K.S.A. » Chapter 21
Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 21-4718 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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21-4718.

History: L. 1992, ch. 239, § 18; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 264; L. 1994, ch. 291, § 58; L. 2002, ch. 170, § 2; L. 2010, ch. 135, § 12; Repealed, L. 2011, ch. 30, § 288; July 1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 55 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1994–2026 · leading case: Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). · cites it 4× “1018-1023 (codified at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4718 (2003 Cum. Supp.”
State v. Horn, 238 P.3d 238 (Kan. 2010). · cites it 14× “He argues that the departure sentencing statute, K.S.A. 21-4718, specifically refers to the use of the “trial jury” in the departure proceedings.”
State v. Gideon, 894 P.2d 850 (Kan. 1995). · cites it 9× “The defendant reasons that just as with Rule 32, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4718 must be construed to require the State to give notice of the grounds on which it seeks a departure sentence.”
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). · cites it 2× “See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4718 (b)(2) (2005). [9] See Wool, "Legal Considerations for State Sentencing Systems," at 10 ("there now appear to be five members of the Court who believe Almendarez-Torres [the source of the prior conviction exception] was wrongly decided"); see also,…”
State v. Miller, 926 P.2d 652 (Kan. 1996). · cites it 8× “75-5218 and K.S.A. 21-4718 imply that the sentencing court has continuing jurisdiction between the time sentence is pronounced and the time the order on the departure motion is issued.”
State v. Hayden, 364 P.3d 962 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 10× “at 11 (summarizing that “if a defendant waives a trial jury by pleading guilty to the criminal offense and the district court has accepted the plea and the trial jury waiver, K.S.A. 21-4718[b][4] directs that an upward durational departure sentence proceeding is to be conducted…”
State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2002). · cites it 4× “21-4716 and K.S.A. 21-4718). The dissent cites no state or federal legislative act to support its broad claim that other jurisdictions provide Apprendi protections when probation is presumed but not granted.”
State v. Duncan, 243 P.3d 338 (Kan. 2010). · cites it 6× “He argues the departure sentence is illegal because the trial court did not empanel a jury to determine whether aggravating factors existed to justify the upward departure as required by K.S.A. 21-4718 and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.”
State v. Reed, 352 P.3d 530 (Kan. 2015). · cites it 2× “21-4716[a]; K.S.A. 21-4718[a][4]). “ ‘[Ujnder the mandate of these provisions, the court’s findings at the time of sentencing govern as to the reasons for departure.”
State v. Martinez, 165 P.3d 1050 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 6× “§ 1326 (previously deported), the district court may consider this fact in determining whether he could successfully complete a plan of probation. Notice of Intent to Depart Martinez also claims he was not given notice or an opportunity to respond to the district court's intent…”
State v. Valentine, 921 P.2d 770 (Kan. 1996). · cites it 3× “The defendant cites to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4718, contending that this statute requires that notice be provided to the defendant before any aggravating factor is used to impose a departure sentence.”
State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435 (Kan. 1996). · cites it 2× “” K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4718 requires that notice be provided to the defendant before any aggravating circumstance may be used to impose a departure sentence.”
Show all 55 citing cases →
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(a) — 5 cases
State v. Gideon, 894 P.2d 850 (Kan. 1995). “The defendant reasons that just as with Rule 32, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4718 must be construed to require the State to give notice of the grounds on which it seeks a departure sentence.”
State v. Miller, 926 P.2d 652 (Kan. 1996). “75-5218 and K.S.A. 21-4718 imply that the sentencing court has continuing jurisdiction between the time sentence is pronounced and the time the order on the departure motion is issued.”
State v. Bost, 903 P.2d 160 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Koehn, 966 P.2d 63 (Kan. 1998).
State v. Rodriguez, 933 P.2d 164 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(a)(1) — 1 case
State v. Theurer, 337 P.3d 725 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(a)(2) — 4 cases
State v. Miller, 926 P.2d 652 (Kan. 1996). “75-5218 and K.S.A. 21-4718 imply that the sentencing court has continuing jurisdiction between the time sentence is pronounced and the time the order on the departure motion is issued.”
State v. Dull, 317 P.3d 104 (Kan. 2014).
State v. Koehn, 966 P.2d 63 (Kan. 1998).
