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K.S.A.Chapter 21

K.S.A. § 21-3436 (2026)

Repealed

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1994–2022 99citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 99 opinions since 1994, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(15) (15 cases).

21-3436.

History: L. 1992, ch. 298, § 77; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 249; L. 1994, ch. 341, § 14; L. 2002, ch. 88, § 4; L. 2003, ch. 13, § 1; L. 2005, ch. 59, § 2; L. 2006, ch. 211, § 2; L. 2009, ch. 32, § 24; Repealed, L. 2010, ch. 136, § 307; July 1, 2011.

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 21-3436 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Mitchell, 942 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1997).
cites § 21-3436 18×subsections: (a)(14)cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“” First-degree felony murder means the killing of a human being committed “in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto.” K.”
The case’s holding
A defendant charged with felony murder predicated on the sale of cocaine cannot assert self-defense, because that sale is an inherently dangerous forcible felony precluding the justification.
Later courts cite it for
“self-defense is not available in felony-murder cases” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Walker, 153 P.3d 1257 (Kan. 2007).
cites § 21-3436 6×subsections: (a) 3× (a)(15)cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“Discussing this analysis in light of Kansas’ felony-murder statute, the Schoonover court stated: “The Kansas Legislature authorized multiple punishments by enacting K.S.A. 21-3436. K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-3436 lists those felonies which shall ‘be deemed an inherently dangerous…”
The case’s holding
A confession is voluntary if it is the product of the accused's free and independent will as determined by the totality of the circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused to communicate on request with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused's fluency with the english language.” · 6 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Sophophone, 19 P.3d 70 (Kan. 2001).
cites § 21-3436 8×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“"(b) in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto." Aggravated burglary is one of the inherently dangerous felonies as enumerated by K.”
The case’s holding
A defendant cannot be convicted of felony murder when the death results from the lawful acts of a third party acting in self-defense or law enforcement.
Later courts cite it for
“it is only because the act which resulted in the killing was a lawful one by a third party that a question of law exists as to whether sophophone can be convicted of felony murder.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Beach, 67 P.3d 121 (Kan. 2003).
cites § 21-3436 5×subsections: (a)(14)cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“A defendant is guilty of felony murder if, “in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto,” a human being is killed.”
The case’s holding
Unanimity is not required regarding the alternative means of committing felony murder so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative.
Later courts cite it for
“a person with a large amount of cash intent on engaging in an illegal transaction is a foreseeable target of a violent crime.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Conway, 159 P.3d 917 (Kan. 2007).
cites § 21-3436 8×subsections: (a) 4× (a)(15) 2× (b)cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto.” K.”
The case’s holding
Gang-affiliation evidence is not evidence of crimes or civil wrongs under K.S.A. 60-455, so no limiting instruction on such evidence is required absent a request or objection.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature specifically limited the admissibility of evidence of crimes and civil wrongs in k.s.a. 60-455; no similar legislative statement exists with regard to evidence of gang affiliation.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Smallwood, 955 P.2d 1209 (Kan. 1998).
cites § 21-3436 8×subsections: (a) (a)(7)cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“Case 95-CR-1671 On May 9,1995, based on the same facts, the State filed a second case, 95 CR-167, against Smallwood charging three counts: felony child abuse murder, K.S.A. 21-3436, resulting from alleged child abuse on September 7, 1993 (Count I); child abuse, K.”
The case’s holding
A single assaultive incident of child abuse resulting in death merges with the killing and constitutes only one offense.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature intended that anyone who causes the death of a child while committing the act of abuse of a child to be guilty of the crime of first-degree felony murder.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48 (Kan. 2006).
