Kansas Statutes Annotated homeSearch Kansas
K.S.A.Chapter 21

K.S.A. § 21-3208 (2026)

Repealed

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1976–2019 50citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 50 opinions since 1976. The most litigated part is subsection (2) (34 cases).

21-3208.

History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3208; Repealed, L. 2010, ch. 136, § 307; July 1, 2011.

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 21-3208 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Bradford, 34 P.3d 434 (Kan. 2001).
cites § 21-3208 8×subsections: (1) 2× (2)cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“12-A-1 relating to voluntary intoxication, rather than instructing according to the statute, K.S.A. 21-3208. He did not object to this instruction below but contends the instruction as given was clearly erroneous.”
2
GREENState v. Pabst, 44 P.3d 1230 (Kan. 2002).
cites § 21-3208 4×subsections: (2) 4×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“He notes that K.S.A. 21-3208(2) provides: *667 "An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of…”
The case’s holding
The standard jury instruction defining premeditation is sufficient, and prosecutorial statements that do not deliberately misstate the law do not require reversal.
3
YELLOWState v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139 (Kan. 2001).
cites § 21-3208 8×subsections: (2) 6×cited by 137 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Overruled by Kansas v. Marsh on other grounds: 14 citing opinions limit it to other grounds, 2 say in part, and 1 says overruled outright.
Where it cites § 21-3208
“According to Kleypas, because the jury in his case was precluded from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication unless that evidence alone negated specific intent, the instruction ran afoul of both K.S.A. 21-3208 and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.”
The case’s holding
The Freeman factors apply only when the length of a sentence is challenged (stating Scott severely limited the application of the Freeman factors and the test only applies where the length of a sentence is challenged).
Later courts cite it for
“any instruction dealing with the consideration of mitigating circumstances should state (1) they need to be proved only to the satisfaction of the individual juror in the juror's sentencing decision and not beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) mitigating circumstances do not need to be found by all members of the jury in order to be considered in an individual juror's sentencing decision.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Robbins, 32 P.3d 171 (Kan. 2001).
cites § 21-3208 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“" K.S.A. 21-3208(1). Here, Robbins by his own testimony indicated he knew what was happening and decided to continue with the crime because he figured he was in trouble anyway.”
The case’s holding
Convictions are multiplicitous when the evidence required to prove a greater offense necessarily proves a lesser included offense.
Later courts cite it for
“whether convictions are multiplicitous is a question of law subject to unlimited review.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Ludlow, 883 P.2d 1144 (Kan. 1994).
cites § 21-3208 5×subsections: (2) 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“Subsection (2) of K.S.A. 21-3208 was taken from the Minnesota Criminal Code.”
Later courts cite it for
“voluntary intoxication may be a defense to the charge of premeditated first-degree murder, where the evidence indicates such intoxication impaired a defendant's mental faculties to the extent that he was incapable of forming the necessary intent or other state of mind to commit intentional murder with premeditation.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Brown, 244 P.3d 267 (Kan. 2011).
cites § 21-3208 2×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“2d 301 [1984]; K.S.A. 21-3208(2) (intoxication); State v.”
The case’s holding
The defendant's age at the time of the offense is an element of an off-grid offense that the jury must find.
Later courts cite it for
“defendant's age at the time of the offense is an element of the crime if the state seeks to convict the defendant of the more serious, off-grid level of the offense.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Hilt, 322 P.3d 367 (Kan. 2014).
cites § 21-3208 1×subsections: (2)cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“3d 267 (2011); see K.S.A. 21-3208(2).” State v. Kidd, 293 Kan.”
The case’s holding
Any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“a prosecutor may use analogies, similes, allusions, and other rhetorical devices in an attempt to bring order to the facts presented at trial, place them in a meaningful context, and construct the whole of a case. within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Edwards, 290 P.3d 661 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 21-3208 4×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“It seems to me that die defense that’s been raised in this case is one of intoxication, and that defense is governed by statute, specifically K.S.A. 21-3208. [K.S.A.] 21-3208 contemplates a defense in certain circumstances where an individual is intoxicated to the point where he…”
9
GREENState v. Kershaw, 359 P.3d 52 (Kan. 2015).
cites § 21-3208 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“21-5205(b) (previously codified at K.S.A. 21-3208[2]), which provides: “An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessaiy element to constitute a particular…”
The case’s holding
Aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime, so voluntary intoxication is not a defense to it.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature's designation of a general intent mental culpability requirement where a crime is defined by the term 'knowingly' continues to express a legislative intent that a voluntary intoxication defense is unavailable for that crime.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Davis, 587 P.2d 3 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
cites § 21-3208 4×subsections: (2) 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“Under K.S.A. 21-3208(2), the fact of voluntary intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such intent.”
11
GREENState v. Shehan, 744 P.2d 824 (Kan. 1987).
cites § 21-3208 2×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“The first point on appeal is that the trial court committed reversible error in not giving a requested instruction on voluntary intoxication pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3208(2). Shehan testified at trial that during the evening and nighttime hours of May 30 and early morning of May 31…”
The case’s holding
A jury instruction on voluntary intoxication requires evidence that the defendant's mental faculties were impaired to the extent he was incapable of forming the necessary specific intent.
Later courts cite it for
“where the trial court reaches the correct result based upon the wrong reason, this court will affirm the trial court.” · 5 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Murrin, 435 P.3d 1126 (Kan. 2019).
cites § 21-3208 1×subsections: (2)cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“"An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be taken into consideration in…”
The case’s holding
Voluntary intoxication may negate a necessary stand-alone mental state, so it is relevant to specific intent crimes but not general intent crimes; the culpable mental states statute guides that classification.
Later courts cite it for
“the 2011 recodification did more than modify the meaning of 'intent' in kansas criminal law. its addition of the culpable mental states statute provided guidance for classifying crimes as general or specific intent crimes.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENState v. Sterling, 680 P.2d 301 (Kan. 1984).
cites § 21-3208 2×subsections: (2)cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“” K.S.A. 21-3208 is a restatement of the law of Kansas which has traditionally been applied by the Kansas courts.”
The case’s holding
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime but may be considered when a particular intent is a necessary element of an offense.
Later courts cite it for
“an act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such intent or state of mind.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Gilliland, 276 P.3d 165 (Kan. 2012).
cites § 21-3208 1×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“3d 1 [2009], and voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes under K.S.A. 21-3208[2], State v. Brown, 291 Kan.”
The case’s holding
A defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that aggregated non-constitutional errors would have affected the outcome of the trial to warrant reversal.
Later courts cite it for
“kansas does not formally recognize pretrial taint hearings.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Jackson, 714 P.2d 1368 (Kan. 1986).
cites § 21-3208 2×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“Appellant next contends the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of diminished capacity constituted a denial of equal protection in light of the fact that a jury instruction is allowed upon the partial defense of voluntary intoxication.”
The case’s holding
Aggravated kidnapping occurs when a defendant exerts control over a victim, even if the victim manages to escape.
16
GREENState v. Jones, 151 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2007).
cites § 21-3208 1×subsections: (2)cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“2d 301 (1984); see also K.S.A. 21-3208(2) (intoxication); State v.”
The case’s holding
An interrogation is custodial only if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel they were not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
17
GREENState v. Sappington, 169 P.3d 1096 (Kan. 2007).
cites § 21-3208 1×subsections: (2)cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“The prosecutor’s argument could be viewed as an assertion that voluntary intoxication is never a legal defense, which is incorrect.”
The case’s holding
A trial court is not required to provide a voluntary intoxication instruction if the defendant elects to rely solely on a mental disease or defect defense.
Later courts cite it for
“court satisfied this requirement by fully hearing sappington's complaints” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Moore, 194 P.3d 18 (Kan. 2008).
cites § 21-3208 1×subsections: (2)cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication K.S.A. 21-3208(2) provides: “An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the…”
The case’s holding
A defendant is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction if supported by circumstantial evidence of drug use, even if the error is harmless due to overwhelming evidence of intent.
Later courts cite it for
“(a) a person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend such person ... against such other's imminent use of unlawful force.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Kessler, 73 P.3d 761 (Kan. 2003).
cites § 21-3208 1×subsections: (2)cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“21-3208(2) states: “An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be taken into…”
The case’s holding
A district court lacks authority to impose an upward durational departure sentence if the underlying statutory procedure is unconstitutional.
Later courts cite it for
“a district court's authority to im pose sentence is controlled by statute.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Smith, 178 P.3d 672 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 21-3208 3×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 21-3208
“K.S.A. 21-3208 codifies the defense of voluntary intoxication.”

