Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 (2026)

Consecutive and concurrent terms

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 2. (a) As used in this section, "crime of violence" means the following:

(1) Murder (IC 35-42-1-1).

(2) Attempted murder (IC 35-41-5-1).

(3) Voluntary manslaughter (IC 35-42-1-3).

(4) Involuntary manslaughter (IC 35-42-1-4).

(5) Reckless homicide (IC 35-42-1-5).

(6) Battery (IC 35-42-2-1) as a:

(A) Level 2 felony;

(B) Level 3 felony;

(C) Level 4 felony; or

(D) Level 5 felony.

(7) Domestic battery (IC 35-42-2-1.3) as a:

(A) Level 2 felony;

(B) Level 3 felony;

(C) Level 4 felony; or

(D) Level 5 felony.

(8) Aggravated battery (IC 35-42-2-1.5).

(9) Kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2).

(10) Rape (IC 35-42-4-1).

(11) Criminal deviate conduct (IC 35-42-4-2) (before its repeal).

(12) Child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3).

(13) Sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 1 felony under IC 35-42-4-9(a)(2) or a Level 2 felony under IC 35-42-4-9(b)(2).

(14) Robbery as a Level 2 felony or a Level 3 felony (IC 35-42-5-1).

(15) Burglary as a Level 1 felony, Level 2 felony, Level 3 felony, or Level 4 felony (IC 35-43-2-1).

(16) Operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death or catastrophic injury (IC 9-30-5-5).

(17) Operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury to another person (IC 9-30-5-4).

(18) Child exploitation as a Level 5 felony under IC 35-42-4-4(b) or a Level 4 felony under IC 35-42-4-4(c).

(19) Resisting law enforcement as a felony (IC 35-44.1-3-1).

(20) Unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (IC 35-47-4-5).

(21) Strangulation (IC 35-42-2-9) as a Level 5 felony.

     (b) As used in this section, "episode of criminal conduct" means offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.

     (c) Except as provided in subsection (e) or (f) the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively. The court may consider the:

(1) aggravating circumstances in IC 35-38-1-7.1(a); and

(2) mitigating circumstances in IC 35-38-1-7.1(b);

in making a determination under this subsection. The court may order terms of imprisonment to be served consecutively even if the sentences are not imposed at the same time. However, except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of imprisonment under IC 35-50-2-8 and IC 35-50-2-10 (before its repeal) to which the defendant is sentenced for felony or misdemeanor convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the period described in subsection (d).

     (d) Except as provided in subsection (c), the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment to which the defendant is sentenced for convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct may not exceed the following:

(1) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Class C misdemeanor, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed one (1) year.

(2) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Class B misdemeanor, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed two (2) years.

(3) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Class A misdemeanor, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed three (3) years.

(4) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 6 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed four (4) years.

(5) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 5 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed seven (7) years.

(6) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 4 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed fifteen (15) years.

(7) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 3 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed twenty (20) years.

(8) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 2 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed thirty-two (32) years.

(9) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 1 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed forty-two (42) years.

     (e) If, after being arrested for one (1) crime, a person commits another crime:

(1) before the date the person is discharged from probation, parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for the first crime; or

(2) while the person is released:

(A) upon the person's own recognizance; or

(B) on bond;

the terms of imprisonment for the crimes shall be served consecutively, regardless of the order in which the crimes are tried and sentences are imposed.

     (f) If the factfinder determines under IC 35-50-2-11 that a person used a firearm in the commission of the offense for which the person was convicted, the term of imprisonment for the underlying offense and the additional term of imprisonment imposed under IC 35-50-2-11 must be served consecutively.