cites § 21-3436 3×cited by 205 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“zed multiple punishments by enacting K.S.A. 21-3436. K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-3436 lists those felonies which shall “be deemed an inherently dangerous felony whether or not such felony is so distinct from the homicide alleged to be a violation of’ the felony-murder provision and…”
The case’s holding
Courts determine multiplicity by applying a strict same-elements test based on statutory definitions rather than the specific facts proven at trial.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) whether the acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occur at the same location; (3) whether there is a causal relationship between the acts, in particular whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether there is a fresh impulse motivating some of the conduct.” · 24 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Farmer, 175 P.3d 221 (Kan. 2008).
cites § 21-3436 4×subsections: (a)(15) 2× (b)(4) 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“See K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-3436(b)(4), (b)(6). Thus, the argument goes, the State has used the criminal discharge statute in a situation it was not intended to cover.”
The case’s holding
A criminal defendant does not need to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no requirement that a criminal defendant challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the trial court in order to preserve it for appeal.” · 12 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Kunellis, 78 P.3d 776 (Kan. 2003).
cites § 21-3436 3×subsections: (a)(8) (a)(9)cited by 67 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436.” In turn, K.S.A. 21-3436(a)(8) includes felony theft under subsection (a) or (c) of K.”
The case’s holding
A felony murder conviction cannot stand if the underlying theft was completed before the death occurred.
Later courts cite it for
“a conviction for felony murder based upon a death occurring after the 'commission' of the theft, without more, cannot stand.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Parks, 280 P.3d 766 (Kan. 2012).
cites § 21-3436 7×subsections: (a) (a)(4)cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“21-3107(2)(b) and K.S.A. 21-3436 do not support this earlier conclusion.”
Later courts cite it for
“reversal for cumulative error is not required if the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENState v. Griffin, 112 P.3d 862 (Kan. 2005).
cites § 21-3436 4×subsections: (a)(9)cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto.” Burglary is an inherently dangerous felony.”
The case’s holding
All participants in a crime are equally guilty of that crime and any other reasonably foreseeable crime committed in carrying out the intended crime.
Later courts cite it for
“all participants in a crime are equally guilty of that crime and any other reasonably foreseeable crime committed in carrying out the intended crime.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Gleason, 88 P.3d 218 (Kan. 2004).
cites § 21-3436 2×cited by 125 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto.” Burglary, the underlying crime in the instant case, is an inherently dangerous felony under K.”
The case’s holding
An aider and abettor of an inherently dangerous felony is liable for felony murder regardless of physical presence because foreseeability is established as a matter of law.
Later courts cite it for
“accordingly, where the trial court sustains an objection and admonishes the jury to disregard the objectionable testimony, reversal is not required unless the remarks are so prejudicial as to be incurable.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Thompkins, 952 P.2d 1332 (Kan. 1998).
cites § 21-3436 6×subsections: (a)(4) 2×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“Premeditated Murder Instruction Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being committed intentionally and with premeditation or in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments…”
The case’s holding
The principle established in Sullivan remains the governing standard for the legal issue at hand (reaffirming a previous case articulating the principle found in Sullivan).
Later courts cite it for
“means that there was design or intent before the act; that is, that the accused planned, contrived, and schemed” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Ackward, 128 P.3d 382 (Kan. 2006).
cites § 21-3436 2×subsections: (a)(14)cited by 119 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“n Mitchell: “In determining whether sale of cocaine is a forcible felony so as to prohibit the defense of self-defense in a felony-murder charge, consideration of the circumstances of the commission of the crime, in addition to the elements of the crime in the abstract, is…”
