Sec. 8. (a) Subject to subsection (b), a unit does not
have the following:
(1) The power to condition or limit its civil liability, except as
expressly granted by statute.
(2) The power to prescribe the law governing civil actions
between private persons.
(3) The power to impose duties on another political subdivision,
except as expressly granted by statute.
(4) The power to impose a tax, except as expressly granted by
statute.
(5) The power to impose a license fee greater than that reasonably
related to the administrative cost of exercising a regulatory power.
(6) The power to impose a service charge or user fee greater than
that reasonably related to reasonable and just rates and charges
for services.
(7) The power to regulate conduct that is regulated by a state
agency, except as expressly granted by statute.
(8) The power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a
crime or infraction under statute.
(9) The power to prescribe a penalty of imprisonment for an
ordinance violation.
(10) The power to prescribe a penalty of a fine as follows:
(A) More than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for the violation
of an ordinance or a regulation concerning air emissions
adopted by a county that has received approval to establish an
air permit program under IC 13-17-12-6.
(B) For a violation of any other ordinance:
(i) more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for
a first violation of the ordinance; and
(ii) except as provided in subsection (c), more than seven
thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) for a second or
subsequent violation of the ordinance.
(11) The power to invest money, except as expressly granted by
statute.
(12) The power to adopt an ordinance, a resolution, or an order
concerning an election described by IC 3-5-1-2, or otherwise
conduct an election, except as expressly granted by statute. An
ordinance, a resolution, or an order concerning an election
described by IC 3-5-1-2 that was adopted before January 1, 2023,
is void unless a statute expressly granted the unit the power to
adopt the ordinance, resolution, or order.
(13) The power to adopt or enforce an ordinance described in
section 8.5 of this chapter.
(14) The power to take any action prohibited by section 8.6 of this
chapter.
(15) The power to dissolve a political subdivision, except:
(A) as expressly granted by statute; or
(B) if IC 36-1-8-17.7 applies to the political subdivision, in
accordance with the procedure set forth in IC 36-1-8-17.7.
(16) After June 30, 2019, the power to enact an ordinance
requiring a solid waste hauler or a person who operates a vehicle
in which recyclable material is transported for recycling to collect
fees authorized by IC 13-21 and remit the fees to:
(A) a unit; or
(B) the board of a solid waste management district established
under IC 13-21.
(b) A township does not have the following, except as expressly
granted by statute:
(1) The power to require a license or impose a license fee.
(2) The power to impose a service charge or user fee.
(3) The power to prescribe a penalty.
(c) Subsection (a)(10)(B)(ii) does not apply to the violation of an
ordinance that regulates traffic or parking.
[Pre-Local Government Recodification Citations: 17-2-2.5-3
part; 17-2-2.5-4 part; 18-1-1.5-1 part; 18-1-1.5-4; 18-1-1.5-13 part;
18-1-1.5-19 part; 18-1-1.5-20 part; 18-3-1-47 part; 18-3-1-49 part;
18-4-2-2 part; 18-4-2-3; 18-4-2-35(b); 18-4-2-35(c);
19-10-3-1.]
As added by Acts 1980, P.L.211, SEC.1. Amended by Acts
1981, P.L.17, SEC.3; P.L.123-1987, SEC.2; P.L.3-1987, SEC.540;
P.L.3-1990, SEC.122; P.L.251-1993, SEC.4; P.L.164-1995, SEC.14;
P.L.1-1996, SEC.84; P.L.200-2005, SEC.4; P.L.13-2013, SEC.148;
P.L.150-2016, SEC.1; P.L.189-2016, SEC.5; P.L.19-2019, SEC.3;
P.L.4-2023, SEC.1.
Notes of Decisions
City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000).
· cites it 41× “Code § 8-1-2-101(b), prohibiting municipalities from receiving any form of "payment" other than the "direct, actual, and reasonably incurred management costs" for a utility's occupation of a public right-of-way; (3) that the remaining provisions of Ordinances *153 6970 & 6971…”
Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. 2011).
· cites it 24× “Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8 (2007). Indiana Code section 36-1-3-8 was amended in 2005 and added subsection (ii), "except as provided in subsection (c), more than seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) for a second or subsequent violation of the ordinance.”
Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind. 1990).
· cites it 23× “Neither the Cable Act nor Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8 provide reimbursement or other damages for consumers who are injured because a municipality charges excess fees.”
Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 20× “at 22 (citing Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8). The majority concedes "the facts that underlie the ordinance violations also give rise to the criminal charges," id.”
Alexander v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 12× “The Class asserts, in summary fashion, that the Sheriffs and the State’s authority to enter into contracts by which they will “reap a benefit” is constrained by statutory prohibitions against excessive license fees, see Ind.Code Ann. § 36-1-3-8(5) (West, PREMISE through 2007 1st…”
Town of Avon v. West Cent. Conservancy Dist., 957 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. 2011).
· cites it 8× “) While that may be correct, we see little difference in the statutory language of the Review of Powers Provision and the language from Section 36-1-3-8 that we addressed in City of Crown Point .”
City of North Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg'l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2005).
· cites it 2× “" Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8. Rather, the Legislature has said, "Any doubt as to the existence of a power of a unit shall be resolved in favor of its existence," and this is so "even though a statute granting the power has been repealed.”
