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K.S.A.Chapter 21

K.S.A. § 21-5415 (2026)

Criminal threat; aggravated criminal threat

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) ACTIVE · 72 IN 5Y cited 2016–2026 93citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 93 opinions since 2016, 72 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(1) (77 cases).

21-5415. Criminal threat; aggravated criminal threat. (a) A criminal threat is any threat to:

(1) Commit violence communicated with intent to place another in fear, or to cause the evacuation, lock down or disruption in regular, ongoing activities of any building, place of assembly or facility of transportation, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such fear or evacuation, lock down or disruption in regular, ongoing activities;

(2) adulterate or contaminate any food, raw agricultural commodity, beverage, drug, animal feed, plant or public water supply; or

(3) expose any animal in this state to any contagious or infectious disease.

(b) Aggravated criminal threat is the commission of a criminal threat, as defined in subsection (a), when a public, commercial or industrial building, place of assembly or facility of transportation is evacuated, locked down or disrupted as to regular, ongoing activities as a result of the threat.

(c) (1) A criminal threat is a severity level 9, person felony.

(2) Aggravated criminal threat is a severity level 5, person felony.

(d) As used in this section, "threat" includes any statement that one has committed any action described by subsection (a).

History: L. 2010, ch. 136, § 50; July 1, 2011.

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 21-5415 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805 (Kan. 2019).
cites § 21-5415 13×subsections: (a)(1) 12× (a)cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“ANALYSIS The three issues before this court all relate to Kansas' criminal threat statute, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415(a). There, the Legislature defined "criminal threat" to include a threat to "(1) [c]ommit violence communicated with intent to place another in fear .”
The case’s holding
A criminal threat statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it allows for conviction based on reckless disregard for causing fear rather than a specific intent to cause fear.
Later courts cite it for
“the portion of k.s.a. 2018 supp. 21-5415(a)(1) allowing for a conviction if a threat of violence is made in reckless disregard for causing fear causes the statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad because it can apply to statements made without the intent to cause fear of violence.” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENState v. White, 384 P.3d 13 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 21-5415 22×subsections: (a)(1) 17× (b)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“010; (3) K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) K.”
3
GREENState v. Hirsh, 446 P.3d 472 (Kan. 2019).
cites § 21-5415 4×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 87 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415 (identical wording; "[a] criminal threat is any threat").”
The case’s holding
Delayed disclosure of exculpatory information constitutes a due process violation only if the defendant establishes prejudice resulting from an inability to use the material effectively at trial.
Later courts cite it for
“delayed rather than absent disclosure of exculpatory information may or may not qualify as a brady violation, depending on whether the defendant can establish prejudice due to his or her inability to use the brady material effectively at trial.” · 6 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Johnson, 450 P.3d 790 (Kan. 2019).
cites § 21-5415 5×subsections: (a)(1) 5×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“The provision in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1), allowing for a conviction if a threat of violence is made in reckless disregard for causing fear, is unconstitutionally overbroad because it punishes conduct that is constitutionally protected under some circumstances.”
The case’s holding
A constitutional error is harmless only if the state demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict.
Later courts cite it for
“a constitutional error is harmless if the state can demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Lindemuth, 470 P.3d 1279 (Kan. 2020).
cites § 21-5415 6×subsections: (a)(1) 6×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“The provision in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1), allowing for a conviction if a threat of violence is made in reckless disregard for causing fear, is unconstitutionally overbroad because it punishes conduct that is constitutionally protected under some circumstances.”
Later courts cite it for
“lindemuth simply spoke in the heat of argument and the result of unthinking rage-more reckless, impulsive bluster than an intentional threat.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Louis, 476 P.3d 837 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 21-5415 5×subsections: (a)(1) 5×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“1956 (2020), the portion of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1) proscribing criminal threat if a threat of violence is made in reckless disregard for causing fear is unconstitutionally overbroad because it can apply to statements made without the intent to cause fear of violence.”
7
GREENState v. Stevenson, 478 P.3d 781 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 21-5415 5×subsections: (a)(1) 5×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“While the Boettger court held the 2018 version of reckless criminal threat unconstitutional, the 2015 version of reckless criminal threat is the same in relevant part and is also unconstitutional.”
Later courts cite it for
“a 'threat' is made when the statement reveals intent to inflict physical or other harm on another's person or property.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENKansas v. Boettger, 140 S. Ct. 1956 (2020).
cites § 21-5415 1×cited by 38 casesrelating-to
Where it cites § 21-5415
“" Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5415 (a)(1) (2018). Respondent Timothy Boettger was convicted for telling the son of a police detective that he " 'was going to end up finding [his] dad in a ditch.”
The case’s holding
The First Amendment bars a state from criminalizing threats made in reckless disregard of causing fear, so a reckless criminal-threat statute is unconstitutional.
9
GREENState v. Reynolds, 552 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2024).
cites § 21-5415 1×subsections: (a)(1)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“21- 5412(b)(a) (aggravated assault is a severity level seven, person felony); K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1) (criminal threat is a severity level nine, person felony).”
The case’s holding
A reviewing court must apply standard instructional error analysis and harmless error review rather than automatic reversal when a jury instruction contains an alternative means error.
Later courts cite it for
“if a defendant claims a jury instruction contained an alternative means error, the reviewing court must consider whether the instruction was both legally and factually appropriate.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Rankin, 489 P.3d 471 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 21-5415 1×subsections: (a)(1)cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“In October 2019, while Rankins' direct appeal was pending, the Kansas Supreme Court held "the portion of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1) allowing for a conviction if a threat of violence is made in reckless disregard for causing fear causes the statute to be unconstitutionally…”
Later courts cite it for
“a criminal defendant can challenge his or her criminal history for the first time on appeal because the misclassification of a prior conviction results in an illegal sentence that can be corrected at any time.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENState v. McFarland, 485 P.3d 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 21-5415 9×subsections: (a)(1) 9×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1) explicitly states a criminal threat is a threat to commit violence.”
Later courts cite it for
“intentional criminal threat is a threat to commit violence communicated with intent to place another in fear.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENState v. Phipps, 539 P.3d 227 (Kan. Ct. App. 2023).
cites § 21-5415 6×subsections: (a)(1) 6×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1). After Phipps’ criminal threat conviction, the Kansas Supreme Court held in Boettger that the "reckless disregard" portion of the criminal threat statute was unconstitutionally overbroad.”
Later courts cite it for
“applies to any pending criminal case in kansas in which the defendant's sentence is not final.” · 1 citing court
13
NO FLAGState v. Self, 581 P.3d 368 (Kan. Ct. App. 2025).
cites § 21-5415 11×subsections: (a)(1) 8× (a) 2×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 21-5415
“at 822, held that the portion of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415 26 criminalizing reckless criminal threat is unconstitutional.”
14
NO FLAGState v. Travelbee, 591 P.3d 146 (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
cites § 21-5415 11×subsections: (b) 5× (a)(1) 3× (a) 2×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 21-5415
“" Travelbee points out that K.S.A. 21-5415 does not define "lock down" and no Kansas appellate court has interpreted that term in the context of aggravated criminal threat.”
15
NO FLAGState v. Oliver, 502 P.3d 1078 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).
cites § 21-5415 8×subsections: (a)(1) 5×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 21-5415
“In that case our Supreme Court held that the portion of our criminal threat statute, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415, which criminalized the making of a threat of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing fear, is "unconstitutionally overbroad because it punishes conduct…”
16
NO FLAGState v. Oliver, 502 P.3d 1078 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).
cites § 21-5415 8×subsections: (a)(1) 5×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 21-5415
“In that case our Supreme Court held that the portion of our criminal threat statute, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415, which criminalized the making of a threat of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing fear, is "unconstitutionally overbroad because it punishes conduct…”
17
NO FLAGState v. Allen, 583 P.3d 493 (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
cites § 21-5415 7×subsections: (a)(1) 7×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 21-5415
“He argues that the offense of criminal threat under K.S.A. 21-5415(a)(1) is an indivisible offense, so the intentional version of the offense cannot be used for criminal history scoring purposes because the reckless version of the offense was declared unconstitutional in State v.”
18
NO FLAGState v. Cardillo, 483 P.3d 466 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 21-5415 6×subsections: (a)(1) 6×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 21-5415
“1956 (2020), the Kansas Supreme Court held the "reckless disregard" portion of the criminal threat statute found in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1) to be unconstitutionally overbroad because it encompassed more than true threats and thus potentially punished constitutionally…”
19
NO FLAGState v. Vicknair, 582 P.3d 585 (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
cites § 21-5415 6×subsections: (a)(1) 4× (a)cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 21-5415
“The Smith court noted that Boettger rendered unconstitutional the portions of both K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415 and K.S.A. 2003 Supp.”
20
GREENState v. Hirsh, 405 P.3d 41 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 21-5415 2×subsections: (a)(1) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 21-5415
“The statutory definition of the crime determines the allowable unit of prosecution, and there can only be one conviction per allowable unit of prosecution.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
201620212026

