K.S.A. » Chapter 22

K.S.A. § 22-3402

Discharge of persons not brought promptly to trial; discharge deadlines; delays, requests and charging of time; suspension of deadlines until March 1, 2024; guidelines for prioritizing trials; office of judicial administration report to legislature; retroactive application of certain amendments

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22-3402. Discharge of persons not brought promptly to trial; discharge deadlines; delays, requests and charging of time; suspension of deadlines until March 1, 2024; guidelines for prioritizing trials; office of judicial administration report to legislature; retroactive application of certain amendments. (a) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within 150 days after such person's arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (e).

(b) If any person charged with a crime and held to answer on an appearance bond shall not be brought to trial within 180 days after arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant, or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (e).

(c) If any trial scheduled within the time limitation prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) is delayed by the application of or at the request of the defendant, the trial shall be rescheduled within 90 days of the original trial deadline.

(d) After any trial date has been set within the time limitation prescribed by subsection (a), (b) or (c), if the defendant fails to appear for the trial or any pretrial hearing, and a bench warrant is ordered, the trial shall be rescheduled within 90 days after the defendant has appeared in court after apprehension or surrender on such warrant. However, if the defendant was subject to the 180-day deadline prescribed by subsection (b) and more than 90 days of the original time limitation remain, then the original time limitation remains in effect.

(e) For those situations not otherwise covered by subsection (a), (b) or (c), the time for trial may be extended for any of the following reasons:

(1) The defendant is incompetent to stand trial. If the defendant is subsequently found to be competent to stand trial, the trial shall be scheduled as soon as practicable and in any event within 90 days of such finding;

(2) a proceeding to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial is pending. If the defendant is subsequently found to be competent to stand trial, the trial shall be scheduled as soon as practicable and in any event within 90 days of such finding. However, if the defendant was subject to the 180-day deadline prescribed by subsection (b) and more than 90 days of the original time limitation remain, then the original time limitation remains in effect. The time that a decision is pending on competency shall never be counted against the state;

(3) there is material evidence that is unavailable, reasonable efforts have been made to procure such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence can be obtained and trial commenced within the next succeeding 90 days. Not more than one continuance may be granted to the state on this ground, unless for good cause shown, where the original continuance was for less than 90 days, and the trial is commenced within 120 days from the original trial date; or

(4) because of other cases pending for trial, the court does not have sufficient time to commence the trial of the case within the time fixed for trial by this section. Not more than one continuance of not more than 30 days may be ordered upon this ground.

(f) In the event a mistrial is declared, a motion for new trial is granted or a conviction is reversed on appeal to the supreme court or court of appeals, the time limitations provided for in this section shall commence to run from the date the mistrial is declared, the date a new trial is ordered or the date the mandate of the supreme court or court of appeals is filed in the district court.

(g) If a defendant, or defendant's attorney in consultation with the defendant, requests a delay and such delay is granted, the delay shall be charged to the defendant regardless of the reasons for making the request, unless there is prosecutorial misconduct related to such delay. If a delay is initially attributed to the defendant, but is subsequently charged to the state for any reason, such delay shall not be considered against the state under subsection (a), (b) or (c) and shall not be used as a ground for dismissing a case or for reversing a conviction unless not considering such delay would result in a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial or there is prosecutorial misconduct related to such delay.

(h) When a scheduled trial is scheduled within the period allowed by subsection (a), (b) or (c) and is delayed because a party has made or filed a motion, or because the court raises a concern on its own, the time elapsing from the date of the making or filing of the motion, or the court's raising a concern, until the matter is resolved by court order shall not be considered when determining if a violation under subsection (a), (b) or (c) has occurred. If the resolution of such motion or concern by court order occurs at a time when less than 30 days remains under the provisions of subsection (a), (b) or (c), the time in which the defendant shall be brought to trial is extended 30 days from the date of the court order.

(i) If the state requests and is granted a delay for any reason provided in this section, the time elapsing because of the order granting the delay shall not be subsequently counted against the state if an appellate court later determines that the district court erred by granting the state's request unless not considering such delay would result in a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial or there is prosecutorial misconduct related to such delay.

(j) The provisions of this section shall be suspended until March 1, 2024, in all criminal cases.