Worman Enter., Inc. v. The Boone Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 805 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. 2004).
· cites it 2× “The Home Rule Act significantly expanded the powers of "units" of local government, but expressly prohibited regulation by local agencies of conduct already regulated by a state agency. Id. Worman points out that the Indiana Department of Environmental Management regulates solid…”
Triple G Landfills, Inc. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 774 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
· cites it 12× “It seeks a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance is invalid and unenforceable, for any of four reasons: that the Ordinance is preempted by state law, found at Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8(7); that it is a “zoning” ordinance adopted in the absence of the preexisting comprehensive county…”
Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. 2003).
· cites it 2× “" I.C. § 36-1-3-8(b). We have applied the Home Rule Act in construing the zoning authority of governmental units.”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(3) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(5) — 5 cases
Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind. 1990).
“Neither the Cable Act nor Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8 provide reimbursement or other damages for consumers who are injured because a municipality charges excess fees.”
City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000).
“Code § 8-1-2-101(b), prohibiting municipalities from receiving any form of "payment" other than the "direct, actual, and reasonably incurred management costs" for a utility's occupation of a public right-of-way; (3) that the remaining provisions of Ordinances *153 6970 & 6971…”
Alexander v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“The Class asserts, in summary fashion, that the Sheriffs and the State’s authority to enter into contracts by which they will “reap a benefit” is constrained by statutory prohibitions against excessive license fees, see Ind.Code Ann. § 36-1-3-8(5) (West, PREMISE through 2007 1st…”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(6) — 2 cases
Alexander v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“The Class asserts, in summary fashion, that the Sheriffs and the State’s authority to enter into contracts by which they will “reap a benefit” is constrained by statutory prohibitions against excessive license fees, see Ind.Code Ann. § 36-1-3-8(5) (West, PREMISE through 2007 1st…”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(7) — 3 cases
Triple G Landfills, Inc. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 774 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
“It seeks a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance is invalid and unenforceable, for any of four reasons: that the Ordinance is preempted by state law, found at Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8(7); that it is a “zoning” ordinance adopted in the absence of the preexisting comprehensive county…”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(10) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(10)(B) — 1 case
Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
“at 22 (citing Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8). The majority concedes "the facts that underlie the ordinance violations also give rise to the criminal charges," id.”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(3) — 3 cases
Town of Avon v. West Cent. Conservancy Dist., 957 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. 2011).
“) While that may be correct, we see little difference in the statutory language of the Review of Powers Provision and the language from Section 36-1-3-8 that we addressed in City of Crown Point .”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(4) — 1 case
City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000).
“Code § 8-1-2-101(b), prohibiting municipalities from receiving any form of "payment" other than the "direct, actual, and reasonably incurred management costs" for a utility's occupation of a public right-of-way; (3) that the remaining provisions of Ordinances *153 6970 & 6971…”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(5) — 4 cases
City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000).
“Code § 8-1-2-101(b), prohibiting municipalities from receiving any form of "payment" other than the "direct, actual, and reasonably incurred management costs" for a utility's occupation of a public right-of-way; (3) that the remaining provisions of Ordinances *153 6970 & 6971…”
Alexander v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“The Class asserts, in summary fashion, that the Sheriffs and the State’s authority to enter into contracts by which they will “reap a benefit” is constrained by statutory prohibitions against excessive license fees, see Ind.Code Ann. § 36-1-3-8(5) (West, PREMISE through 2007 1st…”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(6) — 3 cases
City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000).
“Code § 8-1-2-101(b), prohibiting municipalities from receiving any form of "payment" other than the "direct, actual, and reasonably incurred management costs" for a utility's occupation of a public right-of-way; (3) that the remaining provisions of Ordinances *153 6970 & 6971…”
Alexander v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“The Class asserts, in summary fashion, that the Sheriffs and the State’s authority to enter into contracts by which they will “reap a benefit” is constrained by statutory prohibitions against excessive license fees, see Ind.Code Ann. § 36-1-3-8(5) (West, PREMISE through 2007 1st…”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(7) — 9 cases
City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000).
“Code § 8-1-2-101(b), prohibiting municipalities from receiving any form of "payment" other than the "direct, actual, and reasonably incurred management costs" for a utility's occupation of a public right-of-way; (3) that the remaining provisions of Ordinances *153 6970 & 6971…”
Worman Enter., Inc. v. The Boone Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 805 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. 2004).
“The Home Rule Act significantly expanded the powers of "units" of local government, but expressly prohibited regulation by local agencies of conduct already regulated by a state agency. Id. Worman points out that the Indiana Department of Environmental Management regulates solid…”
Town of Avon v. West Cent. Conservancy Dist., 957 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. 2011).
“) While that may be correct, we see little difference in the statutory language of the Review of Powers Provision and the language from Section 36-1-3-8 that we addressed in City of Crown Point .”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(8) — 3 cases
Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
“at 22 (citing Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8). The majority concedes "the facts that underlie the ordinance violations also give rise to the criminal charges," id.”
— Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(b) — 1 case
Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. 2003).
“" I.C. § 36-1-3-8(b). We have applied the Home Rule Act in construing the zoning authority of governmental units.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.