The case’s holding
A defendant's statements remain voluntary if police deception and religious references do not overcome the individual's free will under the totality of the circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“cumulative trial errors, when considered collectively, may be so great as to require reversal of the defendant's conviction.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Donaldson, 112 P.3d 99 (Kan. 2005).
cites § 21-3436 4×subsections: (a) 2× (a)(8) 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“Such is not necessary, as K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3436(a) states that "[a]ny of the following felonies shall be deemed an inherently dangerous felony," and the list includes under subsection (8) "felony theft under subsection (a) or (c) of K.”
The case’s holding
Joinder of charges is proper when crimes are connected, such as when a defendant provides evidence of one crime while committing another.
16
GREENState v. Ngan Pham, 136 P.3d 919 (Kan. 2006).
cites § 21-3436 2×subsections: (a)(10)cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“We concluded that through K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-3436, the inherently dangerous felony statute, “the leg *1263 islature stated its intent as to when cumulative punishments can be imposed.”
The case’s holding
A court is not required to give a lesser included offense instruction if the evidence would not permit a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty of that offense.
Later courts cite it for
“the instruction need not have been given if the evidence would not have permitted a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the lesser included offense.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Bridges, 306 P.3d 244 (Kan. 2013).
cites § 21-3436 2×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“21-3404 states in relevant part: “Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being committed: [[Image here]] “(b) in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight from any felony, other than an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436…”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor's personal opinion regarding witness credibility constitutes unsworn testimony that improperly impinges upon the jury's duty to determine truthfulness (State v. Bridges).
Later courts cite it for
“(1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether it was motivated by prosecutorial ill will; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors.” · 4 citing courts
18
YELLOWState v. Scott, 183 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2008).
cites § 21-3436 2×cited by 80 cases
Overruled by State v. Dunn on other grounds: 6 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 21-3436
“See K.S.A. 21-3436 (precluding application of K.”
The case’s holding
Statutory notice of intent to seek the death penalty provides sufficient notice to allow a defendant to respond to aggravating factors (State v. Scott).
Later courts cite it for
“it is improper for a prosecutor to 'vouch' for the credibility of a witness," but "it is not improper for a prosecutor to argue that of two conflicting versions of an event, one version is more likely to be credible based on the evidence.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Sanchez, 144 P.3d 718 (Kan. 2006).
cites § 21-3436 6×subsections: (b)(6) 3× (a)(7)cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“In 1992, the legislature amended the definition of first-degree murder again, defining felony murder as “the tolling of a human being committed in the commission of, attempt to commit or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in section 77 [KS.A. 21-3436] and…”
Later courts cite it for
“even if a conviction on one underlying felony must be reversed, the felony-murder conviction can still be valid when, on a separate verdict form, the jury unanimously finds the defendant guilty of a different, legally sufficient felony that supports the felony-murder conviction.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Mireles, 301 P.3d 677 (Kan. 2013).
cites § 21-3436 3×subsections: (a)(5)cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 21-3436
“21-3401(b) defines felony murder as the killing of a human being committed in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436. Among the inherently dangerous felonies listed in K.”
The case’s holding
A felony-murder instruction is legally and factually appropriate as a lesser included offense of capital murder, and photographs helping prove the crime's elements are relevant and admissible.
Later courts cite it for
“the elements of felony murder do not include a killing that is intentional or done with premeditation.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199420082022