State v. Cluck, 228 P.3d 1074 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(a)(3) — 3 cases
State v. Martinez, 165 P.3d 1050 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). “§ 1326 (previously deported), the district court may consider this fact in determining whether he could successfully complete a plan of probation. Notice of Intent to Depart Martinez also claims he was not given notice or an opportunity to respond to the district court's intent…”
State v. Huerta, 247 P.3d 1043 (Kan. 2011).
State v. Jolly, 249 P.3d 421 (Kan. 2011).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(a)(4) — 5 cases
State v. Reed, 352 P.3d 530 (Kan. 2015). “21-4716[a]; K.S.A. 21-4718[a][4]). “ ‘[Ujnder the mandate of these provisions, the court’s findings at the time of sentencing govern as to the reasons for departure.”
State v. Blackmon, 176 P.3d 160 (Kan. 2008).
State v. Hines, 294 P.3d 270 (Kan. 2013).
State v. Jackson, 298 P.3d 344 (Kan. 2013).
State v. Horn, 196 P.3d 379 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(a)(l) — 8 cases
State v. Miller, 926 P.2d 652 (Kan. 1996). “75-5218 and K.S.A. 21-4718 imply that the sentencing court has continuing jurisdiction between the time sentence is pronounced and the time the order on the departure motion is issued.”
State v. Gideon, 894 P.2d 850 (Kan. 1995). “The defendant reasons that just as with Rule 32, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4718 must be construed to require the State to give notice of the grounds on which it seeks a departure sentence.”
State v. Hines, 294 P.3d 270 (Kan. 2013).
State v. Bost, 903 P.2d 160 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Heath, 901 P.2d 29 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(b) — 12 cases
State v. Gideon, 894 P.2d 850 (Kan. 1995). “The defendant reasons that just as with Rule 32, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4718 must be construed to require the State to give notice of the grounds on which it seeks a departure sentence.”
State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2002). “21-4716 and K.S.A. 21-4718). The dissent cites no state or federal legislative act to support its broad claim that other jurisdictions provide Apprendi protections when probation is presumed but not granted.”
State v. Horn, 238 P.3d 238 (Kan. 2010). “He argues that the departure sentencing statute, K.S.A. 21-4718, specifically refers to the use of the “trial jury” in the departure proceedings.”
State v. Ippert, 995 P.2d 858 (Kan. 2000).
State v. Trimble, 894 P.2d 920 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(b)(2) — 1 case
State v. Horn, 196 P.3d 379 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(b)(4) — 6 cases
State v. Horn, 238 P.3d 238 (Kan. 2010). “He argues that the departure sentencing statute, K.S.A. 21-4718, specifically refers to the use of the “trial jury” in the departure proceedings.”
State v. Hayden, 364 P.3d 962 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015). “at 11 (summarizing that “if a defendant waives a trial jury by pleading guilty to the criminal offense and the district court has accepted the plea and the trial jury waiver, K.S.A. 21-4718[b][4] directs that an upward durational departure sentence proceeding is to be conducted…”
State v. Duncan, 243 P.3d 338 (Kan. 2010). “He argues the departure sentence is illegal because the trial court did not empanel a jury to determine whether aggravating factors existed to justify the upward departure as required by K.S.A. 21-4718 and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.”
State v. Bennett., 347 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015).
State v. Horn, 196 P.3d 379 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(b)(5) — 1 case
State v. Horn, 196 P.3d 379 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(b)(6) — 1 case
State v. Horn, 196 P.3d 379 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(b)(7) — 1 case
State v. Horn, 196 P.3d 379 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(b)(l) — 1 case
State v. Horn, 238 P.3d 238 (Kan. 2010). “He argues that the departure sentencing statute, K.S.A. 21-4718, specifically refers to the use of the “trial jury” in the departure proceedings.”
— K.S.A. § 21-4718(c) — 4 cases
State v. Miller, 926 P.2d 652 (Kan. 1996). “75-5218 and K.S.A. 21-4718 imply that the sentencing court has continuing jurisdiction between the time sentence is pronounced and the time the order on the departure motion is issued.”
State v. Koehn, 966 P.2d 63 (Kan. 1998).
State v. Mares, 893 P.2d 296 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
Soto v. State, 927 P.2d 954 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
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