One bar per year. Tallest: 23 cases in 2022. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Kan. Ct. App.80Kan.6D. Kan.4N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1Pa.1SCOTUS1
By subsection
(a)9 cases
State v. Hirsh, 446 P.3d 472 (Kan. 2019).“K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415 (identical wording; "[a] criminal threat is any threat").”
State v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805 (Kan. 2019).“ANALYSIS The three issues before this court all relate to Kansas' criminal threat statute, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415(a). There, the Legislature defined "criminal threat" to include a threat to "(1) [c]ommit violence communicated with intent to place another in fear .”
State v. Jackson, 497 P.3d 214 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Self, 581 P.3d 368 (Kan. Ct. App. 2025).“at 822, held that the portion of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415 26 criminalizing reckless criminal threat is unconstitutional.”
State v. Travelbee, 591 P.3d 146 (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).“" Travelbee points out that K.S.A. 21-5415 does not define "lock down" and no Kansas appellate court has interpreted that term in the context of aggravated criminal threat.”
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(a)(1)77 cases
State v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805 (Kan. 2019).
State v. White, 384 P.3d 13 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).“010; (3) K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) K.”
State v. Johnson, 450 P.3d 790 (Kan. 2019).“The provision in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1), allowing for a conviction if a threat of violence is made in reckless disregard for causing fear, is unconstitutionally overbroad because it punishes conduct that is constitutionally protected under some circumstances.”
State v. Lindemuth, 470 P.3d 1279 (Kan. 2020).“The provision in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1), allowing for a conviction if a threat of violence is made in reckless disregard for causing fear, is unconstitutionally overbroad because it punishes conduct that is constitutionally protected under some circumstances.”
State v. Louis, 476 P.3d 837 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).“1956 (2020), the portion of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5415(a)(1) proscribing criminal threat if a threat of violence is made in reckless disregard for causing fear is unconstitutionally overbroad because it can apply to statements made without the intent to cause fear of violence.”
Showing the top 5 of 77. More in the list view →
(a)(1)(c)(1)1 case
State v. Howell, 515 P.3d 755 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).
(b)2 cases
State v. White, 384 P.3d 13 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).
State v. Travelbee, 591 P.3d 146 (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
(c)(1)1 case
State v. Judkins, 467 P.3d 543 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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