One bar per year. Tallest: 12 cases in 2006. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Kan.88Kan. Ct. App.8Ala. Crim. App.110th Cir.1Ill.1
By subsection
(a)9 cases
State v. Walker, 153 P.3d 1257 (Kan. 2007).“Discussing this analysis in light of Kansas’ felony-murder statute, the Schoonover court stated: “The Kansas Legislature authorized multiple punishments by enacting K.S.A. 21-3436. K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-3436 lists those felonies which shall ‘be deemed an inherently dangerous…”
State v. Conway, 159 P.3d 917 (Kan. 2007).“in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto.” K.”
State v. Donaldson, 112 P.3d 99 (Kan. 2005).“Such is not necessary, as K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3436(a) states that "[a]ny of the following felonies shall be deemed an inherently dangerous felony," and the list includes under subsection (8) "felony theft under subsection (a) or (c) of K.”
Hawley v. Kansas Dep't of Agric., 132 P.3d 870 (Kan. 2006).
State v. Anderson, 197 P.3d 409 (Kan. 2008).
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(a)(1)1 case
State v. Gayden, 910 P.2d 826 (Kan. 1996).
(a)(2)4 cases
State v. Kesselring, 112 P.3d 175 (Kan. 2005).
State v. Rucker, 441 P.3d 1053 (Kan. 2019).
State v. Giang Nguyen, 133 P.3d 1259 (Kan. 2006).
State v. Littlejohn, 316 P.3d 136 (Kan. 2014).
(a)(3)2 cases
State v. Jones, 198 P.3d 756 (Kan. 2008).
State v. Gayden, 910 P.2d 826 (Kan. 1996).
(a)(4)8 cases
State v. Thompkins, 952 P.2d 1332 (Kan. 1998).“Premeditated Murder Instruction Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being committed intentionally and with premeditation or in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments…”
State v. Washington, 268 P.3d 475 (Kan. 2012).
State v. Pink, 20 P.3d 31 (Kan. 2001).
State v. Bryant, 78 P.3d 462 (Kan. 2003).
State v. Parks, 280 P.3d 766 (Kan. 2012).“21-3107(2)(b) and K.S.A. 21-3436 do not support this earlier conclusion.”
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(a)(5)1 case
State v. Mireles, 301 P.3d 677 (Kan. 2013).“21-3401(b) defines felony murder as the killing of a human being committed in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436. Among the inherently dangerous felonies listed in K.”
(a)(7)5 cases
State v. Torres, 121 P.3d 429 (Kan. 2005).
State v. Edgar, 127 P.3d 1016 (Kan. 2006).
State v. Smallwood, 955 P.2d 1209 (Kan. 1998).“Case 95-CR-1671 On May 9,1995, based on the same facts, the State filed a second case, 95 CR-167, against Smallwood charging three counts: felony child abuse murder, K.S.A. 21-3436, resulting from alleged child abuse on September 7, 1993 (Count I); child abuse, K.”
State v. Sanchez, 144 P.3d 718 (Kan. 2006).“In 1992, the legislature amended the definition of first-degree murder again, defining felony murder as “the tolling of a human being committed in the commission of, attempt to commit or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in section 77 [KS.A. 21-3436] and…”
State v. Williams, 947 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1997).
(a)(8)4 cases
State v. Donaldson, 112 P.3d 99 (Kan. 2005).
State v. Kunellis, 78 P.3d 776 (Kan. 2003).“in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436.” In turn, K.S.A. 21-3436(a)(8) includes felony theft under subsection (a) or (c) of K.”
State v. Holt, 917 P.2d 1332 (Kan. 1996).
State v. Rogers, 144 P.3d 625 (Kan. 2006).
(a)(9)2 cases
State v. Kunellis, 78 P.3d 776 (Kan. 2003).
State v. Griffin, 112 P.3d 862 (Kan. 2005).“in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto.” Burglary is an inherently dangerous felony.”
(a)(10)3 cases
State v. Ngan Pham, 136 P.3d 919 (Kan. 2006).“We concluded that through K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-3436, the inherently dangerous felony statute, “the leg *1263 islature stated its intent as to when cumulative punishments can be imposed.”
State v. Makthepharak, 78 P.3d 412 (Kan. 2003).
State v. Smith, 293 P.3d 669 (Kan. 2012).
(a)(14)10 cases
State v. Ackward, 128 P.3d 382 (Kan. 2006).“n Mitchell: “In determining whether sale of cocaine is a forcible felony so as to prohibit the defense of self-defense in a felony-murder charge, consideration of the circumstances of the commission of the crime, in addition to the elements of the crime in the abstract, is…”
State v. Jacques, 14 P.3d 409 (Kan. 2000).
State v. Beach, 67 P.3d 121 (Kan. 2003).“A defendant is guilty of felony murder if, “in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto,” a human being is killed.”
State v. LaMae, 998 P.2d 106 (Kan. 2000).
State v. Jackson, 124 P.3d 460 (Kan. 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(a)(15)15 cases
State v. Farmer, 175 P.3d 221 (Kan. 2008).“See K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-3436(b)(4), (b)(6). Thus, the argument goes, the State has used the criminal discharge statute in a situation it was not intended to cover.”
State v. Conway, 159 P.3d 917 (Kan. 2007).
State v. Walker, 153 P.3d 1257 (Kan. 2007).
State v. Nguyen, 172 P.3d 1165 (Kan. 2007).
State v. Llamas, 311 P.3d 399 (Kan. 2013).
Showing the top 5 of 15. More in the list view →
(b)3 cases
State v. Conway, 159 P.3d 917 (Kan. 2007).
State v. Jones, 896 P.2d 1077 (Kan. 1995).
State v. Ulland, 943 P.2d 947 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
(b)(4)1 case
State v. Farmer, 175 P.3d 221 (Kan. 2008).
(b)(6)2 cases
State v. Sanchez, 144 P.3d 718 (Kan. 2006).
State v. Green, 127 P.3d 241 (Kan. 2006).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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