(k) When prioritizing cases for trial, trial courts shall consider relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the:

(1) Trial court's calendar;

(2) relative prejudice to the defendant;

(3) defendant's assertion of the right to speedy trial;

(4) calendar of trial counsel;

(5) availability of witnesses; and

(6) relative safety of the proceedings to participants as a result of the response to the COVID-19 public health emergency in the judicial district.

(l) The office of judicial administration shall prepare and submit a report to the senate standing committee on judiciary and the house of representatives standing committee on judiciary on or before January 17, 2022, and January 16, 2023, containing the following information disaggregated by judicial district:

(1) The number of pending criminal cases on January 1, 2022, and January 1, 2023, respectively;

(2) the number of criminal cases resolved during fiscal years 2021 and 2022, respectively, and the method of disposition in each case;

(3) the number of jury trials conducted in criminal cases during fiscal years 2021 and 2022, respectively; and

(4) the number of new criminal cases filed in fiscal years 2021 and 2022, respectively.

(m) No time between March 19, 2020, and March 1, 2024, shall be assessed against the state for any reason. Any person arraigned before March 1, 2024, shall be deemed to have been arraigned on March 1, 2024, for the application of the time limitations provided in subsection (a), (b) or (c).

(n) The amendments made to this section by section 1 of chapter 12 of the 2021 Session Laws of Kansas are procedural in nature and shall be construed and applied retroactively.

