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Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 21-3201 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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21-3201.

History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3201; L. 1992, ch. 298, § 2; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 17; Repealed, L. 2010, ch. 136, § 307; July 1, 2011.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 133 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1973–2025 · leading case: State v. Butler, 416 P.3d 116 (Kan. 2018).
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State v. Butler, 416 P.3d 116 (Kan. 2018). · cites it 3× “The essence is the agreement to commit a crime, not simply to commit a particular act, as to drive an automobile at a certain time and place. Clearly a mental state is contemplated.”
State v. Lewis, 953 P.2d 1016 (Kan. 1998). · cites it 8× “The issue also involves interpretation of the provisions of the Kansas Criminal Code dealing with intent and strict liability crimes, K.S.A. 21-3201 and K.S.A. 21-3204, as well as K.”
State v. Chavez, 447 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2019). · cites it 5× “At the time O'Rear shot the victim, K.S.A. 21-3201 separated criminal intent into two categories: "intentional" conduct and "reckless" conduct.”
State v. Bolze-Sann, 352 P.3d 511 (Kan. 2015). · cites it 4× “The State need not prove realization of a specific danger.”
In re C.P.W., 213 P.3d 413 (Kan. 2009). · cites it 7× “22-4903, which subjects to criminal liability “[a]ny person who is required to register as provided in the Kansas offender registration act who violates any of the provisions of such act,” does not identify or require a particular intent beyond the general intent required by…”
State v. Jones, 748 P.2d 839 (Kan. 1988). · cites it 10× “The statutory distinction between a general intent crime and a crime of specific intent is whether, in addition to the general intent required by K.S.A. 21-3201 (a willful or wanton act), the statute identifies or requires a further particular intent, i.”
State v. Richardson, 209 P.3d 696 (Kan. 2009). · cites it 4× “The distinction between general intent and specific intent crimes is “whether, in addition to the intent required by K.S.A. 21-3201, the statute defining the crime in question identifies or requires a further particular intent which must accompany the prohibited acts.”
State v. Coleman, 460 P.3d 368 (Kan. 2020). · cites it 5× “" K.S.A. 21-3201 (Ensley 1988). The later involuntary manslaughter statute criminalizes any unintentional killing done recklessly.”
State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1997). · cites it 6× “Plunkett's argument would add an additional element to the crime of rape not included in the statute. K.”
State v. Creamer, 996 P.2d 339 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 9× “21-3442, do not require proof of a general criminal intent as required by K.S.A. 21-3201. We do not agree. To begin with, defendant was convicted by a jury.”
– State v. Patterson –, 455 P.3d 792 (Kan. 2020). · cites it 2× “Its predecessor, K.S.A. 21-3201 (Ensley), stated: "Except as provided .”
State v. Charles, 372 P.3d 1109 (Kan. 2016). · cites it 2× “" See K.S.A. 21-3201(c). Again, an objective standard is employed.”
Show all 133 citing cases →
— K.S.A. § 21-3201(1) — 8 cases
State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1997). “Plunkett's argument would add an additional element to the crime of rape not included in the statute. K.”
State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1995).
State v. Cantrell, 673 P.2d 1147 (Kan. 1983).
State v. Hill, 744 P.2d 1228 (Kan. 1987).
State v. Rider, Edens & Lemons, 625 P.2d 425 (Kan. 1981).
— K.S.A. § 21-3201(2) — 14 cases
State Ex Rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 646 P.2d 1091 (Kan. 1982).
State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1995).
State v. Cantrell, 673 P.2d 1147 (Kan. 1983).
State v. Hill, 744 P.2d 1228 (Kan. 1987).
State v. Stone, 853 P.2d 662 (Kan. 1993).
— K.S.A. § 21-3201(3) — 7 cases
State v. Stone, 853 P.2d 662 (Kan. 1993).
State v. Farley, 587 P.2d 337 (Kan. 1978).
State v. Burrell, 699 P.2d 499 (Kan. 1985).
State v. Warren, 624 P.2d 476 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
Henderson v. Schenk, 631 P.2d 246 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
— K.S.A. § 21-3201(a) — 20 cases
State v. Richardson, 209 P.3d 696 (Kan. 2009). “The distinction between general intent and specific intent crimes is “whether, in addition to the intent required by K.S.A. 21-3201, the statute defining the crime in question identifies or requires a further particular intent which must accompany the prohibited acts.”
State v. Pennington, 132 P.3d 902 (Kan. 2006).
State v. Murrin, 435 P.3d 1126 (Kan. 2019).
State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1997). “Plunkett's argument would add an additional element to the crime of rape not included in the statute. K.”
State v. Maestas, 316 P.3d 724 (Kan. 2014).
— K.S.A. § 21-3201(b) — 27 cases
State v. Adams, 253 P.3d 5 (Kan. 2011).
State v. Coyote, 1 P.3d 836 (Kan. 2000).
State v. Pulliam, 430 P.3d 39 (Kan. 2018).
State v. Hernandez, 239 P.3d 103 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. DuMars, 108 P.3d 448 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).
— K.S.A. § 21-3201(c) — 33 cases
State v. Bolze-Sann, 352 P.3d 511 (Kan. 2015). “The State need not prove realization of a specific danger.”
State v. Charles, 372 P.3d 1109 (Kan. 2016). “" See K.S.A. 21-3201(c). Again, an objective standard is employed.”
State v. Jenkins, 39 P.3d 47 (Kan. 2002).
State v. Gonzalez, 412 P.3d 968 (Kan. 2018).
State v. Johnson, 376 P.3d 70 (Kan. 2016).
— K.S.A. § 21-3201(c)(1) — 1 case
State v. Perkins, 257 P.3d 1283 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
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