Sec. 2. (a) In enacting this section, the general
assembly finds and declares that it is the policy of this state to
recognize the unique character of a citizen's home and to ensure that a
citizen feels secure in his or her own home against unlawful intrusion
by another individual or a public servant. By reaffirming the long
standing right of a citizen to protect his or her home against unlawful
intrusion, however, the general assembly does not intend to diminish
in any way the other robust self-defense rights that citizens of this state
have always enjoyed. Accordingly, the general assembly also finds and
declares that it is the policy of this state that people have a right to
defend themselves and third parties from physical harm and crime. The
purpose of this section is to provide the citizens of this state with a
lawful means of carrying out this policy. Provisions concerning civil
immunity for the justified use of force as defined in this section are
codified under IC 34-30-31.
(b) As used in this section, "public servant" means a person
described in IC 35-31.5-2-129 or IC 35-31.5-2-185.
(c) A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other
person to protect the person or a third person from what the person
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
However, a person:
(1) is justified in using deadly force; and
(2) does not have a duty to retreat;
if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent
serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission
of a forcible felony. No person, employer, or estate of a person in this
state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for
protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.
(d) A person:
(1) is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force,
against any other person; and
(2) does not have a duty to retreat;
if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent
or terminate the other person's unlawful entry of or attack on the
person's dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle.
(e) With respect to property other than a dwelling, curtilage, or an
occupied motor vehicle, a person is justified in using reasonable force
against any other person if the person reasonably believes that the force
is necessary to immediately prevent or terminate the other person's
trespass on or criminal interference with property lawfully in the
person's possession, lawfully in possession of a member of the person's
immediate family, or belonging to a person whose property the person
has authority to protect. However, a person:
(1) is justified in using deadly force; and
(2) does not have a duty to retreat;
only if that force is justified under subsection (c).
(f) A person is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly
force, against any other person and does not have a duty to retreat if the
person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or stop
the other person from hijacking, attempting to hijack, or otherwise
seizing or attempting to seize unlawful control of an aircraft in flight.
For purposes of this subsection, an aircraft is considered to be in flight
while the aircraft is:
(1) on the ground in Indiana:
(A) after the doors of the aircraft are closed for takeoff; and
(B) until the aircraft takes off;
(2) in the airspace above Indiana; or
(3) on the ground in Indiana:
(A) after the aircraft lands; and
(B) before the doors of the aircraft are opened after landing.
(g) Notwithstanding subsections (c) through (e), a person is not
justified in using force if:
(1) the person is committing or is escaping after the commission
of a crime;
(2) the person provokes unlawful action by another person with
intent to cause bodily injury to the other person; or
(3) the person has entered into combat with another person or is
the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the
encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do
so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to
continue unlawful action.
(h) Notwithstanding subsection (f), a person is not justified in using
force if the person:
(1) is committing, or is escaping after the commission of, a crime;
(2) provokes unlawful action by another person, with intent to
cause bodily injury to the other person; or
(3) continues to combat another person after the other person
withdraws from the encounter and communicates the other
person's intent to stop hijacking, attempting to hijack, or
otherwise seizing or attempting to seize unlawful control of an
aircraft in flight.
(i) A person is justified in using reasonable force against a public
servant if the person reasonably believes the force is necessary to:
(1) protect the person or a third person from what the person
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force;
(2) prevent or terminate the public servant's unlawful entry of or
attack on the person's dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor
vehicle; or
(3) prevent or terminate the public servant's unlawful trespass on
or criminal interference with property lawfully in the person's
possession, lawfully in possession of a member of the person's
immediate family, or belonging to a person whose property the
person has authority to protect.
(j) Notwithstanding subsection (i), a person is not justified in using
force against a public servant if:
(1) the person is committing or is escaping after the commission
of a crime;
(2) the person provokes action by the public servant with intent to
cause bodily injury to the public servant;
(3) the person has entered into combat with the public servant or
is the initial aggressor, unless the person withdraws from the
encounter and communicates to the public servant the intent to do
so and the public servant nevertheless continues or threatens to
continue unlawful action; or
(4) the person reasonably believes the public servant is:
(A) acting lawfully; or
(B) engaged in the lawful execution of the public servant's
official duties.
(k) A person is not justified in using deadly force against a public
servant whom the person knows or reasonably should know is a public
servant unless:
(1) the person reasonably believes that the public servant is:
(A) acting unlawfully; or
(B) not engaged in the execution of the public servant's official
duties; and
(2) the force is reasonably necessary to prevent serious bodily
injury to the person or a third person.
As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.1. Amended by Acts
1977, P.L.340, SEC.8; Acts 1979, P.L.297, SEC.1; P.L.59-2002,
SEC.1; P.L.189-2006, SEC.1; P.L.161-2012, SEC.1; P.L.13-2013,
SEC.139; P.L.107-2019, SEC.7; P.L.9-2024, SEC.536.
Notes of Decisions
Mayes v. State (2001)
ind · cites it 9×
“Writing for the court, Judge Garrard observed: If subsection (d)(1) [of Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2] is to be taken literally, then no person may claim self defense if that person at the time he acts is coincidentally committing some criminal offense.”