History: L. 1970, ch. 129, § 22-3402; L. 1976, ch. 163, § 18; L. 2004, ch. 47, § 1; L. 2012, ch. 157, § 4; L. 2014, ch. 139, § 5; L. 2020, ch. 4, § 2; L. 2021, ch. 12, § 1; L. 2023, ch. 15, § 1; April 20.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 243 cases (47 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC (2016) kan · cites it 43× “On appeal, the majority relied on Bollacker and concluded that statutory speedy trial under K.S.A. 22-3402 applied and the district court had correctly dismissed the case.”
State v. Brownlee (2015) kan · cites it 40× “3d 354 (2011) ("A defendant who is not being held 'solely by reason' of the pending charges is not entitled to the protections of the 90-day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial under K.S.A. 22-3402."). The State concedes that this argument was not raised before the…”
State v. Dupree (2016) kan · cites it 17× “Here, Dupree only presents a statutory challenge under K.S.A. 22-3402 and because he did not allege a constitutional speedy trial violation, he has abandoned the constitutional argument.”
State v. Edwards (2010) kan · cites it 24× “K.S.A. 22-3402 provides, in relevant part: “(1) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within 90 days after such person’s arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further…”
State v. Brown (2007) kan · cites it 38× “*626 On November 13, 2003, Brown filed a motion for discharge pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402 alleging that the statutory 90-day period expired on November 9, 2003.”
State v. McQuillen (1984) kan · cites it 34× “K.S.A. 22-3402. The information *162 charged McQuillen with rape (K.”
State v. Queen (2021) kan · cites it 21× “Under the facts here, where a district court judge mistakenly set a trial beyond the speedy trial time set in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402, the judge did not cite the need to do so because of a crowded docket, and no party requested nor did the court order a continuance, the…”
State v. Dobbs (2013) kan · cites it 17× “The court granted the continuance, stating: “[T]he State has presented a case that appears to match the requirements of the K.S.A. 22-3402 Subsection 5(c). This is material evidence which is unavailable.”
State v. Mathenia (1997) kan · cites it 23× “He does not assert in his brief on appeal that his statutory right under K.S.A. 22-3402 was violated, but relies on his constitutional right to a speedy trial.”
State v. Arrocha (2002) kanctapp · cites it 22× “; The State appeals the district court’s dismissal of charges against John Arrocha because he was not brought to trial within 90 days of arraignment as required by K.S.A. 22-3402(1). We must decide whether Arrocha was being held in custody solely because of the charges in this…”
State v. Vaughn (2009) kan · cites it 11× “K.S.A. 22-3402 and the Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial A total of 269 days passed between the date of the defendant’s arraignment on August 15,2006, and the hearing before the district court on May 11, 2007.”
State v. Grimes (1981) kan · cites it 22× “Grimes, due to the State's failure to comply with the Kansas speedy trial statute, K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 22-3402. A chronological *144 statement of the facts is necessary to an understanding of the issues.”
Show all 243 citing cases →
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(1) — 62 cases
State v. Brown (2007) kan “*626 On November 13, 2003, Brown filed a motion for discharge pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402 alleging that the statutory 90-day period expired on November 9, 2003.”
State v. Edwards (2010) kan “K.S.A. 22-3402 provides, in relevant part: “(1) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within 90 days after such person’s arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further…”
State v. Arrocha (2002) kanctapp “; The State appeals the district court’s dismissal of charges against John Arrocha because he was not brought to trial within 90 days of arraignment as required by K.S.A. 22-3402(1). We must decide whether Arrocha was being held in custody solely because of the charges in this…”
State v. Hines (2000) kan
State v. Mann (2002) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(2) — 56 cases
State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC (2016) kan “On appeal, the majority relied on Bollacker and concluded that statutory speedy trial under K.S.A. 22-3402 applied and the district court had correctly dismissed the case.”
State v. Vaughn (2009) kan “K.S.A. 22-3402 and the Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial A total of 269 days passed between the date of the defendant’s arraignment on August 15,2006, and the hearing before the district court on May 11, 2007.”
State v. Mathenia (1997) kan “He does not assert in his brief on appeal that his statutory right under K.S.A. 22-3402 was violated, but relies on his constitutional right to a speedy trial.”
State v. McQuillen (1984) kan “K.S.A. 22-3402. The information *162 charged McQuillen with rape (K.”
State v. Jamison (1991) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(3) — 25 cases
State v. Edwards (2010) kan “K.S.A. 22-3402 provides, in relevant part: “(1) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within 90 days after such person’s arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further…”
State v. Davis (2004) kan
State v. Ransom (1983) kan
State v. Pennington (2010) kanctapp
Smith v. Deppish (1991) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(3)(c) — 28 cases
State v. White (2003) kan
State v. Brown (2007) kan “*626 On November 13, 2003, Brown filed a motion for discharge pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402 alleging that the statutory 90-day period expired on November 9, 2003.”
Smith v. Deppish (1991) kan
State v. Hines (2000) kan
State v. Mays (2004) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(3)(d) — 15 cases
State v. Jackson (2005) kan
State v. Arrocha (2002) kanctapp “; The State appeals the district court’s dismissal of charges against John Arrocha because he was not brought to trial within 90 days of arraignment as required by K.S.A. 22-3402(1). We must decide whether Arrocha was being held in custody solely because of the charges in this…”
State v. Dean (2009) kanctapp
State v. Rodriguez-Garcia (1999) kanctapp
State v. Hines (2000) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(4) — 11 cases
State v. Breedlove (2012) kan
State v. Sievers (2014) kan
State v. Mays (2004) kan
State v. Hanks (1985) kan
State v. White (2003) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(5) — 7 cases
State v. Dobbs (2013) kan “The court granted the continuance, stating: “[T]he State has presented a case that appears to match the requirements of the K.S.A. 22-3402 Subsection 5(c). This is material evidence which is unavailable.”
State v. Edwards (2010) kan “K.S.A. 22-3402 provides, in relevant part: “(1) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within 90 days after such person’s arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further…”