As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.8. Amended by Acts 1977, P.L.340, SEC.111; P.L.330-1987, SEC.1; P.L.164-1994, SEC.1; P.L.304-1995, SEC.1; P.L.203-1996, SEC.7; P.L.219-1997, SEC.1; P.L.228-2001, SEC.6; P.L.266-2003, SEC.2; P.L.71-2005, SEC.4; P.L.213-2005, SEC.4; P.L.1-2006, SEC.549; P.L.126-2008, SEC.12; P.L.125-2012, SEC.416; P.L.126-2012, SEC.59; P.L.13-2013, SEC.144; P.L.214-2013, SEC.43; P.L.158-2013, SEC.650; P.L.168-2014, SEC.108; P.L.238-2015, SEC.16; P.L.13-2016, SEC.18; P.L.80-2018, SEC.4; P.L.184-2019, SEC.15; P.L.142-2020, SEC.83; P.L.218-2025, SEC.23.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 586 cases (22 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 2006).
Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 2006). · cites it 21× “" See I.C. § 35-50-1-2. 3 . Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(a) (1995 Supp.”
Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. 2002). · cites it 24× “" Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2(a) (1988). This Court in Kendrick held that the trial court's authority to impose consecutive sentences arises only (1) when it has a mandatory duty to do so under section 35-50-1-2(b) or (2) "when a court is meting out two or more terms of imprisonment.”
Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. 2000). · cites it 32× “Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-1-2 (a)(West 1998).”
Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005). · cites it 12× “The trial court's sentencing of Smylie to consecutive terms after finding an aggravating circumstance did not increase the sentence above the statutory maximum for each offense. See State v. Abdullah, 372 N.”
Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 20× “Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2. Subsection (a) of the statute gives the trial court discretion to determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.”
Johnican v. State, 804 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 19× “In pertinent part, Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2 provides: [The court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.”
White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1986). · cites it 12× “The transcript of the sentencing hearing makes it apparent that the trial court regarded consecutive sentences as mandatory under Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 : Sec. 2(a). Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the Court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment…”
Hardley v. State, 905 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 2009). · cites it 16× “" Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 (d)(2)(A). [8] Although not readily apparent, this result may be inconsistent with this Court's opinion in Griffin v.”
Ratliff v. State, 741 N.E.2d 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 24× “" Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 (b) (1998). Here, Ratliff operated a vehicle while intoxicated and fled from a police officer who attempted to stop him.”
Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 10× “Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2 in no other way limits the ability of a trial court to impose consecutive sentences.”
Michael Damien Howell v. State of Indiana, 97 N.E.3d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 20× “" Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 (b). "Whether certain offenses constitute a 'single episode of criminal conduct' is a fact-intensive inquiry.”
Wendy Thompson v. State of Indiana, 5 N.E.3d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 8× “First, she argues that the trial court erroneously sentenced her to a term of imprisonment that exceeded the maximum sentence allowable under the consecutive sentencing statute, Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2. Second, she argues that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the…”
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(1) — 1 case
Williams v. State, 889 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(2) — 2 cases
Salone v. State, 652 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
Totten v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(C) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a) — 69 cases
Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. 2002). “" Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2(a) (1988). This Court in Kendrick held that the trial court's authority to impose consecutive sentences arises only (1) when it has a mandatory duty to do so under section 35-50-1-2(b) or (2) "when a court is meting out two or more terms of imprisonment.”
Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 2006). “" See I.C. § 35-50-1-2. 3 . Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(a) (1995 Supp.”
Lamirand v. State, 640 N.E.2d 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
Wendy Thompson v. State of Indiana, 5 N.E.3d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “First, she argues that the trial court erroneously sentenced her to a term of imprisonment that exceeded the maximum sentence allowable under the consecutive sentencing statute, Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2. Second, she argues that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the…”
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(10) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(11) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(12) — 4 cases
Bethea v. State, 964 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Bryan A.Ogle v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(13) — 3 cases
Anthony W. McGriff v. State of Indiana, 20 N.E.3d 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(14) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(15) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(6) — 1 case
Arthur Moore v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(7)(8) — 1 case
Foster v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(8) — 2 cases
McCarthy v. State, 751 N.E.2d 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b) — 76 cases
Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. 2002). “" Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2(a) (1988). This Court in Kendrick held that the trial court's authority to impose consecutive sentences arises only (1) when it has a mandatory duty to do so under section 35-50-1-2(b) or (2) "when a court is meting out two or more terms of imprisonment.”
White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1986). “The transcript of the sentencing hearing makes it apparent that the trial court regarded consecutive sentences as mandatory under Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 : Sec. 2(a). Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the Court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment…”
Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 290 (Ind. 2002).
Michael Damien Howell v. State of Indiana, 97 N.E.3d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “" Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 (b). "Whether certain offenses constitute a 'single episode of criminal conduct' is a fact-intensive inquiry.”
St. John v. State, 529 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b)(1) — 2 cases
Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2. Subsection (a) of the statute gives the trial court discretion to determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.”
Pawloski v. State, 555 N.E.2d 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b)(l) — 1 case
Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2. Subsection (a) of the statute gives the trial court discretion to determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.”
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c) — 134 cases
Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 2006). “" See I.C. § 35-50-1-2. 3 . Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(a) (1995 Supp.”
Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005). “The trial court's sentencing of Smylie to consecutive terms after finding an aggravating circumstance did not increase the sentence above the statutory maximum for each offense. See State v. Abdullah, 372 N.”
Cole v. State, 850 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. 2002). “" Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2(a) (1988). This Court in Kendrick held that the trial court's authority to impose consecutive sentences arises only (1) when it has a mandatory duty to do so under section 35-50-1-2(b) or (2) "when a court is meting out two or more terms of imprisonment.”
Johnican v. State, 804 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “In pertinent part, Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2 provides: [The court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.”
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c)(2) — 6 cases
Robert L. Slone v. State of Indiana, 11 N.E.3d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Dustin A. Evans v. State of Indiana, 81 N.E.3d 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Kyle E. Bowers v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d) — 38 cases
Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. 2006).
Breaston v. State, 907 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 2009).
Johnathon R. Aslinger v. State of Indiana, 2 N.E.3d 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Barnett v. State, 834 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Jones v. State, 774 N.E.2d 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(1) — 6 cases
Ryan S. Crum v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
Williams v. State, 787 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Wilder v. Sheriff (N.D. Ind. 2023).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(2) — 13 cases
Jones v. State, 775 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Jones v. State, 774 N.E.2d 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
State v. Jones, 918 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Jones v. State, 777 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(2)(A) — 1 case
Hardley v. State, 905 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 2009). “" Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 (d)(2)(A). [8] Although not readily apparent, this result may be inconsistent with this Court's opinion in Griffin v.”
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(2)(B) — 2 cases
Thorne v. State, 687 N.E.2d 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Brenda Painter v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(2012) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(3) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(4) — 3 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(6) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(e) — 21 cases
Jacob L. Maciaszek v. State of Indiana, 113 N.E.3d 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
Sweatt v. State, 887 N.E.2d 81 (Ind. 2008).
Hollar v. State, 916 N.E.2d 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(e)(1) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(e)(2)(B) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(f) — 2 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.