiana is D.”
Hernandez Camberos v. Palacios, 2021 IL App (2d) 210078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021). · cites it 2× “” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2018). ¶ 18 An Illinois court may modify another state’s child custody determination only if the requirements of section 201(a)(1) or section 201(a)(2) are met, and: “(1) the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing…”
In Re Marriage of Akula, 935 N.E.2d 1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “750 ILCS 36/ 102(3), (4) (West 2006). Accordingly, the argument for continuing jurisdiction in Illinois fails.”
In re Marriage of Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). · cites it 2× “” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2018). Examining the evidence presented, the court commented that, in the case of these parties, “[t]he reality is that the children did not live in either Illinois or Colorado continuously for [a] six[-]month period immediately prior to the…”
In re Est. of Mirabella S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 4× “” 750 ILCS 36/102(1) (West 2016). Rather, the petition asserts that Matthew left Mirabella in Lauren’s care.”
In Re Sophia GL, 867 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). “" 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2004). Further, section 305(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 36/305(a) (West 2004)) provides that "[a] child-custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this State.”
Show all 33 citing cases →
— 750 ILCS 36/102(1) — 1 case
In re Est. of Mirabella S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(1) (West 2016). Rather, the petition asserts that Matthew left Mirabella in Lauren’s care.”
— 750 ILCS 36/102(11) — 1 case
In re Est. of Mirabella S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(1) (West 2016). Rather, the petition asserts that Matthew left Mirabella in Lauren’s care.”
— 750 ILCS 36/102(13) — 3 cases
In Re Sophia GL, 890 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 2008). “" 750 ILCS 36/102(13) (West 2004). The UCCJEA defines "physical custody" as "the physical care and supervision of a child.”
Cochran v. Lindeman, 890 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 2008). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(13) (West 2004). The UCCJEA defines “physical custody” as “the physical care and supervision of a child.”
In re Parentage of W.C. (Ill. App. Ct. 2026).
— 750 ILCS 36/102(14) — 2 cases
In Re Sophia GL, 890 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 2008). “" 750 ILCS 36/102(13) (West 2004). The UCCJEA defines "physical custody" as "the physical care and supervision of a child.”
Cochran v. Lindeman, 890 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 2008). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(13) (West 2004). The UCCJEA defines “physical custody” as “the physical care and supervision of a child.”
— 750 ILCS 36/102(2) — 1 case
Jordan Boyd v. Skylar Weisenberger (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
— 750 ILCS 36/102(3) — 5 cases
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(3) (West 2014). 1 1 It defines a “child-custody proceeding,” in contrast, as “a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.”
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(3) (West 2014).1 ¶ 38 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ¶ 39 We turn first to subject matter jurisdiction.”
In Re Marriage of Akula, 935 N.E.2d 1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “750 ILCS 36/ 102(3), (4) (West 2006). Accordingly, the argument for continuing jurisdiction in Illinois fails.”
In re Est. of Mirabella S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(1) (West 2016). Rather, the petition asserts that Matthew left Mirabella in Lauren’s care.”
In re Marriage of Akula (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
— 750 ILCS 36/102(4) — 3 cases
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(3) (West 2014). 1 1 It defines a “child-custody proceeding,” in contrast, as “a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.”
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(3) (West 2014).1 ¶ 38 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ¶ 39 We turn first to subject matter jurisdiction.”
In re Est. of Mirabella S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(1) (West 2016). Rather, the petition asserts that Matthew left Mirabella in Lauren’s care.”
— 750 ILCS 36/102(7) — 25 cases
In Re Marriage of Diaz, 845 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2004). In the present case, Katharine argues that Illinois is Madalyn’s home state because Madalyn was born in Illinois and lived there with her until she and Madalyn went to Michigan.”
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(3) (West 2014). 1 1 It defines a “child-custody proceeding,” in contrast, as “a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.”
McCormick v. Robertson, 2014 IL App (4th) 140208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2010). Thus, pursuant to section 201 of the UCCJEA, an Illinois court “has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination” (absent an emergency, which is provided for in section 204) only if it finds one of the four criteria listed in…”
In Re Ds, 840 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. 2005). “" 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2004). Respondent argues that, under section 201(a), Indiana is D.”
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “” 750 ILCS 36/102(3) (West 2014).1 ¶ 38 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ¶ 39 We turn first to subject matter jurisdiction.”
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