State v. Dean (2009) kanctapp
State v. Montes-Mata (2009) kanctapp
Bloom v. State (2020) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(5)(b) — 1 case
State v. Edwards (2010) kan “K.S.A. 22-3402 provides, in relevant part: “(1) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within 90 days after such person’s arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further…”
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(5)(c) — 8 cases
State v. Dobbs (2013) kan “The court granted the continuance, stating: “[T]he State has presented a case that appears to match the requirements of the K.S.A. 22-3402 Subsection 5(c). This is material evidence which is unavailable.”
State v. Brown (2007) kan “*626 On November 13, 2003, Brown filed a motion for discharge pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402 alleging that the statutory 90-day period expired on November 9, 2003.”
State v. Garcia (2006) kan
State v. BLAUROCK (2009) kanctapp
State v. Pennington (2010) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(5)(d) — 3 cases
State v. Edwards (2010) kan “K.S.A. 22-3402 provides, in relevant part: “(1) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within 90 days after such person’s arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further…”
State v. Dean (2009) kanctapp
State v. Elnicki (2010) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(6) — 2 cases
– State v. Williams – (2020) kan
State v. Elnicki (2010) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(a) — 26 cases
State v. Queen (2021) kan “Under the facts here, where a district court judge mistakenly set a trial beyond the speedy trial time set in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402, the judge did not cite the need to do so because of a crowded docket, and no party requested nor did the court order a continuance, the…”
State v. Brownlee (2015) kan “3d 354 (2011) ("A defendant who is not being held 'solely by reason' of the pending charges is not entitled to the protections of the 90-day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial under K.S.A. 22-3402."). The State concedes that this argument was not raised before the…”
State v. Shockley (2021) kan
State v. Trass (2024) kan
State v. Sinnard (2024) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(b) — 16 cases
State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC (2016) kan “On appeal, the majority relied on Bollacker and concluded that statutory speedy trial under K.S.A. 22-3402 applied and the district court had correctly dismissed the case.”
State v. Allen (2021) kan
State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC (2015) kanctapp
State v. Sinnard (2024) kan
State v. Razzaq (2019) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(c) — 3 cases
State v. Queen (2021) kan “Under the facts here, where a district court judge mistakenly set a trial beyond the speedy trial time set in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402, the judge did not cite the need to do so because of a crowded docket, and no party requested nor did the court order a continuance, the…”
State v. Bierman (1991) kan
State v. Queen (2021) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(d) — 5 cases
State v. Stevenson (2020) kanctapp
State v. Brownlee (2015) kan “3d 354 (2011) ("A defendant who is not being held 'solely by reason' of the pending charges is not entitled to the protections of the 90-day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial under K.S.A. 22-3402."). The State concedes that this argument was not raised before the…”
State v. Lomon (2022) kanctapp
State v. Queen (2020) kanctapp
State v. Queen (2020) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(e) — 4 cases
State v. Brownlee (2015) kan “3d 354 (2011) ("A defendant who is not being held 'solely by reason' of the pending charges is not entitled to the protections of the 90-day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial under K.S.A. 22-3402."). The State concedes that this argument was not raised before the…”
State v. Sinnard (2024) kan
State v. Queen (2020) kanctapp
State v. Queen (2020) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(e)(1) — 1 case
State v. Allen (2020) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(e)(3) — 3 cases
State v. Wright (2018) kan
State v. Shockley (2021) kan
State v. Allen (2020) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(e)(4) — 9 cases
State v. Sinnard (2024) kan
State v. Queen (2021) kan “Under the facts here, where a district court judge mistakenly set a trial beyond the speedy trial time set in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402, the judge did not cite the need to do so because of a crowded docket, and no party requested nor did the court order a continuance, the…”
State v. Shockley (2021) kan
State v. Wright (2018) kan
State v. Foster (2021) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(f) — 2 cases
State v. Hunter (2021) kanctapp
State v. Grayson (2022) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(g) — 21 cases
State v. Brownlee (2015) kan “3d 354 (2011) ("A defendant who is not being held 'solely by reason' of the pending charges is not entitled to the protections of the 90-day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial under K.S.A. 22-3402."). The State concedes that this argument was not raised before the…”
State v. Dupree (2016) kan “Here, Dupree only presents a statutory challenge under K.S.A. 22-3402 and because he did not allege a constitutional speedy trial violation, he has abandoned the constitutional argument.”
State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC (2016) kan “On appeal, the majority relied on Bollacker and concluded that statutory speedy trial under K.S.A. 22-3402 applied and the district court had correctly dismissed the case.”
State v. James (2019) kan
State v. Owens (2019) kan
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(h) — 2 cases
State v. Brownlee (2015) kan “3d 354 (2011) ("A defendant who is not being held 'solely by reason' of the pending charges is not entitled to the protections of the 90-day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial under K.S.A. 22-3402."). The State concedes that this argument was not raised before the…”
State v. Taylor (2021) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(i) — 2 cases
State v. Brownlee (2015) kan “3d 354 (2011) ("A defendant who is not being held 'solely by reason' of the pending charges is not entitled to the protections of the 90-day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial under K.S.A. 22-3402."). The State concedes that this argument was not raised before the…”
State v. Allen (2020) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(j) — 2 cases
State v. Bird (2022) kanctapp
State v. Mitchell (2025) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(m) — 4 cases
State v. Contreras-Avila (2024) kanctapp
Jones v. Douglas County Board of Commissioners (2025) ksd
State v. Dunklin (2024) kanctapp
State v. Mitchell (2025) kanctapp
— K.S.A. § 22-3402(n) — 1 case
State v. Mitchell (2025) kanctapp
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