Show all 50 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197619972019

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2001. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Kan.42Kan. Ct. App.6Minn.1Mo.1
By subsection
(1)4 cases
State v. Robbins, 32 P.3d 171 (Kan. 2001).“" K.S.A. 21-3208(1). Here, Robbins by his own testimony indicated he knew what was happening and decided to continue with the crime because he figured he was in trouble anyway.”
State v. Bradford, 34 P.3d 434 (Kan. 2001).“12-A-1 relating to voluntary intoxication, rather than instructing according to the statute, K.S.A. 21-3208. He did not object to this instruction below but contends the instruction as given was clearly erroneous.”
State v. Edwards, 290 P.3d 661 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).“It seems to me that die defense that’s been raised in this case is one of intoxication, and that defense is governed by statute, specifically K.S.A. 21-3208. [K.S.A.] 21-3208 contemplates a defense in certain circumstances where an individual is intoxicated to the point where he…”
State v. Lilley, 647 P.2d 1323 (Kan. 1982).
(2)34 cases
State v. Pabst, 44 P.3d 1230 (Kan. 2002).“He notes that K.S.A. 21-3208(2) provides: *667 "An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of…”
State v. Brown, 244 P.3d 267 (Kan. 2011).“2d 301 [1984]; K.S.A. 21-3208(2) (intoxication); State v.”
State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139 (Kan. 2001).“According to Kleypas, because the jury in his case was precluded from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication unless that evidence alone negated specific intent, the instruction ran afoul of both K.S.A. 21-3208 and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.”
State v. Ludlow, 883 P.2d 1144 (Kan. 1994).“Subsection (2) of K.S.A. 21-3208 was taken from the Minnesota Criminal Code.”
State v. Hilt, 322 P.3d 367 (Kan. 2014).“3d 267 (2011); see K.S.A. 21-3208(2).” State v. Kidd, 293 Kan.”
Showing the top 5 of 34. More in the list view →

Show all 50 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

Kansas Statutes Annotated Home  |  Search Kansas  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com