Derrick Weedman v. State of Indiana (2014)
indctapp · cites it 6×
“Under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2, a person is justified in using reasonable force to protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force by another person.”
Matthew Bryant v. State of Indiana (2013)
indctapp · cites it 6×
“Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 (2006). To prevail on a claim of self defense, the defendant must present evidence that he: (1) was in a place he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great…”
Barnes v. State (2011)
ind · cites it 8×
“Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(B) making it a criminal offense to commit battery on a law enforcement officer "while the officer is engaged in the execution of the officer's official duty," and Ind.Code § 35-41-3-2(b) providing persons the right to use "reasonable force .”
Smith v. State (2002)
indctapp · cites it 8×
“2d 390 (Ind.2001), to support Smith's contention that possession of marijuana or dealing in marijuana is insufficient to constitute the "commission of a crime," which would prohibit a defendant from claiming self defense under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2.”
Melvin Wolf v. State of Indiana (2017)
indctapp · cites it 4×
“2002); Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 . “When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State bears the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.”
Simpson v. State (2009)
indctapp · cites it 6×
“Code § 35-41-3-2(a) 4 Our supreme court has explained that "reasonably believes," as used in Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2, "requires both subjective belief that force was necessary to prevent serious bodily injury, and that such actual belief was one that a reasonable person…”
Thomas King v. State of Indiana (2016)
indctapp · cites it 4×
“To prevail on a claim of self-defense under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2, a defendant must have: (1) acted without fault; (2) been in a place where he or she had a right to be; and (3) been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm.”
Miller v. State (1999)
ind · cites it 4×
“Ind.Code § 35-41-3-2 (1993). When raised, a defendant must establish that he *700 or she was in a place where he or she had the right to be, acted without fault, and was in reasonable fear or apprehension of death or great bodily harm.”
Jefferson Jean-Baptiste v. State of Indiana (2017)
indctapp · cites it 16×
“Acknowledging the vitality of the Castle Doctrine in Indiana, 3 see I.C. § 35-41-3-2, we stated that, “in matters concerning merely civil process, the courts of this land have been zealous in protecting against the authority of the government to force entry into a private…”
Boyer v. State (2008)
indctapp · cites it 6×
“” Ind.Code § 35-41-3-2(a). When the defendant has raised a self-defense claim, the State must disprove at least one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant was in a place where she had a right to be; 2) the defendant was without fault; and 3) the…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(3) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(32) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a) — 62 cases
Mayes v. State (2001)
ind
“Writing for the court, Judge Garrard observed: If subsection (d)(1) [of Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2] is to be taken literally, then no person may claim self defense if that person at the time he acts is coincidentally committing some criminal offense.”
Simpson v. State (2009)
indctapp
“Code § 35-41-3-2(a) 4 Our supreme court has explained that "reasonably believes," as used in Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2, "requires both subjective belief that force was necessary to prevent serious bodily injury, and that such actual belief was one that a reasonable person…”
Derrick Weedman v. State of Indiana (2014)
indctapp
“Under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2, a person is justified in using reasonable force to protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force by another person.”
Boyer v. State (2008)
indctapp
“” Ind.Code § 35-41-3-2(a). When the defendant has raised a self-defense claim, the State must disprove at least one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant was in a place where she had a right to be; 2) the defendant was without fault; and 3) the…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a)(l) — 1 case
Boyer v. State (2008)
indctapp
“” Ind.Code § 35-41-3-2(a). When the defendant has raised a self-defense claim, the State must disprove at least one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant was in a place where she had a right to be; 2) the defendant was without fault; and 3) the…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(b) — 6 cases
Barnes v. State (2011)
ind
“Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(B) making it a criminal offense to commit battery on a law enforcement officer "while the officer is engaged in the execution of the officer's official duty," and Ind.Code § 35-41-3-2(b) providing persons the right to use "reasonable force .”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) — 57 cases
Thomas King v. State of Indiana (2016)
indctapp
“To prevail on a claim of self-defense under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2, a defendant must have: (1) acted without fault; (2) been in a place where he or she had a right to be; and (3) been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm.”
Derrick Weedman v. State of Indiana (2014)
indctapp
“Under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2, a person is justified in using reasonable force to protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force by another person.”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c)(1) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d) — 8 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d)(1) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d)(2) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d)(3) — 4 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d)(8) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d)(l) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(e) — 4 cases
Matthew Bryant v. State of Indiana (2013)
indctapp
“Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 (2006). To prevail on a claim of self defense, the defendant must present evidence that he: (1) was in a place he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(e)(3) — 9 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(e)(8) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(e)(l) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g) — 7 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(1) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(2) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(3) — 16 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(i) — 9 cases
Jefferson Jean-Baptiste v. State of Indiana (2017)
indctapp
“Acknowledging the vitality of the Castle Doctrine in Indiana, 3 see I.C. § 35-41-3-2, we stated that, “in matters concerning merely civil process, the courts of this land have been zealous in protecting against the authority of the government to force entry into a private…”
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(i)(1) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(i)(2) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(j)(2) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(j)(4) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.